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Achieving a working relationship: An historical study of news media-military relations to identify and evaluate factors affecting the conflict between national security requirements versus the news media's right to know

Avery, Joseph P., Ph.D.

The Union Institute, 1994

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PROJECT DEMONSTRATING EXCELLENCE

***ACHIEVING A WORKING RELATIONSHIP: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF
NEWS MEDIA-MILITARY RELATIONS TO IDENTIFY AND EVALUATE
FACTORS AFFECTING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS VERSUS THE NEWS MEDIA'S RIGHT TO KNOW***

PART I

A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of
the Graduate School of The Union Institute
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in
Political Science & Public Policy

by

**JOSEPH P. AVERY
JANUARY 1994**

Abstract

Achieving a working relationship: An historical study of news media-military relations to identify and evaluate factors affecting the conflict between national security requirements versus the news media's right to know. Avery, Joseph P., Ph.D. *The Union Institute*, 1994. 600 pp. Advising Professor: Edward L. Wingard

This research project is an historical, legal, and scholarly review of news media-national security (military) relations during wartime or time of crises to identify factors explaining, alleviating, or aggravating the relationship between national security requirements versus the news media's right to know. Adopting Gadi Wolfsfeld's Transactional Model of Media Interaction, this study seeks to discover whether or not an optimal working relationship between the news media and military is possible.

The objectives of this study were to (1) conduct a literature review of relevant studies addressing the relationship between the news media and national security institutions, (2) review crucial case law influencing the news media-military relationship, (3) conduct an historical examination of wartime news media-military relations, (4) identify factors affecting this relationship, and (5) present recommendations regarding the establishment of an optimal working relationship between the news media and military.

Data were collected through a literature review of works relevant to the study of the relationship between the American news media and our government's national security institutions, particularly the military during wartime. Data were also collected through an historical review of primary and secondary sources.

Twenty-five "critical factors" were identified that affect the relationship between the news media and national security establishment. The factors emanated from the review of scholarly studies, judicial precedent, and historical relationships. The broad conclusion reached is that, historically, no common or standard relationship has been found between the news media and the military and that such relationship constantly changes according to the individual circumstances of the conflict and current sociopolitical environments. Consequently, the ability to establish an "optimal working relationship" permitting both parties to meet the majority of their institutional objectives and responsibilities, without significant sacrifice, is only possible through efforts toward mutual understanding, consensus and compromise, the development of trust and responsibility, and their willingness to do so.

Dedication

This document is dedicated first to my wife, Virginia Avery, for her enduring patience, and to my son, William Avery, for paying the price for many fatherless days. Second, I wish to credit my parents for their moral and financial support in helping me complete this program. I also owe a large debt of gratitude to the United States Air Force for its encouragement and financial aid required to complete this program, and to the U.S. Air Force Academy Department of Political Science for providing the time to complete this study.

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CHAPTER 1.

OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

"Power in America today is control of the means of communication"

- Theodore H. White

As twilight consumes the most violent century in the history of mankind, its finality is distinguished by astonishing advances in communications technology which are swiftly propelling the world's societies into the Twenty-First Century. Such advances are not only redefining the concepts of time and space, but also relationships between governments and their people and the ability of modern states to pursue violence as a method of settling disputes. War was once the sole province of the warriors, individuals trained to destroy and accept destruction, psychologically inoculated to some degree against war's devastation. However, now public support has become an increasingly important requirement for sustained conflict.

Ironically, advances in weapons and communications technology have distanced the warriors from the personal gore of war as one may destroy an enemy without sight or personal contact, while simultaneously permitting the civilian public to bear personal witness to the death and destruction of conflict within their very homes thousands of miles from the battlefield. The problem arising under such

circumstances is that civilians have not been psychologically inoculated against witnessing the personal carnage of war--carnage piped to the public through the conduit of the news media. Furthermore, such advanced communications conduits may leak critical information adversely affecting operational security and endanger the lives of friendly forces. Consequently, such naked visions of war, caused by fallacious public opinion, may threaten the ability of a state to defend its vital national interests, particularly if truth and understanding are procedurally distorted by the news media. Finally, it is becoming more difficult for our government to control these diffused and amorphous communications technologies. For these reasons it is critical that we examine the relationship between the news media and national security forces and attempt to define an optimal working relationship and understanding beneficial to achieving both military and news media requirements. Power in America today is determined, in large part, by those who control the means of communications (White, 1972).

The purpose of this study is to examine the nature of the conflict between the requirements of our national security system for security and success in military operations and the First Amendment rights of the news media to collect and report news to the public. Using an historical review as a methodological conduit for information collection and analysis, this researcher seeks to identify those factors that influence this relationship and which may hold clues to either resolving or alleviating the conflict between the news media and national security organizations to permit both to attain their respective goals and objectives.

Chapter I will discuss the historical perspective of this study, the statement of the problem, limitations and assumptions of the study, specific definitions, and a statement of the purpose of this study and its practical and academic importance. Chapter II will include a review of related literature required to understand the problem and extract critical factors important to defining the relationship between the news media and military. Chapter III will provide a discussion of the research methodology used within this study. Chapter IV contains legal research of the judicial history of news media-military relations. Chapter V will embody the historical review of the relationship between the two divergent institutions to search for additional critical factors that may lead to a better understanding of the problem and possibility of an improved working relationship. Chapter VI will delineate the research findings extracted from the literature, judicial, and historical reviews, and Chapter VII will summarize the research findings and close with a conclusion and recommendations.

The two principal questions demanding resolution within this study are as follows: (1) What factors define the working relationship between the news media and national security institutions, particularly the military, during wartime, and (2) What should be the optimal working relationship during wartime between the news media and national security organizations in our democratic republic which would permit both to achieve their primary institutional goals and objectives? For the news media, the primary goal is to freely collect and disseminate such news via print or electronic media to the public. To accomplish this primary goal, the media must keep the public informed, educated and vigilant against government abuses of power. For national security institutions, the goal is to prevent free access to vital national security information that would endanger military operational security and success, troop

safety, or adversely affect politico-military considerations important during wartime. The difference between the two defines the heart of a dichotomous relationship steeped in an intrinsic constitutional conflict.

This apparently dichotomous relationship presents the researcher with an enigma that seemingly defies resolution. However, it is of central importance to understand the nature of this relationship and the many factors or variables influencing the association. It would be difficult to improve such a working relationship without this information. What are the determinants of this relationship, and how can they be manipulated or changed to reach an optimal solution? The solution would be represented by establishing an optimal working relationship based upon a positive sum game philosophy whereas both can achieve their primary goals.

The fundamental relationship between the American news media and national security apparatus commences with the ratification of our national Constitution and, more specifically, with the First Amendment of the Constitution which states in part that "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press..."(Pritchett, 1971: 132). On the other hand, according to our *National Military Strategy*, the fundamental objective of our armed forces is "to deter aggression and, should deterrence fail, to defend the nation's vital interests against any potential foe" (Powell, 1992: 6).

Furthermore, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution requires that "The Congress shall have Power to...provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States...to raise and support Armies...and to make all Laws which shall be

necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers....Regarding the Executive branch, Article II of the Constitution states that "the President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States....He shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States." Matthews succinctly summarizes the essence of the problem.

The copresence of these two eminently sensible provisions in our Constitution has not, however, led to their harmonious coexistence....War attracts two varieties of men--the soldier who prosecutes it and the newsman who reports it. The soldier finds that operational security is an absolute condition for the successful prosecution of war; the newsman finds that operational security interferes with what he regards as his absolute right to report that war. And so the argument was born, an argument that continues to the present day and...that is inherent in any form of liberal democratic governance. (Matthews, 1991: pix)

How a nation can simultaneously achieve both dichotomous goals in an effective manner without trampling on the critical responsibilities of either party is a central problem which requires analytical scrutiny. It is the purpose of this project to examine how this often antagonistic relationship may be improved in a mutually beneficial fashion. To accomplish this research goal, this work must seek to identify the critical factors which affect and elucidate this relationship, and which may offer clues to reconciling this antagonistic relationship.

It has often been stated that the relationship between the news media and defense establishment has changed dramatically (for the worse) since the Vietnam War (Serfaty, 1991: 241-242). This reportedly altered relationship has continued to the present and affected news reporting and military operations in Vietnam, Granada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf Conflict of 1990-1991. Furthermore, there is presently no body of evidence available to conclude that this relationship will change significantly in the near future. If this is so, will the news media-military relationship become increasingly better or worse? The response to this question may potentially affect national security policy making, implementation, and outcomes.

Many journalists have concluded that during World War II, news media-national security relations were acceptable if not far superior to what exists today (Cronkite, 1991; Cronkite, Senate Hearing, 1991; Schanberg, Senate Hearing, 1991). The various reasons for this conclusion will be discussed later, but for the purpose of this study the assumption will be viewed as valid. News media-national security relations were similarly perceived as relatively good during the Vietnam War (Apple Jr., *NYT*, 4 Feb 1991; Mills, *Washington Post*, 26 Jan 91). If the aforementioned statements are true, then what factors lead to the deterioration in news media-defense relations between 1974 and 1993?

The nature of the news media-defense relationship changed dramatically during the Vietnam War, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s. This study has concluded that it is the dimension or nature of this change which is of critical importance. Furthermore, there appears to be no universal standard for news media-national

security relations. According to Neal H. Koslowe, defense attorney for the U.S. Department of Defense in The Nation Magazine et al v. U.S. Department of Defense:

I can say this, your Honor, the experience that we have had in the conflicts since World War II has been that the rules and procedures have changed with each conflict depending on conditions, geographical location and other factors. In World War II there was censorship. In Korea there was censorship. In Vietnam there were just ground rules and escorts. In Grenada there was a news blackout. In Panama there was the deployment of the national media pool. In Operation Desert Shield there was the deployment of the national media pool. In Operation Desert Storm there was the CENTCOM pool operation. I don't know what would happen in a future conflict, should there be one.... (Koslowe, 1991:7)

The change appears to be more psychological, ideological, and technological in nature rather than structural (e.g., news media organization, routines, rules, goals, numbers, etc.). The government was concerned with the accuracy of information emanating from the combat zone and disseminated to the public on a daily basis through a new medium--television. For the first time in history, from one's living room the average citizen can descend upon the battlefield thousands of miles away and actually view, in living color, the death, destruction and chaos of war. War, which previously appeared to have only a military dimension, has obtained a powerful political impact on both domestic politics, national security policy, and foreign affairs.

The American politician discovered the inherent political nature and fallout of war (McFarlane, 1991).

One of the earliest and most prominent discussions on the subject of planning and conducting war which directly affects our modern national security concerns is *The Art of War* by Chinese general Sun Tzu, written between 400-320 B.C. Central to Tzu's theory of war was his focus on the political aspects of war. As stated by Tzu:

War is a matter of vital importance to the State of which a decision directly affects that State's survival or ruin....When he [the enemy] is united, divide him. Drive a wedge between a sovereign and his ministers; on other occasions separate his allies from him. Make them mutually suspicious so they drift apart. Then you can plot against them....All warfare is based on deception....To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy [politically] without fighting is the acme of skill. What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy, next to disrupt his alliances, and the next best is to attack his army. (Griffith, 1971: 63-78)

National unity was considered by Sun Tzu to be an essential requirement of victorious war (Griffith, 1991). Both national security and news media organizations must realize the intrinsic content of politics in war. As stated by both Stephen

Budiansky of *U.S. News and World Report* and Harvard Professor Joseph Nye, just prior to operation Desert Storm:

Stephen Budansky:

But there is another factor at work: The new generation of generals, for the most part, is well aware of the political dimension of their military planning and is taking politics into account at every turn. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Dugan was fired last week after he publicly outlined a plan for massive bombing including an effort to eliminate Hussein and his inner circle.... (Budiansky et al, 1990:29-30)

Joseph Nye:

The scale [of the Gulf operation] is enormously different from Panama, Libya, or Grenada, which were short and sharp. There wasn't time for differences over civilian and military control to arise. (1990:29)

In his renowned treatise *On War* (1832), Carl von Clausewitz also fully understood the highly political nature and context of war, and how significant the political element of war was to a state's probability of victory. As stated by Clausewitz:

War is a mere continuation of policy by other means. We see, therefore, that War is not merely a political act, but also a real

political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means... (Clausewitz, 1968: 119)

The greater and the more powerful the motives of a War, the more it affects the whole existence of a people. The more violent the excitement which precedes the War, by so much the nearer will the War approach to its abstract form, so much the more will it be directed to the destruction of the enemy, so much the nearer will the military and political ends coincide.... (119-120)

We see therefore, in the first place, that under all circumstances war is to be regarded not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument; and it is only by taking this point of view that we can avoid finding ourselves in opposition to all military history. Secondly, this view shows us how Wars must differ in character according to the nature of the motives and circumstances from which they proceed. (121)

The war in Vietnam was the first American conflict in which the political aspects of war overpowered the purely military element. This became painfully obvious to an unprepared military when, for the first time in history, three major forces collided: (1) the force and tradition of military institutions collided with the (2) growing force of technological advances in mass communication and the (3) reshaping of domestic

American politics characterized by vicious attacks on most major governmental and social institutions.

As written by Robert Stone in the acclaimed series The Vietnam Experience:

General Westmoreland was not a sophisticated man, and he appears not to have realized how gravely the cards were stacked against him. His approach reflected a military philosophy, unique to the United States, which held that war was somehow a nonpolitical event. This philosophy had its roots in a salutary tradition excluding the armed forces from political involvement. The results of this tradition did not always serve the national interest. In World War II, to Churchill's consternation and Stalin's bemusement, American troops made no attempt to reach Berlin before the Russians....Eisenhower, acting on General Marshall's orders, declared that political considerations would not be allowed to influence military operations. Such a statement was utterly nonsensical to the war leaders of Europe, but most American soldiers accepted its soundness. (Fischer & Stone, 1986: 62)

That the leading soldiers of a country born in insurrection should subscribe to such a doctrine is ironic, but Westmoreland, like his predecessors, did so. In the case of Vietnam, he could not have been more mistaken....Westmoreland served an

administration whose war aims were so bound to political restrictions, foreign and domestic, that they could never be clarified beyond a generalized desire for good news.... (62)

Consequently, war embodies an intrinsic politico-military component which considers those political and diplomatic factors affecting the successful outcome of foreign policy and national security objectives, military operations, or diplomatic efforts related to war or crisis. For example, if domestic public support is required to achieve national security goals and objectives, then the attainment and maintenance of public support becomes a politico-military matter directly related to the successful outcome of the military operation and national security policy objectives.

One can argue that there is no easier way to divide a nation than to create controversy, antagonism, and unfavorable perceptions of events. Since Vietnam and the development of new communications technology, the American news media has excelled, at one time or another, in all three aspects (Graber, 1989). Advances in mass-media communications technology has permitted the news media apparatus to become more autonomous regarding information gathering, dissemination or transmission, a stark difference from news reporting prior to Vietnam where the daily battlefield footage for the first time brought the horrors of war to the general public. The news media-defense relationship changed dramatically (Braestrup, 1985).

Operation "Urgent Fury" (Granada intervention) was the first test regarding our national security establishment's reaction to the post-Vietnam news media environment. Military planners had to decide how to manage the news media and thus

define the news media-defense relationship in the post Vietnam world (Halloran, 1987; Pontuso, 1990; Sidle Report, 1984). Will the news media be entirely excluded from the combat zone? Will they be permitted full access to the area of conflict and arrive with the troops, or will a "pool" of media representatives be organized and transported at the designated time to the combat zone by military transports, and news representatives escorted throughout the combat area? As mentioned previously, this may depend upon circumstances of the conflict (Senate Hearing, 1991).

As a result of operation Urgent Fury, President Reagan established the Sidle Panel in 1984 in an attempt to reach a compromise and provide news media access to combat operations. The conclusions of the Sidle Panel report are addressed in detail later in this study, but the general essence of the report concluded that the news media should have access to military operations, and that "a basic tenet governing media access to military operations should be voluntary compliance by the news media with security guidelines or ground rules...issued by the military" (see Sidle Panel Report, Appendix E, Atch. 1:5). However, this study will demonstrate that there is considerable historical evidence and legal precedent supporting military authority to enforce non-voluntary security guidelines as the national security situation requires.

Operation "Just Cause" (December 20, 1989) in Panama was another first regarding news media-national security relations in a combat environment. It provided the first test of the "press pool" concept recommended by the Sidle Panel (Sidle Panel, 1984). The combination of a national security concern for operational secrecy and government understanding of the need for the press to report newsworthy events led to the establishment of the *Department of Defense National Media Pool*. The

central objective to be achieved by establishing the press pool was to restrict news media knowledge and access to military combat operations during the early and most critical phase of the conflict which requires the most secrecy to protect the lives of participants. However, it was also established to provide some media access to early events for delayed reporting. Structurally, the press pool is composed of a limited number of selected representatives (the numbers vary) from the major electronic and print news media. These individuals receive special training and are prepared to receive quick Pentagon notification of deployment with American combat troops overseas. News media pool members are to keep their deployment secret, even from their fellow reporters until the deployment is over and military operations have begun (see Appendix G, Atch 3).

After an initial setback, several practice rapid deployments of the press pool system in 1987 proved successful, but when operation Just Cause commenced at 0100 hours on December 20, 1989, the press pool was nowhere to be seen. Unfortunately, the press pool of about 14 journalist missed the initial landing and a "main body" of other journalist did not land in Panama until December 22, 1989, two days after the commencement of combat operations. According to David R. Gergen, former Editor of *U.S. News & World Report*, and special assistant to former President Reagan for communications, the press pool "flopped horribly":

When the U.S. Marines and Rangers stormed Panama in December 1989, not a single journalist went with them to cover the action. The Pentagon did organize a fourteen-member pool but it arrived on the scene four hours after the fighting started,

and it was unable to file any dispatches for another six hours.
(Gergen, 1991: 59)

Overall, in its first real combat test, the press pool concept apparently failed. After investigating the matter, charges of Department of Defense mismanagement and incompetence were flying from the news media organizations and counter charges regarding breach of security emanated from the military. According to Gergen:

Frustration grew among reporters as the fighting dragged on longer than expected and General Noriega at first eluded his captors. The invasion had begun at 1 A.M. on Wednesday, December 20. Seeking to accommodate the press, the Pentagon began letting in trickles of new reporters on Thursday and allowed a chartered jumbo jet, carrying 200 journalists, to land early Friday morning. But armed U.S. security guards prevented reporters from leaving U.S. military installations on their own until Saturday. (Gergen, 1991: 59)

U.S. government briefings often seemed indifferent to journalists' interests and escorted tours conducted by the military usually carried reporters to the scenes of yesterday's actions or traced the droppings of Noriega's bizarre lifestyle.
(59)

The military also piled up a list of complaints in Panama. Their sharpest was that when the press pool was activated in Washington, one of its members violated a cardinal rule: not to tell other reporters, especially from rival publications. According to *Newsweek*, a magazine reporter from *Time* told a newspaper correspondent who called his editors hours before the invasion started. As it turned out, U.S. preparations were so large that they tipped off the Panamanians anyway, so that no harm was done by the press, but the apparent leak confirmed the worst fears of the Pentagon. (59-60)

The last major combat operation to test the press pool concept and news media-national security relations was the Persian Gulf Conflict of 1990-1991. Although the conflict was an overwhelming allied military success, neither news media organizations nor members of Congress were exhilarated over the quantity and quality of the news coverage (See Appendix F, Atch 1: Boxer, Cosponsor H. Res. 37, 1991; Edwards, 1991, Vento, 1991; Klug, 1991, and Langer, 1990).

In addition to the numerous disapproving letters from news media organizations and irate members of Congress regarding inadequate press access and excessive restrictive rules and guidelines, a number of lawsuits were filed against the Department of Defense for limiting access to military facilities, operational areas, and newsworthy information. The two most prominent of these legal challenges, to be discussed in detail later, are The Nation Magazine v. U.S. Department of Defense (1991) and J.B. Pictures, Inc., v. U.S. Department of Defense (1993). The first case was dismissed,

and the second case was won by the Department of Defense as recently as April 1993. However, there appears to be a general consensus that there was far better overall news coverage during the Persian Gulf conflict than that obtained from either the Granada or Panama interventions.

CHAPTER 2.

REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE

I. INTRODUCTION

During the course of research and analysis required for this study, no definitive treatise concerning the relationship between the news media and national security institutions was discovered. This is opposite to the significant quantities of data and writings regarding the impact of news media operations and interactions on political agenda setting, public policy-making, political election campaigns, and related issues. More specifically, there was a very limited number of works addressing the relationship between the military and news media organizations and representatives during wartime, and few attempted to establish an optimal working relationship between military and news media institutions during times of conflict and crisis (Halloran, 1991).

The aforementioned situation made the research more difficult, yet permitted the ability to forge new territory based upon historical findings and present actions. If anything was accomplished during the course of this examination, it was the ability to differentiate myth from fact regarding the historical relationship between the military and the news media, and use such information to establish a workable foundation for future news media-military relations that would enable the mutual achievement of divergent institutional goals and objectives. Nevertheless, such institutional objectives

are often highly dichotomous and can only be reconciled by some level of mutual agreement, trust, compromise, and consensus. Otherwise, the public, the news industry, and the nation itself will continue to be served in an inadequate manner.

Prior to the Vietnam War, the nature of the relationship between the two great national institutions, the national security establishment and the American news media, has been basically non-combative and lacked little scholarly assessment regarding news media-military relationships or impacts. Significant intellectual focus on the news media as a unit of study has been a relatively recent phenomenon limited largely to the post World War II era. Only newsroom functions, routines, or the impact of the news on politics received early examination (White, 1950; Breed, 1955; Converse, 1962; Tuchman, 1973).

Since Vietnam, however, nearly every aspect of the relationship between national defense and/or foreign policy and mass media has been examined to varying degrees of detail and fruitfulness (Gitlin, 1980; Lichter, 1982; Mowlana, 1984; Pontuso, 1990, Burt, 1991; Brody, 1991). It can only be assumed that at least one reason for such close and sudden examination was the inherent *political component* which lies at the heart of news media-military and foreign relations (Zaller, 1991; Iyengar & Simon, 1993).

The focus of this research project is to perform a literature, judicial, and historical review, using Wolfsfeld's Transactional Model of Media Interaction, as a framework of analysis for news media-national security relations to identify those factors which may alleviate the ongoing conflict between our nation's national security

requirements during wartime and the news media's right to know and disseminate information. Accordingly, this study must accomplish at least four basic objectives to fulfill its responsibilities to its readers. First, it must review the salient literature and explain the Transactional Model of Media Interaction and describe why it is best suited as a framework of analysis for examining the news media-military relationship within the specified parameters. In other words, why does it best explain the national security-news media relationship.

Second, after reviewing news media-military relations in an historical and legal context, we will seek to identify the critical factors affecting the relationship, either positive or negative, between the national security organizations and news media during times of war or crisis.

Third, we must then isolate and examine those factors or concepts which may contribute to either alleviating or resolving the conflict between our national security requirements and news media objectives during wartime.

Fourth, from the examined factors and concepts, the author must seek to offer recommendations outlining a working relationship which may reduce to a minimum the conflict between our national security and news media organizations during wartime to enable the achievement of their various goals and objectives in an optimal manner.

The various components of this study will be completed in the following order. *First*, the importance and explanation of the concept of "framing" will be discussed in

order to clarify and understand one of the most central issues affecting the relationship between the news media and national security institutions, and to also better understand the review of the literature. *Second*, a survey of relevant scholarly writings will be reviewed which discusses various models or conceptualizations of media interaction. *Third*, Wolfsfeld's Transactional Model of Media Interaction and the results of Wolfsfeld's study will be reviewed in detail and offered as the best explanation of the news media-national security relationship. *Fourth*, a review of general factors affecting news content, quantity and quality will be examined as part of the literature review. *Fifth*, relevant judicial decisions affecting the issue of news media-national security relations will be considered. *Sixth*, an historical analysis of news media-military relations will be performed as the heart of this study. Lastly, the review will conclude with an identification and analysis of critical factors which help explain, define, or affect the relationship between the news media and the military, and also provide a summary of the research findings and recommendations.

Following the foundational literature, legal and historical reviews, this study will focus on the nature of the research results or findings and conclude with a research summary which delineates the research conclusions and recommendations.

Framing the Issue

To understand the nature of news media-military relations, one must first understand the interpretive concept of "framing." Framing is basically the light or import a news story is told to the public. It is exceedingly important because of the belief by many (Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Iyengar, 1991; Gamson, 1989; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Goffman, 1974) that the frame in which a news story is cast is often more important than the facts of the story itself. As stated by Gamson:

I begin with an assumption about the informational content of the news. Facts have no intrinsic meaning. They take on their meaning by being embedded in a frame or story line that organizes them and gives them coherence, selecting certain ones to emphasize while ignoring others. Think of news as telling stories about the world rather than as presenting 'information,' even though the stories, of course, include factual elements.
(Gamson, 1989: 157)

The above explanation is important because, as Gamson has concluded, it is possible to tell many different stories from the same facts (1989). The content of a news story is understood by the way in which the story is framed. Consequently, when applied to the topic of news media-defense relations, the facts of any story related to national security or military operations can be emphasized and/or interpreted to either support the government's point of view or oppose government action. As elucidated by Gamson:

To identify frames, the informational content of news reports is less important than the interpretive commentary that surrounds it. Television news is replete with metaphors, catch phrases, and other symbolic devices that provide a shorthand way of suggesting the underlying story line. These devices provide the rhetorical bridge by which discrete bits of information are given a context and relationship to each other. (Gamson, 1991:158)

We should recognize that there are multiple 'senders' in most news reports. The reporter or anchor person suggests a story line in the lead and closing; the interviews used during the broadcast....All conscientious effort to frame events in a way that the sponsor considers most meaningful. In other cases, the particular frame may favor the interests of a particular organization whom the sources represent, helping it to further its programs or neutralize its opponents. (158)

II. MODELS OF MEDIA INTERACTION

Historically, the sophisticated examination of news media-national security or foreign policy relationships has been a relatively recent phenomena, although writings have occurred regarding press-military relations during the American Revolutionary War (Wiggins, 1964), Spanish American War (Gottschalk, 1983; Knightley, 1975), and the American Civil War (Ewing, 1987; Gottschalk, 1983; Knightley, 1975). An extensive group of serious writings focuses upon the agenda setting powers of the American news media (Kosicki, 1993; McCombs, 1993, 1991; Rodgers et al, 1993; Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Shaw & Martin, 1992; Weaver et al, 1981; Benton & Frazier, 1976), the affects of the press on politics and election campaigns (Graber, 1990, 1989; Shaw & McCombs 1991; Ansolabehere, et al, 1991; Westlye, 1991; Blumler & Gurevitch, 1982; Clark & Evans, 1983), and with minor exceptions (Lasswell, 1927; Almond, 1950; Rosenau, 1961; Cohen, 1963), only in the past thirty-five years has a considerable body of writings focused on the impact of mass media on foreign policy (Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Zaller, 1991; Serfaty, 1991; Bosso, 1989; Cutler, 1987; Mowlana, 1984; Cohen, 1963, 1967; 1970, 1983) and national security (Matthews, 1991; Serfaty, 1991; Pontuso, 1990).

The following authors have also offered theoretical constructs of government-media interaction developed to explain the relationship, often strained, between the government and national security organization and the nation's news media, particularly during wartime operations. Although a number of these writings refer to the impact of the news media on foreign policy, war or the threat of war may

also be considered a foreign policy option. Thus they are equally appropriate and relevant in their assessments.

O'HEFFERNAN: "MUTUALLY EXPLOITIVE ASSOCIATION"

Maintaining our focus on wartime news media-national security relationships, O'Heffernan examined the complex reality of the Persian Gulf War of 1991, and summarized what policy-makers thought the Gulf War taught us about the dynamics of mass media and foreign or national security policy (O'Heffernan, 1992). According to O'Heffernan, lost in the debate over the role of the media was the "role of the media in the making and implementation of a U.S. foreign policy which leads not only to the decision to use force against Saddam, but which for decades had incrementally created the conditions for the war..."(3). As elucidated by O'Heffernan:

The Gulf War has made obvious the fact that both foreign policy and journalism are now the products of vast world-girdling enterprises that must and do work hand in hand in a thousand different ways, but for vastly different reasons. Molotch's and Lester's classic characterization of power almost 20 years ago (1975) is far more true in today's media-saturated policy environment: 'One dimension of power can be construed as the ability to have one's account become the perceived reality of others.' Both the mass media and foreign policy institutions strive to produce accounts of reality that are accepted and acted

upon by others, but with far different motivations. And clearly, both use the other to construct and project their own account. (O'Heffernan, 1992: 3)

The power of such "framing" by the media can directly affect national security policy by either framing the discussions regarding such policy or influencing events after the policy has been implemented. A fundamental question addressed by O'Heffernan is this: "Where does the mass media fit into government calculations of interests, strategies and tactics of war and diplomacy, and what kind of a model of foreign policy encompasses the global media, especially the medias' interaction with the government during the Gulf War?" (4)

In contrast to Allison (1971) or Grossman & Kumar (1979) discussed on the following pages, O'Heffernan prefers to use an "ecosystemological" model to describe the government-news media relationship which is based, not on a symbiotic one implying a "cooperative mutual benefit," but as a "*co-evolved interdependent mutually exploitive one.*" This exploitation can be understood to mean an unjust or improper use of another person or organization for one's own profit or advantage, or one benefiting at the expense of another. Consequently, this model views the relationship as one where both the news media and foreign policy and defense institutions have "grown together" in a dynamic and mutually exploitive associative process. This ecosystem is viewed as competitive, aggressive, and manipulative which may or may not be mutually beneficial (O'Heffernan, 1992: 12).

One of the weaknesses of O'Heffernan's conception of the news media-military relationship is that it relies on a relationship of mutual exploitation which may not be mutually beneficial, while in reality, there is significant evidence that both the news media and military benefit from their relationship: the military needs the power of the media to frame it's view of the war to gain public support while the media needs access to war news that frequently only the government can provide.

ALLISION: "A BARGAINING AGENT WITHIN THE POLICY PROCESS"

One foreign policy process model offered for consideration is the Bureaucratic or Hierarchic model. It assumes that the policy process consists of an interactive network of "bureaucratic routines of policy institutions" in a process of continual bargaining among coalitions of policy makers (Allision, 1971). In Allision's model, the foreign policy process is composed of actors working in hierarchic organizations "whose interests and alliances, strategies and tactics shift with the issue at hand and the play of forces both within and without the government (O'Heffernan,1992: 4)." O'Heffernan also refers to Allision's model because it suggests that the news media is also a bargaining agent within the policy process, simultaneously serving as an **actor** involved in the policy debate and also as an **instrument of the government** and of other actors resulting in an "inside-outside" role for the media. As such, the national security organization must deal directly with this policy actor, and this normally means some degree of accommodation, understanding, and compromise.

As Allison proposed, it is true that the news media is an actor in the policy process as well as an instrument of the government regarding support for government policies, although the degree to which the news media is an active bargaining agent is open to significant debate. Regardless, the weakness of Allison's model is that it fails to account for important multidimensional factors which affect the news media-military relationship during wartime, particularly such factors as political ideology, the social and political context of the relationship, the level of interaction between the news media and military, the internal news process, or the structural dimension of the relationship which considers the power and dependency between the two institutions.

GROSSMAN AND KUMAR: "COOPERATIVE SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP"

In a more direct relationship between the government and news media, Grossman and Kumar (1979) view the association as one of a cooperative symbiotic relationship or "subtly composite unity" in which both *the news media and the government rely on one another to meet their objectives*. For example, the government or national security establishment uses the news media to gain support for its various programs, budgets, or policies, and the news media uses and needs the government to obtain access to information, newsworthy stories, and increase its ratings. *During this cooperative symbiotic relationship, how stories are "framed" are of particular importance to the government.*

Grossman and Kumar view the news media-military relationship more accurately than O'Heffernan or Allison by describing it as a cooperative symbiotic relationship in

which both parties must rely on one another to meet their respective organizational goals. This view reflects an element of common sense in that the government controls access to significant amounts of information that the news media requires, yet the government wishes positive news media coverage to support its foreign and military policies. However, this model fails to explain the often hostile and antagonistic relationship between the news media and military, particularly during wartime.

ROSENAU: "AN ACTOR AND SOURCE OF FOREIGN POLICY"

Rosenau (1980, 1966) provided a framework to explain the foreign policy process and account for the various sources of American foreign policy. Under this model, the news media would qualify as a critical "societal source" of American foreign policy. This process is used today to analyze the policy process (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1991). As a source of foreign policy influence, the news media becomes an actor in the foreign policy process. It accomplishes this by reporting the status of present national security policy (Cohen, 1983, 1967) or attempting to set such policy by adopting an agenda setting role (Bosso, 1989). However, this model does not take into account the various attributes of the news media-military relationship mentioned in the previous models. Rosenau is simply viewing the media as one influence on the creation of American foreign and national security policy.

**KRAMER: "PROCESS CHANGE: DEMOCRATIZATION AND INFORMATION
REVOLUTION"**

An issue of central importance which drives the relationship between the news media and national security establishment is the ability of the news media to set agendas (Brosius & Kepplinger, 1992; Shaw & Martin, 1992; McCombs & Shaw, 1972), affect public opinion (Page et al, 1990; Leff et al, 1986; Gamson & Modigliani, 1986; Kraus & Davis, 1976) and political decision making and public support (Protest & McCombs, 1991). Helmut Kramer, University of Vienna, in a paper focusing on the role of public opinion in foreign policy rejects the "Mood Theory" proposed by Almond and Rosenau and the realists school of thought (1992). Mood theory views public opinion as a phenomena which is erratic, moody, impulsive, unpredictable, and "governed by caprice rather than judgment" (Kramer, 1991: 6). However, Nincic (1988) and Russett (1990) performed a study of American foreign policy in the 1980s which contradicted this "mood model." As stated by Kramer:

The increase in the interest in and participation of the Western public in foreign policy [national security policy] and international affairs has to be seen both as a result and an active element of the long range process of democratization in the second half of this century (Elias 1990, 36f)...and of specific changes in the realm of foreign policy itself due to the rapid process of internationalization and the information revolution. With the distinction between national and international affairs more...blurred, foreign policy is used by political leaders

increasingly as a field of political prestige and image-making.

(Kramer, 1991: 11)

It is the dual influence of the *information revolution* and the phenomenon of *greater public involvement* in the domestic and foreign policy making arenas (democratization and information revolutions) that increase the power of the news media regarding both the foreign and national security policy-making process. The synergistic effects of these forces adds to the news media's ability to influence events, even if it sets the agenda for military action or American intervention or withdrawal (e.g., Somalia). Kramer's belief that the relationship between the news media and government is affected by both the information revolution and trends toward greater democratization or greater public involvement in the domestic and foreign policy making arenas cannot be denied. Although this is important, as discussed earlier, there are other central factors or dimensions affecting the relationship between the news media and military which are not addressed in Kramer's model.

**KING AND WELLS: "HEGEMONIC REALITY: MEDIA SUPPORTIVE OF GOVERNMENT
FOREIGN POLICY FRAME"**

King and Wells (1992) propose a view of the government-media relationship based upon growing evidence that, at least over the long run, *the news media has a tendency to support official government policy initiatives and adopt the government "frame" of view.* As proposed by King and Wells:

A growing body of empirical research documents the American media's tendency to support official governmental foreign policy initiatives and to accept the foreign "frame" articulated by the president (Entman, 1989, 1990, 1991; Hallin, 1984, 1986, 1987; Rachlin, 1988; Berry, 1990; Nacos, 1990.). This characteristic of the media is found not only in the pre-Vietnam period (Berry, 1990; Nacos, 1990; Cohen, 1963), but during that conflict as well (Berry, 1990; Hallin, 1984, 1986; Entman and Paletz, 1982). While the press has tended to be more skeptical of official policy pronouncements and actions since 1975, media coverage of post-Vietnam U.S. foreign policy still leans toward general acceptance of the foreign policy establishment's world view--a situation that Hallin (1987) and Rachlin (1988) characterize as the imposition of a "hegemonic reality" on the presentation of foreign policy news." (1)

In their content analysis of American newsmagazine coverage of the Gulf War, King & Wells sought to test two hypotheses:

- (1) That newsmagazines will be more likely to present the Bush administration's historical frame of the Gulf conflict as analogous to the Second World War's "just and moral action against Hitler" than the opposing frame of the conflict as "a morally ambiguous Vietnam-type quagmire."

(2) There will be more adherence to Bush's frame during the military engagement of Desert Storm (the "rally-round-the-flag" effect) than during the military build-up of Desert Shield (4).

In the King and Wells study all stories relating to the Persian Gulf conflict in *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *U.S. News & World Report* from August 13, 1990, to March 4, 1991 (the last issues published before the cessation of hostilities) were analyzed with the unit of analysis the paragraph. News articles, commentaries and editorials were also included (see Appendix A, Attachment 1, Tables 1, 2, 3, and 5).

King & Wells concluded that the Bush administration's frame of the crisis as analogous to World War II and Hitler received more support than did the frame that the Gulf Conflict was analogous to a Vietnam Quagmire, *although newsmagazine support for specific elements of the official administration frame was far from overwhelming* (1992: 16). According to King and Wells:

During both the military build-up phase of Desert Shield and the military engagement of Desert Storm, the magazines drew more parallels with Vietnam than with the second world war....In other words, during Desert Storm magazines were more likely than in the earlier phase to note that Vietnam analogies were inappropriate to the current conflict. (17)

Rejection of the administration's claim about the role of the media in Vietnam notwithstanding, the newsmagazines certainly

did not present an oppositional voice to the Bush frame of the Gulf Conflict. They tended to concur with the positive historical parallels of World War II and to reject the parallels to Vietnam. A similar phenomenon occurred with U.S. public opinion, as most American's--including the media--came to accept the 'dealing-with-aggressors' argument (Mueller, 1992:11) and the analogy to the second world war...(Schuman and Rieger, 1992: 325). (18)

The above study divided the Gulf War conflict into separate phases of which media, public, and congressional support for the policy may differ depending upon the phase. The nature of the conflict is not viewed as unidimensional, but as both linear (based upon a sequential development) and multidimensional. This study views the phases of conflict as follows:

Conflict Phases:

Phase I: Buildup, planning, and policy decision-making activities.

Emphasis on **obtaining:**

- Public support
- Media Support
- Congressional Support

Phase II: War and the achievement of military and political objectives.

Emphasis on **maintaining**:

- Public support
- Media Support
- Congressional Support

Phase III: Aftermath.

Emphasis on **explaining & reformulating**:

- Public support
- Media Support
- Congressional Support

Consequently, one can observe how the relationship between the news media and national security establishment alters according to the phase of the conflict and the corresponding emphasis by the administration on obtaining, maintaining, and explaining and reformulating news media support, public support, and congressional support.

The significance of the King and Wells study is that it presents evidence that, under normal circumstances, the media default position appears to be that the news media is normally supportive of government foreign and military policy unless such policies are highly controversial. Furthermore, the model indicates that support for such policies may depend upon the phase of the conflict or how long the war remains in any one phase. Although the King and Wells study contributes significantly to the understanding of the news media-military relationship, it still fails to integrate the

many different factors affecting the complex relationship between the news media and military. On the other hand, Dr. Gadi Wolfsfeld appears to form a model of news media-military relations which better integrates and explains the various factors which directly influence the relationship between the news media and military during wartime.

**WOLFSFELD: "TRANSACTIONAL MODEL OF MEDIA INTERACTION:
MULTIDIMENSIONAL, INTERACTIVE, AND ANTAGONISTIC"**

Gadi Wolfsfeld presents a model of news media-government relations which can be described as *multidimensional, interactive, and antagonistic* (1992). He describes the news media-government relationship as a transactional two-way flow of communication and influence (Wolfsfeld, 1991). In other words, it concerns not only the impact or the affect of the media on our national security organizations, Congress, and the public, but also the influence of the government apparatus on news media institutions and operations. Furthermore, this transactional influence is characteristically multidimensional.

Wolfsfeld believes the role of mass media in political conflicts is best understood by studying the interaction between antagonists and the media (1992: 1). By antagonism, we mean the opposition of a conflicting force, tendency, and principle, or some actively expressed opposition or hostility (Merriam-Webster, 1985). Therefore, an antagonist is one who is an adversary or opponent of another and

expresses some hostility, opposition, and holds conflicting views, beliefs and principles.

The nature or characteristics of Wolfsfeld's Transactional Model include the following propositions:

- (1) There is some level of interaction (communication and influence) between two or more antagonists and the news media.
- (2) There is a Structural Dimension which considers the power of each side and the dependency between antagonists and news media (Power and Dependency).
- (3) There is an Ideological Dimension which is composed of the various beliefs, assumptions, norms, and attitudes of both the news media and the antagonists (e.g., military).
- (4) There is both a Social and Political Context which bounds and strongly influences the nature of such transactions and their outcomes. (Wolfsfeld, 1992).

We will now further review the characteristics of Wolfsfeld's Transactional Model of Media Interaction to clarify the model and gain a better understanding of the importance and implications of its propositions. For one to attempt to construct a

better working relationship between the news media and national security institutions, it is essential that we fully understand Wolfsfeld's Transactional Model.

A. THE STRUCTURAL DIMENSION


Unlike Grossman and Kumar (1979) who view the news media-national security relationship as a symbiotic, cooperative, and mutually beneficial one, or O'Heffernan's "ecosystemological" model of a news media-government relationship which is described as a "co-evolved interdependent and mutually exploitive" one (1992: 12), Wolfsfeld views the structural dimension of the relationship between the press and antagonists (e.g., national security organizations or military) as a "competitive symbiosis" in which "each side is dependent on the other for needed services but each tries to obtain those services *on their own terms*" (Wolfsfeld, 1984). By symbiosis, we mean the living or working together of *two dissimilar organizations in a mutually beneficial but competitive relationship rather than a solely cooperative one*.

These two principal sets of interests or services can be summarized as follows:

- (1) The news media is motivated by the need to receive access to events and information and report such information considered newsworthy.
- (2) The antagonist (military) is interested in advancing the dissemination of the news in its "frame" to support and advance antagonist programs and activities.

The two differing interests can result in either cooperative or conflicting behavior (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1981). There is evidence that the relationship need not be strictly antagonistic or competitive (Miller, 1978). This relationship can be viewed in figure #1 below:

Figure #1



Therefore, the transactional model is characterized by mutual needs which may be satisfied in either a competitive or cooperative fashion. *Since both the news media and antagonists are mutually vulnerable, they have the ability to either cooperate or resist in the achievement of goals.* Consequently, the structural dimension of Transactionalism considers the fact that the power of each party is relative. Furthermore, they have the prerogative to direct their behavior in either a

cooperative or conflicting manner. *They have the ability to change their working relationship.*

What determines this relative degree of dependency? It is determined by the fact that they are both mutually vulnerable to some extent although the degree of dependency changes along some continuum of need, circumstance and time, and their power relationship fluctuates depending upon the specific circumstances of each news crisis, action or event. During government crisis, war, and conflict, the government controls access to most official sources of information considered newsworthy, and other information from secondary sources or leaks is often peripheral to the crisis at hand. However, this monopoly on information may vary. According to Wolfsfeld:

Nevertheless, the level of media dependence on the military can vary over time and circumstance. The longer a war continues...the greater the likelihood that new sources will emerge. As journalists become more accustomed to their environment and more knowledgeable about the conflict they find it easier to break away from official sources and 'minders' and develop their own contacts. (1992: 2)

Furthermore, geography itself may affect the structure influencing the amount of information available to the news media and the dependency of the media on the military. For example, the British press was totally dependent upon the British military for gaining access to the extremely remote Falkland islands (Morrison and Tumber, 1988), and the American press was largely dependent on American military

and Saudi hospitality for access to the Persian Gulf area of conflict. Few roads were available, and it was easy to become lost in the desert terrain with few or no landmarks (Mills, 1991).

B. THE IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION

The ideological dimension of the transactional model of news media-military relations affects the behavior of both the antagonists and the news media. Ideologies, regardless of how old or novel, form an integrated system of assumptions, values, beliefs and goals regarding the nature of the individual, a society's economic, political, social, and cultural system, and the nature of the external world in which an individual or organization must cope. Ideologies are belief systems which act as interpreters between an individual and his or her external sociopolitical environment. They develop from the thoughts, perceptions, experiences and beliefs of people and affect the way they understand and relate to their human environment. Most importantly, ideology influences the way people process information (Funderburk and Thobaben, 1989; Dolbeare & Medcalf, 1988).

When Wolfsfeld discusses the dimension of ideology, he is referring to personal and organizational ideology or culture. Why do news media and national security organizations operate the way they do? Why do news media and military representatives act and think the way they do under various circumstances (Braestrup, 1977, Just, 1970)? The answer is dependent upon the nature of the personal and organizational ideology and culture that these institutions and personnel hold (Dolbeare, & Dolbeare 1976; Graber, 1989; Just, 1970).

Why organizations and representatives hold the attitudes and beliefs they do depend upon their individual and organizational ideologies. Do you believe that justice is the search for truth and fairness, or is it the strict adherence to legalistic procedures regardless of whether "truth" and "fairness" are gained? Do you believe that a person's basic individual rights should be sacrificed for the greater good of society, or do you believe that an individual's "inherent" rights to life, liberty, property, and pursuit of happiness should never be sacrificed for the "good of society?" Do you define equality as meaning equality of opportunity for all citizens to participate in a given socioeconomic system without being discriminated against, or do you interpret equality to mean the equal distribution of socioeconomic goods and property to all members of society, regardless of their individual contributions to society? How one responds to such questions is largely determined by their ideological filter (Baradat, 1979; Lane, 1962).

How one interprets facts and events and responds to the above interrogatories is determined by the ideological filter in which thoughts, perceptions and beliefs flow (Funderburk & Thobaben, 1989; Barth, 1976). Ideological filters are developed starting with the childhood socialization process as impregnated by various sociopolitical influences such as the family, friends, school, external organizations (e.g., church, schools, etc.) or the communications media to include movies and television (Watkins, 1985; Collins, 1982). Furthermore, early studies have pointed, in particular, to the communications media's direct impact on the human socialization process and ideological development (Chaffee and Schleuder, 1986; Watkins, 1985;

Reese and Miller, 1981; Comstock, 1981; Coldevin, 1972; Conway et al, 1981; Garramone and Atkin, 1986; Conway et al, 1975).

In the context of Wolfsfeld's ideological dimension, ideology affects news media-military relations when we focus upon the battle over the context or interpretation of the "frames" of a news story. Using the same definition as Gamson, "Frames" can be defined as "a central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue" (Gamson, 1989: 157). Will the antagonists or the news media frame the import or slant of the story? In other words, whose interpretation of events will be accepted? As stated by Wolfsfeld:

The most useful way for researchers to deal empirically with the ideological dimension of the relationship is to focus on the interpretive frames of the conflict which are being put forth by each of the antagonists and the news media (Bennett 1983; Gamson, 1989; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Linsky, 1986; Wolfsfeld, 1992). (Wolfsfeld, 1992: 2)

The *determinants of story frames* differ depending upon whether they are developed by the news media or national security organizations (e.g. Department of Defense, military, etc.). Regardless, one commonality is that they are based to one degree or another on ideology and process. As concluded by George Gerbner after a review of the same news event as reported in different newspapers, there is "no fundamentally non-ideological, apolitical, non-partisan news gathering and reporting system" (Gerbner, 1964).

The following clarifies the difference between process and ideology:

Process: The news media process largely determines what news or story (facts) will be selected for publication or broadcasting. This is a function of the organizational gatekeeping and news selection process or criteria. What criteria does the editor use to select stories?

Ideology: Unless unchallenged, the news media's political ideology will largely determine in what context, slant, interpretation or "frame" the news will be presented to the public (Lichter, Rothman, & Lichter, 1986). Additionally, the political ideology of the reader may interpret the facts of the news story in a different light. Thus the interpretation of the news is affected both the sender and receiver of the news.

C. WOLFSFELD'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSION OR CONTEXT

The social and political context of a news story, which bounds and strongly influences the nature of such news media-national security transactions and their outcomes, affects and reflects the relationship between the press and the government based upon prior news media-military experiences and ongoing sociopolitical events and relations. This dimension also affects the **content** of the news to some degree, and determines what will be reported about a specific event or if such event will be considered as newsworthy and reported. For example, public opinion and the news media-government relationship during the Watergate era was not the same as the time

prior to Watergate or representative of present working relationships (Lang & Lang, 1983). *What is happening both politically and socially within our society affects the news media-national security relationship.* If the news media is generally unpopular with or distrusted by the public, it may become more difficult for the media to successfully force demands upon the national security institutions for greater access during wartime (Kurtz, 1991; Arce, 1991; Mooney, 1991).

D. WOLFSFELD: COMMUNICATIONS, INFLUENCE AND INTERACTION

Influence over the content of news media stories is determined to some extent by the nature of communications and interaction between the news media and antagonists (Wolfsfeld, 1991), as well as from a host of other sources (Shoemaker & Mayfield, 1987). The relevance of the transactional approach regarding such interaction is that it views the interaction as a two-way flow of communications in which each party influences the other. As explained by Wolfsfeld:

There are...other...aspects of these interactions which cannot be adequately explained by focusing exclusively on notions of power and dependency. The relationship between the antagonists and the mass media is also defined by a set of cultural transactions in which each side presents its own ideological interpretations of reality. (1991: 3).

This balancing act between power and dependency is determined by the power relationship between the media and antagonist (i.e., national security institutions). The antagonist's power over the news media can be determined by the following four factors: (1) level of the antagonist's social, political, and media status; (2) the amount of organization and resources controlled by the antagonist; (3) the amount of newsworthy behavior generated by the antagonist; and (4) the level of media dependency. The last item measures the antagonists degree of vulnerability to the media (Wolfsfeld, 1991: 5).

On the other hand, the power of the media over the antagonist is determined by a number of relevant factors to include: (1) their social and political status; (2) their level of resources; (3) the extent of their distribution [audience]; and (4) their level of dependence on the particular conflict (Wolfsfeld, 1991: 10). *The battle over influence centers on both the quantity of coverage and the quality [framing] of coverage.*

RESULTS OF WOLFSFELD'S STUDY

Using the transactional model, Wolfsfeld's study sought to discover whether or not, and under what circumstances, the news media played an **independent and significant role** in the Persian Gulf Conflict of 1991. *First*, did the news media have any influence on the conflict by framing the event in its own terms? Furthermore, what association and variables permitted such effects and relationship? *Second*, did the military manipulate the press and convert them into an administration propaganda tool, or did the news media voluntarily relinquish its autonomy and objectivity for

higher newspaper sales or television ratings? *Third*, under what conditions is the news media most likely to play an independent and significant role in war (Wolfsfeld, 1992)? Wolfsfeld, seeking to answer these questions, focused on the objective and subjective circumstances determining the news media's role in the Persian Gulf conflict and, consequently, also examines the nature of their relationship.

The criteria established by Wolfsfeld to determine whether or not the press was "independent" and "played a significant role" in the war is as follows:

(1) Media Independence:

a. The extent to which the press becomes an active agent in a given conflict rather than a passive conveyer of political information. In other words, the extent to which the press is willing and able to use professional discretion in making genuine choices about how to collect and publicize news. Such media independence may be measured by the following factors:

- To what extent is the media dependent upon official sources of information versus access to a variety of sources?

- To what extent are media representatives initiating stories rather than passing along officially initiated stories? [Active role in obtaining and framing information].

-- Does the war or conflict appear to be changing direction or strategy because of the nature of the media coverage?

After an analysis of the Persian Gulf War of 1991, Wolfsfeld reached the following important conclusions which also affect the relationship between the news media and national security institutions:

1. The higher the grade of war the **less likely** the news media are likely to play an independent and significant role in the conflict. In other words, the larger and more complex the military conflict, the less likely the news media will affect the operation, and relations between the press and military will probably be less hostile.
2. The greater the antagonists' level of control over war events and the informational environment the **less likely** the news media are to play an independent and significant role in the conflict.
3. The greater the level of national and international consensus about a war, the **less likely** the news media will play an independent and significant role in the conflict.
4. The greater the extent of *frame congruence* between the more powerful antagonist and the news media, the **less likely** the news media will play an independent and significant role in the conflict. (Wolfsfeld, 1992, 8)

3. The greater the level of national and international consensus about a war, the **less likely** the news media will play an independent and significant role in the conflict.

4. The greater the extent of *frame congruence* between the more powerful antagonist and the news media, the **less likely** the news media will play an independent and significant role in the conflict. (Wolfsfeld, 1992, 8)

Data for Wolfsfeld's study were obtained through in-depth interviews with American journalists and official sources who interacted during the Persian Gulf war. Interviewees included military press officers, print and television journalists based in Saudi Arabia and the Pentagon, and military officers representing the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, including two senior members of General Schwarzkopf's staff.

The study concluded that the news media failed to have an effect on either the military's behavior or on the course of the war. As stated by the author:

None of the interviewees could point to incidents in which either the presence of the news media or press coverage had an effect on Allied military operations in the Gulf. The direction of influence seems to have been one sided: the Allies had a great deal of impact on the media....The cases of the bunker and the 'Highway of Death' may again stand as exceptions to this rule as there were several reports in the news media that the military

command carried out minor changes in policy...because of these incidents. (1992:22)

The lessons or factors extracted from the study which led to this conclusion are as follows:

(1) According to the **first rule of transaction**, the higher the grade of conflict the less likely the media will play an independent and significant role. The Allies consisted of at least 38 countries and hundreds of thousands of troops scattered throughout the deserts of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and on the ships in the Gulf and Mediterranean. There were geographical, logistical, and technical difficulties impeding independent sources of information. The battle area was not isolated, and there were few roads. When some journalists did attempt independent or unilateral reporting, they ended up as either prisoners of war or detained by authorities (Mills, 1991; Hedges, 1991). As stated by a veteran public affairs officer during the interview:

Those that had been there, the Bob Simons and the guys I knew as a young lieutenant in Vietnam that I escorted there - it was a very nostalgic trip for all of us - realized that this was not Vietnam, the size of California where you could run out and get a quick fire fight, come back to Hotel Rex, file your story and that was the end of it...There are no roads. There are no

vehicles and there are no telephones. If you want to file a story, you stay in your hotel and file it. (Wolfsfeld, 1992:11)

(2) According to the **second rule of transaction**, the greater the antagonist's (military) level of control over war events and information flow the less likely the news media will play an independent and significant role. This was the case during the Persian Gulf conflict. The Allies had nearly total control of information flow and operational strategy and tactics (Mooney, 1991; Kurtz, 1991; Gordon, 1991). Wolfsfeld suggested that one effective indicator as to media lack of control over information is journalistic discontent, as displayed in a *Time* magazine story:

As soon as the Pentagon rules for dealing with the news media were made final, the presidents of the four major U.S. television news networks sent a letter of protest to Secretary of Defense Dick Chaney. So did the editors of the Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, the Philadelphia Inquirer, Time and the Associated Press...The network presidents charged that the rules go beyond what is required to protect troop safety and mission security...and raise the specter of government censorship of a free press. (Wolfsfeld, 1992: 13)

To control the media's access to information and prevent security leaks, contacts with reporters were centralized through Journalist Information Bureaus (JIBs) established in Saudi Arabia, where stories were submitted to military censors for approval (Wolfsfeld, 1992).

3) According to the **third rule of transaction**, the greater the level of national/international consensus over the event or action (war) the less likely the media will play an independent and significant role. Unlike the Vietnam war, the pattern of consensus was characterized by initial opposition and heated debate (*Newsweek*, 29 Oct 90: 22-30) regarding involvement in the Persian Gulf conflict, followed by acceptance and strong support during the later phase after marginal passage of the congressional resolution approving military force. One can interpret this as "grudging approval" of the action. Thereafter, the emphasis was on support for our military troops in the field rather than President Bush's policy to implement a military solution to the problem (*Newsweek*, 19 Nov 90: 26-33). There was still significant support for use of economic sanctions rather than military force.

In contrast, the Vietnam war was characterized by overwhelming congressional and public support in the beginning phase of the conflict followed by eroding support over time as the military, journalists, politicians, and public became disillusioned with the lack of progress. On August 7, 1964, during the early phase of the Vietnam War, Congress overwhelmingly passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution by a vote of 88-2 in the Senate and 416-0 in the House. The resolution stated in part that "the United States is...prepared...to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force...to assist any member of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty...in defense of its freedom" (Porter, 1981: 286-287).

Further evidence of a high level of political and journalistic consensus over the Gulf war was that the number of stories supportive of the "support for the troops"

frame far outnumbered the "war controversy" frames 36 to 19 (Wolfsfeld, 1992). As explained Wolfsfeld:

Indeed, the polls which were taken showed the American public generally in favor of military control over the press (Gannett Foundation, 1991); it was clear that the news media could never mobilize much public support for their struggle against military restrictions. Public opinion, as one journalist put it, was not very interested in the problems of the 'little yapping dog' following the general. Stories which dealt with such topics as the anti-war movement or the human cost of war brought a flood of angry letters and phone calls. (Wolfsfeld, 1992: 17)

(4) According to Wolfsfeld's **fourth rule of transaction**, the greater the extent of frame congruence between the more powerful antagonist and the news media, the less likely the news media will play an independent and significant role in the war or conflict. In other words, in a conflict between antagonists of unequal size and ability, if the news media "sides with" or supports the frame of the stronger party (i.e., United States), the media's impact on the prosecution of the war will probably be insignificant. However, if the news media sides with the weaker "underdog," in this case Iraq, then the nature of the news stories may have some impact on policy, war strategy, and tactics.

As mentioned previously, one of the major assumptions of this study is that all wars are not exclusively military conflicts, but political conflicts, and are fought using

political forces as well as military forces (Gordon, 1991). During a conflict, the weaker party will almost invariably seek to rally the news media and third party nations to their side in an attempt to reframe the conflict in a favorable light supportive of the weaker party. During operation Desert Shield, Saddam Hussein attempted repeatedly to gain international sympathy and media support (Dewell et al, 1990: 24-25). During Desert Storm, one method was to permit Peter Arnett and his staff from Cable News Network to remain in Baghdad and continue broadcasting, although under heavy censorship when not favorable to Iraqi objectives .

Studies by Hallin and Gitlin (1992), Liebes (1992), and the Gannett Foundation (1991), now *The Freedom Forum*, all concur that the Allies continued to dominate the media during the Gulf war, and provided Iraq little opportunity to turn media support away from the Allied war effort to support for Iraqi claims. Only the bombing of the Baby Milk Factory (Shotwell, 1992), the Ameriyya civil-defense shelter or underground bunker in Baghdad (Squitieri & Walte, 1991; Human Rights Watch, 1991), and the view of the "Highway of Death"(*Newsweek*, 20 Feb 91: 17) could have in some way aided the Iraq view or "frame" as the "victims" of Allied atrocities and bullying.

Although not included in Wolfsfeld's Transactional model, technology was another variable which not only directly affected the outcome of the Gulf conflict, but also public, political, and media support for the war. In fact, one of the few major criticisms of the war by the media was the way in which the government was attempting to frame the war as "a bloodless and sterile" conflict. As stated by two interviewed reporters:

Well it was terribly neat. It was managed in such a way so that it was a bloodless war in which one hundred thousand people got killed. My impression from a great deal of distance from the United States was that no one was interested in having a messenger come to them and say: 'Gee there's people getting killed here.' The reporters were the only visible enemy people could see - they never did see the Iraqis. (Wolfsfeld, 1992:19)

The Iraqis were the enemy. How many Iraqi civilians were really killed? Nobody really cares that much. How many troops were killed? Eighty to one hundred and twenty thousand. I guess for a nation to go to war you have to demonize the enemy - at least for a while. But because of the media this war was perhaps a little better on that count. People had a little feeling for who was getting killed. No one knew about Japanese or German victims in World War II. (20)

One question to keep in mind is would it have made any difference, during World War II, if the general public did know how many Japanese or Germans were being killed? Did it make a difference in the Iraq war? Was the public morose enough to believe that tons of bombs were falling, artillery was firing, machine guns were blasting, ships were being sunk, but no one was dying? That civilians were untouched? That is the nature of war -- death and destruction. Is there a difference between World War II and now? The answer may point to news media

technology: the ability to personally rub the nose of civilian non-combatants back home into the death and gore of combat on a daily basis.

Not until **after** the Gulf War did the news frame change in a dramatic way, and the mass media **did have** an independent and significant impact on government policy. The issue concerned the plight of the Kurds in Iraq, especially during Saddam Hussein's drive to reconsolidate his power base in Iraq, and extinguish anti-government rebellions in northern and southern Iraq (Watson et al, 1991).

Wolfsfeld's Transaction Model of Media Interaction appears to integrate the various characteristics and dimensions of news media-military interaction more effectively and completely than the other models of media interaction described in this chapter. The detailed review of Wolfsfeld's model demonstrated the importance of the level of level of communication or interaction between the news media and antagonists, as well as the structural, ideological, and social and political dimensions of the relationship and how they affect the relationship. The following section will discuss the importance of other factors which affect the nature of the relationship between the news media and military during wartime.

III. LITERATURE ON THE GENERAL FACTORS AFFECTING NEWS CONTENT, QUANTITY, QUALITY, AND NEWS MEDIA-MILITARY RELATIONS

A. PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IDEOLOGY

Whether internal or external to the arena of scholarly studies and scientific analysis, it is indeed rare to find reserved discussions regarding the legitimate roles and effects of mass media in society. The consecrated gates guarding the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and of the press usually prevent calm discourse of the subject without arousing cries of indignation or frenzied fear on the part of media representatives and special interest groups. From a constitutional perspective, many media representatives see little to discuss. Regardless, differences in personal and institutional ideologies do affect the relationship between individuals and institutions.

In response to a question posed during one attempt at determining to what degree of social responsibility a newspaper should aspire when selecting and reporting news accurately, the editor of a major American city newspaper indignantly replied that "we have no requirement to act responsibly." The Supreme Court case of Near v. Minnesota (1931) appears to support this view. This interchange transpired during a televised round-table discussion on the roles of mass media at the Harvard University School of Government. It is the nature of the above remarks, if not institutional demeanor representing members of the media, which often prevent its endearment to the public and depict their institutional ideology (Graber, 1989: 66-67).

This lack of endearment was demonstrated during the media's blitzkrieg like outcry and scorching nightly commentaries criticizing the Reagan administration's low level of media access to the October 1983 Granada invasion which basically fell on deaf ears. This situation was repeated again during the Panama invasion, signaling that not even the formation of the new Department of Defense Press Pool resolved the problem. Additionally, the media was far from satisfied during the 1991 Gulf War. The public's response to government setting limits on press access to information during wartime or international conflict was one of basically detached indifference (Gergen, 1991; Kurtz, Jan 31 91: C2/A9). Regardless, it has long been known that ideology is a central component of news collection and dissemination (Gerbner, 1964).

Personal, group, or organizational ideology (value systems) are significant determinants of how one acts, perceives the world, organizes and processes information, and interacts with others. In a general way, both the news media industry and national security organization are driven by their own general ideological assumptions, beliefs and values (Just, 1970). The similarity or dichotomy in such value systems dramatically affect the interaction and relationship between the two organizations.

According to Kenneth and Patricia Dolbeare, long time students of ideological development, a well articulated ideology acts as a social interpreter "which describes (1) how the present social, economic, and political order operates, (2) examines why this is so, (3) whether this is good or bad, and (4) what should be done about it." *The Dolbeares believe that ideologies cannot help but become integrated within an*

individual's personality (Dolbeare, 1976:2-3). Consequently, ideologies are developed or acquired by individuals who examine the historical and immediate sociopolitical and economic world order; describe their own perceptions of how they view this order; offer reasons for why this order is good or bad; and then offer their own beliefs, values, assumptions and goals as to what they believe the "ideal, correct, and right" sociopolitical order should be (Dolbeare, 1976). These beliefs, values and assumptions act as filters for their information processing. It is the clash of personal and institutional ideologies which form the heart of the news media-military relationship.

An ideology provides both a conscious and unconscious operating mechanism for a person to arrange the complex intricacies of everyday life and sort out its puzzling parts into convenient boxes of understanding. Often related to a political party or philosophy, an ideology provides a person a short-cut mechanism to discriminate between facts and policies without the need for extensive thinking or self-examination, freeing an individual's mind for other more mundane activities. Rarely are the merits and future implications of a social, political, or legal issue objectively evaluated, but quickly decided upon by the ideological filter inextricably fused to a person's innate personality characteristics (Dolbeare & Dolbeare, 1973: 1-21).

According to the above suppositions, one function of ideological filters is to quickly simplify issues for expedited decision-making. However, the problem associated with this role is that many issues are far too complex to use simplifying ideological filters for expeditious information processing, classification and

decision-making. In many instances, regardless of the facts assessed, the filters either provide the same preprogrammed answers, or falsely interpret the facts of an issue resulting in a fallacious conclusion. An autonomous "manual override" is required to maintain one's proper perspective when assessing and processing data to prevent ideological distortion, but not all people have the discipline or capacity to enact such an override.

Political conservatives work under one set of assumptions and political liberals another regarding the complex and dynamic network of causes and effects which drive the world (Dolbeare & Dolbeare, 1973). Likewise, so do reporters and national security representatives, both civilian and military (Lichter, Rothman, & Lichter, 1986; Lichter, 1982; Gerbner, 1964). Institutionally, national security and news organizations work predominantly under separate ideological filters which result in a de facto polarization of attitudes, views, values, and goals (Graber, 1989). News media and national security organizations are influenced by ideological beliefs, values, and attitudes which may influence how they "frame" the news facts and storyline.

The Formation/Effects of Ideology on News Media and Military Representatives

The powerful ideological translator (filter) interprets all new incoming information and historical facts and provides a rationale (decision rules) for one's beliefs and attitudes. In modern parlance, this translator is developed and programmed like a PROM (Programmable Read Only Memory) chip of a contemporary microcomputer. A person's brain stores (consciously as well as subconsciously) information or events accumulated over a period of years into a memory file which

cannot be easily changed or erased (Read Only Memory or ROM), except through "a conscious and vigorous reprogramming" effort or traumatized by a significant emotional event.

It's this "Programmable Read Only Memory" characteristic within each one of us that acts as the interpreter or filter affecting our beliefs and interpretation of all information, facts, events, and personal experiences processed daily. This human PROM chip unconsciously assists and often directs our daily decision-making, whether it is a decision to vote for a political candidate, purchase a natural fur coat, or whether to trust the government or the military establishment. It also decides our acceptance of the present political, social and economic system. Only under exceptional conditions, such as the affects of a significant emotional event, a dramatic change in circumstances or knowledge, or a long-term reprogramming effort, will this internal PROM interpreter become "reprogrammed" to accept new personal assumptions, beliefs, or ideologies which directly changes our daily decision-making rules. *Thus members of our national security institutions and the news media must understand their cultural and ideological differences, and attempt some form of "institutional reprogramming" through a joint effort toward understanding.* Acknowledgment of such differences on a personal level would be a significant start.

As previously discussed, members of the military and news media will not succeed in developing a better working relationship unless a mutual understanding is achieved regarding their distinctive functions, organizational culture, motivations, personal and institutional ideologies, and organizational processes. People are information processors who receive, store, and generate information. However,

unlike simple computers or machines, they generate, process, and respond to humanistic feelings such as pleasure, happiness, anger, indignation, and hurt or pain. People more readily react to these sensor stimuli rather than simply to raw sterile data. Consequently, data generation and processing cycles mirror the complexity of the world, and sources of information are normally unlimited.

For news representatives, the above process may influence the content of news, for the news media may adopt the process of "mirroring" in which the content of news reflects their view of social reality with little or no distortion. The reporter is seen only as an observer of reality (Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980). Television, newspapers, magazines, movies, personal experience, education, parents, friends, and hundreds of other sources provide information for us to receive, process, store, and generate in the form of new information.

The Origins of Ideology

As alluded to earlier, the development of ideologies is predicated upon unique perceptions of the human condition and upon the nature of mankind and its relationship to society and to other individuals. Who are we? Where did we come from? How did we develop? How do we relate to others, and to what rights, if any, are we as human beings entitled.

Modern ideologies have developed, and justified once developed, from a combination of four main sources: (1) actual historical events, (2) past political

discourses, (3) personal experiences and interpretations of events by people directly involved in ideological development and evolution, and (4) indirectly through an historical accumulation of sociopolitical and economic practices, policies, laws, and beliefs. It must be noted that ideological beliefs do not remain static, but evolve over time. For example, the American ideology of liberalism has cultivated over time the philosophy of reform liberalism, a derivative of liberalism which emphasizes different issues and reprioritizes others, but still maintains itself within the basic ideological boundaries of liberal thought.

This discussion leads us to a central point of this section, the question concerning how all individuals, not only news reporters or military personnel, assume an ideological belief which directly affects the relationship and daily interactions between various groups and individuals. The answer is simple, but the specific mechanics are complex. Political or ideological beliefs generally arise from the following influences:

- a. Personal Economic Circumstances
- b. Past or Present Political or Religious Persecution
- c. Nature of education and educational level
- d. Beliefs of Parents
- e. Beliefs of Peers
- f. Internal Child Rearing Practices
- g. External Sociopolitical environment in which raised
- h. Significant emotional events or experiences
- i. Empirical Observations (Personal Awareness & Observations)
[Facts are unconsciously arranged to fit their perceptions of the world].

Regarding news media cooperation and content, one reason why news media representatives during World War II felt a common bond with national security goals, but today feel a need to act more neutrally, if not adversarially, is a change in ideology and culture. The attitude of a journalist toward an issue is usually reflected in the tone or slant of their story. Do they tell the whole story, or just one side of the issue? If so, what side? After a twenty minute speech, what parts of the speech are selected for quotation and what information is deleted? When a televised news story or investigative report on nuclear energy is aired, who are the individuals selected to be interviewed for the piece? How much air time will be permitted? Are they proponents or opponents of nuclear energy? Does the nature of the news media's elite ideology influence the nature or slant of news stories? Students of media study have concluded that the generally liberal ideology of news media elites does have a direct impact on the nature of news reporting (Rothman & Lichter, 1987).

During election campaigns, news organizations are sensitive to the liberal bias of newsmen, and take procedural steps to prevent and insure neutral and unbiased reporting (Gans, 1979; Hofstetter, 1976). However, outside election years, the bias is more difficult to control because less attention is focused on the issue of media bias. Political and ideological bias by the news media is an important factor which is difficult to measure (Peletz & Entman, 1981).

In a 1986 profile of professional journalists by G. Cleveland Wilhoit and David H. Weaver, 95% were white, 66% male, and 70% graduated from college. Further-

more, results indicated that only a small percentage of the working press in larger more prominent news organizations were Republicans:

Among executives, 33 percent were Democrats, 58 percent were independents, and 9 percent were Republicans. Among staffers, 51 percent were Democrats, 44 percent were Independents, and only 4 percent were Republicans. The rest had other affiliations. The many who called themselves "Independents" were more likely to identify with Democrats than Republicans. (Graber, 1989)

Looking at the aforementioned figures, with the understanding that most of the self-acclaimed "independents" have liberal, democratic leaning sentiments, 91% of the news media executives and 95% of the staffers were liberal or liberal leaning. Furthermore, as reported in a *Los Angeles Times* poll of about 3,000 citizens and 2,700 journalists nationwide, the attitudes of journalist on specific issues of political and social importance often differ sharply with the general public (Schneider & Lewis, 1985). These figures may lead one to question the ability of the news media to report news of war and conflict objectively. *Although journalists have professional ethics to tell the truth and act fairly, and a need to do so to attract news sources and a broader audience, there is no ethical violation in framing a story in a particular way.* Regardless, as will be observed later in this study, they have no constitutional requirement to act fairly or objectively.

When attempting to understand or control the byproduct of news organizations, an understanding of the above statistics is required. For example, an organization seeking reports in favor of nuclear energy should have on hand a group of supportive experts immediately ready for interview. Otherwise, the news organization will seek their own, and the experts they seek will most likely **not** be supportive of nuclear development (Rothman & Lichter, 1987). Because news organizations are limited by time, having supporting data and personnel available increases the likelihood that a story will be produced with the outcome national security organizations desire.

Members of the press working as foreign correspondents are usually well educated with considerable reporting experience. According to a 1979 survey of leading media and business leaders by S. Robert Lichter, 54 percent of American foreign correspondents were left-leaning in their political orientation, 32 percent were self-identified as politically middle of the road, and only 14 percent were identified as leaning to the right (Lichter, 1982). The sociopolitical implications of domestic and overseas reporters being left-leaning can be significant in the long-term. For example, will minority social and political views drive the majority? Will the American public be provided a realistic and accurate view of international affairs, crisis and conflict?

Although news media editors attempt to prevent biased reporting during the news gathering process, is it difficult to eliminate entirely. Even Cable News Network (CNN), which credits its success to non-biased news reporting and in-depth news coverage, occasionally falters. CNN foreign correspondent, Stuart Loory, who served as CNN's Moscow bureau chief from 1982 to 1986, was attacked by former U.S. Ambassador to Rumania, David Funderburk, for seriously flawed and misleading

reports on then communist Rumania. For example, one report by Loory stressed how Rumanian President, Nicolai Ceausescu, had cultivated the respect of his people by authorizing the construction of huge building projects and by acting independently of Moscow (Irvine & Kincaid, 1990).

In summary, Funderburk pleaded with Loory to "look beneath the surface" and accused him of whitewashing human rights abuses by the regime by claiming that the Jews in Rumania were "well-treated and allowed to emigrate." Ironically, the World Human Rights Guide identified Rumania and the Soviet Union as among the five worst human rights violators in the world at that time (Irvine & Kincaid, 1990:203-204).

Nevertheless, as will be seen during the legal review of the literature, there is no constitutional requirement that news reporting be factual, accurate, or socially responsible--only that news dissemination, in contrast to news collecting or access, be free and unencumbered by government interference except in an extremely narrow set of circumstances.

B. NEWS MEDIA FUNCTIONS AND MISSIONS

While discussing the nature and roles of the media, political scientist Harold Lasswell offered three primary functions of the mass media: (1) the surveillance and reporting of local and world events or news, (2) the interpretation of news events, and (3) the socialization of individuals into their cultural settings (Lasswell, 1969:103).

To these three Dr. Graber adds a third, "the deliberate manipulation of the political process" (Graber, 1989:5).

The **surveillance and reporting of news** is the most common and universally accepted function of the news media. Regarding international news, reporters are dispatched, at times living in residence, to major nations whose actions usually affect the American political or economic scene to some degree. London, Paris, Bonn, Berlin, Moscow, Beijing, Panama City, Israel, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Tokyo and other locations where major news emanates are common news collecting areas. The major American cities, New York, Washington, D.C., Chicago and Los Angeles also receive major news coverage by a wide variety of domestic and international news media organizations.

The function of news **interpretation and analysis** is often criticized by the public because individuals wish to evaluate the facts themselves, without additional filters or commentary added by the media. This phenomena may be prevalent because the American public, and the mass media itself, have become more intellectually sophisticated over the past fifty years. The major national newspaper and television networks have the resources to attract excellent resident news analysts or guest experts who are authorities on a particular field of expertise such as foreign affairs, defense, politics or the environment. These experts have the ability to add valuable information and expand upon the bare facts of the situation. Written analysis by major newspapers usually offer the most comprehensive and accurate news analysis. In contrast, television news, suffering from time constraints and often

lacking authoritative expertise, tends to be less capable at effective detailed news analysis, although they are making noteworthy efforts to improve this deficiency.

If one legitimately adds to the definition of mass media the film industry, mass media also has a considerable **impact on the socialization process** (Conway, et al, 1981; Watkins, 1985; Garramone & Atkin, 1986). Mass media disseminates, both directly and indirectly, cultural values, orientations and behavior expectations. It also provides personal role models and affects attitudes regarding political and cultural socialization or orientation and personal behavior (*Newsweek*, 21 Jun 93: 54-60). There are hidden messages, overt messages, and cultural signals sent daily through the many outlets of the media. Furthermore, there has always been a direct link between support for our political system, media industry politics, and war (Koppes & Black, 1990; Litwak, 1986).

Manipulation of the news and political process actually involves a number of discrete elements. Rather than simply reporting news events, investigative reporting attempts to induce some type of change within the political process or cultural setting. It may involve a change in public policy, the operation of a government agency, an attack upon a specific individual, group of individuals or an organization, or to expose some wrongdoing or other perceived issue of importance (e.g., Bernstein & Woodward, 1974; *CBS 60 Minutes*, 1993; *ABC 20/20*, 1993; and *A&E Investigative Reports*, 1993).

Investigative reporting strives to stimulate government or public action of one type or another, and can have a significant impact upon policy-makers (Cook et al.,

1983). In the Cook study of a televised investigative report involving fraud in federally funded home health care programs, it was found that policy-makers became more interested in home health care, and policy changes came more from the demand for change by journalists than the general public.

Do investigative reports lead to "herd behavior" by news organizations in an attempt to change policy? A 1985 Study of a *Chicago Sun-Times* series on government mishandling of rape cases concluded that the greatest effect of the series was its impact on the news media itself, resulting in a significant increase in the number and length of stories on rape by nearly all media organizations in the area (Protess et al., 1985). Other studies and works also reported changes in public policy due to investigative reporting (Leff, Protess, Brooks, 1986; Shaw, & McCombs, 1977; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; McLeod, et al., 1974).

Furthermore, rather than reporting the news, news commentary and analysis can be viewed as an attempt to manipulate the news by setting public and government agendas (Shaw & McCombs, 1977). This is accomplished by highlighting the news media's interpretation of the facts, which, when fed back into the news cycle to the news makers, could change the news of the following day. *Regarding the news media-military relationship, understanding of news media processes and tendencies is important to elevating mutual understanding between both parties, and contributes toward building an optimal working relationship.*

C. INTERNAL NEWS PRODUCTION, PROCESSES AND ROUTINES

One cannot understand the nature of news media product, particularly in reference to high visibility military operations, unless there is an understanding of the news media's internal news objectives, processes, routines, and culture. For example, there is evidence that the news media gives greater priority to news story accuracy rather than being representative of different points of view (Borman, 1978). Likewise, whether or not the public receives fair and unbiased news may be more a result of the influence of "counterbalancing" external forces or the pressures of news criteria rather than specific efforts to ensure representative and balanced news (Young, 1981).

Tuchman (1973) suggested that news content is a function of the news gathering routines of news organizations. Other scholars have also demonstrated that news routines do impact news content, particularly because "news is the end product of a complex process which begins with a systematic sorting and selecting of events and topics according to a socially constructed set of categories" (Hall et al, 1981: 335).

Media representatives or organizations do not normally intend to mislead the American public through biased reporting. Biased reporting often unintentionally happens as a result of the application of the general news guidelines. *It is the industry desire for conflict, relevancy, timeliness, and novelty which drive the news.* "Good television news" is defined as "exciting news," news that will attract viewers, not put them to sleep. Using this definition, one can see that "good news" may not necessarily be "good news." Consequently, depending upon how busy the news day

is, small unexciting protests can be made to look like larger more supported protests by "hyping" the event through increasing the length of coverage and deceiving camera angle shots, making unexciting events more visually exciting. Furthermore, to meet the news criteria, news personnel are attracted to the same types of stories, often resulting in monolithic or "herd" reporting. There is also a close tie between support for social movements and the media (Strodthoff, Hawkins & Schoenfeld, 1985; Leonard, 1986). Figure 2 represents the news process in a typical news organization.

First, one of the primary internal activities conducted by news representatives is the "**gatekeeping**" function. By gatekeeping, we mean an editorial review of raw news data to determine what information is newsworthy and selected for publication or broadcast. Gatekeeping can affect the "framing" of news by its focus on what class of news stories will be selected for dissemination (White, 1950). White was probably the first to suggest that journalists function as gatekeepers of newsworthy messages. For example, are there stories supportive of nuclear energy or opposed to nuclear energy? Supportive of military intervention or opposed to military intervention? Within the gatekeeping function lies the agenda setting powers of the press.


A second step in a typical news production process, and part of the gatekeeping activity, is the criteria selecting the news. Beyond ideological preferences, there is also criteria related to news timeliness, relevancy, conflict, or uniqueness. For news to be selected for printing or broadcasting, it must meet one or more of the above criteria. Consequently, the process of gatekeeping determines news reporting and frame outcome.

As stated previously, whether reporting on domestic or foreign affairs and conflicts, gatekeeping and news content is influenced by ideological positions (Altschull, 1984). Additionally, Shoemaker and Mayfield reinforce Altschull's proposition that the primary determiner of media content is the ideology of those who finance the media (1987).

Particularly important to national security considerations, another method that the media uses to influence the news and exercise its editorial power is by defining reality through the reporting and structuring of information, despite efforts by other parties to offer a conflicting or differing view of "reality" (Reese, 1990). A summary of the news process can be seen in figure 2 on the following page.

THE NEWS PROCESS

Figure 2



Doris Graber describes the internal news making and reporting operations classified by media scholars into various models (Graber, 1989: 76-77). The **Mirror Model** postulates that the reporters should simply reflect social reality by reporting exactly what they see or hear without commentary or analysis. It entails a "just the facts" presentation of the news. The central role is to report the news, not analyze the news. News and factual analysis are left to the receiver or user of the news. *The key to the mirror model is accurate and objective reporting without media shaping or interpretation* (Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980). Many news organizations claim that this style of reporting is less than optimal because it fails to take into account the scale or importance of the story. For example, using an overly strict interpretation of the model, the news story: "The Students for a Better Society held a protest outside the White House today" does not state the size of the protest or its significance, if any. Most other commentary would be deleted, and the value of the news left to the viewer or reader.

In contrast, Molotch and Lester believe that the media fails to mirror reality, that they reflect "the practices of those having the power to determine the experiences of others" (1981: 133). The general public is seen as manipulated by the news media's power elite transferring their ideology through the communications medium (Shoemaker & Mayfield, 1987).

The **professional model** of news reporting considers audience appeal as a central factor of importance. As construed by Dr. Graber:

In the professional model, news making is viewed as an endeavor of highly skilled professionals putting together an interesting collage of events selected for importance, attractiveness to media audiences, and balance among various elements of the news offering....This, in a sense, makes the audience the ultimate judge of which stories may pass scrutiny and which will be ignored. (Graber, 1989:77)

Using a "journalist centered approach" or "**organizational model**," evidence exists that news content is influenced by journalists' socialization and attitudes (Sigal, 1973). Institutional socialization provides news representatives with a set of shared organizational values. The organizational model of news reporting is based upon the organizational dynamics and interpersonal relationships within the news organization. What news is or is not selected and the method of news presentation depends upon the technical constraints affecting the news organization, the accessibility of the news, the cost-benefit analysis associated with collecting and assessing the news, legal and profit considerations, and the interplay between reporter and gatekeeper personalities (Graber, 1989).

Several studies have indicated that news content results from *the influence of social and institutional forces* (Wackman et al, 1975; Long, 1979; Shoemaker & Mayfield, 1987). Such forces external to the news room include advanced communications technology, economic forces, culture, advertisers and the audience itself. Studies have also linked the lack of news competition with variations in news

content (Long, 1979) as well as chain ownership of the news media (Wackman et al, 1975; Shoemaker & Mayfield, 1987).

The **political model** of news reporting is a highly politicized view of news collecting, processing and reporting. As stated by Dr. Graber, "news everywhere is a product of the ideological basis of individual newsmen, as well as of the pressures of the political environment in which the news organizations operate" (Graber, 1989:77). *It is the prevailing political environment that will determine who or what will become newsworthy.* For example, when the wave of conservative politics swept onto the political scene with the commencement of the "Reagan Revolution" in 1980, conservative leaders, politics, and policies were prominently highlighted in the news. When the extent of the Exxon Valdez oil spill was discovered during the Bush administration, environmental and ecology issues became prominent news, while other news faded in importance.

In most instances, there is usually far more news, both good and bad, than a news medium is capable of reporting. This requires gatekeeping activities. Whether print or television news mediums, news information is received daily from the wire services, bureau reporters, government officials, private citizens, organizations, professional journals, and other news organizations and sources. This raw news data must be collected, sorted, evaluated for newsworthiness and timeliness, and processed for printed, radio broadcast or televised news presentations. It is the responsibility of the news organizations' gatekeepers, the army of field reporters, news executives, producers and editors, to analyze and decide upon the news to be selected and released for public consumption. In practical application, this media power or

discretion is absolute. Consequently, this ingrained news philosophy affects the relationship between the news media and national security institutions. Both what will be published and the ideological slant that it will receive are within the total purview of the news organizations.

In a similar fashion, news reporters are analogous to the law enforcement officers driving the daily beat in patrol cars. Using both their visual acuity, time-tested intuition, political leaks, and radio communications with their headquarters, reporters and law enforcement officers are usually the first on the scene of a news event, or the first to be told of a possible newsworthy story. Both the police officer and the reporter are the initial gatekeepers into their respective systems, the judicial system or the news system. Their discretion to report or not to report a specific "event" will critically impact the careers or lives of an individual, groups of individuals, an organization or even a public policy.

Regarding the above analogy, the similarity ends at a specific point. Unlike news organizations, the search for sensationalism and profit do not account as major drivers for law enforcement gatekeepers. Furthermore, the explosion in mass communications has diminished the discretion of the news reporter considering the reporter could be circumvented by other media organizations or modes of communications. In contrast, police officers usually work alone in a less publicized environment without the type of ratings driven competition common of media organizations.

The **incentive model** proposes that *news coverage is determined by the incentive inherent in the story*. If the potential story has sufficient action, excitement, or interest, it provides an incentive or motivation for news organizations to publish the story (Graber, 1989:209). The incentive must usually include more than "social importance or relevance," unless it portrays suffering and unusual human misery or injustice. The inherent worthiness of a story in terms of social utility frequently means fairly little in the news business. War and crisis normally has sufficient action, excitement, and interests, and is almost assured of extensive coverage.

The social and political effects of news gatekeepers are obviously powerful (Graber, 1989:77-80.). These relatively few individuals or news sources will not only determine what news will or will not be presented to the public, but also the nature of the commentary, video, photographs, and analysis accompanying such stories. They shape the news and our window to society. The gatekeepers can make minor stories appear cataclysmic or major events look trivial. They "frame" the story (Gamson, 1990). They can legitimize causes or contribute to their discredit. They can prevent either opponents or proponents of a certain policy or action from being heard. Finally, they can prevent a newsworthy story from being heard at all.

Our view of the world, of the state of our nation, our environment, economy, execution of foreign affairs, our sense of personal worth or values, support for education, or even victory or defeat in war can be profoundly influenced by the decisions made daily by news media gatekeepers (Gamson, 1990). The sociopolitical impact of gatekeeper decisions can be profound. As one example, Peter Braestrup,

chief of the Saigon bureau of the Washington Post during the Vietnam War, concluded that journalistic commentary and interpretations on the conduct of the war misled both the public and government officials (Braestrup, 1978).

Braestrup commenced a detailed study of the 1968 TET offensive in South Vietnam, and concluded that the effects and outcomes of the offensive were distorted by the media, leading to a dramatic alteration in the outcome of the war. The distortion occurred in the framing of the TET offensive caused by the nature of the stories selected for distribution (Braestrup, 1978). As reviewed by Graber:

Walter Cronkite and other commentators pieced together a picture of defeat for American and South Vietnamese forces when information really indicated a defeat for the North Vietnamese. These erroneous interpretations heightened existing antiwar pressures. (Graber, 1989:80)

President Lyndon B. Johnson considered it hopeless to try to recapture public support for the war after Walter Cronkite announced in 1968 that the war could not be won. As David Halberstam put it: 'It was the first time in American history a war had been declared over by an anchorman. (Graber, 1989:240)

News stories are not necessarily selected by the media on the basis of political ideologies, leanings or outcomes in mind. With occasional exceptions, the news

organizations are relatively consistent regarding the types of events considered worthy of news. Although the news selection criteria **do not** address the slant or light in which the news event will be published or aired, a general criteria does exist to select **what** stories will be printed or broadcasted (Graber, 1989; Gans, 1979; White, 1950).

The following criteria are generally used to select newsworthy stories:

1. Strength of news impact on readers, listeners or viewers.
2. Contains conflict, violence, crisis, scandal or disaster (Wars, murders, strikes, protests, natural disasters, etc.)
3. Relevancy and familiarity to the audience
4. An event that has a local impact will receive priority, particularly regarding those inside the viewing or circulation area.
5. Is the news timely or novel? Old news or repetitive events will receive less priority. (Graber, 1989:83-86)

Studies have concluded that the criteria of Conflict, Relevancy and Timeliness are the most important news selection decision factors, and stories containing these elements will receive priority (Clyde & Buckalew, 1969). Another important concept to understand is that the process of news collecting and dissemination is itself narrow and limited. The number of independent news collecting agencies are declining. Approximately 80% of all television stations are in the 100 most densely populated

areas of the country, which serve nearly 90% of the nation's households, and belong to multiple-owner groups (Graber, 1989:45).

By 1985, 68% of the nation's daily newspapers with 78% of the nation's circulation were controlled by major chains. The ten largest newspaper chains accounted for nearly half of all newspaper circulation. Of concern is that only three corporate-owned networks, NBC, CBS and ABC dominate more than a third of the nation's household televisions. However, cable television services are reducing the influence of these three networks, and a new fourth broadcast network launched in 1987, the Fox Broadcasting Company, now produces a number of very popular national shows, among them *America's Most Wanted*, *Cops*, and *The Simpsons*.

In June of 1990, Fox made \$550 million from advertising revenues, back from a \$95 million dollar loss in 1988 (Grover & Duffy, 1990). Although the big three networks are losing ground and influence quickly to the cable news and entertainment networks, they are also facing credible competition from Fox Broadcasting. How this competition will affect the presentation of news is not presently known for certain, but a good hypothesis would argue that ABC, NBC, and CBS news will become increasingly sensational and less controlled. Furthermore, a large number of news stories covered by American mass media are selected from the same sources: the Associated Press and United Press International wire services. To a lesser degree, Reuters, a British wire serve, also provides foreign news to American news agencies. The collection of foreign news is far more concentrated than that of domestic news.

The fundamental point of the preceding discussion is to describe the narrowness of news sources and selections. To some extent, this helps the national security institutions to control much of the news. *American news organizations are private corporations, and as such, they are motivated by ratings and profit.* In fact, **they are probably the only private enterprises in the nation that are afforded explicit constitutional protection.** To attract readers, listeners or viewers, news is carefully selected for maximum attention, impact and entertainment. Consequently, its is disproportionately heavy in conflict, violence, crisis and scandal. This is why it is often said that news creates reality rather than reports it.

SUMMARY OF RELATED LITERATURE

In conclusion, the point of the preceding discussion regarding the models of media interaction, the focus on the dimensions of Dr. Wolfsfeld's model of media interaction, the nature of news operations, the behavior and ideology of news personnel and culture, and the character of the news industry is to provide a basis of understanding regarding what factors drive news media behavior and responses to specific events, particularly war and conflict.

National politics, foreign affairs, national security and media requirements are strongly and inevitably intertwined. The behavior of the media can affect our relationship with foreign governments, damage or benefit American national interests, encourage conflict, change the course of battle, or even affect the types of weaponry

to be used in a conflict along with the military tactics and strategy to be employed. The relationship between news media and national security institutions is a complex and dynamic one involving Congress, the Administration, military commanders, representatives of mass media, and the American public.

Summarizing the preceding chapter, we discussed the fact that no definitive treatise concerning the relationship between the news media and national security institutions was discovered during the course of the literature review. However, the war in Vietnam appeared change the nature of the relationship between the news media and military. The following issues and outcomes were examined during the course of the literature review, including how they relate to the central focus of the study:

1. The importance of "framing" news stories was examined with the conclusion that the informational content of the story is less important than the interpretive commentary that surrounds it. One point of conflict between the news media and military is the battle over framing of news stories. Who's interpretation of the facts will be dominant.

2. There are various models of news media-military interaction which seek to explain the relationship between the news media and other organizations. O'Heffernan suggests that a "mutually exploitive relationship" exists between the news media and government institutions, where the institutions have grown together in a mutually exploitive process based upon competitiveness and manipulation to one another's benefit. However, this model suffers from inherent weaknesses, one being evidence

that the relationship is mutually beneficial. Allison proposes that the news media is a bargaining agent and actor in the policy making process, and as such, our national security institutions must directly deal with this actor by some degree of accommodation, understanding and compromise. However, the power and influence of the news media as a bargaining agent is uncertain and open to dispute, and Allison's model does not account for other important variables affecting the relationship. In contrast to O'Heffernan, Grossman and Kumar view the news media-government relationship as a "cooperative symbiotic relationship" with the characteristic of permitting both institutions to benefit and attain their respective goals and objectives in a *quid pro quo* fashion. However, this model fails to explain the often hostile and antagonistic relationship between the news media and military, particularly during wartime. Rosenau discusses the limited view that the news media as a societal source of American foreign policy and as an agenda setter. Kramer looks to democratization and the information revolution to define the relationship between the news media and national security establishment. Such advances permit the news media to set agendas and affect public opinion, thus political decision-making. Nevertheless, there are other central factors or dimensions affecting the relationship omitted by this model.

3. The King and Wells study of the Gulf War focused on the phenomena of "hegemonic reality," the inclination of the news media to support the government's foreign policy frame. The study concluded that the Bush administration's frame of the crises received more media support than did the conflicting frame that the war was analogous to a Vietnam quagmire. Furthermore, it was seen that conflicts are normally divided into three phases, with media coverage differing from phase to phase as well as the administration's actions. During Phase I, the military buildup, the

administration's emphasis is on obtaining public support, media support, and Congressional support. Phase II focuses on maintaining public, congressional and media support during military operations, and Phase III represents the aftermath and the need to justify and reformulate administration actions and ability or inability to achieve public support, media support, or Congressional support. Although this model contributes significantly to the explanation of news media-military interaction, it fails to integrate the various important dimensions of such interaction.

4. Wolfsfeld's "Transactional Model of Media Interaction" viewed the news media-military relationship as multidimensional, interactive and antagonistic. The relationship consists of two-way interaction, a structural dimension, ideological dimension, and social and political context. Each side needs one another, but they try to achieve needed services on their own terms. No other author or model has integrated or discussed the many influences affecting the nature of the news media-military relationship. News process and ideology is also an important part of this relationship. The difference is that this relationship could be cooperative as well as competitive. In his study of the Gulf War, Wolfsfeld sought to discover whether or not the news media played an independent and significant role in affecting the conflict in some way. The answer depends upon the circumstances of the conflict and the meeting of criteria. In the Gulf war, the conclusion was no.

5. Chapter 2 then continued to discuss the general factors affecting news content, quantity and quality. The reason for this discussion was to form a foundation of understanding regarding media operations and motivations, and how this affects the news media-military relationship. We looked at how political ideology

affects the news media culture and behavior of its representatives, and how such ideologies are formed in individuals, whether military personnel or news media representatives. A discussion followed regarding how ideological filters can permit identical facts and figures to be interpreted differently by different individuals, and how this affects the reporting of news and the relationship between the news media and military.

6. News media functions and missions were reviewed to discover how different news functions can influence news differently. News production processes and routines also influence news policy and production, including the framing of news stories. Different models were discussed regarding *how* news organizations should report the news. The mirror model, professional model, organizational model, political model, and incentive models were discussed regarding their affect on the nature of the news reported and amount of commentary or bias permitted. Regardless of the model of news reporting selected, the news selection criteria remains about the same. News selected for publication or airing is Timely, Relevant, and offers Conflict or Violence. "Good news" is normally not news. Under this criteria, military operations will be assured significant news media coverage.

CHAPTER 3.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

TYPE OF STUDY AND DATA

This study is a qualitative research project consisting of an historical examination of the relationship between the news media and military during time of crises or war. It is designed to produce reliable knowledge about the historical relationship between the American news media and our central institution of national security, the military, and to discover whether or not an optimal working relationship between the news media and military could be attained. It is hoped that a model relationship could be proposed that would be mutually beneficial to both parties.

Primary Data Sources

Primary data sources for this study include actual historical government source documents regarding rules and regulations managing the relationship between the news media and military. It also includes the examination of government policy documents, policy directives, and regulations regarding the news media in time of conflict or crisis. Furthermore, it includes transcripts of interviews by prominent individuals on the subject of news media-military relations during congressional

hearings. Actual letters from Congressmen, Senators, and news media organizations concerning the relationship between the news media and military were also examined for clues.

Secondary Data Sources

Secondary data sources were examined to include academic studies and research results, newspaper and magazine articles, professional journal articles, and other relevant studies and judicial rulings affecting the news media-military relationship. Books, periodicals and professional journals were also examined to provide a well rounded, non-biased view of the issue.

It was important to keep focused on the PDE topic and not digress into other peripheral areas regarding media affairs which contained abundant studies and research data.

METHOD OF COLLECTION

Relevant Research

The problem with subject specificity is that relevant research is often interconnected with studies not centering on the central topic. Regardless, news

media research was examined and filtered to include those known studies most relevant to the central focus of the study.

Although there is significant research regarding news media effects on election campaigns, the impact of media on foreign policy, and similar issues, there is a dearth of information regarding the nature and impact of news media interaction on the working relationship between the news media and military, and what actions may be taken to reach an optimal working relationship designed to enhance the ability of both institutions to successfully achieve their respective institutional goals and objectives. Such an ability is difficult, but not impossible. Like the historic breakthrough between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1993, it will take an introspective reassessment, compromise, and a desire by both parties to accomplish this mutually advantageous goal for an optimal outcome to be achieved.

Historical Review

The qualitative historical analysis of the news media-military relationship was both challenging and interesting. Once again, I was surprised by the relative paucity of information directly related to the subject. Few authoritative works were available which provided a detailed examination of the working and personal relationship between American news organizations and personnel and the armed forces. It appears that only in our recent history has the power of the news media warranted focused and detailed examination regarding its influence and impacts on society and its institutions. Only as war has become more visible with the growth of the

communications industry and technological advancement have researchers begun to target such matter for serious study.

Legal Review

One method to understand and determine both the historical and present relationship between the news media and our national security institutions is to examine crucial Supreme Court rulings which help to define the relationship between the military and news media. Legal research was conducted to analyze relevant court cases which helped form the relationship between the two institutions. Recent judicial opinions have contributed formulating the relationship between the aforementioned institutions. Research was conducted using Lexis-Nexis and Legi-Slate on-line computer research systems which focus on legal and legislative cases and law, including various reference law books.

Identification and Synthesis of Critical Factors

After completing the examination of relevant studies, legal research, and historical works and papers, critical factors were distilled from this information. A critical factor is one identified as directly impacting or defining the nature of the working relationship between the news media and military institutions. Identification and examination of these factors may hold the key to recommendations leading to the establishment of an optimal working relationship.

The objective of this study is to identify what the crucial factors are influencing the working relationship between the news media and national security institutions, and then use the knowledge of such factors to establish an optimal relationship between the two divergent and often antagonistic institutions.

News Media Differentiation

A differentiation between print and electronic news media was not made during this study. The critical factors discovered through this examination, under most circumstances, apply to both print and electronic media equally, and recommendations made to improve the relationship apply to both. This is not to presume that print and electronic media do not have their unique needs and requirements regarding news collecting, processing, and dissemination.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

This research study is an historical, legal and scholarly review of news media-national security (military) relations during wartime to identify factors explaining, alleviating or aggravating the relationship between national security requirements versus the news media's right to know. Adopting Wolfsfeld's Transactional Model of Media Interaction as a model for news media interaction, we wish to discover whether or not an optimal working relationship, which permits both organizations to achieve their respective objectives, is possible.

The first subproblem. The first subproblem is to research and identify, from an historical, legal and scholarly review of the subject, the "critical factors" affecting the relationship, either positive or negative, between the military and news media during wartime.

The second subproblem. The second subproblem is to analyze the previously identified "critical factors" or concepts impacting the relationship between national security requirements and news media objectives, and offer recommendations to alleviate the conflict and establish recommendations or some formula for an optimal working relationship that permits mutual achievement of organizational goals and objectives.

THE HYPOTHESIS

The hypothesis: There has been no standard or consistent working relationship between the news media and military, and Dr. Gadi Wolfsfeld's Transactional Model of Media Interaction will best explain the relationship between the news media and national security organizations during war or combat operations by offering an effective framework to explain the relationship between the two institutions.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study will not attempt to focus on peacetime national security-news media relations.

This study will not attempt to examine all aspects of media-government relations.

The focus of this study will limit itself to a review of relevant historical, legal, and scholarly writings pertinent to wartime news media-military relations.

This study will not focus upon nor determine the preparation and training of news media representatives.

This study will not examine the historical development of communications research.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study requires the addressing of subsidiary questions vital to resolving the research issue at hand. Consequently, the following questions will be addressed throughout this study:

(1) What is the structural composition of War or international conflict? Is it unidimensional or multidimensional, and if multidimensional, what are the various components which may affect the news media-national security relationship?

(2) What is the primary responsibility of the United States regarding national security and news media requirements?

(3) Does the mass-media have a constitutional right of access to military operations and facilities, either domestically or overseas?

(4) Does the military have the right, if not responsibility, to conceal and protect access to military operations, personnel, and facilities?

(5) Are news media-national security relations adversarial, and if so, must they be this way?

(6) What are the advantages and dangers of live reporting or direct uplinks?

(7) Where does the primary responsibility of the military commander lie?

(8) What are the ideological and philosophical working assumptions driving news media and national security operations?

(9) What is the historical relationship between the news media and national security institutions during wartime?

(10) What is the legal relationship between the news media and national security institutions?

(11) Through consensus and compromise, can the media and military overcome such differences into an optimal working relationship?

(12) What would be the optimal news media-defense relationship?

ASSUMPTIONS OF THE STUDY

The following assumptions have been made regarding this study, and each are discussed in detail throughout the body of this document.

The first assumption. The first assumption is that a condition of antagonism exists in the relationship between the news media organizations and the national security institutions.

The second assumption. That the Transactional Model of Media Interaction can explain the relationship between the mass media and military during combat operations and offers an effective understanding required to resolve or alleviate the conflict between the news media and national security organization during combat operations, and to determine the degree of influence that the news media will have on national security policy and operations.

The third assumption. The goals and objectives of the news media and national security organizations differ significantly.

The fourth assumption. News organizations are politically liberal, highly competitive, and profit driven organizations.

The fifth assumption. That wars are not only military conflicts, but political conflicts, and are fought using political forces as well as military forces, strategy, and tactics.

DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY

News Media: Elements of news media include newspapers, news magazines, radio and television.

Press: A generic term to mean all elements of news media, electronic & mechanical.

News Media Representative: An employee or contracted agent of either the print or electronic news media to include newspapers, news magazines, radio and television.

National Security Organization or Institutions: The Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Council, Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the defense and military intelligence agencies, and the military services to include the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.

Antagonist: A party with opposite or contradicting interests to another party which is often involved in a lose-lose or zero-sum relationship.

Framing: The interpretation given to a story by the writer or broadcaster. The interpretive light or import a news story is given when reported to the public representing the "slant" of the story.

CINC: Commander in Chief

News Content: Refers to the complete range of quantitative and qualitative attributes of both verbal and visual communications of news (Shoemaker & Mayfield, 1987).

News worthiness: An important criterion which journalists use to judge whether a story should be covered and published (Dennis & Ismach, 1981).

Reality: That which a society knows about itself (Fishman, 1980). Comparing what one reads or sees in the news media to actual observations, knowledge, or agreed upon events or conditions by society as a whole as the actual situation or fact.

Distortion: The extent to which the view of the world presented by the news media differs from that presented by other sources (Altheide, 1976).

PURPOSE OR IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

There are four primary reasons for conducting this research. *First*, the continuance of our free and democratic society depends upon an autonomous press free from government interference and censorship. *Secondly*, during wartime operations, a free and autonomous press can constitute a direct threat to the safety of our military forces and the success or failure of military operations in defense of American national interests. *Thirdly*, a constant state of antagonism, mistrust, and conflict between news media and national security organizations is not in the best interest of the general public, news organization, or national defense. *Finally*, the ultimate purpose of this study is to discover some mutually agreeable method of operation and interaction which could permit both the news media to fulfill its organizational obligations of news collection and dissemination, but also respect and recognize the concerns and objectives of defense personnel for personal safety and operational security in defense of our nation. Achieving such a working relationship is beneficial to all parties and worthy of scholarly analysis.

CHAPTER 4.

LEGAL RESEARCH: JUDICIAL HISTORY OF NEWS MEDIA-MILITARY RELATIONS

I. CONSTITUTIONAL CASE HISTORY OF PRESS-MILITARY RELATIONS

The primary foundation of the news media's right to collect and disseminate information without interference from the government and its national security organizations is the First Amendment to the Constitution which states in part, "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...." However, even this "right" carries with it a narrow field of restrictions. The Supreme Court has consistently held that no constitutional right is totally sacred under all circumstances (Near v Minnesota, 1931). As will be discussed on the following pages, the law provides exceptions to nearly every rule.

The influence of the mass media upon the political arena of national security affairs has been growing tremendously over the past thirty years, particularly since the development of high technology communication systems and the portable satellite uplink television cameras permitting live on-location broadcast (Office of Technology Assessment, 1990: 166). Throughout this period, the media has lobbied vigorously for the right to access national security information while the government has defended

the right to protect State secrets (NYT v. U.S., 1971; The Nation Magazine v. Department of Defense, 1991).

The news media has argued in court that its status as the "fourth branch of government" should permit it to gain special access rights to governmental and private information. In contrast, the nation's highest court has ruled in at least two major cases that the media's perceived status is imaginary rather than constitutional. In Zemel v. Rusk (1964), the court ruled that "the right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information." If it did, it may trample over whatever rights to privacy a citizen has as inherent in our Constitution or ruled by the Supreme Court (Boyd v. U.S., 1886; Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965), or even the privacy rights of the government (Greer v. Spock, 1976). In a later case, the Supreme Court once again ruled that the press had no greater right to access information than that legally available to the general public or private citizen. As stated by Justice White who delivered the opinion of the court in the landmark case of Branzburg v. Hayes (1972):

It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally....Despite the fact that news gathering may be hampered, the press is regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own conferences...and the meeting of private organizations....A [minority] of States have provided newsmen a statutory privilege of varying breadth, but none has been provided by

federal statute....We are asked to [interpret] the First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy. This we decline to do...(Shapiro, 1975: 425).

Dealing with the military directly, the *Branzburg* ruling was further reinforced by the important case of *Greer v. Spock* (1976). In this case, the court upheld two regulations of the Fort Dix, N.J. Army base banning demonstrations, picketing, protest marches, political speeches, and similar activities. The second regulation prohibited the distribution or posting of any publication without prior written approval of headquarters. The court upheld this ruling, stating that military bases, even ones open to the public, are not private forums. As ruled by the court:

The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated....The notion that federal military reservations, like municipal streets and parks, have traditionally served as a place for free public assembly and communication of thoughts by private citizens is historically and constitutionally false. (Lockhart et al, 1986: 648-649)

Consequently, members of the news media do not have unlimited access to military bases, and may require permission to enter. *Pell v. Procunier* (1974) previously provided such press limits to courtrooms, and *Adderley v. Florida* (1966) to jails and prisons.

In the important case of Houchins v. KQED (1978), Chief Justice Berger and the Court held that "neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of information within the government's control" (Lockhart et al, 1986: 610), and even the important case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980) did little to alter that decision except when it concerns access to criminal trials by the media which were traditionally open to the public anyway (448 U.S. 555, 100 S. Ct 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973, 1980). In Cable News Network, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co, Inc. (1981), once again the court upheld the limitation on news media access rights when the court held that the news media's right to access was no greater than that of the public in general.

Critical Factor: News media representatives have no Constitutional right to greater access to information than does the general public.

Keeping focused on national security and public officials, can public officers prior restrain the publication of an article that falsely accuses them of corruption, dereliction of duty, and other libelous (i.e., damaging, maliciously printed with reckless disregard for the truth) remarks? The answer is apparently no. In the landmark Supreme Court case of Near v. Minnesota (1931), the court ruled that there can be no prior restraint or censorship of publications except under very limited circumstances. According to Chief Justice Hughes who delivered the opinion of the Court:

The statute in question cannot be justified by reason of the fact that the publisher is permitted to show, before injunction issues, that the matter published is true and is published with good motives and for justifiable ends....If this can be done, the Legislature may provide machinery for determining in the complete exercise of its discretion what are justifiable ends and restrain publication accordingly. And it would be but a step to a complete system of censorship. (Lockhart, 1986: 585-586)

Critical Factor: The news media may print false, untrue, slanted, or even damaging stories about persons or events without prior judicial restraint.

One of the more notable legal cases regarding media rights versus national security concerns is New York Times v. United States (1971), or the case of the famous *Pentagon Papers*. In this case, the court was concerned with the government attempting judicial "prior restraint" of publications. Only under very exceptional circumstances has such prior restraint action been permitted (United States v. Progressive, Inc., 1979). Daniel Ellsberg was a high level aid in the National Security Council who was unhappy with the nature of American defense policy and activities in Vietnam. He gained access to a top secret defense department study critical of the gradual escalation and conduct of American defense policy in Vietnam, and secretly reproduced the document forwarding a copy to the newspapers for publication. His defense was that he felt that the document had been improperly

classified as top secret. In sum, the Supreme Court agreed, and ruled that minimal harm would be done from publication. As concluded by the Court:

Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity....To find that the President has 'inherent power' to halt the publication of news by resort to the courts would wipe out the First Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty and security of the very people the Government hopes to make 'secure'....Our cases...have indicated that there is a single, extremely narrow class of cases in which the First Amendment's ban on prior judicial restraint may be overridden. Our cases have thus far indicated that such cases may arise only when the nation 'is at war,' during which times 'no one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction of its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.' (Shapiro & Tresolini, 1975: 197)

Nevertheless, in the above decision, Chief Justice Berger and Justices Harlan and Blackmun presented dissenting opinions which cast some doubt as to whether such a ruling would survive the test of time. Because of the frenzied pace at which the Court ruled on the case, the three justices thought the Court handled the case "nearly irresponsibly" without thought or reflection on the merits, implications or consequences. As stated by the dissenting judges:

These are difficult questions of fact, of law and of judgment; the potential consequences of erroneous decision are enormous. The time which has been available to us, to the lower courts, and to the parties has been wholly inadequate for giving these cases the...consideration they deserve. (Lockhart et al, 1986: 599)

Furthermore, Justice Harlan questioned the *authority of the court* to rule on the importance or classification of national security information:

Constitutional considerations forbid 'a complete abandonment of judicial control.' Moreover, the judiciary may properly insist that the determination that disclosure of the subject matter would irreparably impair the national security be made by the head of the Executive Department concerned--here the Secretary of State...or Defense--after actual personal consideration by that officer. This safeguard is required in the analogous area of executive claims of privilege for secrets of state.... '*The very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial....*' (Lockhart et al, 1986: 599)

In another strong dissent, Justice Blackmun attacks the ruling on both similar and different grounds:

[The First Amendment] is only one part of an entire Constitution. Article II of the great document vests in the Executive Branch primary power over the conduct of foreign affairs and places in that branch the responsibility for the Nation's safety....I cannot subscribe to a doctrine of unlimited absolutism for the First Amendment at the cost of downgrading other provisions. First Amendment absolutism has never commanded the majority of this Court. 'When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.' (Lockhart et al, 1986: 600)

As stated previously, the government narrowly extended this criteria through the case of United States v. Progressive (1979) in which The Progressive magazine sought to publish an article entitled, "*The H-Bomb Secret--How We Got It, Why We're Telling the It,*" describing production and technical secrets of the Atomic Bomb. Applying the "grave and irreparable harm test," the Court ruled that "A right to life is more important than a right for the public to know" (Lockhart et al, 1986: 602). Unlike the New York Times case which failed to rely on any federal act, the government and court relied upon a violation of Section 2274 of The Atomic Energy Act which authorized injunctive relief against communication of restricted data utilized to injure the U.S. or to advantage foreign nations.

Regardless, the battle over media rights in this area is still contested, and some believe the Times ruling set a bad precedence. As described by Graber:

Many people still believe that the decisions to disclose or withhold security-related information from the media and the public are political and should be made by the elected legislative and executive branches rather than by the nonelective courts. They contend that the agencies that routinely deal with military and foreign policy security information are infinitely better qualified to assess matters of public security than are judges whose training is narrowly legal....What is dubbed 'the public interest' may be simply the reporters' interest in furthering their careers, or the publisher's interest in making money, or the government's interest in shielding itself [or other nations] from embarrassment. (Graber, 1989: 129)

Critical Factor: Under circumstances where the government does not rely upon any constitutional or statutory authority, it cannot prevent publication of unclassified or classified information through court ordered prior restraint. However, specific challenges to publication may be upheld.

In Schenck v. United States (1919), a famous freedom of expression case involving advocacy of illegal actions, the court did take into account the importance of

national security by sustaining the conviction of defendants charged with violation of the 1917 Espionage Act. In this case, the defendants were printing material advocating insubordination in the armed forces, and called for the troops to desert. This action occurred during wartime. As concluded by the Supreme Court:

We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants, in saying all that was said in the circular, would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.... The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater, and causing a panic.... When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right. (Shapiro & Tresolini, 1975: 368)

Applicable to operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the importance of government control of national security information in time of threatened or actual conflict has always been of particular concern to the government. Thousands of lives may be jeopardized. Insofar as government institutions are concerned, access to information above that authorized to the general public under the Freedom of Information Act is controlled by the appropriate government officials.

The government has no responsibility or requirement to provide news media access to war zones or potential war zones outside of the United States. In this regard, the First Amendment right ends at the borders of American jurisdiction and sovereignty unless the Supreme Court rules otherwise, which it hasn't to date. No court cases have directly examined the role and limits of news gathering under the First Amendment in a military context abroad (Nation Magazine v. Department of Defense, (1991). Although as a matter of courtesy members of the press are often provided complimentary passes and accommodations to private or special government events, this practice is not a legally required one. As previously discussed, technically, the news media has free access rights to only public events and information openly available to the general public (Branzberg v. Hayes, 1972). There have been no cases found which directly address limiting press access to battlefields.

Critical Factor: The Executive Branch of government has the Constitutional responsibility and legal right to protect and secure national security information, particularly during wartime.

During the Persian Gulf Conflict of 1990-91, there were two direct and important challenges to the Department of Defense regulations limiting press access to American military forces within the area of military operations. In the first case, the consolidated plaintiffs The Nation Magazine, et al. argued that the press pools (1) limited access to the battlefield to a specific number of news media representatives, and (2) subjected them to certain restrictions (ground rules and guidelines). The

plaintiffs argued that the DoD regulations violated First Amendment rights "to a foreign arena in which American military forces were engaged."

On January 16, 1991, the plaintiffs sought both declaratory and injunctive relief. The injunction sought a court order to stop the government practice of limited access media pools and ground rules, and a declaratory judgment in the form of a court determination to affirm or "declare" certain rights to a party of the dispute (i.e., right to access). It does not involve direction or action as does an injunction.

In the aforementioned case, the Department of Defense provided the following arguments to dismiss:

(1) The First Amendment does not bar the government from restricting access to combat activities and that the regulations are *narrowly tailored* and necessitated by compelling national security concerns. [Court rejects argument]

(2) The question of press access to the battlefield is a "political question," and falls under the political doctrine of judicial non-interference. Because the President is Commander in Chief, a federal court may not reverse determinations made by the Executive branch in a military context, even when First Amendment rights are affected. [Court rejects argument]

(3) The case is moot because the regulations were lifted on March 4, 1991, after the conclusion of Desert Storm, and therefore non-justiciable. [Court said plaintiffs'

case is too abstract, and the action over, thus the case is moot. It is difficult to determine future circumstances.]

It is astonishing to this researcher that the DoD did not add to their argument the premise that First Amendment rights do not carry outside the sovereign territorial jurisdiction of the United States. This is particularly true while Americans are in theater at the permission of a host state with separate rules, laws, culture and sovereign jurisdiction. Under those conditions, we are bound by international law to honor their rules unless the host state otherwise consents. Both private citizens and diplomats visiting or living in foreign countries are bound by the host country's laws, customs, regulations, and sovereign prerogatives. This respect for state sovereignty is a concept embedded in both international law and the articles of the United Nations, of which we are obliged as a nation to uphold. Consequently, this issue can be viewed as a matter of foreign affairs, particularly if war is considered an extension of foreign policy.

The fact of being outside the territorial limits of the United States, under the jurisdiction of another sovereign state, and the responsibility, if not constitutional requirement, of the Commander in Chief and his subordinate national security institutions to ensure military security to protect troop safety, military operational integrity, and enforce international law, should weigh heavily in favor of the government (Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. 39, 43).

In Nation Magazine, et al (1991), the court, in an opinion by Judge Sand, ducked the issue of access:

In order to decide this case on the merits, it would be necessary to define the outer constitutional boundaries of access. Pursuant to long-settled policy in the disposition of constitutional questions, the courts should refrain from deciding issues presented in a highly abstract form, especially...where the Supreme Court has not articulated guiding standards....Since the principles at stake are important and require a delicate balancing, prudence dictates that we leave the definition of the exact parameters of press access to military operations abroad for a later date when a full record is available....Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise its power to grant plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief on their right of access claim. (31-32).

Thus, in the Nation Magazine case, the Court did not rule on whether or not the military is constitutionally required to provide access to the battlefield. However, it did state that if the military did permit the news media on the battlefield, it had to do so in a non-discriminatory manner, and that access not be denied arbitrarily. Furthermore, the activities of the press are also subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions (Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Cox, 379 U.S. at 558).

In the Nation case, the court relied heavily on the Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles case (331, U.S. 549, 584 (1947) in its judgment which states that constitutional issues should be in "clean-cut and concrete form." In deciding

whether or not to grant plaintiffs declaratory relief, there must be clear constitutional principles and the proper circumstances to address them. As concluded in the Opinion of the court to dismiss the complaint on April 16, 1991:

In the Court's view, the right of access claims, and particularly the equal access claims, are not sufficiently in focus...to meet the Rescue Army requirement that 'the underlying constitutional issues [be presented] in a clean-cut and concrete form....' For the reasons articulated throughout the Opinion, prudence dictates that a final determination of the important constitution issues at stake be left for another day when the controversy is more sharply focused. Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed.

In the recent case of J.B. Pictures, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Defense (1993), the plaintiffs requested permission for access to Dover Air Force Base for the purpose of filming the bodies of soldiers arriving from the Persian Gulf. The government denied press access to the military installation. The plaintiffs, requesting a temporary restraining order, claimed that their "First Amendment rights to witness the return of the bodies to Dover and to photograph, view, and write about the return of those bodies were violated. The government argued that:

- (1) The President is Commander in Chief under Article II.
- (2) Dover AFB is a closed base not open to the public.

- (3) Plaintiffs want the government to supply them with certain images, not speech.
- (4) Ceremonies would detract from the function of base supply operations.
- (5) It is not illegitimate for the government to try to influence public opinion at any time, especially during war. In fact, it is the President's responsibility to do so, to mobilize public support.
- (6) Because ceremonies create hardships for those who must fly from around the nation to attend them , they will be held at the service members duty of home station.

In the final decision of the Court decided on April 22, 1993, Judge Royce C. Lamberth ruled that "the First Amendment does not give plaintiffs a right of access to the hanger at Dover Air Force Base." The court supplied the following arguments in support of its case:

(1) The past cases upon which the plaintiffs rely upon to support their First Amendment claim (e.g., Greer v. Spock (1976); Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United States (1985); The United States v. Albertini (1985), and Cable News Network, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co. (1981)) do not support the plaintiffs' claim that the First Amendment guarantees a right to access to the Dover hanger. On

the contrary, the precedents establish that no such right exists (1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6517, p. 4).

(2) The claim in this case is that defendants' restrictions indirectly limit plaintiffs' off-base speech by keeping them from sources of information, thus denying plaintiffs of their rights of free speech and their alleged right of access. However, the government need not open up all sources of information to everyone...and the government need not be a viewpoint-neutral source of information (1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6517, p.7).

SUMMARY OF LEGAL RESEARCH

In conclusion, this chapter emphasizes both the constitutional rights of the news media to express itself freely and control its editorial content, yet limitations on the news media regarding its right to access information, particularly military installations and national security information. News media claims of an historical precedence of "free access" to war zones and "freedom from wartime censorship" are claims which are unfounded based upon the facts uncovered during both the legal and research. The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that freedom of speech does not equate to freedom of access. Furthermore, the issue regarding free press access and information collection outside the United States has not been definitively settled or addressed by the Supreme Court. However, there is significant domestic legal precedent and international relations law to conclude that the news media would probably lose a battle to gain unrestricted news access and collection rights outside the

sovereign territory of the United States, particularly when under the sovereign jurisdiction of a host nation, such as Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War of 1990-1991.

It was also established that when forming its agenda issues or "frames," accuracy of information is not required by the news media. The only effective method to fight inaccurate new media stories regarding national security or military operations is through dissemination of truthful and accurate information capable of being substantiated. Furthermore, the government, except under extraordinary circumstances, cannot prevent publication of either unclassified or classified information. Consequently, it is the responsibility of the government to take special precautions to secure classified information, and to place whatever controls are required to limit access to such information.

In contrast, the First Amendment does not require the government to permit access to the news media to information under government control. In other words, the press does not always have the right to access information where the public does not have access rights. Furthermore, the President and his national security organizations are not required to provide "politically neutral information" regarding its policies and operations to the media. The government is not required to provide information non-supportive of its policies.

The central implication of the aforementioned conclusions based upon judicial case law is that the military does have the legal authority to regulate and control news media access to information, including the ability to censor such news information, during military operations. When such operations are conducted outside the borders

of the United States, the government's ability to control information increases dramatically.

CHAPTER 5 .

HISTORICAL REVIEW OF NEWS MEDIA-MILITARY RELATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

In reference to this historical examination of the relationship between the news media and our national security establishment's central institution, the military, the same caveat must be applied as previously stated in Chapter 2 of this study: no definitive treatise concerning the relationship between the news media and the military has been discovered during the course of this research. Few works focusing directly on the stated subject have been uncovered. Consequently, the historical examination of the phenomenon will center upon a relatively small selection of published works and a broader selection of government documents, some recently unclassified, including congressional letters, reports, and hearings. News media articles will also add to the subject historical examination. Three of the more prominent authors which form the backbone of non-government publications concerning the **historical role** and relationship between the news media and military are works by Knightley (1975), Bullard (1974), and Mathews (1957). Bullard's work was originally published in 1914. Other important authors focusing on news media-military relations include Wiggins (1964) and Gottschalk (1983).

The genesis of the modern "war correspondent" can be traced to basically three individuals: *Charles Lewis Gruneison* (Spain, 1837) who was the first commissioned

war correspondent, *Sir William Howard Russell* (Crimean War, 1854) who is acknowledged as the first professional war correspondent (Bullard, 1974:352), and *Henry Crabbe Robinson* (1808, Spanish Revolution), one of the earlier observers of 19th Century conflict. **It was these early pioneers of war coverage who defined the initial relationships between the news organizations and the military establishment.** An excellent work which examines the genesis of newspaper war correspondents is the 1957 work, *Reporting The Wars*, by Joseph J. Mathews.

The following is a chronology of the historical relationship between the news media and military institutions as first established first by the early reporters, and then by the more contemporary group of official war correspondents.

II. SELECT MILITARY CONFLICTS

A. EARLY AMERICA

In a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report entitled "*Federal Regulation of the Press in Military Operations: A Brief Chronology of Developments and Related Policy Actions, 1725-1991*," the nature of the news media-military relationship was briefly discussed in a chronological manner commencing with the American republic during the 1700s. Referring to early America:

Colonial Governments frequently resorted to censorship in wartime. Typical of such precautions was a Massachusetts

Order-in-Council of 13 May 1725, declaring that 'the printers of the newspapers in Boston be ordered upon their peril not to insert in their prints anything of the public affairs of this province relative to the war without the order of the government.' (Wiggins, 1964: 94)

The American government, during the Revolutionary War, made ineffectual efforts at secrecy but was patient under dangerous disclosures and opposed in principle to concealment of some kinds (94).

B. THE CRIMEAN WAR: "A BRITISH AND AMERICAN NEWS FAILURE: 1854-1856"

Author Phillip Knightley, who wrote arguably the most definitive work on the history of war correspondents entitled, *The First Casualty*, will be referred to extensively in this paper, since there are very few historical works of substance on the subject of news media-military relations.

One of the earliest and most famous of Western war correspondents was William H. Russell who covered the British Crimean War in 1854 for *The Times* (Knightley, 1975; Bullard, 1974). Unlike the standard procedure of the era of hiring other journalists, the *Times* insisted on hiring its own journalists to cover the war in the Crimea. Russell turned out to be an excellent war correspondent, and in coordination

with editor John Dalane, significantly increased the prestige and circulation of the newspaper (Knightley, 1975: 5).

Delane instructed Russell to write the truth, and this instruction caused major hardship for Russell at Gallipoli and other locations where Russell was unpopular with the British military which did their best to discourage his efforts. He also witnessed the infamous "Charge of the Light Brigade" on October 25, 1854 of which only 200 of 673 men returned after charging directly into the Russian artillery (1975:11). As stated by Knightley on reporting techniques:

Russell wrote a version of the battle, but was dissatisfied with it, so he requisitioned many officers and clarified the situation slightly. (He found what most war correspondents soon discover: eye-witness accounts are frequently contradictory). Then he wrote his story of the battle. It was peppered with what were to become the clichés of war: there was a 'rain of death' and grapeshot 'tore through the enemy ranks'.... (Knightley, 1975: 10)

Even in these early days of war correspondents, two distinct techniques were emerging. Russell was basically a battlefield correspondent trying to report the over-all scene, to give a contemporary observer's account of how a battle was lost or won. (1975: 10)

Russell was famous for criticizing the conduct of the war and its leaders, often driving the British War Department into fits of anger. After the disastrous Light Brigade charge, Russell wrote that "I looked at the group of officers representing the military mind of England close at hand in this crisis and I was not much impressed with confidence by what I saw" (1975:11). His assessment of top British military leaders, such as Lord Raglan, was equally frank, but often kept private: "He is a good brave soldier, I am sure, and a polished gentlemen, but he is no more fit than I am to cope with any leader of strategic skill" (1975:11). Raglan was eventually fired. Although Russell freely wrote his dispatches, they were censored by the newspaper, with some especially sensitive dispatches circulated among government officials rather than published.

Like Russell, the collection of competing correspondents attempting to cover the conflict were equally unpopular. As described by Knightly:

Lord Raglan decided not to recognize the correspondents, not to give them rations or assistance, and to look the other way at any efforts by junior officers to discourage them. This took the form, with Russell, of cutting down his tent when he pitched it within the lines, [and] forcing him out with the camp followers....Russell rode up and down behind the action, making several attempts to attach himself to the entourage of divisional commanders, all of whom sent him packing. (Knightley, 1975: 8-9)

Similar to modern national security and press concerns which arose during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, security and censorship problems also became major issues during the Crimean War:

[Lord Raglan] got the deputy judge-advocate to claim that Russell's dispatches had involved serious breaches of security and had afforded assistance to the enemy. That they were breaches of security was undoubtedly true. In one article alone, published in *The Times* on October 23, 1854, Russell revealed the number of pieces of artillery that had been moved to the front, the position and amount of gunpowder needed to supply them, the exact positions and names of two regiments, and the fact that there was a dearth of round shot. Since this was no doubt telegraphed to Russian the day it appeared in London, even Delane [*Times* editor] agreed that Russell should be curbed, and he told the government he would 'confine all [his] correspondents exclusively to the version of past events.'
(Knightley, 1975: 12-13)

After constant *Times* attacks on Lord Raglan for incompetency on the battlefield, he was replaced by Sir William Codrington, who placed considerable restraints upon the press:

Codrington issued a general order, on February 25, 1856, that must rank as the origin of military censorship. It forbade the

publication of details of value to the enemy, authorized the ejection of a correspondent who, it was alleged, had published such details, and threatened future offenders with the same punishment." (Knightley, 1975: 16)

C. THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR: 1846-1848

According to Gottschalk (1983), the Mexican War was purportedly 'the last American conflict where the idea of press censorship was not entertained, possibly because the war came too soon for the telegraph system' (Gottschalk, 1983: 36). The middle of the 19th Century commenced the dawning of news specialization regarding war reporting with the introduction of the professional "War Correspondent." Consequently, accompanying the rise of the specialized war correspondent came the growing battle between the need for military security and secrecy versus the right to collect and disseminate war news.

George W. Kendall was one of the more renowned reporters of war covering the war between the United States and Mexico, and is recognized as the first war to be comprehensively reported in the American daily press (Bullard, 1974: 351). He reported from the camps of Generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott as they advanced into Mexico and secured eventual victory. The pony express system was their primary method of communications, as well as sailing ships in the Gulf of Mexico. His relationship with the military appeared to be good, but during the campaign he was captured by the Mexican military and eventually thrown into prison with captured American soldiers, but

eventually released from a Santiago prison in 1842 (Bullard, 1974). Kendall's relationship with the military can be summarized as follows:

Through the Summer of 1846, Kendall was much of the time with the Rangers of Captain Benjamin McCulloch, a commander whose men called him 'Ben,' who 'could ride anything that went on four legs....' With the Mexican mounted bodies known as the Lancers he had innumerable brushes and in many of these Kendall had a share....With these daring men the New Orleans editor waded and floundered through water, mire, and mud.... (Bullard, 1974: 354-365)

All these operations were observed by Kendall and he sent back couriers with reports for the *Picayune* as often as possible. Almost as a free lance he rode with the Rangers....In one of these small fights, Kendall, who much the time was doing the work of a soldier and could hardly claim the immunity of a non-combatant usually granted a war correspondent, plunged into the melee and came out with a cavalry flag as a trophy....(354-365)

It appears that, like many a soldier, the initial breed of war correspondents were often individuals of action and adventure. These personality characteristics probably aided the correspondents in building a relationship based upon mutual understanding and respect. A philosophy of "how can you report on us if you don't know us" appeared to

dominate in the military camps. Those correspondents that expended the effort, often at risk of life and limb, to understand their subjects were more readily accepted.

D. THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: "SCANDALOUSLY POOR REPORTING"

The American Civil War, like any war, nearly always results in expanded news coverage and increased sales of newspapers and the hiring of additional correspondents to cover the event. However, such opportunities for news glory do not always ensure that the quality of reporters or reporting will improve. As discovered by Knightley, truth is usually the first casualty of war:

Like many other aspects of the Civil War, its war correspondents have been romanticized into legend....The legend conveniently overlooks the fact that the majority of Northern correspondents were ignorant, dishonest, and unethical; that the dispatches they wrote were frequently inaccurate, often invented, partisan, and inflammatory. (Knightley, 1975: 21)

In a major work by Professor J. Cutler Andrews on news reporting during the Civil War entitled, *The North Reports the Civil War*, his assessment of journalistic war reporting of the day was quite frank when he wrote that "Sensationalism and exaggeration, outright lies, puffery, slander, faked eye-witness accounts, and conjectures built on pure imagination cheapened much that passed in the North for

news (Andrews, 1955:640). An order issued by Wilber F. Storey of the *Chicago Times* represented the pressure to "get out the news" when he directed his reporters to "Telegraph fully all news you can get and when there is not news send rumours" (Chicago Daily Journal, April 22, 1924).

The accuracy of news was threatened by the gaming of facts and figures by both the press and the government. Because of the pressure generated by news organizations for journalists to provide novel stories for their expanding reader base, the pressure frequently resulted in various differences in story facts:

Accuracy became a minor consideration. Casualties were grossly underestimated; generals listed as killed lived on to die of old age; battles were reported on days when there was no action at all...[and] Atlanta was reported captured a week before the battle for the town took place.....Junius Browne of the New York Tribune collected from officers details of the Battle of Pea Ridge (March 1862) and wrote a brilliant, but entirely imaginary, eye-witness report. (Knightley, 1975: 26)

The Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, began to dicker with casualty figures. He altered an account of Grant's failure at Petersburg, reducing the losses to about a third of their actual numbers. This department withheld news of the surrender of Harper's Ferry for twenty-four hours and changed '10,000

Union troops surrendered' first to '6,000' and in later dispatches to '4,000.' The actual figure was 11,200. (27)

In one of the finest works on the subject of the relationship between the press and national security establishment entitled, *"Newsmen and National Defense: Is Conflict Inevitable,"* a U.S. Army War College publication, an article by Joseph Ewing reviews the press-military relations during the American Civil War, as seen through the eyes and news media trials and tribulations of General William T. Sherman. Sherman's hostility toward the press during the war is well documented in a collection of 24 previously unpublished letters. Summarizing Sherman's plight:

The cause of Sherman's enmity toward the press is simple: Northern newspapers repeatedly and in great detail alerted the South that an attack was imminent. The telegraph, the railroad, and the daily press had made it possible to disseminate information at a rate and in quantities undreamed of a generation before, but the newspapermen still saw their job in the old, simple, terms: get out the story. That the story could now be gotten out with a speed that put its subjects' lives at hazard was not immediately apparent. Sherman was among the first--and was certainly the most vocal--of the military men who had to cope with the fact that the Industrial Revolution had overtaken the Bill of Rights. (Matthews, 1991: 20)

The relations between Sherman and the press started rather poorly and probably sunk to its lowest in the history of American press-military relations. One reason for such hostility was summarized by Sherman himself after the North's disastrous loss at the First Battle of Bull Run in a letter to his foster father:

Now in these modern times a class of men has been begotten & attend our camps & armies gathering minute information of our strength, plans & purposes & publishes them so as to reach the enemy in time to serve his purposes. Such publications do not add a man to our strength...but are invaluable to the enemy. You know that this class [journalists] published in advance all the plans of the Manassas Movement [which] enabled [General Joseph E. Johnston]...to reinforce Beauregard whereby McDowell was defeated & the enemy gained tremendous strength & we lost in comparison.... (Matthews, 1991: 21)

New York Herald reporter, Thomas W. Knox, in a six-column story charged Sherman with gross criminal negligence and insanity after the battle of Chickasaw Bluffs in which 1,700 Northern casualties were taken (Matthews, 1991). When Sherman had Knox seized, the reporter stated what Sherman already knew: that he was the enemy of the press, and as such, they were on their own campaign to "write him down (23). Sherman wrote to Senator Ewing about the press coverage of the Union defeat:

I am in battle & was pushed forward, catching all the path of the balls & bullets in front, and then the curses & malediction of the nonthinking herd behind. The Newspapers declare me their inveterate Enemy, and openly say they will write me down. In writing me down are they not writing the Cause and the Country down? They encumber our transports, occupy state rooms to the exclusion of officers on duty, they eat our provisions...and increase the impedimenta. They publish without stint positive information of movements past & prospective, organizations, names of commanders, and accurate information which reaches then enemy with as much regularity as it does our People....To them more than to any other cause do I trace the many failures that attend our army. While they cry about blood & slaughter they are the direct cause of more bloodshed than fifty times their number of armed Rebels. Never had the enemy a better corps of spies than our army carries along, paid, transported, and fed by the United States. (Matthews, 1991: 23-24)

A Congressional Research Service reported entitled "*Federal Regulation of the Press in Military Operations: A Brief Chronology of Developments and Related Policy Actions, 1725-1991*," stated the following regarding the Civil War:

"During the Civil War, 'while Southern censorship was rigid, it was, at least, consistent--a trait badly lacking in the North

where censorship policy shifted on a daily basis (Phillip Knightley. *The First Casualty*. New York, Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1975, p.16.).

"In the North, after having tried an unsuccessful voluntary, self-imposed newspaper censorship, Federal authorities 'moved to enforce a compulsory system that essentially consisted of after-the-fact (of publication) suspension of offending newspapers and close supervision of what was transmitted by the press over the far-flung system of telegraph lines'" (Gottschalk, *Consistent with Security*, p.36).

"Press censorship in the North extended to anti-administration editorial views and 'the release of unfavorable news about command cowardice and bad judgment (p.36-37, Gottschalk).

E. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (1898): "THE MEDIA'S WAR"

The Spanish-American War was located in the center of the proverbial "Golden-Age" of war corresponding characterized by advances in communications technology, such as the telegraph and mass press, and limited censorship. Looking to sell papers and increase readership through the adoption of controversial issues and causes, the *New York Journal*, owned by William Randolph Hearst, sent reporter Richard H.

Davis to Cuba to cover the island's war of independence against Spain. Hearst was hoping that the United States would intervene on behalf of the rebels.

The team of Davis and Hearst tried their best to involve America in the conflict, writing a number of articles designed to arouse public opinion. One such story was "The Death of Rodriguez," a Cuban rebel executed by the Spanish. As described by Knightly:

Hearst was delighted with the success of Davis' story. His newspaper, the *New York Journal*, was in the middle of a battle with Joseph Pulitzer's *World*, and the war was good circulation-building material. If, of course, America could be involved...then circulation prospects would be even better. Hearst did all he could to bring this about. He sent Karl Decker to rescue Evangelian Cisneros, daughter of a Cuban insurgent leader, from jail. He sent an artist, Frederic Remington, to convey visually what Davis had done with words. Remington was not keen on the assignment and found things quiet when he arrived. (Knightly, 1975:55)

The calm that greeted Remington when he wired Hearst "Everything is quiet. There is no trouble here. There will be no war. I wish to return," failed to deter Hearst from his objective when he wired the reply: "Please remain. You furnish pictures. I will furnish war" (Snyder & Morris, 1962:236). Shortly afterwards, the

American battleship *Maine* mysteriously blew up in Havana Harbor, which Hearst blamed on the Spanish, and the Spanish-American war commenced shortly thereafter.

Hundreds of reporters covered the war, and limited censorship was evident. However, the quality of reporting was generally dismal, with truth a scarcity. Looking for even greater newspaper sales, Hearst hired the famous Stephen Crane, author of *The Red Badge of Courage* to cover the conflict. However, being a novelist, Crane apparently had difficulty with Hearst's other reporters and transferred to the *New York World* covering the battle of San Juan Hill.

Despite censorship attempts, news media-military relations were good during the war, and both Richard Harding Davis and Stephen Crane accompanied American troops during the invasion of Puerto Rico. By this time the war was nearing its end and the quality of reporting was also deteriorating, not that it was ever good. According to Knightly, when correspondent Crane captured a town in Puerto Rico alone in advance of American troops as a joke, double-crossing Davis who was suppose to accompanying him, Richard Davis filed the following story:

While I slumbered, Crane crept forward between our advance posts and fell upon the doomed garrison. He approached Juana Diaz in a hollow square, smoking a cigarette. His khaki suit, slouched hat and leggings were all that was needed to drive the ...man who first saw him, back upon the town in disorderly retreat. The man aroused the village and ten minutes later the Alcalde...surrendered to him the keys of the cartel. Crane told

me that no general in the moment of victory had ever acted in a more generous manner. He shot no one against a wall, looted no churches, levied no forced loans. Instead, he lined up the male members of the community in the plaza, and organized a joint celebration of conquerors and conquered." (Knightley, 1975:57)

The Spanish-American War did have a more serious side. Reporters were wounded covering skirmishes, and *World* reporter Sylvester Scovel was perceived as "the most bitterly hated American in Cuba" with the Spanish placing a ten thousand dollar bounty for his capture (Bullard, 1974:410). He was eventually captured by the Spanish and imprisoned, but released unharmed. Bullard (1974) reported that censorship was severe after the sinking of the *Maine* on February 15, 1898. The American navy attempted to blockade the area, but the newspapers procured a fleet of fast boats to run the blockages and get the story to the public. As described by Bullard who originally wrote *Famous War Correspondents* in 1914:

After the press men were ordered away from Havana and the blockade was begun the work of the news boats became most exacting. The line of blockade stretched one hundred and twenty miles....Patrols would start at each end of the blockading fleet and meet at the middle, when one would take the news and sketches both had secured and start for Key West. (Bullard, 1974:414)

However, there were press successes and events which demonstrated good relations between the military and the press. As described by Bullard during the Philippine campaign:

The first great event of the campaign was the victory of Admiral Dewey in Manila Bay. In his official report the commander of the American fleet says: 'Mr. J.L. Stickney, formerly an officer in the United States Navy, and now correspondent for the *New York Herald*, volunteered for duty as my aide and rendered valuable services...." On the forward bridge of the flagship *Olympia*...Stickney heard Dewey speak the words which opened the battle, the well remembered 'You may fire when ready, Gridley.' The exact number of American newspaper men who saw service at the front in this short war cannot be stated. One authority puts the number at one hundred and thirty; another at one hundred and sixty-five, and a third sets the mark at two less than two hundred. Their numbers exceeded certainly the wildest dreams of the War Department. (Bullard, 1974:416-417)

In summary, the Spanish-American war was a relatively short conflict which established the circulation of newspapers and the careers of reporters. Although there were some censorship and access problems, the war was generally well covered with nearly two hundred reporters in the area of conflict. Relations between the press and military were relatively good.

F. WORLD WAR I: "LEAST REPORTED WAR--CENSORSHIP REIGNS"

In competition with the American Civil War, the First World War was probably the worst reported war in history. The degree of censorship by the Allied powers was nearly total, and although the Germans welcomed American correspondents into their ranks and managed their journalists more productively, heavy wartime censorship was the rule of the day on both sides of the conflict (Knightley, 1975: 80-112). Knightly saw World War I as the pinnacle of war correspondents being used as State propaganda machines:

In Britain, under the Defense of the Realm Act, a system of censorship was created so severe that its legacy lingers today. The willingness of newspaper proprietors to accept this control and their co-operation in disseminating propaganda brought them wars of social rank and political power. But it so undermined public faith in the press. (Knightley, 1975: 80-81)

As the war progressed, as mechanized slaughter reached a scale never before envisaged (nearly 10 million killed in the fighting or as a direct result of it, 21 million wounded), and as a rotting corpse on barbed wire became a symbol of a world gone mad, so the propaganda machine that had made possible the transition from peace to war multiplied like a tumour on the brain of Europe. (84)

The German government had complete control over all press information and facts (Lasswell, 1957: 165-66). German censors had to approve all information, and Britain also held an iron fist over press freedom. According to Knightly:

Censorship had been imposed on August 2, 1914, and [Lord] Kitchener's only concession to informing the public about the military situation was to appoint an officer, Colonel Sir Ernest Swinton,...to write reports on the conduct of the war. (Knightley, 1975: 86)

The difficulties were immense. Kitchener had ordered that any correspondent found in the field should be arrested, have his passport taken, and be expelled. (88)

By June 1915, the British government finally pressured the military to accept a few journalists into the battle area and accompany British troops. However, the welcome mat was worn out long before their arrival. The British officers were outwardly hostile to the journalists, and each journalist had a personal censor assigned to review any transcripts:

Lower-ranking regular officers were extremely hostile to the idea that there would be war correspondents 'prying around' and 'giving the whole show away.' So they were...allowed to go nowhere without a conducting officer...instructed to waste the correspondent's time as much as possible. These traveling

censors went wherever the correspondents went, lived with them, ate with them, read their dispatches, and even examined their private letters.... (Knightley, 1975: 96)

When the United States entered the war on April 6, 1917, American correspondents, although more creative and maverick than the British and French journalists already discouraged by severe censorship, fared only slightly better regarding access to war news. They faced the same censorship barriers as the other allied journalists.

One of the first and most experienced American war correspondents to arrive in Europe was Richard Davis from the Wheeler News Syndicate. His experience was devastating and depressing. He was arrested by the British and placed under guard, then captured and nearly executed by the Germans. Then, in disgust, he returned to the United States out of frustration of not being permitted access to the front lines (Knightley, 1975:115-6).

Irvin S. Cobb, war correspondent for the *Saturday Evening Post*, was also captured by the Germans and jailed. However, the German military leaders decided to take advantage of his presence by inviting Cobb to a propaganda feast, providing him with a two week tour of the German war machine and latest weapons. Moreover, after a controversy caused by an interview with General Kitchener in which Kitchener was not suppose to be quoted, but was, Cobb also left Europe and returned to America in disgust over the restrictions (Knightley, 1974:117).

There were few journalistic successes, but William G. Shepherd served as one because of his political savvy. He managed good stories by interviewing Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty. Then, when visiting British General Headquarters (GHQ) at Saint-Omer on April 22, 1915, wrote an account of the first poison-gas attack on the Western Front, and also reported on the first German Zeppelin raid on London (118).

After the Russian front collapsed, the French were on the verge of collapsing, and the British were tiring of the War. Headed by Sir Gilbert Parker, an apparently successful effort was made through manipulation of the American press by the British propaganda bureau to persuade America to enter the War. As explained by Knightly:

Parker spent the war analyzing the American press and decided on ways of influencing it. He then compiled a mailing list of Americans likely to be able to sway public opinion, and he used this as a basis for his propaganda campaign. Under Parker's direction, British efforts to bring the United State into the war...penetrated every phase of American life, from the pulpit to the classroom, from the factory to the office. It was one of the major propaganda efforts of history, and it was conducted so well and so secretly that little about it emerged until the eve of the Second World War.... (120-121)

Another aspect of WWI was the official government accreditation requirements for war correspondents assigned to the American Expeditionary Force. Some would

label them rigorous, and others ludicrous. The following are examples of government requirements to be met for certification as an official war correspondent:

1. Personal interview with the Secretary of War or designated representative.
2. Swear an oath to 'convey the truth to the people of the United States.'
3. Write by pen an autobiographical sketch to include a discussion of the reporter's character, work history, experience, and health.
4. State what the reporter planned to do and where he or she planned to go in Europe.
5. Pay \$1,000 to the army to pay for equipment.
6. Have the newspaper post a \$10,000 bond to be forfeited if the reporter violated any rules. (Hershey, 1966: 44-45)

During the interim years between the end of World War I and the start of American involvement in World War II, war correspondents were involved in reporting the major events leading to the Second World War, and predicted our involvement before American public opinion supported such option. Beginning in

1931, Japan launched savage military operations against China, including such acts as the massive bombing of Canton, the battle of Shanghai, and the Japanese sinking of the American gunboat *Panay* in the Yangtze river (Knightley, 1974:270-271).

One reporter who stood out during this period for his "behind-the-scenes" reporting was Edgar Snow. Snow was more concerned with the causes and effects of conflicts rather than the event itself. As explained by Knightly:

Snow saw the hypocrisy of the British and American expressions of sympathy at what was occurring in China. Although newspapers gave prominence to the Japanese aggression, they did not write that the United States was the main supplier of war materials to Japan until as late as July 1939. They did not mention the British companies that had contracts to supply the Japanese in China..... (271)

He even saw beyond the immediate horror of the rape of Nanking (when 300,000 Chinese civilians were murdered by Japanese soldiers in an orgy of rape and plunder) to the fact that this would lessen political antagonisms between various Chinese groups and intensify the opposition to Japan. (272)

G. WORLD WAR II: "FULL CENSORSHIP AND PRESS-GOVERNMENT UNITY"

Although press reports from China were relatively free and open, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, American censorship of the press became routine, as well as the government funneling of false information to the press to prevent divulging of actual battle damage and other military secrets. Details of the Pearl Harbor attack were themselves censored by the military with the likely reason to prevent a national panic and to prevent enlightening the Japanese regarding the full extent of the damage (Knightley: 273). With the Pacific Fleet basically destroyed, America's West coast was open to Japanese invasion. If the Japanese continued to press their attack on Pearl Harbor, there was little remaining to prevent occupation of the Hawaiian Islands by a determined Japanese ground assault.

Wartime censorship of the news was a routine and highly organized and well funded endeavor. The news media became part of the war effort. All forms of communication were highly censored. As explained by Knightley:

The Office of Censorship, under Byron Price, formerly the executive news editor of the Associated Press, dealt with censorship of all civilian modes of communication: reading millions of letters, checking cables and telegrams, tapping telephone calls, vetting films, and ensuring that newspapers and radio stations followed the *Code of Wartime Practices*, which the censors compiled and frequently revised.... (275)

Outside America, control was simpler. Correspondents were not allowed in the theaters of war unless they were accredited, and one of the conditions of accreditation was that the correspondent must sign an agreement to submit all his copy to military or naval censorship....Their interests and those of the war correspondents were diametrically opposed. Correspondents seek to tell as much as possible as soon as possible; the military seeks to tell as little as possible as late as possible. Since the armed forces ...were running the war, censorship was spectacularly successful. (274-276)

War correspondents went along with the official scheme for reporting the war because they were convinced that it was in the national interest to do so. They saw no sharp line of demarcation between the role of the press in war-time and that of the government.... (276)

It's true that it was difficult to discern fact from fiction during war coverage. However, war thrives on deceit and deception, and the military has the responsibility to become proficient at such tasks to spare American lives and defeat the enemy. Keeping the enemy off-balance and second guessing their own intelligence is an important aspect of war. True to a large extent during World War II, *truth is usually the first casualty in any war, especially larger ones with more at risk.*

Regardless of the particular war, the justification used to implement censorship operations by the government can be summarized as follows:

- (1) Improve morale in the field and at home
- (2) Shape public opinion for support of the war
- (3) Save government or personal embarrassment
- (4) Deceive the Enemy -- Keep them guessing
- (5) Maintain Security/Secrecy of Military Operations
- (6) Enable effective Counterintelligence and Psychological Operations

Historically, problems arise when war correspondents attempt to be military strategists and tacticians rather than reporters, and often second guess the military leadership on the wisdom of their actions. If a military operation obviously goes wrong, this may become less of an issue, but to prejudge actions before the results are in can be quite another, and such pre-judgment has historically deteriorated good military-press relations. The case of General MacArthur illustrates the potential problems associated with a non-censored wartime environment.

On December 8th, 1941, General Douglas MacArthur was responsible for defense of the Philippines after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, to include protection of his air force and other military assets. Nine hours after being alerted to a possible Japanese assault on his installations, his air force was destroyed on the ground by a Japanese attack. As described by Manchester:

He was a gifted leader, and his failure in this emergency is bewildering. His critics have cited the catastrophe as evidence that he was flawed: They are right; he was. But he was in excellent company...Napoleon...Washington...Stonewall Jackson. (Manchester, 1978: 230-231)

One can understand, under these circumstances, that a war correspondent may have ample justification to criticize a commander who had nine hours of warning of an impending attack and failed to take action, resulting in significant loss of forces. However, during the war such specific information was heavily censored. But what if there was no censorship, and the American press, in a herd atmosphere, blasted MacArthur over the affair resulting in his relief from command? What would have been the impact on the prosecution and outcome of the war? The following statements made after the war may well highlight the resulting loss which could have occurred:

Here his long years of studying military feats of the past were to reap spectacular harvests. Altogether [MacArthur] would make eighty-seven amphibious landings, all of them successful, cutting Japanese escape routes and lines of communications. Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, chief of Britain's Imperial General Staff and his country's senior soldier, would write in his diary that MacArthur 'outshone Marshall, Eisenhower and all the other American and British Generals including Montgomery.... (Manchester, 1978:322)

MacArthur, however, possessed a tactical arm Genghis Khan and Napoleon had lacked: air power. His bombers and fighters would permit him to execute triple envelopments....The shortening of the Pacific war and of Allied casualty lists was incalculable. John Gunther would write 'MacArthur took more territory, with less loss of life, than any military commander since Darius the Great.' (Manchester, 1978: 322)

In another case, after the decisive Battle of Leyte Gulf, and achieving strategic surprise with his landing on Leyte, MacArthur's advance proceeded very slowly and cautiously, and thus received criticism from the press. When asked what the journalists should be told about the slow progress, MacArthur said, *"Tell them that if I like I can finish Leyte in two weeks, but I won't! I have too great a responsibility to the mothers and wives in America to do that to their men. I will not take by sacrifice what I can achieve by strategy"* (Manchester, 1978:461).

Based upon available evidence which includes official correspondence, military regulations, reports, interviews, and congressional testimony, news media-military relations during the Second World War could only be described, if compared to contemporary standards, as excellent despite formidable censorship. For example, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in a May 1944 letter to all unit commanders of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, considered accredited war correspondents as "quasi-staff officers" (Appendix B, Atch 1).

During World War II, a full system of news media censorship was established and implemented that far exceeded the censorship provisions of any subsequent

conflict up to the time of this study. Available at the National Archives is a copy of the document "*Regulations for War Correspondents*," dated 1944, established for war correspondents accompanying the Allied Expeditionary Force in the field. This is particularly applicable as a comparison to the Gulf War because they were issued just prior to the June 6, 1944 Invasion of Normandy, and involved a major military buildup and ground invasion. General Eisenhower wrote the forward to that document which, even in those dark days of the world's greatest conflict, summarized similar problems faced during the Gulf War and those to be confronted in future conflicts:

With regard to publicity, the first essential in military operations is that no information of value shall be given to the enemy. The first essential in newspaper work and broadcasting is wide-open publicity. It is your [correspondents'] job and mine to try to reconcile these sometimes diverse considerations.

I well appreciate that the man in the street is entitled to be informed about his country's forces and of the progress of the war. He is vitally interested, and the fullest and most accurate information, compatible with the maintenance of military security, should be made available to him. Only by the willing cooperation of the general public in the war effort can we be victorious.... (Eisenhower, 1944:3-4)

Of the above statement, the last sentence may be viewed as the most important element, one which seems to have proven itself during the Vietnam War. Since war is a battle of political will as well as military might, public support for the war effort is vital to any military operation, and the news media's ability to dramatically affect public opinion makes the media itself a tool of the war effort and our nation's system of defense, whether or not contemporary news organizations or correspondents view themselves in such light. During World War II, the government and military did.

Correspondent Accreditation

Accreditation of war correspondents during the Second World War was a controlled procedure which appeared more strict than present requirements. In summary, accreditation of American correspondents required the following steps or controls:

(1) Correspondents had to submit an application to the Public Relations Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), London.

(2) Approval for War Correspondents to accompany Allied forces in the field rests finally with the Supreme Allied Commander, AEF. The Supreme Commander had the right to reject any application without assigning a reason for such an action.

(3) SHAEF decided from time to time the total number of war correspondents accepted in any particular area.

(4) A prerequisite of accreditation to SHAEF was that the applicant already hold a license as an accredited correspondent to one of the U.S., British, or Canadian Forces.

(5) Correspondents must also have approved overseas visas to be able to land with Allied forces. (see Appendix B, Atch 2:6-8).

Normally, war correspondents held the status of military officers of varying rank, but usually the rank of Captain in the Army or Lieutenant in the Navy, an equivalent rank, and were then subject to military or air force law and direction (Appendix B, Atch 2:9). During Operation Desert Storm, accredited war correspondents were assigned the courtesy rank of "Major," but were not subject to military law or viewed as "members of the commander's staff."

Correspondents assigned to SHAEF were normally accompanied by "conducting officers," or "monitors," assigned by the senior military public relations officer, unless special authority was given to travel unaccompanied. Correspondents were also not permitted to leave the force or unit to which they were assigned without prior permission of the military (Appendix B, Atch 2:11).

The Supreme Commander, SHAEF, was responsible for assisting and providing war correspondents with the facilities required to file their news stories. According to regulations, war correspondents were "free to converse with the forces whenever they wish, subject to the approval of the officer in charge of the forces in question."(Appendix B, Atch 2:12). Other limitations included a request that they "refrain from discussing political questions, from conversing with men on guard or at work, or from discussing subjects which are clearly secret" (12).

Another stipulation was that any war correspondent could have his license revoked, be suspended from work, or removed from the theater of operations by the Supreme Commander because of "distortion or other violations of the approved messages, pictures, captions, commentaries...from the Field by the Correspondent's own office" (13).

Regarding military control over war correspondents, the senior military Public Affairs Officer, by regulation, was to be considered the correspondents' "Commanding Officer," with "all communications on official matters addressed to him." Furthermore, "Senior Officers should not be approached either in person or by letter except through the Senior PR Officer concerned, or present," and any complaints by the war correspondent of whatever nature were also to be directed to the Senior PR officer (Appendix B, Atch 2:16-17). Regarding war correspondents' quarters, they were directed to live in whatever places were allotted to them--period.

Censorship

Regarding the issue of press censorship, Appendix B, Atch 2:22) of the SHAEF regulation listed the details of the censorship to be imposed upon war correspondents with the Allied Expeditionary Forces, and are summarized as follows:

(1) Press Copy: All material for publication in the Press including captions for photographs, for newsreel commentaries and for broadcasting will be submitted for censorship in triplicate, or as required locally. Censorship regulations will be issued by the Supreme Commander, Allied Forces.

(2) Photographs, Films and Sketches: Basically the same as above.

(3) Private Correspondence: Private and personal correspondence (even letters to Mom) had to be submitted for censorship. Correspondents were not permitted to seal their own letters. This requirement was also applicable to all service members in the AEF (22-24).

Operational security, concerned with the success of military actions and the safety of Allied forces, was always the major consideration against an intelligent and formidable foe. However, as in contemporary times, the censors of World War II had to deal with the same problems plaguing current military leaders. As stated in the wartime regulation: "It is impossible to lay down permanent directions on matters

to which reference is forbidden. In certain cases, the position may be affected by local considerations and by operational developments (23).

According to the aforementioned regulation, references to the following could not normally be made in news reports for security reasons:

- a. Composition and location of any units of the Allied Forces.
- b. Details of movements of forces, personnel or equipment.
- c. Operational orders.
- d. Plans and intended operations.
- e. Casualties.
- f. Organization.
- g. Place or location names.
- h. Camouflage and decoy methods.
- i. Names and numbers of any units of the Allied Forces, unless specifically released.

- j. Speculation on any of the above.
- k. Caution should also be exercised in dealing with weapons or equipment of war (e.g. naval vessels, aircraft, etc.).
- l. Generic or general language may be used when referring to military units such as "an artillery unit," or "an American squadron, etc. (23-24)

The definitions, types, objectives, policy, responsibilities, and procedures regarding press censorship directed by SHAEF Headquarters in a declassified memorandum dated April 18, 1944, can be reviewed in Appendix B, Atch 3. Within this document, the basic objectives of the Field Press Censorship organization was to stress (1) Security, (2) Speed of processing stories, (3) Consistency in censorship standards, and (4) to provide censorship guidance and assistance to war correspondents (Atch C:1). Furthermore, military training courses were established to help censorship officials to reach these goals (Appendix B, Atch 4).

I observe little in the above Field Press Censorship standards that differ from the public affairs objectives during Operation Desert Shield or Desert Storm, or which differ from the control that war correspondents were requesting in Korea.

In summary, according to the Congressional Research Service report commissioned by Congress, the researchers discovered the following censorship actions taken during the Second World War:

In 1940, "the President issued E.O. 8381, the first presidential directive establishing security classification policy and practice for national defense information" (U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations, Gov. Secrecy, 1991: 854-855).

"On December 21, The Secretary of the Navy formally asked the media to cease disclosing information, including photographs or other depictions, concerning troop movements, vessel or aircraft deployments, etc. Communications media generally cooperated.

In September 1941, 'both the Army and Navy announced that press censorship plans had been formulated to control information flowing from the United States in the event of a national emergency' (Gottschalk, p.39).

"The day after the attack on Pearl Harbor...the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 'was given temporary powers to direct all news censorship and to control all other telecommunications traffic in and out of the United States" (39).

"Eleven days after the Pearl Harbor attack, the first War Powers Act was signed into law, conferring on the President authority

to censor all communications from the United States with foreign countries" (55 Stat. 838).

On January 15th, 1942, the Office of Censorship issued its first voluntary code of wartime practices for newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals. The same occurred for broadcasting and radio on January 16th (Summers, 1942).

Other significant works regarding wartime censorship requirements were well explored by Gattschalk (1983), Wiggins (1964), Graybar (1979), and the reprint of the SHAEF report *"Press Censorship in The European Theatre of Operations, 1942-1945."*

H. THE KOREAN WAR: "A CONFUSED PRESS AND CENSORSHIP FLUCTUATION"

During the Korean War of 1950-1953, once again the question regarding military-press relations arose. However, when the North Koreans came crashing across the border, the United States was quite unprepared for battle with either the North Koreans or the news media. At the time, the American government and United Nations were focusing on saving the few square yards remaining of South Korea.

The war started with an American retreat with scenes of green American soldiers retreating in panic and fear at the Communist onslaught. This was the image reported at the start of the war. Initially, there was no censorship because no system of censorship, except voluntary self-censorship, existed (Knightly., 1975:336-337).

Correspondents in Korea had a significantly more difficult time than those in the Persian Gulf Conflict of 1991, at least during the outset of the Korean War. As described by William Manchester:

Press headquarters at Taejon was in a dingy, rat-infested government building. The correspondents had one large room in which to sleep, eat, write, and fight. There was one military telephone line to Tokyo, into which each correspondent shouted his story....Rutherford Poats of the United Press borrowed some carrier pigeons from the Japanese newspaper Mainichi, but after the first bird took eleven days to fly from Korea to Tokyo he abandoned their use. (Manchester, 1978: 338)

The Department of the Army conducted a study, filed in the Office of the Chief of Military History, entitled "*Command and Press Relations in the Korean Conflict.*" This was a detailed study by the Army using actual 1950-1953 Department of the Army G-3 files and reports, narrative Historical Reports written by field and headquarters commands, Far East Command (FEC) Monthly Command Reports, the Eighth Army War Diary, and other primary sources.

According to the Army study, General MacArthur's initial approach to news media-military relations during the Korean War was one of limited restraint. He informed correspondents that he would not invoke censorship and insisted that the correspondents establish voluntary controls sufficient to insure the security of military

operations and the safety of personnel (Senate Report, 1991:867). The following policy guidelines were read to the correspondents by MacArthur's information officer:

- (1) Newsmen should not report troop movements, proposed or in progress.
- (2) They should not disclose the location of units, air bases, headquarters, or other installations.
- (3) They should name only major units, and these only after their commitment to the conflict had been officially announced.
- (4) They should remember that the telephone was not a secure means of communication (867-868).

By August 1950 there were approximately 330 news correspondents in the Far East Command, with an average of about 250 over a period of time (Senate, 1991: 868). Logistical support for the correspondents was always a problem, particularly during the beginning of the conflict. However, the voluntary system of censorship did not appear to be working. Reporters were not sure what did or did not violate security under such general guidelines (Knightly, 1975:337). According to the Army's historical report:

Under the code of voluntary censorship, the disclosure of security information became virtually a daily occurrence. Many

of the disclosures were unintentional in that even the most conscientious of newsmen could not always correctly judge what did or did not at a given moment constitute vital military information. The fiercely competitive nature of reporting also caused correspondents to violate security. The hard truth was that the media first to offer the news would gather the larger number of readers or listeners. It was unlikely, therefore, that one correspondent would remain silent for security reasons while a less scrupulous rival reported all the information he could obtain. (Senate. 1991: 869)

Alarmed by the reports coming out of Korea, members of Congress, too, called on the press and radio to stop disclosing troop movements in the Far East. By September 1950, Department of Defense officials in Washington concluded that the code of voluntary censorship was not effective and began searching out through correspondence with General MacArthur the means and date by which command censorship of all public information media could be put into effect in the Far East Command. (869)

By October 1950, a string of MacArthur military victories convinced Washington officials that they "no longer contemplated the imposition of command censorship but now supported...command pressure to insure the security of vital information through the system of voluntary controls," and relayed this message to

General MacArthur (Senate Report, 1991:870). Regardless, security violations continued and this became a more pressing problem when communist China entered the war.

On December 12, 1950, in an effort to prevent the publication of information important to operational security, the following new guidelines were issued to correspondents:

- (1) Release no information on planned activities or movements in progress of United Nations forces.
- (2) Release no enemy movements with respect to our boundary, weakness in our position, or undefended portions of our lines.
- (3) Release no information concerning the effectiveness of enemy or United Nations material.
- (4) Release no report of activities or locations of friendly troops except in terms of division, unit or separate force. (Senate Report, 1991: 871)

This new approach reflected an unfavorable turn of events in the War when the UN forces were retreating. As a result of a meeting between the Secretary of Defense and media representatives in December 1950 regarding the problem of security leaks,

General MacArthur "was informed that the news representatives...felt that the security of information from the combat area was solely the responsibility of the military. They believed further that the military had the responsibility to provide maximum information consistent with security, and to give adequate guidance and facilities for news gathering..."(871). According to the report:

While censorship per se was not ordered, MacArthur received instructions on 6 December to impose a news blackout and impound pertinent communication media under his control in Korean areas whenever he judged that military necessity require such action.

'Effective immediately,' the FEC information officer announced, 'all press stories, radio broadcasts, magazine articles and photography pertaining to military operations were to be submitted for clearance before transmission.' Within the FEC public information office a Press Advisory Division was established to handle censoring tasks in Tokyo. In Korea, the Eighth Army organized a Press Security Division within its information office to perform censorship duties there. (872)

Surprisingly, according to both the Army's historical report and an extensive study of wartime news media performed by Phillip Knightley, although some newsmen protested the above censorship, an estimated 90% of the news correspondents favored it:

Contrary to appearances, they recognized the importance of military security and were convinced, as were home offices, that only official guidance could insure it. Some actively sought military censorship as a means of reducing the keen competition among themselves. (Senate Report, 1991: 872)

As described by Knightly:

So, rather than continue with voluntary censorship--described by one correspondent as 'you-write-what-you-like-and-we'll-shoot-you-if-we-don'-like-it' -- the correspondents found themselves in the unusual position of imploring the military authorities to introduce full, official, and compulsory censorship. (Knightley, 1975:337)

According to the Army study, still photographs, motion picture film, and taped radio broadcasts were also subject to the same criteria as press releases. According to the report, "any photographs that could be recaptured by the enemy for propaganda uses were banned. All tape recordings, the newest techniques in combat recording, were auditioned by censors...[with] offending passages snipped out" (Senate Report, 1991:875).

One major problem during the Korean conflict was that press releases frequently underwent a system of "double censorship," one at Eighth Army level and then again

at Far East Command headquarters. By March of 1951, General Ridgway recommended to General MacArthur that the sole censorship function be transferred to the theater headquarters, a recommendation which was adopted. On June 15th, 1951, a single censorship office in Tokyo, with an operating detachment in Korea, processed all news media releases (Senate Report, 1991: 876).

The fundamental conclusion regarding news media-military relations in Korea was that it was complex, often confusing, and ever changing. This is not to be unexpected considering the change of military circumstances on the battlefield or the nature and location of the conflict itself. There are variables which change and affect the ground rules. The Army study reached the following conclusion regarding news media-military relations during the Korean conflict:

In moving from an unworkable code of voluntary censorship to a compulsory review of press and radio reports, the criteria of censorship grew lengthy and detailed. The amendments and additions, though, accompanied changes in the military situation. In protecting vital military information, the censors actually applied only two basic measurements: (1) Would this release of a report offer aid and comfort to the enemy, and (2) Would its release adversely affect the morale of United Nations troops fighting in Korea. Seasoned correspondents understood the need for security precautions. Their reports often passed through censorship without any cuts. Some inexperienced newsmen, however, were out for "by-line" recognition and

sometimes went to great lengths to evade the clearance procedures in their efforts to get stories into print or on the air.
(Senate Report, 1991:881)

I. VIETNAM: "NEW ERA IN FREEDOM OF THE PRESS"

News media-military relations during the Vietnam War can be characterized by limited censorship and nearly unlimited access. The major reasons why press control was not overly applied in this conflict was twofold: (1) It was not initially an American War, but a war between North and South Vietnam, and (2) Initially there was little coverage of the conflict by the American press, thus the American government encouraged press coverage and, at times, sponsored news media trips to Vietnam to enhance coverage. America was well into the war before it dawned on government officials that greater press restraints were required regarding American military operations which were gradually controlling the war.

Established June 25, 1965, DoD Directive 5230.7, the "*Wartime Information Security Program (WISP)*," finally terminated in January 1987, formed the highlight of the Vietnam era news media-military relationship. It replaced DoD Directive 5230.7, "*Censorship Planning*," dated May 29, 1959.

The function of WISP was to control and examine communications to prevent disclosure of information of value to the enemy, and to collect information of value to the United States (see Appendix C, Atch 1: DoD Directive 5230.7). Communications

was defined as "any letter, book, plan, map, or other paper, picture, sound recording, or conversation transmitted over wire, radio, television...or any other means (Atch 1:2).

There was also a "National WISP" which controlled and examined the communications entering, leaving, transitioning or touching the borders of the United States. The scope and authority of the director of the National WISP program was striking. The program director had control over all communications except the following:

Although there are no restrictions on the authority of the Director of WISP (to be established by the President), National WISP normally will not be exercised over Government communications, over non-government communications facilities allocated to Federal agencies, or those which may come under the control, use or supervision or inspection of Federal agencies. (4)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration was responsible for the overall coordination and direction of the National WISP policy and program within the Department of Defense. The service secretaries were also responsible for their respective organizations.

Under the WISP program, there were three major levels of review accomplished by the government over war correspondents outlined in DOD Directive 5230.7:

1. **Field Press WISP:** This was the security review of news material subject to the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces...including all information or material intended for dissemination to the public. It is normally conducted outside the borders of the United States.

2. **Primary WISP:** This was Armed Forces review performed by personnel at the company, battery, squadron, ship, station, base, or unit level on the personal communications of persons assigned, attached, or otherwise under the jurisdiction of a military unit.

3. **Secondary WISP:** An Armed Forces review performed on the personal communications of officers, civilian employees, and accompanying civilians [reporters] of the Armed Forces of the United States, and on those personal communications of enlisted personnel...not subject to Armed Forces primary review, or those requiring reexamination.

Field Press

The responsibility of *Field Press Wartime Information Security Program (WISP)* was to (a) "insure the prompt release to the public of the maximum information consistent with security, and (b) prevent the disclosure of information which would assist the enemy" (Appendix C, Atch 1:8-9). Field WISP was not responsible for correspondent accreditation, civil review, or providing of media communication facilities.

The overall policy or governing principle of Field Press WISP was that the security review of news material would be accomplished within the shortest practicable time, and that the maximum information should be released to the public consistent with denial of aid to the enemy (9).

Armed Forces WISP

The objectives of Armed Forces WISP were to: (1) prevent the disclosure of information which might assist the enemy or adversely affect any policy of the United States, and (2) collect and disseminate information resulting in the successful prosecution of a war.

Memorandum for Correspondents

The following discussion refers to the *Rules Governing Public Release of Military Information in Vietnam* effective 1 Nov 66 (MACV Directive 360-1, 29 March 1967).

MACV Directive 360-1 specified the ground rules for public release of information in Vietnam. Consistent with the norm of previous policies, the fundamental principle governing the release of military information in Vietnam was that "the maximum amount of information will be made available, consistent with the

requirement for security " (see Appendix C, Atch 2: MACV Dir 360-1, 1967, Page 1, Annex A).

The Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was designated as the sole releasing authority of all information. Official information was by daily press releases, daily press briefings, and special press handouts. The following Vietnam ground rules were quite generous:

VIETNAM GROUND RULES

Releasable Information:

- a. Arrival of major units in country when officially announced by COMUSMACV (MACV Chief of Information).
- b. Strength figures of US forces, by service, when officially announced.
- c. Official total casualty figures on a weekly and cumulative basis, as furnished by the DoD.
- d. Enemy casualty figures for each action or operation, daily and cumulatively.

- e. Casualties suffered by friendly forces announced as light, moderate or heavy (not exact numbers).
- f. Size of friendly forces involved in an action using general terms such as "multibattalion."
- g. Information regarding details of a tactical operation when released is authorized by COMUSMACV.
- h. Air operation targets hit, to include general location and category of target.
- i. Whether aircraft were land or carrier based, and the names of the carriers involved.
- j. Time of attack in general terms.
- k. General evaluation of success of the mission.
- l. Types of ordnance expended in general terms, such as 250-pound fragmentation bombs, 20mm cannon fire, etc.
- m. Number of missions and sorties over North Vietnam and Republic of Vietnam.

- n. Types of Aircraft Involved.
- o. The number of aircraft downed by hostile fire.
- p. Volume of enemy aircraft fire. (Appendix C, Atch 2:2-4)

Non-Releasable Information under Any Circumstances:

- a. Future plans, operations, or strikes
- b. Information on the Rules of Engagement
- c. Amounts of ordnance and fuel moved by support units or on hand in combat units.
- d. Exact number and type or identification of casualties suffered by friendly units.
- e. During an operation, unit designations and troop movements, tactical deployments, name of operation and size of friendly forces unless officially released.
- f. Intelligence unit activities, methods of operations, or specific location.

- g. The number of sorties and the amount of ordnance expended on strikes outside of RVN.
- h. Information on aircraft taking off for strikes enroute to, or returning from target area or while in progress.
- i. Identity of units and locations of air bases from which aircraft are launched on combat operations.
- j. Number of aircraft damaged or any other indicator of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of ground antiaircraft defenses.
- k. Tactical specifics, such as altitudes, course, speeds, etc. (General terms like "low" and "fast" may be used).
- l. Information on strikes which did not take place or are postponed or delayed.
- m. Specific identification of enemy weapon systems used to down friendly aircraft.
- n. Details concerning downed aircraft while rescue operations are in progress.

- o. Causality information by written or visual identification concerning specific persons should not be made public until after notification of Next of Kin by appropriate service personnel. (Appendix C, Atch 2: 4-5)

Unless one was accompanying a military unit, no media monitors accompanied reporters while in Vietnam.

For greater detail regarding media-press relations in Vietnam, one can refer to the October 1, 1963 House of Representatives government report "*United States Information Problems in Vietnam*" by the Committee on Government Operations (Appendix C, Atch 3) and the Senate Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th Congress, entitled "*News Policies in Vietnam*," held on August 17th and 31st, 1966 (Appendix C, Atch 4).

The October 1963 House report was concerned with the complaints by news media organizations that both U.S. officials and the Diem Government of South Vietnam were attempting to control stories regarding the conflict between the Diem government and Vietcong guerrillas. The problem was traced to a joint State Department-Defense Department-U.S. Information Agency directive on handling of correspondents in Vietnam. The State Department admitted that it was poorly drafted, and did not intend to restrict access to information about U.S. activities in Vietnam and was subsequently redrafted (Appendix C, Atch 3:3).

Remarks by Carl T. Rowan, then Deputy Secretary of State for Public Affairs at the panel discussion of Government Press Relations at New York University on September 29, 1961, were entered into evidence as an exhibit to the congressional report. A career journalist for most of his life, Rowan made the following observations:

I was not aware until taking on my present job just how 'scoop conscious' the American press remains. Many of the newsmen with whom I deal are far more concerned about their reputations than about how well informed the American public is. Far too few newsmen--or editors--are willing to weigh their stories against the national interest--especially if it means giving up a 'beat' and the opportunity to boast about it in a promotion ad.

I mention this, because I know that no meaningful discussion of a really serious problem can take place unless we get rid of this notion that all the good intentions are on one side and all the foul scheming on the other. (Atch 3:8).

Interestingly, in a statement made by Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, on 31 Aug 1966 at the Senate Hearings on "*News Policies in Vietnam*," he stated that the Government actually started funding the transporting of U.S. newsmen to Vietnam in 1964 as part of a program to enhance news coverage:

Back in 1964...there were only about 40 newsmen, including foreign journalists, in Vietnam. To assist in remedying this situation we began, in July 1964, a temporary program to transport U.S. correspondents to Vietnam. We had three main reasons for this program: (1) to give U.S.-based newsmen a better understanding of Vietnam and our involvement there, (2) to help assure a balanced output of on-the-scene news, and (3) to stimulate the news media to send experienced reporters to Vietnam under their own sponsorship.

By the Summer of 1965, the press corps in Vietnam had conducted a buildup of its own and increased from 40 to about 450....Since our objectives were largely accomplished, the program was terminated in mid-August 1965. Since then, the Department of Defense has not approved any military travel by newsmen to Vietnam. (Appendix C, Atch 4:68-69).

Regarding the amount of censorship exercised in Vietnam, Secretary Sylvester stated the following during Senate testimony:

There are a few agreed-upon voluntary restrictions which the newsmen in Vietnam observe at the request of our military people out there. There is no other restriction and there is no way any given story is seen beforehand by our people. This

puts on each newsman the responsibility for observance of these agreed-upon principles.

There have been two cases of men who have jeopardized the security of our troops in the judgment of the military people in Vietnam. These two men have had their accreditation lifted for 30 days. One of them has since gone back; the other one is also operating. (Atch 4:70)

Concerning the quality and quantity of news articles covering the war and freedom of the press during the Vietnam War, Secretary Sylvester and Eric Sevareid added the following comments:

Almost anybody who wants to get up off his feet and cover it, does. I have brought along a number of articles....I have had newsmen say that never before has there been such easy coverage, One was Eric Sevareid, another was Mr. Veysey of the Chicago Tribune. There are a large number of them. (Atch 4:76)

The really puzzling problem of reporting this war lies right with the nature of news and its processing....The lens of the camera or the lead paragraph of the newspaper story are like a flashlight beam in the darkness. They focus upon what happens to be moving. All else ceases to exist, and the phenomenon focused

upon tends to become in the minds of the distant readers and viewers, the total condition. (Atch 4:76-77)

For journalists, the physical facilities here, especially transportation, are the best I have ever seen, and the military press officers, the best trained. The normal, inevitable, and necessary tensions exist between press and military but the mutual trust here is certainly higher than it is inside the Pentagon. (Atch 4:77)

Wyoming Senator Gale W. McGee, Committee on Foreign Relations, made the following remark during the August 1966 Senate Hearings on *News Policies in Vietnam* regarding the comparison between news coverage during World War II and Vietnam:

I had lunch...10 days ago with one of our correspondents just back from Vietnam, where he said he had been for six or eight weeks. He made this observation; I do not know how valid it is. He had also reported World War II on the European front. He said there was all the difference in the world in the coverage problems. According to him...there seemed to be a much tighter lid on the reporters in World War II than there is in Vietnam. He raised the philosophical question about whether we could afford it that way or whether we were being smart playing it that way. But he was ready to confess that he had

no alternatives in view of our continual existence on a non-censorship or a freedom basis. (Appendix C, Atch 4:89)

The Vietnam experience permitted relatively open access to news media representatives to cover the war with little or no censorship. One reason for such unencumbered operations is the fact that the war started as a Vietnamese war rather than an American war, with little or no impact on American political or military operations. As the character of the war changed to an American dominated war, the reporting culture was already established, and consequently the American government failed to substantially change American news media restrictions as the war grew in size and scope. As the character of the conflict changes, the military may have to change the news media-military relationship to protect its politico-military interests.

J. THE GRANADA INVASION: "THE ULTIMATE NEWS BLACKOUT"

Operation Urgent Fury (October, 25, 1983) was the first post Vietnam test of not only the post Vietnam effectiveness of the American military establishment and the All Volunteer Army, but also the nature of the post Vietnam news media-military relationship.

This study has confirmed that a system of voluntary compliance ground rules regarding the press release of combat information was issued on July 14, 1965. According to Gottschalk (1983:49), "the press voluntarily observed the military security rules that were established even though the conflict was unpopular with the

media and the public." Only a relatively few violations were reported. According to a 1991 Congressional Research Service Report:

At the direction of the President, U.S. armed forces invaded the island of Grenada on October 25. The action was planned and executed largely in secrecy; no American news media representatives accompanied the invasion forces. 'The decision to keep the press away from the initial operation...was the express wish of General John W. Vessey, Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Appendix D, Atch 1:13-14)

In the face of military communications problems and other organizational difficulties, Army public affairs officers organized a pool of newsmen to visit Grenada under carefully managed conditions on October 27-30 1983. There was, however, no censorship policy governing reporting on the situation.

The Sidle Panel Report

This section is primarily based on the Final Report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Media-Military Relations Panel known as the **Sidle Panel Report**. The report was prepared by Major General Winant Sidle (USA, Retired), on August 3, 1984, and released by the Secretary of Defense on August 23, 1984. This was our military's first major study to attempt to improve news media-military

relations since its disintegration after Vietnam. This landmark study is included in Appendix E, Atch 1.

It is unfortunate, if not ironic, particularly after the blistering rhetoric by news media organizations over the initial exclusion of the press from covering the Granada Operation, that representatives from the news organizations refused to serve on this distinguished committee because they considered serving on a government body "inappropriate."

The Secretary of Defense also formed a permanent *Secretary of Defense Media Advisory Committee*, composed of eminent journalists and war correspondents, to advise him on the best methods of implementing the Sidle Panel recommendations (see Appendix E, Atch 2:SOD Statement 23 Aug 84, No. 450-84).

In a letter from General Sidle to General John W. Vessey, Jr, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the report was qualified regarding content. First, this report set aside the issue of First Amendment rights and did not provide a judgment in that area, deferring that examination to the legal profession.

The panel unanimously agreed that the media should cover U.S. military operations "to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission security and safety of forces (Appendix E, Atch 1:1). Second, the study did not conduct an assessment of the media handling during the Granada operation since the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not request it. The third issue merits a direct quote from General Sidle:

Finally, the matter of responsibility of the media. Although...touched on in the report...we feel we should state emphatically that reporters and editors alike must exercise responsibility in covering military operations. As one of the senior editors who appeared before us said, 'The media must cover military operations comprehensively, intelligently, and objectively.' The American people deserve news coverage of this quality and nothing less....It goes without saying, of course, that...the military also has a...responsibility...of making it possible for the media to provide such coverage. (*News Release, Appendix E, Atch 1: 2*)

The vital question that the third point addresses is that of news media responsibility. However, the senior editor's response ducks this central concern. The dual pillars required for building effective and responsible news media-military relations are *trust* and *responsibility*. Comprehensive, intelligent, and objective news coverage does not equate to responsible journalism. Responsibility is dependent upon how one uses such comprehensive, intelligent, and objective coverage and information. **The answer never addressed the question, and this is the central problem at the heart of media-military relations.**

What Constitutional article or amendment, or Supreme Court ruling, requires that the media act responsibly? There is none (Near v. Minnesota, 1931). This is why, when pressed on the issue as illustrated earlier in this paper, a senior newspaper editor of a major paper, when under attack on the issue during a round-table

discussion, blurted out defensively that "we have no [constitutional] requirement to act responsibly." This is not an isolated industry belief. The central issue is twofold: (1) Do rational human beings require a constitutional mandate as an incentive to act responsibly? (2) Under this philosophy of First Amendment deification, is the media capable of acting responsibly? Has their reasoning been so clouded by ideological filters that this is an impossible task? Upon the answer to these questions may lie possible solutions. Of course, we must define, to some degree, what it means to act responsibly.

In a 1985 Task Force report on news media-military relations, the task force made the following statement regarding responsibility:

Many critics of the news media, including military men, have called for a more 'responsible' press. Yet they are unable to agree on a definition of responsible or on how to enforce responsibility without destroying media independence under the First Amendment. We see responsibility as consisting, first, of news organizations assigning people with knowledge of military affairs to cover combat, and second, of their insisting on reporting and editing that are as fair, accurate, sophisticated, and comprehensive as battlefield circumstances permit.
(Braestrup, 1985:12)

Trust is another vital element which must be added to the equation to reach some semblance of news media-military cooperation. At one time, trust and

responsibility formed the core of human relations. We need not be overly sophisticated here. Let's examine the elementary definitions of trust and responsibility:

Trust: (1) Assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something; (2) one in which confidence is placed, to depend; (3) a charge or duty imposed in faith or confidence or as a condition of some relationship; and (4) to rely on the truth or accuracy of. (Webster, 1985: 1268)

Responsibility: (1) Moral, legal, or mental accountability; (2) reliability and trustworthiness; (3) able to answer for one's conduct and obligations; and (4) accountable and answerable for one's actions. (1005)

What is interesting about the *Sidle Report* is that nowhere in the Statement of Principles does the subject of media responsibility or requirements arise. It focuses primarily on government requirements and responsibilities: basically that the government has the responsibility to keep the public informed by permitting media access (Sidle, 1985.) However, the panel has commented that "actual or perceived lack of mutual understanding and cooperation could be largely eliminated through...having reasonable people sit down with reasonable people and discuss their problems" (Appendix E, Atch 1:15). Regardless, even the concept of reasonableness is relative to one's position, values, goals, ideology or beliefs.

Sidle Report Statement of Principle

The American people must be informed about United States military operations and this information can best be provided through both the news media and the Government. Therefore, the panel believes it is essential that the U.S. news media cover U.S. military operations to the maximum extent possible consistent with mission security, and the safety of U.S. forces.
(Atch 1:3)

The Sidle report's statement of principle encourages news media-government cooperation in keeping the public informed during military operations. It then continues to state that the above principle extends the major "Principles of Information" promulgated by the Secretary of Defense on December 1, 1983, as described below:

It is the policy of the [Department of Defense] to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and members representing the press, radio, and television may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy. Requests for information from organizations and private citizens will be answered responsibly and as rapidly as possible.... (Atch 1:3)

Furthermore, comments regarding the statement of principle continue with the panel stating that this principle is congruent with "A statement of Principle on Press Access to Military Operations" issued on January 10, 1984 by ten major news organizations:

First, the highest civilian and military officers of the government should reaffirm the historic principle that American journalists, print and broadcast...should be present at U.S. military operations. And the news media should reaffirm their recognition of the importance of U.S. military mission security and troop safety.... (Appendix E, Atch 1:3)

Where may we find in the above principles a statement regarding the responsibilities and actions to be taken by news media organizations other than the obvious generic media function of "reporting newsworthy events to the American public?" This researcher has yet to discover such a vital statement.

The following summarizes the **Sidle Panel** recommendations to the Department of Defense to improve news media-military relations:

Recommendation 1: That public affairs planning for military operations be conducted concurrently with operational planning. This includes reviewing all joint planning documents to assure that JCS guidance in public affairs matters is adequate.

Findings & Actions: After reviewing various DoD, JCS, and CINC documents, it appears that such actions have been taken.

Recommendation 2: If it becomes apparent that news media pooling provides the only feasible means of furnishing the media with early access to an operation, then planning should provide for the largest press pool as practical, and minimize the time from pool coverage to "full coverage."

Findings & Actions: In the Persian Gulf Conflict, military planners determined the need to implement two press pool arrangements. The first was activation of the DoD National News Media Pool, and the other was the Combat Press Pools organized in Saudi Arabia for coverage of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Geographic, technical, logistical, safety, and operational factors appeared to dictate such a decision. It must be remembered that news media organizations are opposed to media pools in principle because they direct, control, and limit access of media personnel by the government.

Recommendation 3: The Secretary of Defense should study the matter of whether to use a pre-established and constantly updated accreditation or notification list of correspondents in case of a military operation requiring the use of pools.

Actions: The news media organizations selected what individuals would be assigned to the Department of Defense (DoD) media pool, and provided a list in advance to the DoD.

Recommendation 4: That the basic tenet governing media access to military operations should be *voluntary compliance* by the media with security guidelines or ground rules established and issued by the military. They should be as few as possible and should be resolved in the planning process for each operation. Violations would mean exclusion of the correspondent from further coverage of the operation and exclusion from the pool.

Actions: The above recommendation was implemented during the Persian Gulf conflict. Ground rules and guidelines were approximately one page. A system of formal military censorship was not adopted, in contrast to the system implemented during World War II and other conflicts when there was a formal censorship apparatus.

Recommendation 5: Public Affairs planning for military operations should include sufficient equipment and qualified military personnel to assist correspondents in covering the operation adequately.

Actions: The definition of "adequate coverage" is open to subjective interpretation. Does this mean a "good faith effort?" The Persian Gulf conflict had problems concerning news coverage in that a number of Public Affairs (PA) officers were not fully qualified to perform their duties, delaying the filing of stories. Certain units also failed to have sufficient communications equipment to transmit news media stories, thus delaying such stories.

Recommendation 6: Planners should carefully consider media communications requirements, and if necessary and feasible, plans should include communications facilities dedicated to the news media.

Actions: The Joint Information Bureaus did possess press facilities, but considering the number of correspondents throughout the theater of operation, such facilities were minimally acceptable.

Recommendation 7: Planning factors should include provision for intratheatre and intertheatre transportation supporting the media.

Actions: Transportation was provided during the conflict for authorized press pool participants, but was not guaranteed for non-press pool journalists. Transportation was scarce throughout the conflict because of operational requirements.

Recommendation 8: Media understanding and cooperation should be improved by the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD-PA) by holding meetings between the top military public affairs personnel and news media organizations to discuss mutual problems.

Actions: The SOD has established an advisory panel composed of news media representatives and top military personnel to discuss media-military relations.

General Sidle's "optimum solution" to ensure proper media coverage of military operations would be:

...to have the military -- represented by competent, professional public affairs personnel and commanders who understand media problems -- working with the media -- represented by competent, professional reporters and editors who understand military problems -- in a nonantagonistic atmosphere. The panel urges both institutions to adopt this philosophy and make it work. (Atch 1: 17)

It is interesting to note in General Sidle's final comments that he approves of an "adversarial relationship between the media and the government as healthy and helps guarantee that both institutions do a good job" (16). However, General Sidle continues to state that:

...this relationship must not become antagonistic -- an 'us versus them' relationship. The appropriate media role in relation to the government has been summarized aptly as being neither that of a lap dog nor an attack dog but, rather, a watch dog. Mutual antagonism and distrust are not in the best interests of the media, the military, or the American people. (Atch 1:16)

***BATTLE LINES: A REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND TASK FORCE ON THE MILITARY AND THE MEDIA***

The *Battle Lines Report* on the news media and military relationship was drafted by a group of distinguished task force members to include the eminent author Shelby Foote; Professor Samuel P. Huntington, Harvard University; Charles Corddry, Defense Correspondent from the Baltimore Sun; Edward M. Fouhy, Executive Producer, NBC Network News; Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr, Army War College; Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Peter Braestrup, editor of the *Wilson Quarterly* among other prominent scholars (see Braestrup, 1985: Appendix E, Attachment 3).

The Task Force was convened to explore the nature of the conflict between the news media and military and recommend solutions to address the disintegration in relations. The premise of the study was that American information in the war zone is a civilian concern as well as a military one, and should not be an issue deferred to the commander in the field as it was in Granada (Braestrup, 1985:3).

One of the central problems which led to a blizzard of criticism from the news media regarding the Granada invasion was the lack of military planning concerning news media requirements, and the long delay in permitting the news media into the area of operation--approximately two days after the start of the invasion. Although little criticism emanated from the general public, public and private agencies saw danger in the action. As stated in the *Battle Lines* report:

Fortunately, the Grenada operation achieved its objectives quickly. But the government's failure, at the outset, to allow an independent flow of information to the public about a major military operation was unprecedented in modern American history. (Braestrup, 1985:3)

As we have observed in previous sections regarding the historical relationship between the news media and military, the above situation was not unprecedented. The qualifier was the statement "in *modern* American history."

The various conclusions, beliefs, and supporting rationale for each finding and recommendation offered by the Task Force are summarized below:

(1) The presence of journalists in war zones is not a luxury but a necessity:

Imperfect though it is, our independent press serves as the vital link between the battle field and the home front, reporting on military successes, failures, and sacrifices. By doing so, the media have helped to foster citizen involvement and support, which presidents, admirals and generals have recognized as essential to military success. (Braestrup, 1985:4)

This Task Force does not think that it is the mission of the press to mobilize public opinion for war. [This is the responsibility of the Chief Executive]. For reasons of security, the media have

always accepted restraints on the publication of news, ranging from embargoes and 'ground rules,' voluntarily adhered to by journalists, to outright military censorship on the battlefield. (4-5)

(2) The Task Force believes that this breach need not have occurred, and that no valid security reason existed for excluding all reporters from the immediate post-assault phase.

At the policy direction of the president or the secretary of defense, and with routine planning by the military, a small pool of journalists can always be elected and taken along, with reasonable notice, on a major operation. (4)

(3) The Task Force believes that just as the president and his civilian deputies bear the responsibility for prosecuting a war, so must they assume responsibility for policy decisions on press access and censorship.

The secretary of defense has taken the welcome step of assembling his own advisory group of veteran journalists, but he has yet to give unequivocal support to the notion that information policy is a civilian responsibility and not one that can be delegated [to the military].... (6)

(4) The Task Force believes that it is healthier for the press and for our democratic polity if such complicated constitutional issues are not left to the courts. The Task Force would far prefer to see press access to combat operations arranged, as in the past, through cooperative understandings between government and news media.

The reason for the above recommendation is the general belief, often unspoken, that if the issue of press access to combat zones was fought in the Supreme Court, it would lose and result in government authorization to permanently bar the news media from military operations at the government's discretion. As discussed earlier, previous Supreme Court rulings do not permit the news media unrestricted access, only access to places and events open to the general public. War zones are not normally open to the general public. Task Force member, Samuel P. Huntington, supported this view in a dissenting opinion.

(5) To preserve the security of U.S. military operations, The Task Force favors the use of clearly stated ground rules such as existed in Vietnam.

We regard a system of ground rules as less cumbersome and more effective than the mandatory, military field censorship used in World War II and Korea, which often led to unnecessary delays in the transmission of news. Although civilian authorities should lay down the broad outlines of information policy in combat, the Task Force recommends that the procedural details be left to the commander in the field. (8)

(6) The Task Force concluded that:

Thus, we believe that the president must be prepared to make the political effort--and, if necessary, pay the political price--to mobilize public opinion behind any military operation he authorizes. The press and television cannot repair inept leadership or flawed strategy, nor is it their business to try to do so. They cannot win or lose wars or attempt to remake the history they report. (13)

As summarized on page 21 of the Battle Lines Report, the bottom line to the issue of news media-military relations is one of mutual trust and comprehension. As long as a canyon exists between the news media and military over the issue of trust and responsibility, and an adversarial relationship continues to be fostered within the bowels of organizational culture and during personal interactions, an optimal working relationship can never develop.

K. PANAMA INVASION: "OPERATION JUST CAUSE" 1989

Shortly after U.S. armed forces invaded Panama on December 20, 1989, American news media organizations complained about restricted access to the operational setting due to military limitations on the number of individuals included in the accompanying press pool, the late arrival of pool members, and controls imposed by U.S. field commanders (Specter, 1989). Operation Urgent Fury, the 1983 invasion of Grenada, was seen as a total disaster for news media-military relations, and both the government and news media expected better cooperation and relations in future conflicts. To move in that direction, General John W. Vessey, Jr., then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appointed retired Army General Winant Sidle to study the press-military relationship with the objective of coming to some accommodation between the two institutions. Likewise, the *Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Military and the Media* convened and published a report in 1985 entitled *Battle Lines*, to also review the issue. Despite all the aforementioned analysis and reporting, the following American military conflict, Operation Just Cause, was viewed as another news media-military fiasco.

On December 20, 1989, President Bush ordered the invasion of Panama to dispose of General Noriega. Unfortunately, the media pool was activated too late to respond, most likely because of military secrecy considerations and questions over where the press pool should originate from, either Washington, D.C. or Panama (Hoffman, 1990; 1991). Secretary of Defense Cheney was responsible for final approval for activating the national press pool, and decided to use the Washington based group. According to the Hoffman Report:

Despite the attempt to keep a secrecy lid firmly in place, reports were appearing on TV and on the news wires Tuesday depicting unusual military activity at bases in the United States and Panama. Alluding to these reports, Cheney said 'we were very concerned about the situation--that the PDF (Panama Defense Force) might be waiting for us.' So Cheney said, 'we basically decided to notify the pool after the evening news Tuesday to minimize the possibility of leaks.' The 7:30pm callout guaranteed that the pool would reach Panama hours after the operation began just before 1 am Wednesday. (Hoffman, 1990:7-8)

Consequently, the news media never arrived early in the conflict, and never appeared to keep up with ongoing military operations and the chase after Noriega (Gergen, 1991:47-63). Once again, a study was commissioned to provide recommendations for future conflicts. On January 8, 1990, Pete Williams, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, asked Mr. Fred Hoffman to study the DoD National Media Pool deployment to Panama to discover what went wrong and provide recommendations. Mr. Hoffman provide 17 recommendations which were reproduced in a 1991 Senate Hearing on the media (Senate Hearing, 1991:781). In summary, the recommendations offered by Mr. Hoffman, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, are as follows:

1. The Secretary of Defense should issue a policy directive requiring full support for the press pool system and have such support integrated into planning at all levels.
2. All Joint Staff operational plans must have an annex with measures ensuring that the pool will move with the lead U.S. forces.
3. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs should closely monitor the development of such plans.
4. In the runup to a military operation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should send out a message ordering all commanders to give full cooperation to the media pool and its escorts.
5. The ASD(PA) should side with the media against the Secretary of Defense or JCS if required to prevent secrecy or other obstacles from blocking prompt deployment of a pool to the operational area.
6. After pool deployment, the ASD(PA) should be kept informed to solve press pool problems.
7. The ASD(PA) should consider deploying the pool in two sections, the first composed of a small group of reporters and photographers, and the second individuals with support equipment.

8. The national media pool should not be herded as a single unwieldy unit, but broken up after arriving at the scene of the action.

9. The press pool should be exercised at least once during each quarterly rotation with airborne or other military units.

10. During deployments, have regular briefings for pool newsmen.

11. There is a need to reorganize the office responsible for processing and distributing pool reports sent to the Pentagon. Resources are inadequate, and a contingency plan is required to add personnel in a crisis.

12. The ASD(PA) should consider creating a new pool slot for an editor to assist the journalist.

13. The pool escorting system needs overhaul. Pool escorts should be drawn from the most appropriate service, rather than limiting escort duty to officers of the Plans Division.

14. The ASD(PA) should require that all pool products be shared among the pool participants.

15. Participating pool organizations should share the cost of equipment, and store such equipment at Andrews AFB for ready deployment.

16. All assigned reporters should attend quarterly Pentagon sessions where problems can be discussed and rules and responsibilities underscored.

17. Public Affairs Officers from Unified Commands should meet periodically with pool-assigned reporters and photographers with whom they might have to work in some future crises. (Hoffman, 1991:105-107)

Defense Secretary Richard Cheney's response to the Hoffman Report was made during a question-and-answer session following remarks before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, D.C. on April 4th, 1990. As remarked by Secretary Cheney:

I have read Mr. Hoffman's report. It is a good report. I don't agree with all facets of it in terms of recommendations...I have no problem trying to improve on the operation. We already have efforts under way by...Pete Williams to adopt some of the Hoffman recommendations that make sense. He's working with the joint staff in that regard. But I will say that as long as I'm in this job, it's a decision I'm going to make on a case-by-case basis. Each circumstance is different and unique. (Hoffman, 1991:107-109)

J. THE GULF WAR OF 1990-1991

On February 15, 1991, Jerry W. Friedheim, president of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, former newspaper reporter, editor, and Congressional Fellow for the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, wrote a letter to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs holding hearings entitled "*Pentagon Rules on Media Access to the Persian Gulf War*," held February 20, 1991. At the request of committee members, he provided his opinion on a number of interrogatories regarding the major issues of news media access to wartime operations (Senate Hearing, 1991:1026). The following is a summary of the key points of his testimony:

(1) Since the Revolutionary War, American journalists traditionally have been allowed to accompany American troops on military operations, even when those actions depended upon the element of surprise.

(2) Mission security and troop safety interests have been protected by limiting the number of journalists accompanying the troops, by voluntary reporting restraints, by limited censorship of information that might aid the enemy, or by delay in the filing of dispatches, but not by the exclusion of all journalists.

(3) There are three major imperatives concerning the topic of press-military relations: (a) Military security vs. Informed Citizenry; (b) Government credibility with the public and Congress, and (c) Public Trust in the armed services. Consequently, it can be seen that each constitutional institution has a stake in doing things right. The press must respect the need for military security because it is right. The military must respect the need of the people to know what their uniformed men and women are doing...because that is right. The government must nourish its own credibility and an open society's discourse because that is right. No institution must seek to bar another from the constitutional playing field--or the entire game of freedom will end.

(4) The exact nature and extent of media access to any military operation must depend upon the specifics of each, separate military operation. The press will not normally and need not normally know those specifics in advance. Media access provided by the government in any instances should be the maximum amount possible at the earliest possible time consistent with mission security and troop safety.

(5) Recommend the use of Press Pools when full press access is impossible. (Friedheim, 1991:1-3)

Addressing the first point offered by Friedheim, although it may be true that journalist accompanied American troops during the American Revolutionary War, the relationship between journalists, the military and public was not as caustic as in modern times. Journalists were not isolationists, but well imbedded in the colonial communities for which they required contact and supplies from the inhabitants to survive.

Regarding the second point, historically, it is true that in past conflicts mission security and troop safety was protected by limiting the number of journalists, censorship, voluntary reporting restraints, or by delayed filing of dispatches. However, as seen previously in this study, there is also precedent for near exclusion of journalists from the combat area, involuntary reporting restraints, and total censorship.

Third, and once again, although journalists (i.e., Jerry Friedheim) list major imperatives concerning the responsibility and trust required by government, Congress, and the military to serve the public interests, they fail to address an equally important imperative: the acknowledgment that the news media, like government, is occupying a special position of public trust in our society, protected by the Constitution itself, and is also obligated to exhibit the characteristics of trust and responsibility required of people and institutions occupying such special positions in our society.

Fourth, it is agreed by most that news media access provided by the government should be the maximum possible at the earliest possible time consistent with mission security, troop safety, and military-politico considerations.

Fifth, most authorities would also agree that the use of Press Pools, when full press access is impossible or unwise, should be continued.


In a 1991 Senate Hearing entitled, "*Pentagon Rules on Media Access to the Persian Gulf War*," a number of congressional representatives, private organizations, special interest and news media groups criticized the Persian Gulf media ground rules (Appendix F, Attachments 1-3). As discussed previously in this study, many of the legal issues regarding press access to military operations were resolved during prior and recent court cases, ruling in favor of the government in nearly all instances.

PERSIAN GULF MILITARY NEWS STRUCTURE

The following is a discussion of the news media organization during the Persian Gulf Conflict of 1991. To reduce confusion, the main structures will be explained.

The CENTCOM news media pool located in Saudi Arabia should not be confused with the *Department of Defense National Media Pool* which originates in the United States upon mobilization of American forces for military operations. As stated by CENTCOM, "the purpose and intention of the pool concept is to get media representatives to and from the scene of military action, to get their reports back to the Joint Information Bureau-Dhahran for filing--rapidly and safely, and to permit unilateral media coverage of combat and combat-related activities as soon as possible" (See Appendix G, Atch 1). See Figure 3 on the following page for the overall Department of Defense Public Affairs chain of Command.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Public Information Chain of Command
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm



KEY

Policy Guidance - - - - -
Direct Command _____

According to the Operation Desert Shield Ground Rules, the system consisted of two types of CENTCOM pools, 16 to 18 member pools for ground combat operations, and seven-member pools for ground combat and other coverage. The system was administered by "pool appointment coordinators" operating under ground rules issued by CENTCOM on January 14, 1991 (See Appendix G, Atch 1). Pool positions were divided among the following types of news media organizations which principally serve the American public: radio, television, newspapers, wire service, news magazines, pencil (print reporter), Photo, Saudi, and international. Each category of media appointed a pool coordinator who maintained a current list of members and a waiting list of reporters to be placed in the pool. Membership in the pools was to rotate every two to three weeks (Atch 1).

Members within each pool classification were required to share their media products with all other members of their medium. The Joint Information Bureau-Dhahran (JIB) would notify pool coordinators when a pool was being activated for assignment. The JIBs were manned 24 hours per day (See Senate Hearing, 1991: 246-278).

DoD Directive No. 5122.5 established the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and defines his responsibilities:

1. To serve as principle staff advisor and assistant to the Secretary of Defense for DoD public information, internal information, and Freedom of Information.

2. Ensure a free flow of news and information to the media, appropriate forums, the general public, and to the internal audiences of the Armed Forces, limited only by national security constraints as authorized by....statutory mandates.

3. Act as the releasing agency for DoD information and audio-visual materials to news media representatives. Evaluate news-media requests for DoD support and cooperation and determine appropriate level of DoD participation. (Appendix G, Atch 2:2-5)

As one can observe, the written policy directing the duties and responsibilities of the defense department's highest public affairs official is to insure the maximum dissemination of information to the public appropriate to the specific circumstances.

GOVERNMENT TREATMENT OF THE PRESS

Unlike the unfortunate circumstances suffered by correspondents from previous conflicts, contemporary government and military directives, regulations, and publications provide direction and guidance regarding the treatment and support of news media representatives. Under these regulations, the treatment of journalists is better than offered during most previous wars with the possible exception of Vietnam.

For example, according to Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication 5-02.2, Format, Annex F, F13-14, dated 30 March 1990, current during the Persian Gulf conflict, the media was accorded substantial administrative support in exchange for

abiding by media ground rules established for operational security considerations.

News media support included the following:

(1) The On-Scene Commander (OSC) will provide messing, billeting, transportation, and communications support to allow for filing of news stories and other support to the media if commercial facilities are not available.

(2) Services will be provided to the media on a reimbursable basis. *However, requirements for reimbursement should not interfere with the media's mission.*

(3) News media representatives will normally be afforded the privileges of an officer in the grade of O-4 (Major or Lieutenant Commander) for the purpose of messing, billeting, and transportation.

(4) A minimum of one comprehensive and unclassified briefing should be provided daily to news media representatives during the operation.

(5) Media communications traffic will be processed as soon as possible, contingent on the tactical situation.

(6) Courier flights should be provided as possible to deliver U.S. news material and products from the area of operation.

(7) The supported CINC will provide authorized media representatives with military travel into and within the area of operations when such travel is in connection with assignments to cover the operation and when commercial transportation is restricted or unavailable. The Joint Information Bureaus will also provide such transportation as required and available.

Past American and foreign journalists could have only dreamed of such support and service from their governments. Those journalist who wish for the "good old days" of combat press freedom either failed to study the history of war coverage or have forgotten some of the highly restrictive details from "the good old days" (Chronkite, Senate Hearing, 1991: 20-32).

Although the treatment of the news media during the Gulf conflict was quite good by historical standards, there were some restrictions placed upon military personnel and journalists regarding access to information and facilities. According to JCS Pub 5-02.2, Annex F-15/16:

Implementation of this [Public Affairs] PA plan presents a variety of problems in maintaining a balance between security and providing information to the public. This balance should not preclude providing maximum assistance to [news represen-

tatives] to support their coverage of the operation. Diplomatic and political considerations of all statements or news releases to media representatives should be weighed carefully at all echelons of command. (Senate Hearing, 1991: 264)

The following were operating guidelines for journalists present in the operating areas:

- a. Access to operations must be controlled. The media must not have access to intelligence centers or other classified areas.
- b. No correspondent will be granted access to classified information.
- c. "Off the record" statements will not be made in briefings or discussions with members of the media.
- d. Security will be governed by the provisions of current DoD Directives.
- e. The information bureaus must ensure that material released in the area is reviewed by the On-Scene Commander's (OSC's) staff for security considerations. (Senate Hearing, 1991:357-358)

NATIONAL MEDIA POOL GROUND RULES: DESERT SHIELD**The DoD National Media Pool Ground rules (Stateside Mobilization):**

In exchange for the aforementioned support to the news media by the military, certain ground rules or restrictions were required in return. The following summary describes the Ground Rules for the DoD Press pool effective as of April 13, 1990 and reissued on August 1990:

1. Prior to your departure, do not tell anyone that the pool has been activated.
2. You may not file stories or otherwise attempt to communicate with any individual about the operation until stories and all other information have been pooled with other pool members.
3. You must remain with the escort officers at all times until released.
4. Failure to follow these rules may result in expulsion from the pool.
5. The pool is a non-competitive pool, and all participants must share their reporting and photos on a timely basis. (Appendix G, Attachment 3)

Operation Desert Shield/Storm Combat Press Pools (In Theatre):

On December 14, 1990, Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, forwarded a memorandum to the Washington bureau chiefs of the Pentagon press corps to address complaints from correspondents in Saudi Arabia and to plan for combat coverage, should the need arise.

With the approval of Secretary of Defense Cheney and General Powell, a decision was made to form combat press pools within the theatre of operation. They agreed to provide a military C-141 aircraft to transport representatives of the U.S. news organizations who regularly cover the Pentagon in the event fighting occurs (Appendix G, Atch 4). The flight left Andrews AFB on 17 January 1991, the morning after the bombing began, with 126 news media personnel on board. Cargo planes were of very short supply at the time (Appendix H, Atch 1:19-2). The Combat Press Pools were different from the DoD National Media Pools and CENTCOM press pools in important ways, and should not be confused. The following highlights the difference between the pools:

DoD National Press Pool:

- This pool is composed of pre-designated personnel from the news media to be dispatched on a **no-notice** contingency basis to areas of combat by military transport at the very start of or prior to the start of combat operations.

- The pool members are sworn to secrecy and not permitted to notify or contact other reporters regarding their dispatch.
- The pool is dispatched from the United States to the area of combat.
- All news products are shared with other organizations.

Combat Press Pools:

- These pools are composed of assigned personnel who are dispatched on an **advanced prior notice** basis from either the continental United States or areas outside the U.S. to the operations area or theater of conflict.
- There is no secrecy requirement regarding their mobilization and dispatch into the AO
- They are established to enable sufficient numbers of journalist to cover the AO and report on combat operations

On December 13, 1990, the DoD established a contingency plan for media coverage of hostilities during operation Desert Shield, if such event should occur

(Appendix H, Atch 2). It must be remembered that Desert Shield was a defensive operation in which conflict was speculative. Desert Storm was the Allies' offensive operation in which conflict was a certainty.

The Contingency plan was a three phase plan concerned with deploying rotating correspondent pools "aligned with front line forces to permit combat coverage." Each pool consisted of 18 news media personnel with representatives from all the various types of media, and drawn from news personnel already in Saudi Arabia.

Phase I of the plan included the forming of two pools by the Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran, and the task of training and exercising the pool at least once every two weeks to become familiar with military operations, units, and equipment.

Phase II of the plan involved *actual deployment* of the pools when hostilities are imminent so the first stages of combat could be covered. Attempts at prepositioning correspondents would be made, and the pools increased to expand coverage over time as the war progressed. *The danger with a propositioning policy is that vigilant enemy intelligence agencies could interpret the presence of large numbers of media personnel at a particular location as the most likely location for a military offensive.*

Phase III would begin when Open or Unilateral Coverage was possible, and the pools would be disbanded and all media would operate independently, although under continued U.S. Central Command escort (Appendix H, Atch 2).

On August 26th, 1990, the OASD(PA) sent a message to USCENTCOM regarding policy on Media Travel during operation Desert Shield (Senate Hearing, 1991:349) in accompanying deploying forces into the field. Basically, this policy applied to those units stationed in Saudi Arabia only. News media requesting to accompany a military unit in the field were required to make their requests to the unit they desired to accompany. Once theater clearance is granted, CENTCOM "is hereby delegated authority to act as final approval authority for media travel into theater for the remainder of operation Desert Shield or until further notice"(349). Furthermore, "news media representatives will be provided a PA escort by the deploying unit."

U.S. CENTCOM Ground Rules for Desert Shield Version II:

[In effect until 15 Jan 91]

1. All interviews with news media representatives will be "on the record."
2. No specific locations will be used when filing stories. Stories must be datelined in general such as from "The Arabian Gulf," "Red Sea," etc.
3. You must remain with your military escort at all times until released.
4. Fourteen categories of information are listed as "Not releasable."

5. Interviews with military personnel...will be coordinated in advance by the Joint Information Bureau (JIB), and there will be no "Ambush" interviews.

6. The ground rules then list numerous categories of information which are not releasable and information which is releasable. Most Americans would consider them as common sense restrictions, but not always by media representatives. (Appendix H, Attachment 3)

Of course these ground rules had to be signed by each journalist under the statement: "I understand and agree to comply with all provisions of the Media Guidelines and any additional instructions that my media escort may provide"(Atch 3:3).

DoD Operation Desert Shield Ground Rules (14 Jan 91)

Operation Desert Shield News Media Ground Rules were almost identical to the CENTCOM rules and can be reviewed in Appendix H, Atch 5. The various versions of Operation Desert Shield Ground Rules can be reviewed in Appendix H, Atch 4).

Local Media representatives who covered only specific "hometown" military units were also given the opportunity to cover such units and deploy with them to Saudi

Arabia for a limited time only. Such correspondents were to return to the U.S. after 96 hours.

The reason for such limitations is that USCINCCENT capabilities to support the "Hometown Coverage" were extremely limited: There were more than 250 independent NMR's (News Media Representatives) currently being supported by the USCINCCENT JIB's and several thousand more NMR's have required visas for entry into Saudi Arabia. Therefore, "Hometown Coverage" NMR's and escorts should plan on minimal USCINCCENT JIB support" (Appendix H, Atch 6).

NATIONAL MEDIA POOL GROUND RULES: DESERT STORM

18 Jan 91: A message from USCINCCENT addresses the issue of unescorted correspondents attempting unilateral (independent) reporting of the war in violation of guidance in Ref A, Annex F OPORD /Desert Annex, dated 16 Dec 90. The message stated that "all PA personnel and commanders are reminded to review Ref A and when approached by non-escorted, non-pool correspondents, they should not permit coverage of their unit" (Appendix H, Atch 7).

The dangers inherent in news correspondents free roving over the battle area are obvious. First, without military escorts, they place themselves in physical danger of getting lost, captured or killed by enemy forces. Second, they may misinterpret what they hear or observe by not having the overall tactical or strategic background of the action, leading to false reports and inaccurate news reporting. Third, they can distract unsuspecting units and commanders from their mission by "ambushing" an operational

force, leaving the commander and unit personnel in an uncomfortable position of not knowing what to tell them, if anything. Unfortunately, this is just what happened.

On January 23, 1991, USCINCCENT sent an "all points bulletin" message to all major Theater commanders and units in search of a missing CBS news team (Appendix I, Atch 1). The message stated in part:

A CBS News team is missing and had been unaccounted for since Monday 21 Jan 91. The unescorted team departed Al Fao Hotel, Hafir Al Batin, Saudi Arabia in a beige Toyota Land Cruiser...at 0900 21 Jan and was last seen in the forward operation area in vicinity of [1st Cavalry Division]. Elements of the 1st Cav Div stopped the team as they tried to enter division area and turned them around IAW Instructions provided by HQS CENTCOM. CBS team was not escorted by military escort and was not part of CENTCOM-Sponsored Pool. The CBS Network and JIB-Dhahran have serious concerns about safety. (USCINCCENT Message, Appendix I, Atch 1)

It was eventually discovered that the news team was taken prisoner by Iraqi soldiers near the boarder. Members of the team included Peter Bluff, Producer, Roberto Alvarez, Cameraman, and Juan Caldera, Soundman. They were eventually released by the Iraqis after considerable news media pressure.

Other journalists who violated the media ground rules also met unfavorable fates. *Time Magazine* photographer, Wesley Bocke, after an alert Saudi citizen observed him as an unidentified individual taking photographs of battle tanks moving alongside a main road in Northern Saudi Arabia, confiscated his car keys and reported him to Saudi police. He was traveling unescorted in a vehicle along a main supply route for deployed military forces. The Saudis, after identifying him as American, turned him over to the 118th Military Police battalion who blindfolded him (interrogation tent reportedly contained classified maps) and briefly interrogated the journalist who was eventually released after 30 hours. During this period, he was transferred to an Alabama National Guard MP brigade and handed over to military public affairs officers for release on his own recognizance (Senate Hearing, 1991: 481-483).

Apparently, according to an Associated Press story emanating out of Dhahran, one of the problems that led to this episode was that over 800 journalists were in Saudi Arabia at this time under strict guidelines requiring them to report only while in military media pools, but fewer than 125 pool slots were available. As written in the Edith Lederer AP story:

With no other way to talk to soldiers, reporters and photographers have gone out on their own to get a picture of a war involving more than a half million troops. 'I think freedom of the press as far as the story is concerned is in grave danger,' said Bocke.

Col. William Mulvey, the JIB director, said Sunday: 'There was never any order or intent to detain anybody. The instructions were that unescorted journalists not on combat pools were to be sent back to Dhahran where the pools were organized. He said U.S. officers decided they were mistaken in reporting offenders to the Saudi government....But... unescorted travel remained forbidden. (Senate Hearing, 482)

Other episodes included four French journalists who were lost and nearly out of fuel when they encountered elements of the First Marine Division in an area near the Kuwait border where the marines had encountered the enemy. According to Chief Warrant Officer Eric Carlson, 'Had circumstances been less clear, they could very easily have been killed....'(482). Other journalists were also detained for similar violations of the ground rules. In addition to ground rules, there are also "Guidelines for News Media" to be followed by news media representatives (Appendix H, Atch 4). The air campaign started on January 16, 1991. When the ground war commenced at 8:00 p.m. EST on February 23, 1991, the following statement was given to press pool members:

The coalition forces of operation desert storm began large scale ground operations against Iraqi forces in Kuwait at approximately 8:00 p.m. EST/23 Feb 91. The initial actions consist of combined artillery, infantry, aviation and armor assaults, with close air support, against enemy positions over a broad front along the Saudi Arabian border with Kuwait and Iraq.

This phase of the Desert Storm Campaign has been carefully planned to force Iraq out of Kuwait with the minimum number of casualties to friendly forces. In general, coalition forces will be using mobility, firepower, and advanced technology to conduct closely coordinated air and ground attacks directly against Iraqi static defense positions....Their principal mission is to isolate Iraqi units from lines of communications and support, prevent...a counter attack, and destroy their ability to conduct military operations against coalition forces....

With the commencement of ground operations, the handling of media pool products and enforcement of ground rules governing media coverage becomes even more critical to the success of the operation. UNCINCCENT desires that releasable material be made available as quickly as possible to provide the American public timely, accurate and substantial news about the progress of our forces. Military personnel are expected to be candid and forthcoming when dealing with news media within the limits of operational security..... (Appendix I, Atch 2).

Commencement of ground operations will make the following areas of information particularly sensitive:

-- Information revealing details or tactics about

future or postponed operations.

- Associations between specific friendly units and specific locations
- Information of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire.
- Details of operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against friendly forces. (Atch 2)

Back in the United States, other press restrictions were more controversial. One was the preventing of the press from covering the arrival of bodies at Dover AFB (Appendix I, Atch 3). Dover AFB, Delaware and Travis AFB, California are the American Port-of-Entry Mortuary facilities. Desert Storm used Dover.

Announcement of Casualty Procedures:

The Joint Staff Information Service Center released a message from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs regarding guidance in the reporting of Operation Desert Storm Casualties and Mortuary Affairs. The DoD divides casualties into two major categories and one temporary status: **Hostile, Nonhostile, and Duty Status Unknown (Missing)**. DoD policy on releasing such information is as follows:

The initial release of names of deceased, missing, MIA and POW casualties will be made only by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs OASD(PA), and only

after the [Next of Kin] have been officially notified. (Appendix I, Atch: 4)

USCINCCENT is authorized to release the number of U.S. Casualties in the CENTCOM theater of operation....If operation security concerns dictate the temporary withholding of exact numbers of casualties, CINCCENT may release information about casualties...in terms of 'Light, Moderate, or Heavy' until specific numbers are releasable. (Appendix I, Atch 4 & 5)

FACTORS COMPLICATING DESERT SHIELD/STORM NEWS COVERAGE

In a July 1991 interim report to Congress entitled, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, issued by the Department of Defense, policies and procedures relating to the media and media pools were reviewed. The report mentioned several factors which served to complicate full news coverage of the conflict. Factors listed included:

- The host nation [Saudi Arabia], closed to Western media before the operation began, was reluctant to permit reporters to enter the country and was concerned about reporting of cultural sensitivities.
- More than 1,600 news media representatives eventually massed in Saudi Arabia to report about the war.

- The combat actions used high technology, long range weapons and occurred on and over a distant, vast, open desert and from ships throughout the region.
- The speed of the combined armor and airmobile attacks and drives through Kuwait and Iraq was unusually rapid.
- This was the first US war to be covered by news media who were capable of broadcasting reports instantaneously to the world, including the enemy. (Appendix H, Atch 1:19-1)

From examining defense and military documents at all levels, it is clear that, both specifically and generally, DoD policy was "to provide as much information as possible to the American people without endangering the lives or missions of US military personnel" (Atch 1:19-1). As demonstrated by this study, by nearly any historically known standard, news media support by the Department of Defense during the Persian Gulf Conflict appears to have far exceeded that provided to journalists of previous wars. This is particularly true when balanced against operational security requirements which were not as pressing in previous wars. Even General Eisenhower had to contend with only 27 journalist to cover all of D-Day, not the current 1,600.

One important point to remember when considering news media access to news and freedom of reporting is that, thankfully, most major wars are not fought within the territorial limits of the United States. They operate from or are fought within the borders of other sovereign states not under American laws, jurisdiction, or

constitutional protections. In other words, journalists need permission from the host nation (normally through issuance of VISAs) for entrance into their country, and most nations do not meet our journalistic standards. As explained in the Interim Congressional Report:

When the USS Independence Carrier Battle Group arrived in the Gulf of Oman on 7 August and the first U.S. Air Force F15s landed on sovereign Saudi territory on 8 August, approximately one week after Iraq invaded Kuwait, there were no Western reporters in the Kingdom. The US Government urged the Saudi government to begin granting visas to US news organizations, so that reporters could cover the arrival of the US military. On 10 August, Secretary Cheney called Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States....Prince Bandar said the Saudis were studying the question but agreed in the meantime to accept a pool of US reporters if the US military would arrange their transportation. The DOD National Media Pool, a structure that had been in use since 1985, was alerted that same day. The purpose of the DOD National Media Pool is to enable reporters to cover the earliest possible action of a US military operation in a remote area where there is no other presence of the American news media, while still protecting the element of surprise--an essential element of operational security. (Appendix H, Atch 1:19-1)

On January 14, 1991, a one-page list of ground rules and one page guidelines were issued for Desert Shield & Storm. These were reviewed by press bureau chiefs and military and civilian public affairs people.

Media criticisms included the requirement within the ground rules that all pooled products undergo a security review. This procedure is not historically uncommon. During Desert Shield and Storm, unlike historical precedence, the ultimate decision on publication rested with the news organization, not the government or the military. The procedure worked in the following steps:

1. The public affairs escort officer reviews the material for conformance to ground rule violations only.
2. If a problem is found, and no agreement can be made between the reporter and PA officer, the material would be quickly sent to the Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran for review by the JIB Director and a news media representative.
3. If not resolved at that level, the material is sent to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs for joint review with the news organization's bureau chief.
4. If still not resolved, the final decision on whether or not to publish the contested material rests with the news organi-

zation--not the government or military. (Appendix H, Atch 1:19-2)

According to the Interim Congressional Report:

While the pools were in existence, only five of more than 1,300 print pool stories were appealed through the stages of the review process to Washington for resolution. Four of those were cleared in Washington within a few hours. The fifth story dealt in considerable detail with the methods of intelligence operations in the field. The reporter's editor-in- chief chose to change the story to protect sensitive intelligence procedures. (Appendix H, Atch 1:19-2)

Another news media criticism of the system in Saudi Arabia was the security review requirement for correspondents to have escort officers or "monitors." One problem was that not all escort officers were fully trained and competent to perform the task, thus hindering the journalists. However, there were four basic reasons for such officers. First, they acted as a liaison between the correspondent and the combat units and helped "grease the skids" by providing access to unit locations and for arranging interviews with unit personnel. Monitors act as agents of the on-scene commander. Second, they acted as an operational security check by reviewing stories for conformance to agreed upon ground rules. Third, they were to serve as the news representative's "facilitator and advocate," arranging interviews, briefings, and

transportation, and fourth, they helped prevent correspondents from getting lost and falling into enemy hands.

An additional major press criticism concerned the length of time required for press pool reports to be filed and approved. According to the Secretary of Defense:

Although plans called for expeditious handling of pool reports, much of it moved far too slowly. The JIB Dhahran reviewed 343 pool reports filed during or immediately after the ground war and found that approximately 21% arrived at the JIB in less than 12 hours, 69% arrived in less than two days, and 10% arrived in more than three days. In fact, five reports, hampered either by weather or by poor transportation, arrived at the JIB more than six days after they were filed. (Appendix H, Atch 1: 19-3)

Not to diminish these faults, to their credit the DoD and Central Command conducted, in a timely fashion, 35 televised news briefings from the Pentagon, and in Saudi Arabia, CENTCOM provided 98 briefings (53 on-the-record and 45 on background) conducted by high ranking operational officers (Atch 1:19-3).

The major media support accomplishments highlighted by the Department of Defense in its report to Congress include the following:

1. Enabled the news media to cover Operation Desert Storm through 159 reporters and photographers who were with combat units. By contrast, only 27 reporters were with the D-Day invasion force in 1944 when the first wave of troops went ashore.
2. The media pool system placed journalists in positions to witness actual combat or interview troops immediately after combat, as evidenced by the fact that about 300 reports were filed from front line units. Sixty percent contained eyewitness accounts of the fighting.
3. Pool members were permitted to personally interview front line troops.
4. Frequent public briefings were held on details of the operation. (Appendix H, Atch I:19-4)

DOD DEFENSE MEDIA CRITICISMS AND SHORTCOMINGS

The major shortcomings highlighted by the Department of Defense report to Congress included the following:

1. Command support for the Public Affairs Office (PAO) effort was uneven. Cooperation among commanders appeared uneven. This sometimes resulted in a lack of assets needed to get file stories back to the Dhahran JIB.

2. A significant number of Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) were not trained to conduct security reviews of pool products, and were therefore unable to properly judge operational security violations.

3. The public affairs escort officers displayed a wide range of job expertise. Mistakes were made such as stopping interviews and attempts at altering media reports not covered in the ground rules. (Atch 1:19-4)

One disputed issue was the dissatisfaction voiced by the news media regarding press arrangements, especially with the media pools. They protested the need for military escorts for the news media, and security reviews of media pool products. Whether or not these procedures will change in the future is open to speculation. However, it appears that press restrictions will vary according to the circumstances of the conflict. This is one variable which appears to hold constant historically.

SUMMARY OF THE HISTORICAL REVIEW

Chapter 5 reviewed the historical relationship between the news media and military from revolutionary America to the Persian Gulf war of 1990-1991. The details of the findings will be presented in the following chapters. Reviewing the historical aspects of the news media-military relationship was important for a number of reasons. First, it helps us to understand why we have the relatively antagonistic

relationship between the two institutions that we experience today. Secondly, it serves to separate fact from fiction regarding the true historical nature of the press as an institution during wartime, and the constantly changing relationship between the press and military. Third, critical factors can be extracted from the historical data that can help improve present and future news media-military relations.

After reviewing twelve conflicts, the general conclusion is that there has been no standard or consistent working relationship between the news media and the military. Access to the area of battle and censorship of news by the government has ranged from open access and no censorship to full censorship and no access. Likewise, the professional relationship has ranged from hostile to very friendly. The importance of such findings is that, with no standard base to rest one's working relationship, both parties are free to form a new and hopefully creative and less antagonistic professional relationship which will result in the achievement of each institution's respective goals and objectives.

CHAPTER 6.

RESEARCH FINDINGS

REVIEW OF THE DATA

I. INTRODUCTION

It was the objective of this project to perform an historical study of the news media-military relationship during wartime to identify and examine factors affecting the relationship between national security requirements and the media's right to know. Using Wolfsfeld's Transaction Model of Media Interaction as a model for news media interaction, we wished to discover whether or not an optimal working relationship which permits both organizations to achieve their respective objectives is possible.

The first subproblem requiring resolution was to research and identify, from an historical, legal and scholarly review of the subject, the critical factors affecting the relationship between the military and news media during national security combat operations or crisis. Furthermore, a second subproblem which required addressing was to analyze the factors or concepts impacting the conflict between national security requirements and news media objectives. Finally, we were to offer recommendations to alleviate the conflict and establish some formula to achieve an optimal working relationship permitting mutual achievement of organizational goals and objectives.

To refamiliarize ourselves with the problem, the central hypothesis was that an historical, legal and scholarly review of news media-military relations and Wolfsfeld's Transaction Model of Media Interaction will explain the relationship between the news media and national security organizations during combat operations or crisis, and offer an effective framework to identify factors alleviating the antagonism between the mass media and military, and permit the establishment of an optimal working relationship allowing achievement of respective goals and objectives.

We will now examine the data collected, and begin to answer the aforementioned questions and form our recommendations. It must be remembered that the bottom line objective of this study is to offer a solution to managing the news media-military relationship during time of conflict in an optimal manner.

IDENTIFYING CRITICAL FACTORS

During the literature review centering on the topic of news media-military relations during time of war or crisis, critical factors were identified which either directly or indirectly affected the quality and nature of the relationship between our national security organizations and the news media, either press or electronic. These factors have the ability to either degrade the working relationship between national security organizations during time of war, conflict, or crisis, or tend to foster a more cooperative working relationship between the two organizations.

We will now proceed to identify the critical factors and discuss their influence and effectiveness.

II. REVIEW OF RELEVANT STUDIES [RESEARCH FINDINGS]

The literature review of relevant studies identified salient factors and concepts which contribute to the relationship between national security organizations and the news media. These factors and concepts will now be identified and discussed to discover how they contribute to either the advancement or obstruction of the working relationship between the two great organizational entities, and influence the achievement of their organizational goals and objectives.

Critical Factor #1: Contextual Frames. The concept of "Framing" as identified by Gamson (1989), Gitlin (1980), and others affects the behavior and relationship between national security and news media organizations in their attempt to control or regulate such news frames to meet their respective personal or organizational objectives.

News stories are composed largely of events or issues, and when transacting with national security events or issues, the military as antagonist wishes to control the content, context, and import of such issues with a result favorable to their point of view and specific goals. During operation Desert Storm, national security frames

were expressed as follows: (1) The Invasion of Kuwait was analogous to the unchecked aggression of World War II; (2) Saddam Hussein was analogous to Hitler, and (3) Allied action was to protect a flowering "New World Order." The **competing frames** included: (1) The Persian Gulf conflict was analogous to a "Vietnam Quagmire" which is unwinnable, (2) Saddam Hussein was a victim of previous Western policies, and (3) the Allies are only fighting to protect their oil supplies. Two other important frames include the positive "Support for the Troops" frame and the negative "War Controversy" or "Victims of War" frames.

What frames dominate the national and international news may directly impact public support for the conflict. Consequently, conflict over such frames of reference often forms the battle lines between the military and the news media. In the case of the Persian Gulf conflict, frames supportive of the Bush Administration and national security organizations predominated (King & Wells, 1992; Wolfsfeld, 1992, and Gannet, 1991).

Critical Factor #2: Sociopolitical Ideology. News stories and frames are almost always influenced by the message sender's ideological disposition, whether the messenger is the national security organization or the news media (Altschull, 1984; Shoemaker & Mayfield, 1987; Paletz & Entman, 1981; Wolfsfeld, 1991, Gamson, 1990).

This factor also arose under Section D under "Sociopolitical Factors," where a more detailed explanation may be found. How individuals approach, write, or "frame" news stories is usually affected by their political ideology and cultural background.

Consequently, this factor often determines the type of news coverage the national security organization will receive, and the anticipated response from the national security organization.

Critical Factor #3: Both News organizations and the national security apparatus are actors in the policy-making process. Since war is a form of policy, both actors are involved in varying degrees of policy decision-making (Allison, 1971).

Such actors can also be viewed as involved in a "mutually exploitive association," where one often benefits at the expense of another in a competitive, aggressive, and manipulative environment which may or may not be mutually beneficial (O'Heffernon, 1991). Policy is usually not made in isolation, and during the early phases of a building conflict, the news media as an independent actor plays a role in the policy process in either a supportive or oppositional way. Consequently, national security planners cannot ignore such an actor, and must prepare to defend their policy views with supportive information and expert speakers. They cannot be ignored.

Critical Factor #4: Agenda Setting Influence. The news media has the capacity to set government policy agendas, affect public opinion, and public decision-making and support (Kramer, 1992).

The national security institutions must be alert to such agenda setting, and be prepared to support their policy recommendations with facts and policy experts. They must be able to vigorously defend their position on the issues, positions, or "frames" proposed by the news media and/or special interest groups. The military needs public support to win a sustained conflict, and using the media to achieve such goals should be an integral part of any policy or military planning.

Critical Factor #5: News media behavior differs according to the conflict phase. Conflicts are normally characterized by a: (1) *Buildup Phase* involving military mobilization and political debate regarding the wisdom of military action, (2) *War Phase* characterized by launching a military attack and public support for the troops, and (3) *War Aftermath*, when the media and politicians reassess the wisdom of their actions and either continue to support or criticize such actions. Support for the war may also change depending upon the length of time the country remains in each conflict phase.

The importance of this factor is that the national security organization requires different political or informational tactics to address each conflict phase. During **Phase I**, the news media and Congress will accord the issue the most scrutiny and publicity, and this is when two key issues are resolved: (1) the battle over the Phase I frame will occur and be resolved leading to the temporary resolution of the item, and (2) the conflict's initial legitimacy and justification will be resolved based upon acceptance of the dominant frame.

In **Phase II**, the information, issues, and actions change to gain control of the Phase II combat frames. For example, will the "Support-Our-Troops" or the "Victims of War" and "War Controversy" frames dominate the news media, public opinion, and political attention? During this phase, another frame also becomes an issue. It involves the effective prosecution of the war, the performance of our expensive weapon systems, and the performance of military forces. The national security organization must provide information to address this news media frame during Phase II. In **Phase III**, the information battle then shifts over to Phase III type frames to include "Was the War Necessary" frame or the contrasting "It was in our national interest and worth the cost" frame.

The aforementioned frames form the political "Order of Battle" and require as much thought and analysis as does the military order of battle. War is a form of national policy and contains the political as well as military components required for victory.

Critical Factor #6: Wars are Political Conflicts. Wars are not only military, but political conflicts fought using political as well as military means, and part of the political means, at least in a democratic republic, must include the support of public opinion.

Critical Factors #6 & #7 are directly related stressing that military conflicts are fought using political as well as military means, and require at some point the support of the general public. This element has had a constant historical link in American history. The politico-military aspects of war must be identified and analyzed.

Critical Factor #7: The nature of the government-news media relationship is multidimensional, interactive, and antagonistic, consisting of a structural dimension, ideological dimension, and affected by a social and political context (Wolfsfeld, 1992).

This factor highlights the relationship between national security institutions and the news media as a multifaceted and complex one. Why both think and act they way they do is related to a multitude of dynamic social and political forces. To develop an optimal relationship between the news media and military, these forces must be understood and considered during news media-military interactions.

III. THE REVIEW OF LEGAL PRECEDENTS [RESEARCH FINDINGS]

A review of the legal history of government-news media relations was required to determine the impact of such conflicts on the relationship between the news media and government, and more particularly, between our national security organizations and the news media. The following critical factors or concepts impacting the relationship between the news media and military were extracted from the review of judicial case history concerning the new media.

Critical Factor #8: First Amendment constitutional rights mandate freedom of speech and of the press. The fundamental impact that this has on the relationship between the news media and national security institutions is that government cannot mandate what the news media will write or communicate through electronic or video means, nor can it interfere with the news process except under extraordinary circumstances.

The fundamental significance of this fact is that the national security organizations cannot force news media institutions to print and disseminate information, nor can they prevent them from doing so except under extraordinary circumstances. Consequently, the national security institutions must disseminate convincing factual information supportive of their position to balance the news presentation and framing.

Critical Factor #9: The news media has adopted the function of "societal Watchdog," ever vigilant for abuses of government power, authority or trust. As such, it has assumed an "adversarial relationship" with the government.

Under these circumstances, feeding such a relationship with counter hostility and questionable facts and figures only aggravates the problem. If the national security establishment cannot supply the news media with reliable, credible, and truthful information, it should decline to disseminate such information until a period of greater certainty. Otherwise, the news media will nit-pick over every partially accurate scintilla of information. Furthermore, providing accurate and truthful information will

only help to foster a better and less adversarial relationship and reinforce the ability of both parties to attain their respective goals and objectives. This adversarial relationship places the government in the role of antagonist.

Critical Factor #10: The news media may print false, untrue, slanted, or even damaging stories about persons or events without prior judicial restraint (Near v. Minnesota, 1931). The significance of this fact is that, when forming its issue or event frames, accuracy of information is not required by the news media..

The only effective method to fight inaccurate news media stories or information regarding national security or military operations is through dissemination of truthful and accurate information capable of being substantiated. As previously discussed within this study, the news media has full editorial control over reporting, and there is no constitutional requirement that such information be factual. Consequently, the best tactic to prevent such airing of inaccurate information is to provide the media with the greatest amount of factual information as possible without jeopardizing operational security or troop safety. In most cases, this will satisfy both media and national security requirements.

Critical Factor #11: Under circumstances where the government does not rely upon any constitutional or statutory authority, it cannot prevent publication of either unclassified or classified information through court ordered prior restraint (New York Times v. United States, 1971). However, specific challenges to publications might be upheld under exceptional circumstances (United States v. Progressive, 1979).

The significance of the above factor is that, for operational security and troop safety considerations, *it is primarily the responsibility of the government to take special precautions to secure classified information, and to place whatever controls it deems necessary on access to such information.* Otherwise, the news media may report such information if access is acquired. During the Persian Gulf conflict, the military controlled media access to information in order to control dissemination of such information. Most news media organizations would not report classified information which may endanger military operations or troop safety, but the fact is, under the increasingly competitive atmosphere and financial pressures faced by many news organizations, anything is possible. Consequently, precautions must be taken to prevent such access.

Critical Factor #12: The First Amendment does not "mandate a right of access to government information or sources of information within the government's control" (JB Pictures, Inc. v. Department of Defense, 1993; Cable News Network v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 1981; Houchins v. KOED, 1978).

The importance of this factor is that the government has the right to exclude the news media from those areas placed off-limits to the public. The news media has no constitutional right to greater access to government facilities or information than does the general public. Freedom of speech does not equate to freedom of access (Branzburg v Hayes, 1972).

The above fact is significant because it reinforces the military's right and responsibility to protect operational security and troop safety. The military must have full control within the area of military operations, and control of those military facilities, both foreign and domestic, which directly support such military operations. The news media does not have a right to access military bases, facilities, or battlefields that are placed off-limits to the general public. However, if exceptions are made to either civilians or news media representatives, then at least limited access opportunities to all news organizations may be required or forced through court order, depending upon the circumstances. The military has a responsibility to guard and control access to information which may be of political advantage to the enemy such as the publicity value of viewing caskets of killed in action American soldiers arriving at Dover AFB, Delaware. The military has the right to restrict such visual access (J.B. Pictures v. Department of Defense, 1993).

Critical Factor #13: The President as Commander in Chief has the Constitutional responsibility and legal authority to protect and secure national security information, particularly during wartime. This factor permits the President to restrict news media access to national security information. The significance of this issue is self-explanatory.

Critical Factor #14: The government, particularly the Chief Executive, is not required to be neutral regarding policies or opinions, and has the right and responsibility to supply such facts and ancillary information as required to support and establish its "Frame of events" or governmental policies, including war (J.B. Pictures, Inc. v. Department of Defense, 1993).

The government and its national security establishment is not required to provide politically "neutral information" regarding its policies and operations to the news media. The President is expected to provide information, facts and figures supportive of his foreign and national security policies. In the recent court case of J.B. Pictures v. Department of Defense, 1993, the plaintiffs argued that the military denied access to Dover AFB, preventing the viewing of bodies of American soldiers killed overseas as an attempt to control "negative news" which comes with every war. First, it can be argued that if such casualties were viewed as exceptionally low, it could be perceived as "positive news." Regardless, the government is not required to provide information nonsupportive of its policies if such access is generally restricted.

IV. THE REVIEW OF HISTORICAL FACTORS [RESEARCH FINDINGS]

Critical Factor #15: Historically, there has been no common or standard relationship found between the news media and the military. It changes according to individual circumstances.

There is no "standard" conventional method of interacting with the news media during wartime. The nature of the interaction depends upon the totality of circumstances ranging from the nature of the war (e.g., conventional, guerrilla, large scale, limited, etc.) to its geographic location. Consequently, there is historical latitude regarding the degree of access and censorship accorded to the news media during wartime which ranges along an historical continuum from virtually no access and full censorship to full access and no censorship. This has historically depended upon organizational culture and the conflict's circumstances, time, and geography. It is therefore the responsibility of military planners to assess the degree of access permissible under the circumstances, and determine to what degree, if any, censorship will be required regarding news reporting, particularly news emanating from the war zone. **Media claims of an historical precedence of "free access" to war zones and "freedom from wartime censorship" are claims which are unfounded based upon the facts uncovered during historical research.** Controlled access and censorship of news stories during times of conflict are phenomena deeply embedded in both our nation and the international history of wars and war correspondents.

Critical Factor #16: Since the Crimean War, the quality and accuracy of reporting has ranged from "scandalously poor" to "exceptionally good."

The significance of this factor is that, as stated previously, there can be no guarantee that the national security establishment will receive a fair hearing regarding a proposed or ongoing military conflict. News reporting may be inaccurate and poor resulting in the skewing of public opinion in either support or opposition to the

conflict. On the other hand, news reporting may be exceptionally good with the same results. To increase the probability of accurate news reporting, national security planners should plan to provide the news media with the greatest quantity of accurate information possible contingent upon maintaining operational security, troop safety, and political-military considerations.

Critical Factor #17: News reporting has ranged from highly supportive of administration and national security objectives to highly critical of such objectives to include the endangering the lives of forces in the field.

There will always be uncertainty regarding how the news media will "frame" and report military operations. Consequently, the significance of this factor is for military planners to ensure that the most supportive information is made available to news organizations to enable the administration to receive a fair hearing. Supportive news cannot be taken for granted based upon the Administration's perceived merits.

Critical Factor #18: Historically, news media representative and organizational feelings about wartime censorship have ranged from reasonably supportive of censorship to severe protest at the thought of it.

Depending upon the circumstances, there is historical evidence that news media representatives themselves have differed over the merits of wartime censorship. One

reason why Vietnam was never a censored war was because it didn't start as an American war. We were advisors to the South Vietnamese military establishment. However, as the war evolved over the years to a major American conflict, the control over news coverage failed to change in any dramatic way. The significance of this factor is that the national security organization cannot seek to please everyone. Regardless of the news access and censorship policies adopted, there is little chance of unanimous popularity over the issue. The degree of wartime censorship will most likely continue to depend upon the totality of circumstances surrounding the conflict.

Critical Factor #19: Censorship standards, even within the same conflict, can change significantly throughout the duration of the conflict, and can also vary significantly between different conflicts.

During the review of historical factors, it was again seen that censorship standards have deviated significantly between and sometimes within conflicts. Censorship during the Korean War ran the entire continuum of censorship. The point here is that there is significant historical precedence for news censorship during military conflict, and military planners should implement that level of censorship deemed necessary and reasonable considering the totality of circumstances surrounding the military conflict and the need to maintain operational security.

Critical Factor #20: Access to military operations and battlefields, like censorship, varied from conflict to conflict depending upon wartime circumstances, the nature or type of conflict, and the geographical location and topography of the war zone.

The historical review, as did the legal review of the literature, confirmed the fact that the news media rarely had uncontrolled access to military facilities, battlefields or military operations, nor do they apparently have the constitutional right to such access. This provides the military with a tool to protect its operational security and to consider politico-military considerations during operational planning.

Critical Factor #21: There has been a general agreement among both national security and news media organizations that, at least within our democratic system, the public has the right to be informed about U.S. military operations and commitments, within the confines of ensuring operational security, troop safety, and consideration of politico-military issues.

The historical review found this consensus to be valid. There appears to be little disagreement among national security or news media representatives regarding support for the public's right to know about American military operations, to include the reason for and success of such operations. Consequently, access to such information should be provided by the national security establishment to the greatest extent possible, once again taking into consideration operational security, troop safety, and politico-military considerations.

Critical Factor #22: The historical review has uncovered an apparent philosophical difference between the news media and government, based upon First Amendment considerations, over both the definition and requirement for the news media to act "responsibly." This researcher can find no *Constitutional requirement* for the media to act responsibly (Near v. Minnesota, 1931), nor do some media representatives feel obliged to do so, although there is disagreement within the news media community over this subject.

Consequently, the importance to military planners regarding this critical factor is that they must assume, during their operational planning, that there will be a few news media representatives who will not act "responsibly," and may publish information which will endanger both the success of military operations and the safety of troops in the field. Media access and censorship decisions by military planners must be based upon this consideration.

V. **THE REVIEW OF SOCIOPOLITICAL FACTORS [RESEARCH FINDINGS]**

Critical Factor #23: News media and national security organizational behavior is influenced by ideological beliefs, values, and attitudes which determine how they frame news facts and stories.

The significance of this critical factor to national security planners is that they cannot take a **passive role** in the institutional "tug-of-war" over event or issue "framing." Media viewpoints should be anticipated, and national security planners should have on call those administration experts or spokespersons capable of bringing to the debate arguments and rationales supportive of the administration's viewpoints. This includes making them readily available to the news media for interview. Previous research has indicated that the news media does have a politically liberal bias, and understanding this parameter, Administration and military national security advisors must taken into account such bias during their planning process.

Critical Factor #24: The news industry's general news criteria tends to seek out and disseminate news stories containing conflict, violence, crisis, scandal or natural disasters (e.g., wars, strikes, protests, scandals, tornadoes, earthquakes, fires, hurricanes, etc.). Conflict, relevancy, and the timeliness of news events or issues are normally the three most important editorial decision factors affecting whether or not a news story will be published or broadcasted.

The importance of this factor is that international and domestic conflicts or wars are certain to be well covered by the news industry. Consequently, military planners should be prepared to meet the increasing demand for news and to support the anticipated surge in news media personnel descending upon national security organizations and representatives.

VI. TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS [RESEARCH FINDINGS]

Critical Factor #25: The technological advancements in news media communications equipment makes news media information collection, processing, and dissemination often instantaneous and ubiquitous, thus increasingly difficult to control. The news organizations are becoming more independent of government facilities and their communications abilities.

The above factor is important to national security planners because actions should be taken to study and assess the technological capability of modern news organizations, particularly field reporting units, and to control access to the battlefield of such technology as required to ensure operational security and troop safety. This equipment should be controlled and regulated within the operational theater of conflict. It must be assumed that in our higher technology world that the enemy is capable of monitoring all unsecured communications. Furthermore, the capture of such technologically sophisticated equipment by the enemy within the combat area could provide them instantaneous visual and verbal communications with their central command, and the capability to communicate the positions and activities of friendly units.

VII. COMPARISON OF PRESS-MILITARY RELATIONS [FINDINGS]

A comparison of news media - military relations by military conflict may be observed in Figure 4 on page 250. The analysis is a summary of all the conflicts assessed during the historical review of news media-military relations in Chapter 5. Each conflict was assessed and rated by (1) General news media - military relations during the conflict, (2) the degree of censorship imposed on the news media, and (3) the degree of access to the area of conflict permitted the media by the government. Each rating was assigned a numerical score as follows:

General Relations: Hostile(1) Poor(2) Fair(3) Good(4) Excellent(5)

Censorship: None(5) Limited(4) Variable(3) Moderate(2) Full(1)

Access: None(1) Poor(2) Variable(3) Limited(4) Open(5)

The aforementioned ratings were based upon a subjective assessment of each conflict according to the findings of the historical review. The ratings may be measured in a continuum between each high-low extreme and may be interpreted as follows:

GENERAL RELATIONS:

Hostile: Extremely antagonistic relationship between the news media and the military often leading to severe censorship and poor to no access to the area of conflict. Cooperation is nearly non-existent.

Excellent: Media and military representatives have an excellent rapport, mutual respect, and understanding of their respective missions and are mutually supportive in achieving their goals and objectives. The press may take part in military operations as members of a military unit and be accepted as organic to that unit.

CENSORSHIP:

Full: All news media communications must be read and cleared by government censors for release before filing and dissemination to the public. This includes all written, mechanical and electronic media.

Variable: During the conflict, there were wide swings in the degree of censorship imposed on the news media often ranging from none to moderate or full censorship.

None: No official military censorship was imposed on the news media. Censorship, if any, was voluntarily self-imposed by the war correspondent or editor.

ACCESS:

Open: The news media has full access to the area of conflict and relatively free to roam the battlefield without restrictions.

Variable: During the conflict, the degree of access accorded the news media often varied significantly throughout the war. Access to the battlefield may vary widely according to what command a reporter was assigned and the discretion of the operational commander.

None: The news media was officially banned from the area of conflict and often subject to arrest and deportation if discovered in the area without specific permission of the military commanders.

RESEARCH FINDINGS:

As can be observed in Figures 4 and 5, research findings from the historical review demonstrate that *there is no standard historical relationship between the news media and the military*. However, a statistical analysis of the data confirms a strong positive correlation ($r = .96$) between media relations with the military and the degree of censorship and access restrictions imposed on the news media. Only in one case was there a strong negative correlation: World War II characterized by a high (Excellent) news media-military relations rating but low level of press freedom (Full Censorship) and limited media access. On a scale from 1 to 5 with five being "Excellent" and one "hostile," the mean relations score measured 3.33 (Fair) correlating with a combined restriction score of 3.12 (Variable). The median scores were 3.5 and 3.0 respectively with a standard deviation of 1.3 and 1.2. In other words, when the news media experienced high levels of censorship and low opportunities for information/battlefield access, news media-military relations

degraded. When such news restrictions were less prevalent, news media-military relations were similarly better. However, as stated previously, there were a few exceptions to this rule. I believe that the exceptions can be explained by the sociopolitical environment of the period and the contextual framework of the conflict, including the differences in communications technology.

Finally, another important finding discovered during the historical review concerned the variable access and censorship ratings. It appears that the degree of news media access and level of censorship imposed corresponds to the success or failure of military operations, leading to a variable rating over the duration of the conflict. For example, during the Korean conflict, both censorship and access varied according to the successes and failures of allied military operations. When Allied forces were doing well, censorship was relaxed and access improved. When military setbacks occurred, censorship was tightened and access to information and the battlefield became limited. This was the primary reason for most variable ratings.

MILITARY CONFLICT COMPARISON CHART



NEWS MEDIA - MILITARY RELATIONS

CONFLICT	GENERAL RELATIONS	CENSORSHIP	ACCESS	RATINGS	
				RELATIONS	RESTRICTIONS
U.S. Colonial Period	Fair	Limited	UK	3	4
Crimean War	Fair	Limited	Poor	3	3
Mexican-American	Excellent	None	Open	5	5
U.S. Civil War	Fair	Variable	Variable	3	3
Spanish-American	Good	Moderate	Limited	4	3
WWI	Hostile	Full	Poor	1	1.5
WWII	Excellent	Full	Variable	5	2
Korea	Good	Variable	Limited	4	3.5
Vietnam	Good	Limited	Open	4	4.5
Granada	Hostile	Full	None-Poor	1	1
Panama	Fair	Limited	Poor	3	3
Desert Shield/Storm	Good	Limited	Limited	4	4

FIGURE 4

Military Conflict Comparison Chart

News Media - Military Relations



CHAPTER 7

RESEARCH SUMMARY

I. GENERAL SUMMARY

This historical study of news media-military relations has examined important scholarly studies focusing on the nature of this relationship, and provided a review of related legal literature, cases, court opinions, and government documents which seek to clarify news media-military relations.

The objective of this study is to discover what critical factors contributed to the true nature of the relationship between the two central institutions, and attempt to extrapolate some optimum relationship using this data which may assist both institutions to achieve their respective goals and objectives in the performance of their primary responsibilities.

The study identified twenty-five "critical factors" affecting or defining the relationship between the news media and the military and national security establishment. Before one can attempt to understand the relationship between the news media and military, or offer changes to such a relationship, these factors must be known and understood since their dynamic interaction establishes the nature of the relationship. The critical factors emanated from the following three areas of review:

- a. *Scholarly studies* determining the behavior, sociopolitical beliefs, organization, culture and process of the mass media.
- b. *Constitutional mandates and legal precedent* which defines the legal, cultural and attitudinal framework of the news media-military relationship.
- c. *The nature of the historical relationship* between wartime news media personnel and organizations and the national security institutions (military).

A. SCHOLARLY STUDIES

The literature of relevant studies identified seven critical factors which define and affect the relationship between the news media and military during times of crisis or war. When developing recommendations for an optimal relationship between the two institutions, the following seven factors must be considered:

(1) *Contextual Frames*. Since there is no requirement in our democratic society for the news media to agree with governmental national security policies, this fact automatically establishes a competition over control of the context or framing of news. For example, during operation Desert Storm, the news media could have been either predominantly supportive or critical of government policy regarding the conflict. If the government does nothing to influence news frames, such decision will fall entirely upon

the editorial discretion of the news media with no guarantee of media support for government policies. On the other hand, effective government actions to affect the framing of news may increase the favorable support of government policies, but never guarantee such support.

(2) Sociopolitical Ideology. It has been found that the sociopolitical ideology of news media representatives and organizational culture can affect not only the framing of news stories, but also what stories are determined to be "newsworthy." Similar to political debates in Congress, each ideological group will interpret legislation through their own ideological filters. Two ideologically different parties may support or reject a piece of legislation for entirely different reasons, although the overall outcome may be the same. For example, in a debate over the need to send American military forces into a hostile area, the generally liberal media's initial reaction and comment to such intervention may be to describe it as "gunboat diplomacy" and a potential "Vietnam Quagmire." If the government does not effectively challenge such perceptions, a loss of public support for the military effort, including hostile military-press relations, may result.

(3) Policy Actors. The news media is an actor in the policy-making process, not an objective bystander. For a good professional relationship to develop between the news media and national security institutions, the military must acknowledge this fact, and plan to influence the media's support for national policies by providing accurate and factual information in support of such policies.

(4) *News Media Agenda Setting.* The news media is capable of setting the agenda for policy discussions regarding war and peace. It does so by affecting the attitudes of political elites and public opinion. For example, after operation Desert Storm, news media pressure has been largely credited for Administration policy to protect the Kurdish populations and establish no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq.

(5) *Conflict Phases.* Research suggests that news media behavior and reporting differs according to the phase of the conflict. The implication of this proposition is that for both the media to accomplish a goal of reporting accurate information, and for the national security institutions and Chief Executive to support proposed policy, news media requirements must be an integral part of national security planning at each phase. *Phase I* represents the governmental policy debate over the wisdom of proposed military action, *Phase II* represents the actual military action, and *Phase III* concerns the debate over the war aftermath. Each phase must supply tailored information designed to meet different media informational requirements. A national security failure to furnish proper information at each phase could erode both political and public support at one or all phases of the process.

(6) *Wars are Political Conflicts.* War is not only fought by military means represented by soldiers, guns, bullets, tanks, aircraft, and battleships, but also political considerations to include diplomacy, public support, political savvy, and control over news media frames. They should rightly be incorporated into the "Order of Battle" since they must be planned and accounted for in national security planning along with the appropriate military means. In a democratic society with a free press, political and

public support are important to the commencement of war or to its continuance on a long-term basis.

(7) *The News Media-Military Relationship is Multidimensional.* The understanding that the news media-national security relationship is multifaceted and complex is essential to an optimal relationship. This relationship is affected by a structural or process dimension, an ideological dimension, and is bounded by a social and political dimension. All these dimensions must be understood and addressed to ensure a better mutual understanding and relationship between the military and news media. The interaction of these three dimensions determine the behavior and operational processes of both the news media and the military.

(8) *Technology Makes News Information Difficult to Control.* Advances in communications technology compounds military planning and operational security because news media equipment makes news information collection, processing, and dissemination often instantaneous and ubiquitous, thus difficult to control. Furthermore, the enemy can easily intercept such news transmission and use such information as both an intelligence source and as a weapon in the politico-military war over media "news frames." Military planners must act to control this spectrum of communications by either limiting and controlling such equipment within the theater of operations, and/or providing the in-theater news media with such equipment and security review for outgoing messages.

(9) *News Media & Military Behavior is Influenced by Ideological Beliefs.* Ideological beliefs, values and attitudes often determine how news stories will be

framed, or for that matter, what stories will be reported or aired. This means it would be difficult to base any optimal relationship on a foundation of news objectivity concerning either news media reporting or national security news requirements. Both institutions are affected by ideological filters, although most military operations are based upon as much factual information as is available. With this understanding, it is the responsibility of the national security institutions, and their limited defense against biased reporting, to provide the most factual and accurate information supporting their policy decisions and military operations. As stated previously, although it may serve their professional interest, there is no requirement for the media to report accurate and factual information, nor to disseminate unbiased and objective news. Since the news media cannot agree regarding what "responsible reporting" is, such objective, unbiased, and responsible reporting should not be expected.

(10) *News Selection Criteria Centers on Conflict, Violence, Crisis, & Scandals.*

The significance of this factor to national security planners is that military operations, and particularly those operations which fail, will be classified as "newsworthy events." With technological advances in communications technology and the growth of the news media, the power of the news media also increases in correlation with its reach and influence. The news selection criteria of conflict, relevancy, and timeliness of a news event are three of the most important determinants of news worthiness. Consequently, military operations are inherently news worthy and such coverage should be considered as a permanent part of military operational planning.

B. CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES AND LEGAL PRECEDENT

The analysis of constitutional requirements and legal precedent represents the second major area of focus helping to define the relationship between the news media and military during time of crisis or war. Seven critical factors were identified during this review of legal considerations, an area of focus particularly important in a democratic society established on a code of laws and a free press. When developing recommendations for an optimal relationship between the two institutions, the following seven factors must be considered.

(11) *First Amendment Rights Define Basic Legal Relationship.* The right to free speech and of the press is a fundamental constitutional right which defines the relationship between the news media and the national security institutions. Basically, the government cannot mandate what the news media can say, publish, or write. This is the most simple, yet most difficult point underlying the relationship between national security organizations (military) and the news media. The goal of the press is to obtain, process, and disseminate "newsworthy" information. The goal of national security organizations is often to prevent the access and dissemination of such information. Only by understanding and some settlement by each side regarding these divergent goals can an optimal relationship be achieved.

(12) *News Media is Viewed as a Societal Watchdog.* Acceptance of this often media stated proposition places the government and media, at least to some extent, in some form of "adversarial relationship." Regardless, such a relationship is *de facto* adversarial in that, as stated in critical factor #8 above, their goals and objectives are

already divergent in nature. Nevertheless, this fact does not mean that such relationship must be hostile. Hostility implies a lack of understanding or willingness to reach some "settlement," rather than "compromise," in a relationship. A continuum of "adversarial" exists. The press **will not** agree to "compromise" regarding First Amendment rights, yet the military is **unable** to compromise the security of military operations and the very lives of military personnel. Even the Supreme Court has ruled that the "right to life" is considered dearer than "the right to free speech." This issue is a matter of circumstances. **Moving from a relationship of hostility to one of mutual understanding will lead to an optimal news media-military relationship.**

(13) *Truth is Not A Requirement of a Free Press.* The reporting and dissemination of untrue, false, or "damaging" stories or information by the news media is constitutionally protected and cannot be stopped through prior judicial restraint. Once again, it is irrelevant whether or not the government agrees or disagrees with this legal interpretation. The only national security protection against this "problem" is to ensure that national security planners are prepared to provide the news media with the most accurate and timely information possible taking into consideration national security requirements, operational safety, and politico-military considerations. If false information is printed, it is the responsibility of the responsible national security institution to correct the problem by providing substantiated factual information. This is part of the proposed "**Optimal Relationship Agreement**" between the news media and the military.

(14) *Limited Prior Restraint of Classified Information.* The government, except under unusual circumstances, cannot prohibit the publication of Classified

government information. The implications of this fact is that it is primarily the responsibility of the national security institutions, not the news organizations, to prevent classified military or national security information from being obtained and disseminated. Part of an "*Optimal Relationship Agreement*" would be an understanding of this fact. The other element of the agreement would be a special joint national security-news media review prior to dissemination.

(15) *No News Media Right to Special Access.* The news media has no greater legal or constitutional access to information than does the general public. This is one "hammer" that the national security institutions do have over the news media. Information is scarce without access to sources of information. This critical factor is but one element of a "bartering" system inherent in the "*Optimal Relationship Agreement.*"

(16) *The President has authority to Restrict Access to Government Information.* The President, as Commander in Chief, has the legal right, responsibility, and authority to protect national security information. Consequently, national security institutions may withhold whatever information it deems appropriate from the news media if the general public is also restricted from such information. As part of any "*Optimal Relationship Agreement,*" the news media must understand that such restrictions are important to protecting operational security, troop safety, and politico-military operations against the enemy. On the other hand, the national security institutions should not prevent dissemination of such information which does not degrade or endanger these primary security concerns.

(17) *Government Issue or Policy Neutrality is not Required.* Once again, the government is not required to provide "neutral information" regarding its policies and operations to the news media. The national security institutions are expected to provide facts and figures supportive of their foreign and domestic policies, not aid the opposition. As related to the issue of news access during wartime, according to the recent case of J.B. Pictures v. Department of Defense (1993), national security institutions are not required to disseminate "negative news" regarding its operations and policies, particularly if such news is generally restricted from the public. The importance of this ruling to military planners is that it provides a political weapon to wage the politico-military battle as a supplement to strictly military resources and weapons. As stated previously, wars are political as well as military conflicts. As part of a news media-military "*Optimal Relationship Agreement*," an understanding of this fact must be considered by the news media in its relationship with the national security representatives and institutions in order to understand their behavior and improve the working relationship.

C. THE NATURE OF THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP

An historical review of news media-military relations was conducted to determine the historical nature and quality of such interaction as another way of determining and defining the relationship between the news media and military during times of crisis or war. During the historical review, eight critical factors were identified which directly affect the relationship between the news media and military. When developing

recommendations for an optimal relationship between the two institutions, the following eight factors must be considered.

(18) *There is No Standard or Common News Media-Military Relationship.*

Historically, it is a myth that a common historical working relationship exists between the American news media and the national security institutions under constitutional First Amendment rights or otherwise. Historically, the quality and nature of the working relationship between the American news media and the military has constantly changed according to individual circumstances related to the conflict. The relationship has changed according to both the nature of the conflict (e.g., guerrilla war to large scale conventional conflict) and its geographic location. Related to this relationship is the quality of social interaction between national security and news representatives and the degree of information access and censorship applied to news media coverage.

(19) *News Quality and Accuracy is Diverse.* Since the Crimean War, the quality and accuracy of news media coverage has ranged from very poor to exceptionally good. The reason for either good or poor coverage often fell upon the degree of cooperation and understanding by military commanders regarding the news media. Similarly, misunderstandings of military operations and dangers by news media representatives also endangered the success of military operations and the lives of military forces. Part of any "*Optimal Relationship Agreement*" would require a firm understanding by the news media of the need for military censorship to some degree regarding military operations, facts, figures, and details. On the other hand, such agreement also requires that the national security institutions permit maximum access

to such military operations by the news media, and keep the media supplied with accurate and timely information as permitted under the circumstances to prevent a compromise of military operations, troop safety, or politico-military situations.

(20) *News Supportive of Policy Varies.* Not only has the quality and accuracy of news varied widely, but so has news reporting supportive of national security policies. As part of any "*optimal agreement*," there can be no promise that news media reporting will support government policies. It is primarily the responsibility of the Chief Executive and national security institutions to provide factual and accurate information supportive of wartime policies. If such policy is also supported by Congressional resolution or declaration of war, the Congress also plays an important supportive role in this regard.

(21) *Historical News Media Support for Censorship has Varied.* Historical evidence regarding news representative support or opposition to censorship during military conflicts has ranged from outright opposition to any censorship to acceptance, if not desire, for some degree of censorship. This variation historically relies on the assumption that the news media has cared how their reporting affects the allied war effort or the safety of military forces, placing the First Amendment rights in perspective with the "Right to Life" covered under the Fifth Amendment, not that a constitutional amendment is required to have a right to live. Additionally, if the United States ever lost a major war, First Amendment rights may evaporate along with the Constitution under such circumstances. The point here is that there has been no unanimous agreement among news representatives regarding the degree of censorship acceptable under wartime reporting.

(22) *Wartime Censorship Standards Have Varied Significantly.* Historically, the degree of government imposed news censorship applied during wartime has ranged from full censorship to no censorship, sometimes within the same conflict. Consequently, there has been no standard, historical application of wartime censorship imposed upon the news media. The degree of censorship appears to be determined by the circumstances of the conflict, military necessity and communications technology. Consequently, history places such discretion upon the government and national security institutions regarding censorship needs.

(23) *News Access to Military Operations & Battlefields has Varied.* Historically, news representative access to military operations or battlefields, either within the United States (e.g., Civil War) or overseas, has ranged from highly restrictive and controlled to open and free. However, most historical evidence points to controlled access to news media representatives by government officials and military commanders. The news media has rarely had uncontrolled access to military facilities, battlefields or military operations either domestically or on foreign soil. Furthermore, the recent court case of J.B. Pictures v. Department of Defense (1993) once again reinforces this historical fact by denying news media access to military facilities not open to the general public.

(24) *The Public has a Right to Information About US. Military Operations.* Historically, there appears to be little argument by either national security institutions or the news media that the general public has a right to know the progress, if not the details, of military operations involving American forces. This assumption must be

part of any "*Optimal Relationship Agreement*" agreed upon by both parties, and the military must agree to provide the greatest degree of accurate information possible protective of military operations, troop safety, and in consideration of politico-military necessity.

(25) *The News Media has no Constitutional Requirement to "Act Responsibly."* Both historical and legal research has concluded that the news media has no legal or constitutional requirement to act responsibly or print factual, accurate information. One problem is the debate over what is "responsible reporting." The news media claims that this is a euphemism for "supporting government policy." The general public views it as "using common sense." Regardless, there is no constitutional requirement for the press to use "common sense." At times this commodity is lacking because perceptions generally viewed as "common sense" are often clouded by ideological filters of the news media culture indoctrinate with the "sacrosanctness" of First Amendment rights to the exclusion of all others. The conclusion here is that national security institutions cannot expect the news media to use "common sense" in reporting of military operations because such a concept is apparently relative to one's perspective.

II. CONCLUSION

The historical and legal research embodied within this study reaches the following conclusions regarding the relationship between the national security institutions and the news media's right to know.

(1) It will be difficult, if not impossible, to completely solve the divergent relationship between national security institutions of government and the news media. The goals and objectives of both institutions are constitutionally, philosophically, and culturally opposed. However, mitigating actions can be taken to alleviate institutional animosity and distrust. These actions will be delineated in the recommendations section of this study.

(2) Research has concluded that there has been no standard relationship, treatment, or degree of cooperation between the American news media and the military. Relations have varied from highly cooperative and friendly to uncooperative and hostile. Constitutionally and philosophically, they have been given different mandates and societal objectives to achieve. There is a fundamental incompatibility between the two institutions in their operational processes, procedures and routines, political ideology, and culture. *Consequently, the best relationship that we may hope to achieve is one based upon mutual understanding, respect, and initial trust. Such a trilogy may lead to a standard of responsive and responsible behavior by both parties.*

(3) An institutional reassessment of the behavior, assumptions, presumptions and work routines of each organization is required as a first step to an *optimal working relationship*. Without such a candid and objective institutional evaluation, the likelihood of a working relationship based upon mutual respect and trust would be difficult. It is the mutual atmosphere of institutional self-righteousness or parochialism which obstructs the ability of both institutions to optimally achieve their respective institutional objectives regarding war coverage. This intolerance for the missions and motives of others obstructs a more mutually beneficial relationship. ***One might be able to summarize the point by stating that there should be no need to exhibit adversarial behavior unless one uncovers prima facie evidence to the contrary.*** Professor Wolfsfeld's Transactional Model of Media Interaction describes a relationship which is competitive, antagonistic, and mutually dependent. However, studies have also indicated that such a relationship does not have to be strictly antagonistic or competitive, and could result in either conflictive or cooperative behavior. ***Consequently, it is possible that a general desire and effort to improve relations by both parties may lead to the mutual achievement of institutional objectives.***

(4) This study has concluded that the President and national security institutions have an historical, legal, and practical responsibility to restrict access to information which may jeopardize the success of military operations, troop safety, or have direct tactical or strategic politico-military implications. What information falls within this purview can only be determined by the President and the military, and depends upon the specific circumstances of the conflict. ***This is when the concepts of public and institutional trust become most important. It is the responsibility of the national***

security organizations to ensure that such restricted information and access limitations are truly essential and meet the criteria.

(5) *This research has indicated that the news media has the right to know what it knows -- no more or no less. Legally, it has no greater access to information than does the general public. The news media has the constitutional right to ask questions, but no one has a requirement to answer them.* Consequently, the government has the legal right and responsibility to protect national security information. The most recent court cases and historical precedent continue to support this institutional responsibility and authority.

(6) *When reviewing major American military operations, it has been observed that Dr. Wolfsfeld's rules of transaction appear to be convincingly applicable.* As particularly observed in World War I, World War II, Korea, and the Persian Gulf War of 1991, these conflicts conform to the rules of Wolfsfeld's Transactional Model of news media-military interaction. *First*, all were higher grades of military conflict, and in each case the news media played a less independent and significant role affecting allied behavior, strategy, or outcome of the conflict. *Secondly*, during such conflicts, the antagonist's (military) considerable control over war events and information flow (e.g., limited access, censorship, etc.) prevented the news media from playing an independent and significant role in effecting the outcome of the conflict. *Third*, the higher level of international and domestic consensus supportive of the conflict also limited the news media's influence over wartime operations or outcome. Furthermore, in accordance with Wolfsfeld's fourth rule of transaction, the high level of frame congruence between the news media and the antagonists (i.e., Allied nations)

reduced the news media's ability to play an independent and significant role in affecting the conduct or outcome of the war. Consequently, the relationship may change according to the control the antagonist has over the crisis or conflict.

(7) This study concludes that it is a conceptual aberration based upon ideological distortion and institutional parochialism that prevents a better, mutually beneficial, and optimal relationship between the news media and national security institutions. A better relationship has existed in the past, and there is no impenetrable physical or legal barrier to a better one in the future. The only true obstruction to a better, more productive relationship is the nature of the attitudes and misunderstandings fostered through institutional culture and socialization.

(8) One of the more troubling conclusions of this study concerns the news media's convenient discarding of some commonly accepted notion of "institutional responsibility." The news media's concept of responsibility appears to be limited to that of "collecting and reporting any information to the public without state interference." *However, that is not responsibility -- that is an occupational or institutional function.* By any legal or dictionary definition, responsibility demands much more. It assumes a moral, legal, and mental accountability for one's actions, or the consequences of such actions, and a requirement to conduct one's business in a reliable and trustworthy manner. It also requires that one be willing to answer or assume liability for one's conduct and obligations -- the consequences of one's actions. According to Black's Law Dictionary, responsibility is "the obligation to answer for an act done, and to repair any injury it may have caused." It is to be "liable, legally accountable or answerable." *Unfortunately, the media culture is indoctrinated with*

the belief that it is answerable to no one, and an unfortunate string of previous Supreme Court libel and defamation cases have bolstered this institutional perception of limited responsibility or accountability for news media product. Accordingly, both the public and government suffers from the media's intransigence concerning this issue.

The implications of this state of affairs is that it falls upon the responsibility of the national security institutions to protect their interest and information by controlling access and instituting censorship as required until the news media, as an institution, can decide upon what, if any, standards of professional responsibility or accountability it is willing to accept for its actions, and then strictly codify such standards with appropriate enforcement actions. Only then will the public's interest be truly served by a free and responsible press, not an irresponsible and obdurate one.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon the research findings and summary described in the previous sections, the following recommendations are made with the objective of establishing an *optimal working relationship* between the news media and national security organizations. An optimal working relationship is defined as one in which the goals and objectives of both organizations can be largely satisfied during the course of the working relationship without major sacrifices by either institution. *By taking into account Wolfeld's understanding of the multidimensional nature of the news media-military relationship, such an optimal relationship is possible.*

Recommendation #1: During national security crisis or conflicts, the national security institutions, particularly the military, should establish an institutional objective to provide the American public with as much information as possible regarding the proposed or on-going military operation consistent with the need to protect military operational security, troop safety, and politico-military considerations. Such an effort should be incorporated into Department of Defense, joint, and service planning documents.

Recommendation #2: A joint news media-national security committee should be formed to establish operating procedures to be followed regarding the provision of news during national security crisis or military operations. This committee should discuss the type of media support to be expected both within the United States and in the theater of conflict during such operations. It should also consider mandatory training for war correspondents regarding what classifications of military information

are or are not releasable to the general public and why. This may prevent the need for "media monitors." Likewise, additional training for military officers, particularly public affairs officers, should also be considered.

Recommendation #3: The security of the nation, the Constitution, and the safety and security of military personnel can be at risk during time of crisis and war. With this fundamental understanding, it is recommended that a military doctrine be adopted stressing the concept that it is incompatible with national security requirements to permit unrestricted news media access to military facilities or information until such information may be safely released.

Recommendation #4: Political information directly impacting the ability to sustain successful military operations (politico-military information) should be as protected, guarded and restricted as military operational information. As concluded by this study, political considerations are an integral component of military operations and weaponry. Consequently, the sensitivity of political information must also be considered and controlled during military operations.

Recommendation #5: All general officer billets with the probability of becoming directly involved in military operations, or directly supporting such military operations, should be assigned politico-military affairs officers to review the political sensitivity of operational (e.g., targeting) and non-operation decisions, information, or directives, and assist with news media relations as required.

Recommendation #6: The issue of institutional responsibility must be vigorously addressed and debated, and needs to be the subject of further research. The responsibility of national security organizations has been generally identified and agreed upon by most institutional parties. However, the issue of news media institutional responsibility has yet to be resolved, and should be the subject of further debate and research. Until such issue is seriously addressed, the level of trust between national security and news media institutions will never be fully beneficial. The ability to accept accountability for one's actions provides a required foundation for trust and integrity. Such a deficit may account for the public's distrust and antipathy toward the news media. This assumption is also supported by the public's disregard of the news media's intense public protest against a lack of access to Operation Just Cause and limited access to Operation Urgent Fury.

PROJECT DEMONSTRATING EXCELLENCE

***ACHIEVING A WORKING RELATIONSHIP: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF
NEWS MEDIA-MILITARY RELATIONS TO IDENTIFY AND EVALUATE
FACTORS AFFECTING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS VERSUS THE NEWS MEDIA'S RIGHT TO KNOW***

PART II: APPENDICES

A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of
the Graduate School of The Union Institute
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in
Political Science & Public Policy

by

**JOSEPH P. AVERY
JANUARY 1994**

APPENDIX A

ATTACHMENT 1

Table 1 Distribution of Paragraphs Mentioning Historical Parallels
of World War II and Vietnam, by Newsmagazine

	World War II	Vietnam	Totals
Time	71 (34.3%)	136 (65.7%)	207
Newsweek	116 (41.9%)	161 (58.1%)	277
US News	<u>84 (47.5%)</u>	<u>93 (52.5%)</u>	<u>177</u>
	271 (41.0%)	390 (59.0%)	661

Table 2 Average Weekly Number of Paragraphs Mentioning the Historical Parallels of World War II and Vietnam, by Newsmagazine and Phase of the Gulf Conflict

	Desert Shield ^a			Desert Storm ^b		
	World War II	Vietnam	Totals	World War II	Vietnam	Totals
<u>Time</u>	1.54 (37) ^c	2.71 (65)	4.25 (102)	5.67 (34)	11.83 (71)	17.50 (105)
<u>Newsweek</u>	2.08 (50)	3.42 (82)	5.50 (132)	11.00 (66)	13.12 (79)	24.17 (145)
<u>US News</u>	2.36 (52)	1.91 (42)	4.27 (94)	5.33 (32)	8.50 (51)	13.83 (83)

^a During Desert Shield, 24 weeks were coded for Time and Newsweek and 22 for US News

^b During Desert Storm, 6 weeks were coded for each newsmagazine

^c Numbers in parentheses refer to number of paragraphs

Table 3. Distribution of Historical Parallel Thematic Categories, by Phase of Gulf Conflict

<u>Category</u>	<u>Desert Shield</u>					<u>Desert Storm</u>					<u>Overall</u>
	<u>World War II</u>		<u>Vietnam</u>		<u>Total</u>	<u>World War II</u>		<u>Vietnam</u>		<u>Total</u>	<u>Totals</u>
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N (%)	N	(%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
Justification	30 ^a	(21.6)	05	(2.6)	35 (10.7)	11	(8.3)	05	(2.5)	16 (4.8)	51 (7.7)
Saddam Hussein	36	(25.9)	04	(2.1)	40 (12.2)	15	(11.4)	01	(0.5)	16 (4.8)	56 (8.5)
Public Opinion	06	(4.3)	42	(22.2)	48 (14.6)	09	(6.8)	31	(15.4)	40 (12.0)	88 (13.3)
Media	02	(1.4)	12	(6.3)	14 (4.3)	12	(9.1)	25	(12.4)	37 (11.1)	51 (7.7)
Outcome	08	(5.8)	37	(19.6)	45 (13.7)	10	(7.6)	27	(13.4)	37 (11.1)	82 (12.4)
Bush	15	(10.8)	14	(7.4)	29 (8.8)	10	(7.6)	10	(5.0)	20 (6.0)	49 (7.4)
Congress	06	(4.3)	12	(6.3)	18 (5.5)	01	(0.8)	21	(10.4)	22 (6.6)	40 (6.0)
Mil. Strategy	34	(24.5)	57	(30.2)	91 (27.7)	62	(47.0)	69	(34.3)	131 (39.3)	222 (33.6)
Military Leaders	02	(1.4)	06	(3.2)	08 (2.4)	02	(1.5)	12	(6.0)	14 (4.2)	22 (3.3)
Totals	139	(100)	189	(100)	328 (100)	132	(100)	201	(100)	333 (100)	661 (100)

^a Numbers in each cell of Table 3 and Table 4 refer to number of paragraphs.

Table 5. Tone of Paragraphs Mentioning Historical Parallels of World War II and Vietnam, by Phase of Gulf Conflict

World War II Parallels	During Desert Shield		During Desert Storm		Overall World War II Tone	
	tone ^a	N	tone	N	tone	N
	positive	79	positive	55	positive	134
	negative	14	negative	16	negative	30
	neutral	46	neutral	61	neutral	107
		139		132		271
	average score=	79-14/139= +.468	55-16/132= +.295		134-30/271= +.384	

Vietnam Parallels	During Desert Shield		During Desert Storm		Overall Vietnam Tone	
	tone	N	tone	N	tone	N
	positive	66	positive	69	positive	135
	negative	69	negative	41	negative	110
	neutral	54	neutral	91	neutral	145
		189		201		390
	average score=	66-69/189= -.016	69-41/201= +.139		135-110/390= +.064	

Totals for each phase	Desert Shield	Desert Storm	Overall Tone
average score=	145-83/328= +.189	124-57/333= +.201	269-140/661= +.195

^a Each paragraph containing a reference to a historical parallel was assigned a numeric value based on whether the tone of the paragraph supported the Bush frame (+1), opposed the Bush frame (-1), or was neither supportive nor critical of the Bush frame (0).

APPENDIX B

ATTACHMENT 1

R E S T R I C T E D
Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Supreme Commander

11 May 1944

SUBJECT: Accredited War Correspondents

TO : All Unit Commanders, Allied Expeditionary Force

At my first Press Conference as Supreme Commander I told the War Correspondents that once they were accredited to my headquarters I considered them quasi-staff officers.

All war correspondents that may accompany the expedition are first accredited to Supreme Headquarters and operate under policies approved by the Supreme Commander. They are, in turn, assigned to lower headquarters in accordance with agreements between the Public Relations Division of this headquarters and the Public Relations Officers on the staffs of the several Commanders-in-Chief. This allocation is always limited by accommodations available. Public Relations Officers of the various echelons act as their guides. As a matter of policy accredited war correspondents should be accorded the greatest possible latitude in the gathering of legitimate news.

Consequently it is desired that, subject always to the requirements of operations, of which the Commander on the spot must be the sole judge, Commanders of all echelons and Public Relations Officers and Conducting Officers give accredited war correspondents all reasonable assistance. They should be allowed to talk freely with officers and enlisted personnel and to see the machinery of war in operation in order to visualize and transmit to the public the conditions under which the men from their countries are waging war against the enemy.

/S/ DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
General, U.S. Army.

R E S T R I C T E D

CERTIFIED
TRUE COPY

WARREN KIRKSEAN
Major, Air Corps

ATTACHMENT 2

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Authority	<u>NND 76074</u>
By	<u>KG</u> NARA DATE <u>1/19/91</u>

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REGULATIONS FOR WAR CORRESPONDENTS

Accompanying Allied Expeditionary Force
in the Field

1944

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
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FOREWORD

To Press and Radio representatives accredited to Allied Expeditionary Force :—

With regard to publicity, the first essential in military operations is that no information of value shall be given to the enemy. The first essential in newspaper work and broadcasting is wide-open publicity. It is your job and mine to try to reconcile these sometimes diverse considerations.

I well appreciate that the man in the street is entitled to be informed about his country's forces and of the progress of the war. He is vitally interested, and the fullest and most accurate information, compatible with the main-

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
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tenance of military security, should be made available to him. Only by the willing cooperation of the general public in the war effort can we be victorious.

I am glad to have you with us ; I know that we can so cooperate that this particular job will be well done.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

General U.S. Army,
Supreme Commander,
Allied Expeditionary Force.



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War Correspondent—Definition :

The term " War Correspondent " in these regulations covers any employee of a newspaper, magazine, news agency, broadcasting network, photographic agency, newsreel company, assigned to collect news for dissemination through the medium of his profession.

OBJECT OF THE REGULATIONS

These regulations have been compiled for the guidance of War Correspondents accredited to the Allied Expeditionary Force. They represent a summary of " Regulations for Correspondents Accompanying U.S. Army Forces in the Field " (U.S. War Department Basic Field Manual 30-26) 1942 ; " Regulations for Naval War Correspondents," drawn up by the Admiralty ; " Regulations for Press Representatives Accompanying a Force in the Field," issued with the joint authority of the Army Council and the Air Council ; and " Regulations for Press Representatives with the Canadian Army in the Field," 1943.

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
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PART I—(General)

I. Accreditation of War Correspondents :

(i) Approval for War Correspondents to accompany the Allied Expeditionary Force in the Field rests finally with the Supreme Commander, AEF. Supreme Headquarters, AEF, will decide from time to time the total number of War Correspondents which will be accepted in any particular area and the proportions allotted to each Allied Nation concerned or interested.

(ii) A prerequisite of accreditation to SHAEF will be that the applicant shall already hold a licence as an accredited correspondent to one of the U.S., British or Canadian Forces, but the Supreme Commander has the right to reject any application without assigning a reason for such an action. Accreditation to SHAEF will be signified by over-stamped endorsement of the existing licence. Permission to proceed overseas will be shown by a specially affixed overseas visa. Correspondents carried afloat will not normally be allowed to land overseas and overseas visas will not be granted to correspondents accredited to



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ANCXF without the concurrence of the commander of that force.


(iii) It shall be the responsibility of the Service Departments in London, Washington and Ottawa, respectively, to decide, after consultation with the appropriate newspaper and other organizations concerned, which newspapers and other bodies shall be authorized to have War Correspondents within the approved national proportion or quota.

(iv) A register of War Correspondents accredited to SHAEF will be kept at Supreme Headquarters, AEF, and in the London, Washington and Ottawa Service Departments from which the licences were originated.

2. Application to be a War Correspondent :

(i) Applications for accreditation (subject to para. 1 (ii) above) will be addressed by the newspaper or other organization concerned to the following authorities respectively :

For representatives of U.S. organizations—
to Public Relations Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, London.



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For representatives of British organizations—to the Admiralty, War Office, or Air Ministry, according to the Service with which it is desired to serve.

For representatives of Canadian organizations—to Canadian Military Headquarters, London.

Applications will show the number of the licence held by the representative nominated.


(ii) Each application must be supported by a written guarantee to pay any charges incurred by the Correspondent. Where it is proposed that the Correspondent shall represent more than one newspaper or organization, such a guarantee will be required from one organization only.

(iii) No Correspondent may represent more than one organization without the prior sanction of the accrediting authority.

(iv) Each Correspondent accredited to SHAEF will be supplied with a copy of these regulations and will sign for receipt of same.

3. Status of War Correspondents :

(i) Permission to accompany a force in the field as War Correspondent does not exempt any such



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
person from liability to military or other obligatory service, or impose on the Allied governments any obligation either to the individual to whom the visa is granted, or to the newspaper or organization he represents, save such as are specified in the regulations issued by the governments.

(ii) Any War Correspondent of the Allied Nations who becomes liable to war service, therefore, may be required to comply with any such obligations and to relinquish his work as War Correspondent.

(iii) War Correspondents, while holding licences, have the status of officers and are subject to military or air force law, and are subject to direction by Naval authority in accordance with K.R. & A.I. 525.

(iv) War Correspondents, in the event of capture by enemy forces, are entitled to be treated as officer prisoners of war with the rank of Captain, Army; Lieutenant, Navy; or Flight-Lieutenant R.A.F. respectively, provided they are in possession of a licence. (Authority, Geneva Con., July 27, 1939, title (VII, art. 81).)

(v) No War Correspondent may carry arms.



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PART II

Provision of Information, Facilities and Censorship

4. Information :


To assist War Correspondents, arrangements will be made for the following :

- (i) Joint official communique.
- (ii) Summaries of information and guidance on operations.
- (iii) Periodical press conferences and back-ground talks.

5. Facilities :

(i) Although Correspondents are accredited to SHAEF, they will be accommodated by component Forces on the principle that the majority of correspondents with a particular force shall be representative of the nation from which the force is drawn.

(ii) After the initial allocation of Correspondents to component forces, interchange of Correspondents may be arranged jointly by the PROs of the




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forces affected. In change of Correspondents afloat will be arranged between PROs of military and air formations and PLO to ANCXF. Correspondents may also be given facilities to visit subordinate headquarters and formations nearer to the scene of action, and may accompany naval or air forces for the collection of information. When such permission is given the extent of the facility granted will be clearly specified.

(iii) On such occasions they will normally be accompanied by a conducting officer, allocated by the senior PR officer, except when special authority is given for them to proceed unaccompanied.

(iv) Correspondents will not leave the Force to which they are attached without the prior permission of the PR officer immediately concerned, permission of the PR officer of the Force to which the Correspondent wishes to transfer and reference to SHAEF.

(v) When impending operations are such (*e.g.*, an impending attack on one front) that it appears desirable temporarily to reinforce the Correspondents normally accommodated by a component force by other Correspondents from other forces, the Correspondents thus transferred will be accompanied by their own conducting officers and travel in their own transport.



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6. Censorship :

Censorship will be exercised according to certain fundamental principles. For details, see Appendix "A" which may be expanded or modified from time to time, by special guidance issued by the Supreme Commander.

7. Conversation with Forces :

War Correspondents are free to converse with the forces whenever they wish, subject to the approval of the officer in charge of the forces in question. They are asked to refrain from discussing political questions, from conversing with men on guard or at work, or from discussing subjects which are clearly secret.

8. Press Communications :

The Supreme Commander will assist War Correspondents to obtain facilities for the despatch of their copy. When such facilities are provided through official channels, appropriate charges may be made to individual newspapers or to the appropriate organizations.

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
PART III

General Conditions for War Correspondents

9. Licences :

(i) A War Correspondent will be required to remain in the Theatre for such minimum period as may be laid down by the Supreme Commander. No War Correspondent may give up his licence except with the approval of the Supreme Commander and of the Service Department of his own country.

(ii) A War Correspondent will forfeit his licence if, in the opinion of the Supreme Commander, such forfeiture appears necessary. Apart from any action of his own which may lead to the revocation of his licence, a Correspondent may be suspended by the Supreme Commander because of distortion or other violations of the approved messages, pictures, captions, commentaries, etc., from the Field by the Correspondent's own office. Suspension in this case, will apply until such time as the matter has been dealt with, to the satisfaction of the Supreme Commander, by the Service Department originally granting the licence and the offend-



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ing organization. War Correspondents should ensure that this is well understood by their home editorial departments.

(iii) In the case of either forfeiture or approved relinquishment of his licence, a War Correspondent will be despatched from the Theatre of operations as soon as the exigencies of the service permit. The Supreme Commander may, however, detain a Correspondent within the area in which censorship is exercised, for such period as he deems fit, and may prescribe the route by which he shall proceed out of the area.

(iv) The senior PR officer at SHAEF will be responsible for withdrawing the licence of any Correspondent ceasing to be accredited or granted indefinite leave of absence.

(v) Upon the withdrawal of his licence, a Correspondent ceases to be entitled to the privileges of his appointment, including the right to wear the prescribed uniform.

(vi) Should a War Correspondent appear to have committed a serious offence which *prima facie* renders him liable to be discredited, his facilities will at once be suspended pending the outcome of an official inquiry. (In fairness to employers and Correspondents it is very important that official inquiries should be completed expeditiously.)

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
(vii) A telegram giving the salient facts should be sent immediately by the senior PR officer to the licensing authority in London, Washington or Ottawa who will inform the newspaper or organization concerned at once, whenever a War Correspondent has had his facilities withdrawn.

10. Production of Licences or Passes :

(i) War Correspondents are liable to be called upon to produce their licences or passes by any personnel of the Allied Forces.

(ii) A Correspondent who fails to produce his licence when called on to do so is liable to arrest or detention. Any such case must be reported at once to the nearest PR Officer or his representative, who will at once take necessary steps for identification.

(iii) War Correspondents must at once carry out any instructions issued to them by any personnel of the Allied Forces acting in the execution of their duty. If a Correspondent considers that he has any cause for complaint in this connection, his complaint must be made only to the Senior PR Officer with the force to which the Correspondent is attached, or his representative.



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11. Subjection to Military Law :


A War Correspondent will be subject to Naval, Military or Air Force Law from the time at which he commences to accompany personnel of any Force on active service until he ceases to accompany that Force or the Force ceases to be in active service.

12. Control of War Correspondents :

This is vested in the Senior PR Officer SHAEF, whose representative for this purpose is the Senior PR Officer of the force concerned. This officer is to be regarded by War Correspondents as their C.O., and all communications on official matters will be addressed to him. Senior Officers should not be approached either in person or by letter except through the Senior PR Officer concerned, or present.

13. Complaints :

A War Correspondent who considers that he has any cause for complaint will lay his case before



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the Senior PR Officer of the Force concerned who, after preliminary inquiry, will refer the matter to higher authority if he is of opinion that the circumstances demand this action, or if the War Correspondent concerned is unwilling to abide by his decision.


14. Dress and Equipment :

(i) War Correspondents will wear an approved uniform and distinguishing marks from the time they are mobilized until they cease to accompany armed forces on active service. War Correspondents are forbidden to wear civilian clothing in the theatre of war.

(ii) The approved uniform and headdress will consist of Service dress pattern or battle dress, without rank badges of the Allied Forces, but with the authorized War Correspondent insignia.

(iii) In addition War Correspondents will be in possession of Service respirator, gas cape and steel helmet while on Active Service.

(iv) Arrangements for the provision of uniform, headdress, and equipment must be made by War Correspondents themselves, but required insignia will be officially supplied.



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15. War Correspondents' Quarters and Messing :


(i) War Correspondents will live in the places allotted to them.

(ii) In the event of it being decided to billet War Correspondents, the Senior PR Officer will make the necessary arrangements. Charges incurred as a result of billeting will be recoverable from Correspondents with the exception of those assigned to Canadian Army and RCAF.

(iii) War Correspondents may draw rations, fuel and light on a repayment basis. Repayment does not apply to those assigned to Canadian Army and RCAF.

(iv) If it is desired to form a War Correspondents' Mess, application must be made to the Senior PR Officer. As far as the exigencies of the Service permits, facilities will be given for the formation of a mess and for the transport of supplies in connection with it.

(v) Payment of charges due by War Correspondents to the public will be made monthly in arrear under arrangements to be made by the Senior PR Officer, or on leaving the force or ship.



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16. Transport and Baggage :

(i) Arrangements will be made by SHAEF for the allocation of motor transport, so far as the exigencies of the Service permit, for the conveyance of War Correspondents and their authorized baggage within the Theatre. The use of any privately-hired means of conveyance by War Correspondents without permission of the PRO concerned is prohibited.


(ii) War Correspondents may also be granted travel accommodation subject to Service exigencies, in Naval vessels, transports, service aircraft and troop trains.

(iii) The amount of baggage which may be carried by War Correspondents will be governed by the conditions prevailing in the Theatre at the time.

17. Cash Advances in the Field :

It is open to approved newspaper and other organizations to arrange for their Correspondents to receive cash advances in the field under the same conditions as officers.

In the case of Correspondents, both British and American, serving with wholly American Units;



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their home offices may make deposits with the U.S. Central Disbursing Officer, who will transmit such funds to a designated finance officer in the field. He, in turn, will make cash advances to Correspondents.

Where Correspondents are serving with British Units, arrangements are made between the organizations concerned and the Army Paymaster, who will make arrangements for cash payments in the field.


For Canadian Correspondents, application should be made to DDP, Canadian Military Headquarters for field facilities for cash advances.

18. Medical Treatment :

War Correspondents are eligible for medical, dental or hospital treatment by Service medical and dental staff in the field, subject to the exigencies of the Service.

19. Casualties :

Casualties among War Correspondents will be reported by the PRO of the formations to which the Correspondents are attached, through SHAEF, to the appropriate Service Department in London,




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Washington or Ottawa as applicable. The Department responsible for the original licence will be responsible for informing the newspaper or organization concerned.

20. Reports and Records of Service :

At the conclusion of hostilities the Senior PR Officer will render a report on each War Correspondent. A similar report will be submitted on any Correspondent who is permitted to resign or who is deprived of his licence before the termination of the campaign. These reports will be supplied to the Departments responsible for the original issue of the Correspondent's licence in London or Washington.



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
APPENDIX "A"

I. Censorship :

(i) *Press Copy.*—All material for publication in the Press including captions for photographs, for newsreel commentaries and for broadcasting will be submitted for censorship in triplicate, or as required locally. Censorship regulations will be issued by the Supreme Commander, AEF; the Senior PR Officer will be responsible for all War Correspondents being fully conversant with local censorship regulations as amended from time to time.

(ii) *Photographs, Films and Sketches.*—Pictures of all kinds taken or made during the period of accreditation are subject to censorship. Sketches and undeveloped films and plates must be handed to a PR Officer, who will arrange for their censorship and transmission. Whenever possible, arrangements will be made for local development of negatives; but until such arrangements can be made, undeveloped films or plates may be forwarded direct to the appropriate Service Department in the UK through normal Service channels.

(iii) *Private Correspondence.*—Private and personal correspondence of Correspondents must be submitted for censorship. Correspondents are not



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permitted to seal and "frank" their own letters. Private and business communications can be sent from the zone of operations only through official channels. Further information will be given by the Senior PR Officer.

2. Security :

It is impossible to lay down permanent directions on matters to which reference is forbidden. In certain cases, the position may be affected by local considerations and by operational developments.

(i) Reference to any of the following cannot normally be made, for Security reasons, in Press reports. The list is to be taken as a guide only, and is not comprehensive :

- (a) Composition and location of any units of the Allied Forces.
- (b) Details of movements of forces, personnel or equipment.
- (c) Operational orders.
- (d) Plans and intended operations.
- (e) Casualties.
- (f) Organization.
- (g) Place names (before reference in communiques or censorship directive).
- (h) Camouflage and decoy methods.

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- (i) Names or numbers of any units of the Allied Forces, unless specifically released.
- (j) Speculation upon any of the above.
- (ii) Caution should also be exercised in dealing with weapons or equipment of war—*e.g.*, naval vessels, aircraft, tanks, etc.
- (iii) Generally speaking there is no objection to referring to units as "an artillery unit," "a West Country Regiment," "a Highland Battalion," "an American Squadron," etc.
- (iv) In describing a defensive position occupied, or being prepared, by Allied troops, it is essential that such descriptions should not include information of value to the enemy. To quote some obvious instances, no reference should be made to the nature of anti-tank or other obstacles, fortifications, depth of the position, etc. It is permissible to talk in general terms of trenches, wire, concrete, etc.
- (v) Only such details as have already been published or authorized concerning arms and equipment, etc., of the Allied Forces can be mentioned. No reference can be made to modifications or improvements to such arms and equipment without authority.
- (vi) New types or novel methods of attack or defence should not be referred to until they have been disclosed officially.

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ATTACHMENT 2

ATTACHMENT 3

16/2/45
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BY: [Signature]
AUTHORITY: [Signature]

**SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE**

CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATION MEMORANDUM)
NUMBER)

18 April, 1944

PRESS CENSORSHIP

1. OBJECT

The object of this memorandum is to prescribe the policy and procedure for press censorship in connection with forthcoming operations.

2. DEFINITIONS

a. "Press Material" means all written news, still and motion pictures, and broadcast material intended for publication, broadcast or general distribution.

b. "Field Press Censorship" means the censorship of press material of the following kinds:-

- (1) Press material from accredited correspondents with Army Groups, Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, Allied Expeditionary Air Force and lower formations thereof.
- (2) Press material resulting from facilities granted by this Headquarters or the Headquarters of any lower echelon.
- (3) Official productions including Psychological Warfare and Welfare material.
- (4) Other press material (including foreign language material) originating or published in liberated or occupied countries in the sphere of operations of the Allied Expeditionary Force.

3. POLICY

a. Field Press Censorship will be governed by the principle that the minimum of information will be withheld from the public consistent with security. In general, the following information will not be released:-


- (1) Reports likely to supply military information to the enemy to the detriment of the Allied war effort.
- (2) Unauthenticated, inaccurate or false reports, misleading statements and rumours.
- (3) Reports likely to injure the morale of the Allied Forces.

b. The basic objectives of Field Press Censorship organisation will be:

- (1) Security.
- (2) Speed.
- (3) Consistency.
- (4) Censorship guidance and assistance to war correspondents.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO RESTRICTED
By authority of G.A.L.A.
D. I. P. [Signature]
Date: 4 AUG 1945

SGS - SHAEF File No. 419/73



4. RESPONSIBILITY

a. The basic press censorship policy prescribed in this memorandum will be amplified as may be necessary by the Supreme Commander. Within this Headquarters, responsibility for recommending and carrying out policy will rest with Chief of the Public Relations Division, acting in consultation with Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Chief of Staff, Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, and Senior Air Staff Officer, Allied Expeditionary Air Force.

b. Under the general direction of the Supreme Commander, through the Chief of the Public Relations Division, the execution of Field Press Censorship overseas will be the responsibility of Army Group Commanders for the territory under their control, undertaken in consultation with the Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force and the Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, as necessary.

c. The Public Relations Division at this Headquarters will be responsible for the remainder of Field Press Censorship, including Field Press Censorship in the United Kingdom, and will also be responsible for giving rulings and guidance to authorities responsible for censorship of press material outside the categories mentioned in paragraph 2 b.

5. PROCEDURE


a. In principle, decentralization of press censorship is undesirable from the points of view of both security and of consistency. A certain degree of decentralization may, however, become essential.

b. Field Press Censorship will be carried out by joint press censorship units comprising UNITED STATES, BRITISH, CANADIAN Army, Air and insofar as the situation renders it necessary, Naval personnel provided by the commanders mentioned in paragraph 4 b.

a. The Public Relations Division at this Headquarters will:-

- (1) Establish a Field Press Censorship organization of a sufficient size to be capable of censoring the maximum amount of material which can reasonably be expected to be produced by the accredited correspondents at any stage of the operations.
- (2) Apportion units as required from the Field Press Censorship organization to Army Group Headquarters.
- (3) Maintain a uniform press censorship policy by the issue of directives to joint press censorship units and by liaison, through appropriate channels, with Military Postal and Cable Censorship, the Military Censorship of Civilian Communications, UNITED STATES Office of Censorship, Theatre Censor EUROPEAN Theatre of Operations, UNITED STATES Army and the Ministry of Information.
- (4) Be responsible for field press censorship in any case where press material cannot conveniently be dealt with by a joint censorship unit.
- (5) Deal with points of doubt referred by joint press censorship units to this Headquarters for policy decision.

d. Press traffic will not be encoded/enciphered. No transmission of press material by any means liable to interception will be made forward of censorship. As circumstances permit, courier services, including air courier services, will be provided to ensure that press material is brought back for censorship and clearance without delay.



a. Wireless transmission in clear of censored press dispatches shall not begin from the bridgehead or from any vessel until specifically authorized by the Supreme Commander.

6. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE MATERIAL

Psychological Warfare material will normally be dealt with under the procedure outlined above, but where circumstances render it necessary the censorship of Psychological Warfare material may, with the approval of Army Group Commanders or this Headquarters, as the case may be, be delegated to specially designated Psychological Warfare Branch Officers.

7. MATERIAL ORIGINATING IN LIBERATED OR OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

a. Arrangements will be made at the earliest possible moment for the assumption by nationals of liberated countries of responsibility for press censorship of material originating or published in those countries. Before final agreement on such an arrangement, the proposals will be coordinated with the requirements of Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2 and G-5, this Headquarters. Such arrangements will include provision:-

- (1) that close liaison will be maintained with Joint Field Press Censorship, and
- (2) that reports of Allied Expeditionary Force operations will not be published without submission to Joint Field Press Censorship.

b. Responsibility for the execution of press censorship of material originating or published in enemy territory occupied by Allied Expeditionary Force will remain with the authorities mentioned in 4 b unless and until altered by directive from this Headquarters.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

W. B. SMITH,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

H. R. BULL,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

G-3A

ATTACHMENT 4

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
PUBLIC RELATIONS DIVISION

18 April 1944


Lt. General W. B. Smith, USA
Chief of Staff
Allied Expeditionary Force

My dear General Smith:

I would like you to know how greatly we all appreciate your interest in our Field Press Censorship training course, knowing as we do, the multiplicity and pressure of your many duties.

Your talk to the class provided great encouragement and inspiration, and I am sure that your wise counsel will be fruitful in the trying days ahead.

Faithfully yours,


T. J. DAVIS,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief, Public Relations Division.

SCS-SHAF File No. 100-7

2 1100

WBS

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: 48 CFR 1.101
DATE: 11/21/11
BY: NARA/TH/97

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-6 (Publicity & Psychological Warfare) Division

13 April 1944.

My dear General Smith:

We are delighted and honored that you will address the press censorship course. The curriculum has been adjusted and arrangements made for this talk to take place at 1430 hours on Monday, 17 April.

Arrangements have been made to provide for the admission of your car at the MOI and an officer will be waiting to conduct you to the lecture room.

Following are some points which you may care to talk about to the course, all of which would be of particular interest:

- a. The duties of the C of S and how censorship can help or hinder him.
- b. The dangers of political censorship.
- c. How policy censorship should be handled.

The types of policy points which fall within the scope of censorship.

- d. The importance of order of battle and where censorship can hinder the enemy's intelligence.
- e. Why censorship of senior officers' names and their commands is important.

Sincerely,

Rob
ROBERT A. McCLURE,
Brig.Gen., G.S.C.,
A.C.of S., G-6 Division.

Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith,
Chief of Staff,
Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Expeditionary Force.

2 110:

JCS-STAFF FILE NO. 1101
1101
McCLURE

FILE

*and, by all means,
some of the grief
which censorship has
caused the C/S!*

APPENDIX C

ATTACHMENT 1



REPRINT
(with changes thru 5/21/71 incorporated)

June 25, 1965#
NUMBER 5230.7

ASD(A)

Department of Defense Directive

* SUBJECT Wartime Information Security Program (WISP) *

References: (a) DoD Directive 5230.7, "Censorship Planning",
May 29, 1959 (hereby cancelled)
(b) DoD Directive 5120.33, "Classification
Management Program", January 8, 1963
(c) National Censorship Agreement Between the
Department of Defense and the Office of
Emergency Planning, October 1, 1963

I. REISSUANCE

* This Directive reissues policy on, and assigns responsi- *
bility for, WISP planning involving the Department
of Defense. Reference (a) is hereby superseded and
cancelled.

II. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

* This Directive applies to the Military Departments, the *
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Administration) and
(Public Affairs), and governs planning within the DoD *
for National WISP including Armed Forces, Civil *
Enemy Prisoner of War and Civilian Internee, and Field *
Press WISP. *

III. DEFINITIONS

* A. WISP. The control and examination of communica- *
tions to prevent disclosure of information of value to
an enemy, and to collect information of value to the
United States.

B. United States. The term "United States" includes the *
fifty states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam,
the Virgin Islands, American Samoa and Swain's Island,
the Canal Zone, the Trust Territories of the Pacific

#Second amendment (Ch 3, 5/21/71)

Jun 25, 65#
5230.7

Islands, and any territory or area under the jurisdiction of the United States, or which is committed to its control as administering authority by treaty or international agreement.

- C. Communication. The term "communication" includes any letter, book, plan, map, or other paper, picture, sound recording, or other reproduction, telegram, cablegram, wireless message, or conversation transmitted over wire, radio, television, optical, or other electro-magnetic system, and any message transmitted by any signalling device or any other means.
- * D. National WISP. The control and examination of communi- *
cations entering, leaving, transiting, or touching the borders *
of the United States, and the voluntary withholding from *
publication by the domestic public media industries of *
military and other information which should not be released *
in the interest of the safety and defense of the United States *
and its Allies. *
- * 1. National Telecommunications WISP - Within the scope *
of National WISP, the control and examination of *
communications transmitted or received over the circuits *
of commercial communications companies classified by the *
Federal Communications Commission as "common carriers", *
and not under the control, use, supervision, or inspection *
of a Federal agency. *
- * 2. National Postal and Travelers WISP - Within the *
scope of National WISP, the control and examination *
of postal communications, communications carried on the *
person or in the baggage or personal possessions of *
travelers, and all other communications subject to review *
and not within the purview of other elements of National *
WISP. *
- * E. Armed Forces WISP. The examination and control of. *
personal communications to or from persons in the Armed *
Forces of the United States and persons accompanying or *
serving with the Armed Forces of the United States. *
- * F. Civil WISP. Review of civilian communications, *
such as messages, printed matter, and films, entering, *
leaving, or circulating within areas or territories occupied *
or controlled by the Armed Forces of the United States. *
- * G. Enemy Prisoner of War and Civilian Internee WISP. The *
review of communications to and from enemy Prisoners *
of War and civilian internees held by the United States Armed *
Forces. *

- * H. Field Press WISP. The security review of news material *
subject to the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces of the United
States, including all information or material intended for
dissemination to the public.
- * I. Primary WISP. Armed Forces review performed by *
personnel of a company, battery, squadron, ship, station,
base, or similar unit, on the personal communications of
persons assigned, attached, or otherwise under the jurisdic-
tion of a unit.
- * J. Secondary WISP. , Armed Forces review performed on *
the personal communications of officers, civilian employees,
and accompanying civilians of the Armed Forces of the United
States, and on those personal communications of enlisted
personnel of the armed forces not subject to Armed Forces
primary review, or those requiring reexamination. *
- * IV. NATIONAL WISP *
- * A. Objectives. The objectives of National WISP are to (1) *
deny to the enemy information which would aid his war effort
or would hinder our own; and (2) collect information of value
in prosecuting the war and make it available to proper author-
ities.
- * B. Assumptions *
- * 1. In the event of war, the President will impose National *
WISP. *
- * 2. The imposition of National WISP will be supported *
by appropriate legislation. *
- * 3. Upon imposition of National WISP, the President *
will establish an Office of WISP and appoint a *
Director of WISP. *
- * 4. The Office of WISP will be an independent Federal *
agency reporting directly to the President. *
- * C. National WISP Operating and Planning Principles *
- * 1. WISP is an indispensable part of war, and planning *
for it should keep pace with other war plans. *
- * 2. WISP restraints will be enforced only for reasons *
of military import as described in subsection IV.A.,
above. WISP will not be used to (a) suppress *

#First amendment (Ch 3, 5/21/71)

information, other than in the interest of national security or defense, (b) assist in the enforcement of peacetime statutes unconnected with the war effort, or (c) act as a guardian of public morals.

3. Although there are no restrictions on the authority of the Director of WISP (to be established by the President under paragraph IV.B.3., above), National WISP normally will not be exercised over Government communications, over non-government communications facilities allocated to Federal agencies, or those which may come under the control, use, supervision or inspection of Federal agencies.
4. During the interim between the imposition of National WISP by the President and the determination by the Director of WISP that the Office of WISP is prepared to assume control of Postal and Travelers WISP, Telecommunications WISP, and the Special Analysis Division, the Secretary of Defense will be responsible for such functions.
5. The Director of WISP will notify the Secretary of Defense when the Office of WISP is prepared to assume control of the functions set forth in paragraph IV.C.4., above, after which date responsibility for such functions shall be vested in the Director of WISP.
6. After the Director of WISP assumes control of Postal and Travelers, Telecommunications WISP and the Special Analysis Division, military personnel of the DoD assigned to the Office of WISP will be under the administrative control of their Services, and the operational control of the Director of WISP. Military personnel may be withdrawn by their respective Services as mutually agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of WISP.
7. At the time of transfer of control from the Department of Defense to the Office of WISP, all items of equipment and supplies necessary for and being used or allocated to WISP operations, and all leases that have been entered into for WISP operations, will be transferred to the Director of WISP without reimbursement.

- D. Delineation of Planning Responsibilities. Responsibilities for advance National WISP planning are assigned as follows:
1. The Office of Emergency Preparedness (CEP), under the provisions of reference (c), will:
 - a. Coordinate and monitor all aspects of National WISP planning.
 - b. Develop a plan for establishing Public Media WISP.

- * c. Develop a plan, in coordination with the DoD and other interested agencies, for establishing an Office of WISP. *
 - * d. Furnish policy and training guidance, a coordinator, and training space for the Special Analysis Division, Office of WISP. *
 - * e. Develop plans for the Office of WISP providing for the coordination of the procurement of equipment necessary to support the operations of the Special Analysis Division. *
 - * f. Accept responsibility for procuring space for all elements of National Headquarters of the Office of WISP. *
 - * g. Develop plans for the Office of WISP to coordinate the hiring of all civilian personnel to be used by all elements of the National Headquarters of the Office of WISP. *
 - * h. Maintain an activation file containing the necessary directives for the establishment of National WISP. This includes proposed proclamations, executive orders and legislation. *
 - * i. Coordinate, with foreign governments, in conjunction with the DoD, liaison on National WISP policy matters. *
2. The Department of Defense under the provisions of reference (c) will:
- * a. Develop plans and preparations for National Postal and Travelers WISP, National Telecommunications WISP, and the Special Analysis Division as elements of the Office of WISP. *
 - * b. Maintain liaison with foreign governments on technical and operational planning matters.
 - * c. Maintain duplicate activation files containing the necessary directives for the establishment of National WISP. *
 - * d. Achieve and maintain an adequate degree of readiness at all times for the activation of those elements of the Office of WISP for which the DoD is responsible. *

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#First amendment (Ch 3, 5/21/71)

Specific Responsibilities Within the Department of Defense

1. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) is responsible for:
 - a. Over-all coordination and direction of the National WISP policy and program within the DoD. *
 - b. Representing the DoD with other government agencies on National WISP matters. *
 - c. Maintaining liaison with foreign governments on National WISP matters. *
 - d. Maintaining activation files containing necessary directives, proposed proclamations, executive orders, and legislation. These will be duplicates of activation files maintained in the Office of Emergency Preparedness. *
 - e. Monitoring the Military Departments' National WISP functions and responsibilities to achieve and maintain readiness for the imposition of National Postal and Travelers WISP, National Telecommunications WISP and for the operation of the Special Analysis Division. *

2. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) is responsible for:
 - a. Over-all coordination and direction within the DoD for the National Public Media WISP policy and program. *
 - b. Representing the DoD with other government agencies on National Public Media WISP matters and for developing a policy and program covering DoD participation in National Public Media WISP. *

3. The Secretary of the Army, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force, is responsible for the development of plans and preparations for Postal and Travelers WISP as an element of National WISP. These responsibilities include:
 - a. Preparing logistic and operation plans for Postal and Travelers WISP. *
 - b. Preparing operational instructions and guidance for review. *

- * c. Developing plans for M-day recruitment and assignment of qualified civilians to selected positions in Postal and Travelers WISP. *
- d. Maintaining liaison with other government agencies on planning and activation matters.
- 4. The Secretary of the Army is responsible for developing and preparing plans for the Special Analysis Division as an element of National WISP, and for planning for and operating the National Postal and Travelers WISP organization and the Special Analysis Division, when so directed. This responsibility includes:
 - * a. Selecting and training personnel of the Reserve Components of the Department of the Army for mobilization assignment to National Postal and Travelers WISP. *
 - b. Selecting personnel of the Reserve Components of the Department of the Army for mobilization assignment to the Army Element, Special Analysis Division.
 - * c. Developing Tables of Distribution for M-day recruitment and assignment of civilians to positions in Postal and Travelers WISP. *
 - d. Stockpiling essential supplies and equipment as a readiness measure for National Postal and Travelers WISP. *
- 5. The Secretary of the Navy is responsible for developing plans and preparing for activation of, and the operation of, Telecommunications WISP as an element of National WISP. This responsibility includes:
 - * a. Preparing logistic and operations plans for National Telecommunications WISP. *
 - * b. Recruiting and assigning personnel of the Reserve Components of the Department of the Navy to mobilization billets in Telecommunications WISP. *
 - c. Selecting personnel of the Reserve Components of the Department of the Navy for mobilization assignment to the Navy Element, Special Analysis Division.
 - * d. Developing plans for immediate M-day recruitment and assignment of qualified civilians to selected positions in National Telecommunications WISP. *

- e. Conducting liaison with commercial communications companies, governmental agencies, and others as required on technical operational planning and activation matters.
- * f. Developing and administering necessary training in Telecommunications WISP including the conduct*
* of seminars and exercises, and preparation of curricula and guidance for review units. *
- * g. Preparing and promulgating operational procedure and guidance for reviewers. *
- * h. Stockpiling certain essential supplies and equipment as a readiness measure for National Telecommunications WISP. *
- 6. The Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for making the following preparations for Postal and Travelers WISP and the Special Analysis Division as elements of National WISP. This responsibility includes: *
- * a. Selecting personnel of the Reserve Components of the Department of the Air Force for mobilization assignment to National Postal and Travelers WISP. *
- * b. Selecting personnel of the Reserve Components of the Department of the Air Force for mobilization assignment to the Air Force Element, Special Analysis Division.
- * c. Training personnel of the Reserve Components of the Department of the Air Force and making such personnel available to the Department of the Army for duty upon imposition of National WISP. *
- * F. National WISP Planning Security Classification *
- * 1. The fact of the existence of National WISP planning is unclassified. *
- * 2. Classification will be determined in accordance with issuances under reference (b).
- * V. FIELD PRESS WISP *
- * A. Objectives and Scope
- * 1. The objectives of Field Press WISP are to (a) insure the prompt release to the public of the maximum information *

consistent with security, and (b) prevent the disclosure of information which would assist the enemy.

- * 2. Accreditation of correspondents, provision of communication facilities, civil review, and the internal dissemination of communications are not within the province of field press WISP. *

B. Policy

1. The governing principle will be that the security review of news material will be accomplished within the shortest practicable time, and the maximum information released to the public consistent with denial of aid to the enemy.

- * 2. Every effort will be made to conduct field press review at locations convenient to processing and transmission facilities. *

- * 3. Field press review will be conducted in accordance with United States Armed Forces doctrine which will apply to the security review of news material subject to the jurisdiction of elements of the Armed Forces, whether acting jointly or independently. The security review of news material subject to the jurisdiction of the United States Armed Forces portion of combined commands will be governed by procedure prescribed by the combined force commander insofar as such procedure is in consonance with the principles set forth in paragraphs V.B.1. and 2., above. *

- * 4. Upon declaration of war, or if the United States is attacked, or if the United States is believed about to be attacked, field press WISP may be established in the United States as directed by the Secretary of Defense with the approval of the President. *

- * 5. Field press WISP may be placed into effect immediately outside the Continental United States by a joint, specified, or other area commander of an area in which United States Armed Forces are operating, in the event of (a) a declaration of war by the United States, (b) an armed attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or areas occupied or controlled by the United States, (c) an armed attack on the Armed Forces of the United States, or (d) the commitment to combat of Armed Forces of the United States as a separate force or as a part of a United Nations effort. *

#First amendment (Ch 3, 5/21/71)⁹

- * 6. Wherever initiated or established, Field Press WISP will cease only upon the direction of the Secretary of Defense. *

C. Responsibilities

- * 1. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) will develop over-all plans and provide policy direction for the operation of field press WISP. *
2. The Secretaries of the Military Departments will be responsible for:
- * a. Preparing logistic and operations plans for Field Press WISP. *
- * b. Selecting and training personnel for assignment to Field Press WISP. *
- * c. Preparing and issuing uniform technical operational instructions and guidance to reviewers. *
- * d. Stockpiling essential supplies for Field Press WISP. *

* VI. ARMED FORCES WISP *

- * A. Objectives. The objectives of Armed Forces WISP are to (1) prevent the disclosure of information which might assist the enemy or which might adversely affect any policy of the United States; and (2) collect and disseminate information which may assist the United States in the successful prosecution of a war. *

B. Policy

- * 1. Armed Forces WISP may be imposed in time of peace only when specifically directed by (a) the President, (b) the Secretary of Defense, or (c) by the commander of a unified or specified command, as an emergency security measure, upon indications that an outbreak of hostilities is imminent or has occurred within his area. *
2. Subsequent to a declaration of war by the United States, the following conditions will govern the imposition of Armed Forces WISP. *
- a. Within the Continental United States
- * (1) If the United States is attacked or believed about to be attacked, Armed Forces WISP will *

be established in areas under military control by order of the Secretary of Defense.

* (2) When deemed necessary to maintain security at installations under military control, Armed Forces WISP may be imposed after approval by the Secretary of Defense. The appropriate Military Department will request such approval. *

* (3) Responsible commanders will impose immediate review at ports of water or aerial embarkation and related staging areas to maintain adequate security, and advise the Departments of the Army, Navy, or the Air Force, as appropriate, of such imposition. *

* b. Outside the Continental United States. In all land or water areas where persons in, serving with, or accompanying, the Armed Forces of the United States are stationed, Armed Forces WISP will be imposed immediately. *

* 3. Secondary Armed Forces WISP will be performed by the military components as directed by the appropriate unified or specified commanders in compliance with the order imposing Armed Forces WISP. *

* 4. Armed Forces WISP will cease only when so directed by the Secretary of Defense upon recommendation by the Joint Staff or the appropriate Military Department. *

C. Responsibilities

1. The Secretaries of the Military Departments will be responsible for:
 - * a. Preparing over-all plans and uniform policies for their support of Armed Forces WISP. *
 - * b. Preparing logistic and operations plans for Armed Forces WISP. *
 - * c. Selecting and training personnel for assignment to Armed Forces WISP. *
 - * d. Preparing and issuing Armed Forces WISP regulations. *

e. Stockpiling essential supplies for Armed Forces WISP.

2. Within overseas areas, primary and secondary Armed Forces WISP will be the responsibility of unified or specified commanders. Within CONUS, WISP at water and aerial ports of embarkation and staging areas will be the responsibility of the official of the Military Department having control of the facility.

* VII. CIVIL WISP

* A. Objectives. The objectives of Civil WISP are to (1) ~~collect~~ and disseminate information that will assist the United States in the successful prosecution of a war, and (2) prevent the disclosure of information which might assist the enemy, or which might adversely affect any policy of the United States.

* B. Policy

* 1. When Civil WISP is established in a foreign territory, jurisdiction will be exercised over all communications entering, leaving, or circulating within the territory, except those controlled by other forms of United States or Allied WISP.

* a. Establishment of Civil WISP in a foreign territory controlled by the Armed Forces of the United States may be directed by the Secretary of Defense.

* b. Establishment of Civil WISP in foreign territories occupied by the Armed Forces of the United States as the result of military operations may be directed by the appropriate unified or specified commander.

* 2. The Secretary of Defense will determine the time and phasing of Civil WISP termination or transfer to other than military control.

* C. Responsibilities

* 1. The Secretary of the Army is responsible for the continuous planning for Civil WISP as a military measure,

working in close cooperation with the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force in:

- a. Preparing logistical and operational plans.
 - * b. Planning for the selection and training of military personnel for Civil WISP duty assignments. *
 - c. Conducting operational planning and activation liaison with other Federal agencies.
 - * d. Preparing and issuing technical operational instructions and guidance for reviewers. *
 - * e. Monitoring the conduct of Civil WISP when imposed. *
- 2. The Secretary of the Navy will assist the Secretary of the Army in developing plans, policy, and preparations for the telecommunications element of Civil WISP, including the selection, training, and assigning of Naval personnel to Civil WISP. *
 - * 3. The Secretary of the Air Force will assist the Secretary of the Army in the developing of plans, policy, and preparations for the Postal and Travelers element of Civil WISP, including the selection, training, and assigning of Air Force personnel to Civil WISP. *
 - * 4. Unified or specified commanders will operate Civil WISP as a military measure in United States occupied territory, or in controlled territory within limits determined by mutual agreement between the recognized government of the controlled territory and the United States Government. *
 - * 5. Unified or specified commanders will plan for the operation of Civil WISP in areas subject to occupation or control in accordance with war plans. *

* VIII. ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERPRET WISP *

A. Objectives

- 1. To collect and disseminate information that will assist the United States in the successful prosecution of a war.
- 2. To prevent the disclosure of information which might assist the enemy, or which might affect any policy of the United States.

3. To collect and furnish to authorities of enemy prisoner of war and civilian internee camps information that may help maintain discipline and physical security.

B. Policy


- * 1. The operation of Enemy Prisoner of War and Civilian Internee WISP will be undertaken only with a full understanding of the rights guaranteed to enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees by the Geneva Conventions to which the United States is a signatory. *
- * 2. All enemy prisoner of war and civilian internee mail, with the exceptions required by the Geneva Conventions, will be subject to review. *

C. Responsibilities

- * 1. The Secretary of the Army is responsible for continuous planning for Enemy Prisoner of War and Civilian Internee WISP and will exercise the following responsibilities in close cooperation with the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force: *
- * a. Pre-mobilization planning for Enemy Prisoner of War and Civilian Internee WISP. *
- * b. Preparation and promulgation of Enemy Prisoner of War and Civilian Internee WISP regulations. *
- * c. Guidance for unified and specified commanders in matters pertaining to Enemy Prisoner of War and Civilian Internee WISP. *
- * 2. Unified or specified commanders are responsible for all matters pertaining to Enemy Prisoner of War and Civilian Internee WISP in the area under their jurisdictions. *
- * 3. Prisoner of War WISP Detachments will be established, trained, and assigned to oversea area commands by the Department of the Army. *
- * 4. In areas where National WISP is operating, the Director of WISP, Office of WISP, will review communications to and from enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees in accordance with Armed Forces WISP regulations. *

IX. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

This Directive is effective immediately. Two (2) copies of each implementing document will be forwarded to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) within sixty (60) days.


Deputy Secretary of Defense

ATTACHMENT 2

MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS

31 October 1966.

**RULES GOVERNING PUBLIC RELEASE
OF MILITARY INFORMATION IN VIETNAM
(Effective 1 November 1966)**

BACKGROUND

The basic principle governing the public release of military information in Vietnam is that the maximum amount of information will be made available, consistent with the requirement for security.

In past wars a great deal of information could be, and was, denied to the enemy on the basis that he did not have ready access to it. This is not the case in Vietnam. By their very nature, subversion and guerrilla warfare make it impossible to safeguard many types of information that once were carefully protected. Thus, the arrival of a major US unit is announced immediately, rather than weeks or even months later. Pin-point datelines are permitted. In-country strength figures, by service, are released at regular intervals. Casualty figures are released weekly.

In Vietnam the greatest problem in achieving a full flow of information to newsmen and thence to the public is not that of deciding whether information is releasable, but that of physically gathering, transmitting and checking information from widely scattered locations linked together only by air transportation and an almost saturated communications system.

In the past, certain ground rules have defined the items of information that are not releasable and those that are releasable. The ground rules have been reviewed to insure that they are clearly stated, that they are limited to those required to preserve military security and that the principle of making the maximum amount of information available to the public is being followed.

The situation in South Vietnam is such that correspondents may come into possession of information which has not been released officially under the ground rules set forth herein. Such information is not to be transmitted or released to the public until officially released by Vietnamese, American or other Free World spokesmen in regard to their respective

Annex A

national forces. Official Government of Vietnam (GVN) and US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) accreditation is issued on this condition. Deliberate violation of these conditions or ground rules by a correspondent will be regarded as a basis for suspension or cancellation of accreditation.

Correspondents may find that, at times, their movements may be restricted in certain tactical areas. These restrictions are kept to a minimum but they may be applied by a commanding officer when in his opinion the nature of an operation warrants such action. Correspondents will be advised of such restrictions by the commanding officer in the unit or by the IO representative of the headquarters involved, or by the unit G2/S2 if there is no IO representative present.

GROUND RULES

1. The Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam is the sole releasing authority for all information material, including photography, pertaining to US military activities in Vietnam and gathered or produced by military individuals or organizations. Local commanders are delegated the authority to release hometown news material. As authorized by COMUSMACV, the Chief of Information or his duly appointed representative is the official MACV military spokesman.

2. Information cleared for release will be made available to the press by MACV through one or more of the following means.

- a. Daily press release.
- b. Daily press briefing.
- c. Call outs.
- d. Special press handouts.

3. Releasable Information.

a. General.

(1) Arrival of major units in country when officially announced by COMUSMACV.

(2) Strength figures of US forces, by service, when announced by COMUSMACV.

(3) Official total casualty figures on a weekly and cumulative basis, as furnished by Department of Defense on the basis of reports from the services.

(4) Enemy casualty figures for each action or operation, daily and cumulatively.

b. Ground/Naval Operations.

(1) Casualties suffered by friendly units in an announced operation in terms of "light," "moderate" or "heavy" as applied to size of the force in that action or operation.

(2) Size of friendly forces involved in an action or operation using general terms such as "multibattalion."

(3) Information regarding details of a tactical operation when release has been authorized by COMUSMACV (see paragraph 1, General Notes).

c. Air Operations.

(1) Target or targets hit, to include general location and category of target.

(2) Identification as to whether it was VNAF, US or a joint VNAF/US strike.

(3) Whether aircraft were land-based or carrier-based. Names of carriers when their aircraft are involved.

(4) Time of attack in general terms.

(5) General evaluation of success of the mission.

(6) Types of ordnance expended in general terms, such as 250-pound fragmentation bombs, 500-pound general purpose bombs, rockets, .50 caliber ammunition, 20mm cannon fire.

(7) Number of missions over North Vietnam; number of sorties over the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

(8) Types of aircraft involved.

- (9) Weather enroute and over the target during a strike.
- (10) Pilot sightings of unfriendly aircraft.
- (11) Periodically, the number of aircraft downed:
 - (a) By hostile fire in South Vietnam.
 - (b) By hostile fire in North Vietnam.
- (12) Volume of enemy antiaircraft fire in general.

4. Information not releasable under any circumstances.

a. General.

- (1) Future plans, operations, or strikes.
- (2) Information on or confirmation of Rules of Engagement.
- (3) Amounts of ordnance and fuel moved by support units or on hand in combat units.

b. Ground/Naval Operations.

- (1) Exact number and type or identification of casualties suffered by friendly units.
- (2) During an operation, unit designations and troop movements, tactical deployments, name of operation and size of friendly forces involved, until officially released by MACV.
- (3) Intelligence unit activities, methods of operation, or specific location.

c. Air Operations.

- (1) The number of sorties and the amount of ordnance expended on strikes outside the RVN.
- (2) Information on aircraft taking off for strikes, enroute to, or returning from target area. Information on strikes while they are in progress.

- (3) Identity of units and locations of air bases from which aircraft are launched on combat operations.
- (4) Number of aircraft damaged or any other indicator of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of ground antiaircraft defenses.
- (5) Tactical specifics, such as altitudes, course, speeds, or angle of attack. (General items such as "low and fast" may be used.)
- (6) Information on or confirmation of air strikes which do not take place for any reason, including bad weather.
- (7) Specific identification of enemy weapons system utilized to down friendly aircraft.
- (8) Details concerning downed aircraft while SAR operations are in progress.

GENERAL NOTES

1. The initial release of information pertaining to any tactical operation in the field will be made by the MACV Office of Information (MACOI) when, in the opinion of the field force commander concerned, the release of such information will not adversely affect the security of his command. This condition will exist when it can be presumed that the enemy is aware of the general strength and location of the friendly force(s), and may occur either before or after there has been significant contact. The field force commander's recommendation for release does not constitute authority for commanders subordinate to MACV to effect release to news media. Initial announcement of an operation will be made only by MACOI.

2. Casualty information, as it relates to the notification of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By Executive direction, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by an officer of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media. Casualty photographs can show a recognizable face, name tag, jewelry or other identifying feature or item. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause is out of proportion to the news value of the photograph or film. Although the casualty reporting and notification system works on a priority basis, correspondents are urged to keep this problem in mind when covering an action in the field. Names of casualties whose next of kin have been notified can be verified by the MACV

Information Office and by the Directorate of News Services in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

3. Only two Viet Cong casualty figures are released - "killed in action" and "captured." There is no way to get a "wounded" figure although there are indications that for every Viet Cong killed, one and one-half VC are wounded seriously enough to require hospital treatment. The "captured" figure may be broken down into "Viet Cong" and "Viet Cong Suspects." The total is a firm figure. Any "Viet Cong Killed" figure released by MACV will have been verified on the scene by US personnel to the extent permitted by the military situation. It cannot be an exact figure, but it is probable that duplications and other errors on the high side are more than offset by the number of Viet Cong dead who are carried away or buried nearby, by those who subsequently die of wounds and by those killed by artillery concentrations and air strikes not followed up by ground action. Thus, when the briefer announces a specific number of Viet Cong killed in a particular operation or over a given period, that figure is not as precise as the popular term "body count" would imply. Neither is it a guess or loose estimate. It is the best figure that can be developed and, as noted, probably is conservative in the long run.

4. Members of the Military Assistance Command Information Office are available to discuss any questions which may arise concerning the release of military information.

5. Requests for information concerning nonmilitary activities and Republic of Vietnam military activities should be addressed to the Government of Vietnam, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, the US Mission or the Public Information representative of the appropriate Free World Force or activity.

6. Whenever possible, changes to this memorandum will be brought to the attention of correspondents before they are put into effect.

Nguyen Bao Tri
Major General, ARVN
Minister of Information & Open Arms
Government of Vietnam

Tri

ATTACHMENT 3

UNITED STATES INFORMATION PROBLEMS
IN VIETNAM

ELEVENTH REPORT
BY THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS



OCTOBER 1, 1963.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union and ordered to be printed, with illustrations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1963

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., October 1, 1963**

**Hon. JOHN W. McCORMACK,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.**

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: By direction of the Committee on Government Operations, I submit herewith the committee's 11th report to the 88th Congress. The Committee's report is based on a study made by its Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee.

WILLIAM L. DAWSON, Chairman.

Union Calendar No. 328

88TH CONGRESS } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES { REPORT
1st Session } } No. 797

U.S. INFORMATION PROBLEMS IN VIETNAM

OCTOBER 1, 1963.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. DAWSON, from the Committee on Government Operations, submitted the following

ELEVENTH REPORT

BASED ON A STUDY BY THE FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEE

On September 25, 1963, the Committee on Government Operations had before it for consideration a report entitled "United States Information Problems in Vietnam." Upon motion made and seconded, the report was approved and adopted as the report of the full committee. The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.

I. SCOPE AND BACKGROUND

In mid-1962 the Special Subcommittee on Government Information first looked into complaints that U.S. officials in Vietnam were attempting to control stories filed by U.S. correspondents covering the war between President Ngo Dinh Diem's Government of Vietnam and the Communist Vietcong guerrillas. The complaints did not allege that information of a military-security nature should be divulged, and the subcommittee has the firm conviction that information of military value should not be disclosed. Millions of U.S. dollars and the lives of many U.S. citizens have been spent to assist the Government of Vietnam. The American people have a right—in fact, a need—to know what is going on in Vietnam, and many U.S. correspondents are filing stories from the capital of Saigon and from the combat areas in the jungles to attempt to fill that need.

After the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee was created in January 1963, by Congressman William L. Dawson, chairman of the House Government Operations Committee, a further investigation of Vietnam information problems was completed. At the subcommittee's first hearing with news media repre-

representatives to discuss Government information plans and policies, James Reston, Washington bureau chief of the New York Times, pointed up the Vietnam information situation. He testified:

We are engaged in quite a war in Vietnam and this country hasn't the vaguest idea that it is in a war. The news is being managed, I think, in Vietnam; and it is being managed on a principle that I think is understandable from the point of view of the Diem government. But I question it from the point of view of our Government and our tradition. The Diem government wants access strictly limited to what is going on in the jungles. I don't know whether the Pentagon wants it strictly limited, or partially limited, as to exactly what our aircraft are doing; whether they are merely flying them, whether they are manning guns, and so on. I am very confused as to the degree.

But, because the Diem government wants to control the news there, we are, I think, as a government, going along with that. Maybe we have to do it. I don't know. I doubt it, myself, if we are responsible more or less for directing the war. Americans are being killed in the war. We are simply supplying all the material for the war (hearings, "Government Information Plans and Policies," pt. 1; Mar. 19, 1963, p. 71).

At a subsequent public hearing on May 24, 1963, Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, was asked about a cable in early 1962 from the Secretary of State to the U.S. Ambassador in Vietnam on the handling of U.S. correspondents covering the war in Vietnam. He asked that the cable—a joint State-Defense-USIA directive—be discussed in a closed, rather than public, subcommittee session (hearings, Mar. 25, 1963, p. 116). The hearing, closed to protect information of military-security value, was held on May 24, 1963, with Rogor Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, as the witness.

This report covers the investigation of control of U.S. correspondents reporting developments in Vietnam and, particularly, the joint directive on the handling of U.S. correspondents. The directive is classified confidential under Executive Order 10501 which provides for the protection of military-security information. Sections of the directive quoted in this report and in the hearing are, therefore, paraphrased.

II. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

On September 29, 1961, Carl Rowan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, said at New York University that any contention that the people's right to know is an absolute and fundamental principle is "self-deception." He expressed his conviction that those concerned with the right to know are really more interested in the fourth estate's right "to make a buck." (See exhibit I.)

Early in 1962, Mr. Rowan drafted a "press guidance" telling U.S. Government officials in Vietnam how to handle U.S. reporters writing stories about the guerrilla warfare there. Mr. Rowan's press guidance was sent to the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, Vietnam, as an information directive from the State and Defense Departments and the U.S. Information Agency. It stated that—

news stories which criticize the Diem government could not be "forbidden," but they only increase the difficulties of the U.S. job.

newsmen should be advised that trifling or thoughtless criticism of the Diem government would make it difficult to maintain cooperation between the United States and Diem.

newsmen should not be transported on military activities of the type that are likely to result in undesirable stories.

The State Department contended that the only fault of the 1962 press guidance was "sloppy drafting" and that it was not designed to restrict access to information about U.S. activities in Vietnam. Soon after the press guidance was issued, however, newsmen began reporting difficulties getting information from U.S. officials in Vietnam.

Although the State Department insisted that "layer on layer" of later telegrams superseded the 1962 press guidance, no specific action was taken to issue a general clarification of U.S. press policy in Vietnam until a few days before a subcommittee hearing on the subject. And the questionable sections of the 1962 press guidance were not officially rescinded until immediately after the subcommittee hearings.

In recent weeks the American public has been surprised by developments in Vietnam—developments which have been many months in the making but which the American people are just now discovering. The restrictive U.S. press policy in Vietnam—drafted in the State Department's public relations office by an official with an admitted distrust for the people's right to know—unquestionably contributed to the lack of information about conditions in Vietnam which created an international crisis. Instead of hiding the facts from the American public, the State Department should have done everything possible to expose the true situation to full view.

III. U.S. CONTROL OF NEWS FROM VIETNAM

A. ORIGINAL EXPLANATION OF INFORMATION PROBLEMS

When the subcommittee first looked into control of U.S. correspondents in Vietnam, it was assured that there was no censorship of their dispatches. Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, also informed the subcommittee that the controversial State-Defense-USIA directive to the American Ambassador in Saigon merely "reflected the thought that in dealing with American newsmen covering South Vietnam operations, more flexibility at the local level was needed." (See exhibit II.)

In his testimony, Assistant Secretary Hilsman admitted the need to keep the American people well informed about U.S. operations in Vietnam and declared that "this has been the first principle of our press and information policy from the outset." He explained, however, that since the war was a Vietnamese operation—with the United States providing only the money, material, and advisers—the primary responsibility for access to news rested with the Vietnamese. In spite

of the fact that President Ngo Dinh Diem had spent a good part of his life in the United States, Mr. Hilsman stated that it was difficult for the Vietnam Government to understand the principle of a free press (hearings, p. 393).

B. BACKGROUND OF THE 1962 INFORMATION DIRECTIVE

Assistant Secretary Hilsman testified that the controversial cable sent to the American Ambassador to Vietnam in early 1962 was only one of a series of directives on U.S. information handling in Vietnam. Objectional parts of the cable, he contended, were superseded by later directives, although neither the cable nor any part of it had been specifically rescinded (hearings, p. 396). Although he testified that "layer on layers of cables" had superseded the joint information directive long before the subcommittee hearing, Assistant Secretary Hilsman failed to mention a specific cable on the handling of information from Vietnam which was sent to Saigon just before the subcommittee hearing. This cable, classified confidential, did not rescind the earlier cable but did advise cooperation with U.S. correspondents.

Following the subcommittee hearing, the State Department reported that the joint information directive of early 1962 was drafted by Carl T. Rowan, then serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. The directive was "coordinated" with the Defense Department and the USIA by the State Department's Bureau of Public Affairs under Assistant Secretary Robert Manning and it was reviewed at a conference in Honolulu attended by representatives of all three Government agencies. The State Department reported that the directive "was prepared in accordance with general policy lines laid out by Secretary of State Rusk and the then Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, W. Averell Harriman" (hearings, p. 416).

C. CONTENTS OF THE INFORMATION DIRECTIVE

When subcommittee members discussed with Assistant Secretary Hilsman the question of whether the controversial cable directed U.S. officials in Vietnam to "manipulate" information provided to U.S. correspondents, he denied that that was the intent of the directive but admitted it was "very badly drafted." Mr. Hilsman said that the policy guidelines in the directive "were not precisely stated but fuzzily stated." While he denied that one particular paragraph of the cable "was an instruction to manage the news," he admitted:

I don't know what that means. I can't find anybody who knows what it means. I can't find anybody who can give me a specific example.

Congressman Reuss summarized the discussion by pointing out that—

the cable is indeed a model of ambiguous draftsmanship on a matter that ought to be very clear. So often the fuzzy words mask the fuzzy thoughts * * *. When you are setting forth what amounts to a policy of something less

than full and free press communication, I think you have to state the areas where the press is going to be denied complete freedom with precision and language that anybody can understand (hearings, p. 397).

Although one section of the information directive to the American Ambassador in Vietnam stated that unfavorable articles in American publications would make the U.S. task more difficult, Assistant Secretary Hilsman testified that it is not the present policy to prevent such articles (hearings, p. 398). He said a section of the direction stating that "critical articles are likely to impede the war effort" was not interpreted by the American Ambassador so as to deny any newsman "any access or any facilities or any briefing as a result of critical stories" (hearings, p. 398).

Commenting on a section of the directive which implied that "correspondents should not be taken on missions that might result in stories harmful to the war effort," Assistant Secretary Hilsman explained:

That paragraph in the cable is a prize example of sloppy drafting, because no one knows what it means. It has no operational cutting edge * * *. If we were writing this cable correctly, as it really was meant to be, and the intention behind the paragraph was really clear, it would say we want to make sure that newsmen thoroughly understand the situation and are under no misapprehension that we are fighting this war. The Vietnamese are fighting it and the Vietnamese are directing it (hearings, p. 402).

D. REVISION OF THE INFORMATION DIRECTIVE

Assistant Secretary Hilsman testified that a message of November 24, 1962, to United States military personnel in South Vietnam from Gen. Paul D. Harkins, United States military commander in the area, was "a summation" of present United States information policy in Vietnam. The Harkins message concluded that—

The American public has the right to maximum information concerning its armed services and their activities. This information should be limited only by restrictions imposed to safeguard the national interest. Advisers should, within reasonable bounds, attempt to comply with the need for a free flow of information (hearings, p. 406).

U.S. military advisers on Vietnamese missions were advised by the Harkins memorandum to be "sincere and truthful" when talking with the press and never to use security as an excuse for failure to discuss a subject which was not classified to protect military security.

The second secretary of the American Embassy in Saigon sent a copy of the Harkins memorandum—describing it as an "excellent letter"—to the Department of State. Assistant Secretary Hilsman stated that the Harkins memorandum took precedence over the controversial joint State-Defense-USIA information directive of early 1962 and testified that—

The letter is a reflection of policy directions from Washington, cleared with and prepared jointly with the Ambassador's staff. It is a summation of the directives received from Washington. * * * His letter was prepared on the basis of instructions and in consultation with the Ambassador, in accordance with the policies laid down in Washington (hearings, pp. 406-407).

Subcommittee members pointed out, however, that no single directive officially rescinded the questionable sections of the joint State-Defense-USIA information directive sent out in early 1962. Assistant Secretary Hilsman testified that the summation of the State Department's basic information policy in Vietnam, contained in his opening statement before the subcommittee, was the current information practice (hearings, p. 392). At the specific request of subcommittee members, he agreed to inform U.S. officials in Vietnam that the questionable sections of the earlier information directive were specifically rescinded (hearings, p. 414). A few days after the subcommittee hearing, a cable from Secretary of State Rusk was sent to the American Ambassador in Vietnam specifically rescinding the 1962 "press guidelines" concerning criticism of the Diem government. A copy of Assistant Secretary Hilsman's statement before the subcommittee on Vietnam press policy also was sent to the U.S. Embassy in Saigon for guidance, and steps were taken to draft a new information policy directive, based on the testimony. Assistant Secretary Hilsman reported, however, that before the new information guidelines could be sent "they were overtaken by radically changed conditions in Vietnam: the establishment of martial law and censorship by the Government of Vietnam on August 21." He stated that the United States has objected to the censorship and "good cooperation has prevailed between our Embassy and U.S. press representatives." (See exhibit III.)

EXHIBIT I

REMARKS BY CARL T. ROWAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, AT THE PANEL DISCUSSION OF GOVERNMENT PRESS RELATIONS, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK, N.Y., SEPTEMBER 29, 1961

Mr. Chairman, my distinguished colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, to say that I am pleased to be here would be something of an overstatement, or certainly a misstatement, of what I really feel. I cannot dismiss lightly the comment of a colleague as I left the office today:

"There goes our pal, Rowan—off to a maternity ward to argue against motherhood."

Let me assure you that while I have not exactly come under protest I certainly have come under no illusions, for I was a passionate part of the newspaper world long enough to learn that to favor withholding information from the press is like favoring sin, wife beating, or halitosis.

But I am not so far removed from the profession of journalism, which has been the only one that I have known, that I must come here with any feelings of guilt. I am far enough removed to know that there is much to be said about freedom of information, or Government secrecy, or call it what you will, that is not being said. So in the interest of the public's right to know the full story, I have come here to present some facts and express some opinions that I have not been accustomed to seeing in the speeches of those who cry so vehemently about secrecy in Government.

Let me clear up one point at the outset: What I am about to say is not necessarily the Government's case. I shall express my own honest convictions—convictions based on what I have seen of the operations of both Government and the press during my 8 months in the world of bureaucracy.

Now, if I cannot honestly express pleasure at being here, I can say with complete candor that I come with a real feeling of satisfaction, for I am eager to talk about a situation that I believe to be of the greatest national concern. I have longed to see our editors and the public probe deeper into a situation that for too long has been marked by emotional utterances but very little logic and commonsense.

I view with a mixture of both amusement and dismay the pious charges and declarations that would lead the less discerning to conclude that the only people in this country who really care about the public's right to know are the newspaper and magazine people. Many of my Government colleagues are, like myself, completely devoted to the belief that without a well-informed public no truly free society can survive. We are among the first to admit that the situation in Washington is far from perfect. There is a great deal of information which the public ought to have but does not get for a variety of reasons. In an organization as big and complex as the Federal Government there are public officials who want to hide their inefficiency or their

mistakes. There are individuals who view the press with fear and/or contempt. There are individuals who regard the press only as a vehicle to be used when they want to dispense self-serving propaganda. There is a great deal of information that the public does not get because that information gets lost in the maze of bureaucracy, or it is filed away by an individual whose inexperience or ignorance makes that individual unaware of the serious need to educate the public.

But having said this, I must be candid and state that the "holier than thou" attitude of many of the Government's critics rubs me the wrong way. I am wise enough to the workings of the world of publishing to know that a great deal of this so-called concern about the public's right to know is really concern about the fourth estate's right to make a buck.

I was not aware until taking on my present job just how "scoop conscious" the American press remains. Many of the newsmen with whom I deal are far more concerned about their reputations than about how well informed the American public is. Far too few newsmen—or editors—are willing to weigh their stories against the national interest—especially if it means giving up a "beat" and the opportunity to boast about it in a promotion ad.

I mention this, because I know that no meaningful discussion of a really serious problem can take place unless we get rid of this notion that all the good intentions are on one side and all the foul scheming on the other.

Those of us who have temporarily deserted jobs as reporters, editors, and broadcasters have come to expect those still in the communications industry to ask, "How does it feel to be on the other side?" with the same regularity with which they ask about the weather.

I do not believe that most of them really assume that our purposes are so counter to theirs. Nor do I believe that they really feel any disappointment that we newspapermen-turned-bureaucrats do not rush out daily tossing the key to some Government safe to whatever lucky newspaperman might grasp it. Nor do I really believe that they view our occasional "no comment" as an effort to hide something, or to protect some scoundrel in Government.

I believe that the more thoughtful of my ex-colleagues realize that what they are seeing is evidence that nothing is more sobering than responsibility. There are many of us in Government who, while passionate believers in a full flow of information to the public, are faced also with the fact that we have taken oaths to protect the vital interest of our country and its people.

You do not take this kind of oath and sit in Washington in a sensitive job very long without admitting to yourself that while the public does have a right to know, it also has a right not to know.

Even against the background of a lifelong career in journalism, I say that the more ardent advocates of the public's right to know too often engage in eager self-deception. They have sanctified this theme of the people's right to know by cloaking it in a set of platitudes and high-sounding phrases, and then act as though the people's right to know is an absolute and fundamental principle which cannot in any way be restricted or abrogated.

Last April President Kennedy spoke on this problem before the Bureau of Advertising of the American Newspaper Publishers Asso-

ciation. He pointed out, I think quite convincingly, that our democracy faces some great difficulties in its mortal struggle against a totalitarian regime. Mr. Kennedy emphasized the fact that we face certain disadvantages because ours is an open society while the Sino-Soviet bloc which confronts us can operate under conditions of complete secrecy. He pointed out that Communist leadership has no free press looking over its shoulder criticizing decisions before and after they are made, giving away crucial fallback positions even before negotiations start, arousing public opinion, and sometimes hysteria, to the point where it becomes virtually impossible to make decisions on the basis of what leaders believe to be wisest and most in the national interest.

Mr. Kennedy knows, and I now know far better than I did a year ago, that our democracy is burdened by all these difficulties to one degree or another, and this burden is fundamental to the life and death struggle that we are in today.

But Mr. Kennedy did not ask for censorship. He asked only for the thoughtfulness, the responsibility, the restraint on the part of the communications industry that mere patriotism would demand. I noted, however, that much of the American press reacted only with suspicion and more platitudes about the public's right to know.

For example, the Chicago Tribune commented: "We cannot believe that the people of this country want to take even the first step in the direction of suppression of the truth that makes men free." The New York Herald Tribune said: "In the long run, competent, thorough, and aggressive news reporting is the uncompromising servant of the national interest even though it may be momentarily embarrassing to the Government."

These are noble, high-sounding sentiments with which no believer in democracy could quarrel if we lived in an ivory tower vacuum. But the complications of being part of a terribly complex world society imposes obligations of restraint and responsibility on the free press, just as the complications of living in an organized society places limitations upon the individual's freedom of speech. As one of our eminent jurists said, "freedom of speech does not mean the right to yell 'fire' in a crowded theater" when there is no fire.

I can think of many things that our newspapers could publish tomorrow—and many would if they had the chance—that would so completely serve the interests of the Soviet Union that it would be not "the truth that makes men free," but the truth that helps make men slaves.

I would agree emphatically with the Herald Tribune that competent, thorough, and aggressive reporting must continue, whatever the embarrassment to the Government—but there is a vast difference between embarrassing Mr. Kennedy or Mr. Eisenhower and jeopardizing the lives of 180 million people.

This is what Mr. Kennedy meant when he told the newspaper publishers:

"This Nation's foes have openly boasted of acquiring through our newspapers information they would otherwise hire agents to acquire through theft, bribery, or espionage; that details of this Nation's covert preparations to counter the enemy's covert operations have been available to every newspaper reader, friend and foe alike; that the size, the strength, the location and the nature of our forces and

weapons, and our plans and strategy for their use, have all been pinpointed in the press and other news media to a degree sufficient to satisfy any foreign power; and that, in at least one case, the publication of details concerning a secret mechanism whereby satellites were followed required its alteration at the expense of considerable time and money."

In my few months in Washington I have seen scores of instances where newsmen have printed material, ostensibly to inform the public, when those newsmen realized that they had only part of the story. They were *misinforming* the public—and put in different shoes they would be among the first to concede that the public need not know that particular story.

I do not want to seem to criticize the press as a whole. I will concede that we are fortunate to this extent: our biggest problems are the better newspapers with the more enterprising reporters, and these generally are the newspapers with the greatest sense of responsibility.

Some time back an incident occurred involving a diplomat from an important foreign country. It was a complicated, frustrating affair, and to solve it the Department had to use every kind of diplomacy known to it. Here was an issue which not only jeopardized our relations with this country, but almost certainly would cost us several crucial votes in the U.N. this fall were it made public without the elaborate explanations that almost no American newspaper was likely to give.

Just when we had the situation resolved to the satisfaction of both governments, our Bureau learned that one of the best newsmen in Washington was about to print a story about the incident.

"Shall we ask him not to run it?" I was asked.

"No," I said. "I'm positive that he doesn't know the whole story, or all the background. Let's call him in and tell him the story from start to finish. Then we shall simply say to him, 'We don't propose to tell you how to run your newspaper. Whether you print the story is up to you.'"

The reporter appreciated the full explanation, for he was the first to admit that while all the information that he had had was factual, his story would have been misleading in implication and unfair to all of the parties involved.

The reporter explained to his editors and they agreed unanimously that this was a story that they could do without.

I would defy anyone to show me that the public interest was harmed in any way by this newspaper's decision.

And I think it will be obvious to any man of reason and intelligence that while this kind of full explanation is possible for a responsible newsmen for a responsible newspaper, it would be folly to try it on a great many other reporters, in Washington and elsewhere.

This was a case of a reporter and his editors deciding, in effect, that the public had a right *not* to know that story. Not a day goes by but what those of us in Government must make this kind of judgment dozens of times. In a period of undeclared war, we constantly must decide how far we can go in providing the well-informed populace without which a "free society" becomes a mockery without violating our oath to protect this country from all enemies, foreign and domestic.

There are days in my present job when I am forced to chuckle wryly about the irony of this situation. I know that were I to meet a Communist agent and give him information bearing even the lowest security classification, most of the newspapers in the Nation would literally howl for my scalp. Yet, not a day goes by but what some newspaperman is not invoking the "public's right to know" in an effort to get information of the very highest security classification.

No newspaper editor is going to agree with all the decisions we make as to when it is in the national interest to withhold certain information from the public. Some of us are able to make our decisions as best we know how without any pangs of conscience, however, because we know that even those editors who are most critical of the Government will themselves make decisions each day as to what the public does or does not have the right to know.

Should or should not the press report that the wife of big shot politician X gets drunk almost every night? Should the Daily Bugle do some aggressive reporting about the circumstances under which the son of Podunk's leading industrialist got his draft deferment? Does the public have a right to know that Jim Smith, who has been a pillar of civic strength and a leading public figure for 20 years, spent a year in the reformatory in his teens?

Any honest editor knows that outside Government this question of the public's right to know never has been all black or all white. Nor is such the case in Government.

But in closing let me say that I am reminded of the story of the little man who was beaten regularly by his large wife. One day a friend asked him why he never fought back too vigorously, or refused to call the police.

"Oh, I don't want to do that," he said. "It don't hurt me a lot and it does her so much good."

I want the press to go on criticizing Government, branding needless secrecy wherever it exists. I don't think it is going to hurt us an awful lot, and if you criticize responsibly—and reserve some of the criticism for the press itself—it can do not only the communications industry but our entire Nation an awful lot of good.

EXHIBIT II

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., June 30, 1962.

HON. JOHN E. MOSS,
Chairman, Special Government Information Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am responding to your letter of June 15, 1962, in which you ask concerning press access to information about U.S. activities in South Vietnam.

In South Vietnam, news about military operations obviously is derived from two sources, the Government of South Vietnam and South Vietnam nationals, and representatives of the United States, military and civilian. It appears that in general, the South Vietnamese Government has been most reasonable in its attitude toward and requirements of American news representatives. The U.S. relationship with the news representatives is the concern of the U.S. Ambassador, whose public affairs officer is the senior U.S. public affairs official on the scene.

The basic directive under which U.S. representatives in South Vietnam conduct their relations with news representatives was issued February 20, 1962, in the form of a joint State-Defense-USIA message to the American Ambassador, Saigon. This message reflected the thought that in dealing with American newsmen covering South Vietnam operations, more flexibility at the local level was needed. You will note that this basic directive, two copies of which are at your request enclosed, is classified "Confidential."

May I say in answering other specific questions that news media representatives in South Vietnam are not required to be accredited by the Department of Defense. We continue to process requests for accreditation to the Department under the program established in 1948, and most if not all of the news media representatives in the South Vietnam area are accredited. There is no censorship of press dispatches or other news material. News media representatives are not given logistic support; however, because of the nature of the terrain and the scarcity of nonmilitary vehicles, media representatives are provided local transportation, including helicopter airlift, to assist them in covering specific assignments.

I am glad to be able to assure you that liaison between U.S. military and civilian authorities in South Vietnam, both formal and informal, is so frequent that it can be said to be continuous. During my recent visit to the area I was especially interested in the arrangements by which the military and civilian authorities keep each other informed of their activities and interests. In my opinion the liaison is excellent.

Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

ARTHUR SYLVESTER.

EXHIBIT III

88TH CONGRESS, FOREIGN OPERATIONS
AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEE,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
July 29, 1963.

Mr. ROGER HILSMAN,
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. HILSMAN: At a Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee hearing on May 24, 1963, you agreed to inform U.S. personnel in Vietnam that a 1962 cable on information problems in the area had been superseded. You agreed to specifically rescind one section of the cable warning that U.S. correspondents should not be taken on missions that might result in undesirable news stories.

I understand this action was taken a few days after the hearing, and at that time you also informed the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam that specific guidances on handling the press were being prepared. If the guidelines referred to have been completed, please provide two copies for inclusion in the subcommittee's record of the hearing and specify when and to whom the guidelines were sent out. If the guidelines have not been completed, please state who is working on them and when they will be finished.

Sincerely,

JOHN E. MOSS, Chairman.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 5, 1963.

HON. JOHN E. MOSS,
Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: With regard to your letter of July 29, this is to confirm that, as I indicated during my testimony before your subcommittee, Deptel 1006 has been superseded and paragraph 7 specifically rescinded. A copy of my statement before your subcommittee has also been sent to our Saigon Embassy for their guidance.

Our press and information policy will continue to be guided by the principles which I expressed in my prepared statement. As suggested during my appearance before the subcommittee, moreover, we intend to draft a cable which will specifically set out those principles in the form of an instruction so that there will be no question whatever as to what our policy is.

As you know, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Robert J. Manning recently went to Saigon to take a firsthand reading on press and information problems there. Mr. Manning has given me a report on his Saigon visit, but I am anxious to get his personal

participation in the drafting of this message, in case he has any specific suggestions for helping our newsmen. Although he is now back from Saigon, he immediately left Washington on a long delayed vacation. When he returns, we will promptly draft and despatch a guidelines message which encompasses my testimony and Mr. Manning's specific suggestions. A copy of the message will be sent to you for inclusion in the subcommittee record as soon as it is available.

Sincerely,

ROGER HILSMAN.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 17, 1968.

HON. JOHN E. MOSS,
Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On August 5 I responded to your letter of July 29 and confirmed that Deptel 1006 to Saigon had been superseded and paragraph 7 specifically rescinded. I also reported that a copy of my statement before your subcommittee had been sent to our Embassy for guidance.

Since that time I can report that a new press guidelines cable was drafted in the Department in accordance with my assurance to the subcommittee. Before these guidelines could be sent, however, they were overtaken by radically changed conditions in Vietnam: the establishment of martial law and censorship by the Government of Vietnam on August 21.

In the situation of turbulence that has existed since that date, the Department of State has expressed to the Vietnamese Government its strong objections to the new press censorship, and Ambassador Lodge has stressed our concern repeatedly in his conversations with high Vietnamese officials. In this period good cooperation has prevailed between our Embassy and U.S. press representatives.

Now that martial law and censorship have been lifted, as of September 16, we are reviewing our previous draft guidelines in the context of the altered situation.

Sincerely,

ROGER HILSMAN.

○

ATTACHMENT 4

NEWS POLICIES IN VIETNAM

HEARINGS

Copy

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

NEWS POLICIES IN VIETNAM

CARD DIVISION

AUGUST 17 AND 31, 1966



Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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WASHINGTON : 1966

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NEWS POLICIES IN VIETNAM

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 17, 1966

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

Pursuant to call, the committee met at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Fulbright, Gore, Church, Pell, McCarthy, McGeo, Aiken, Mundt, and Case.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The hearing this morning is prompted by recent news stories concerning certain activities of the U.S. Information Agency in Vietnam. In my recent letter to Mr. Marks, I suggested that this might be a suitable time to discuss some of the broader problems of news dissemination relative to the conflict in southeast Asia.

Without objection, the texts of the letter and the reply will be inserted in the record.

(The correspondence referred to follows:)

August 11, 1966.

Hon. LEONARD H. MARKS,
Director, U.S. Information Agency, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. MARKS: I am writing with reference to a story in today's *Washington Post* concerning the activities of the United States Information Agency in sponsoring visits by foreign newsmen to Vietnam. It is my impression that there is no reason for any particular secrecy with respect to this activity, although the news story indicates that the dimensions of this process at least are being treated as classified material. It does seem to me that Committee members would be interested in learning more about the Agency's undertakings in this field.

Therefore, I suggest that we hold an open hearing on this subject and hope that you will appear as the chief witness. It would be most suitable if this hearing could take place at ten o'clock on Wednesday morning, August 17, in Room 4221 in the New Senate Office Building. I trust that this scheduling is acceptable to you.

While the newspaper article mentioned above has stimulated this public session of the Committee, I would anticipate that our discussions would not be confined to the subject matter of the story. On the contrary, I believe the larger picture of news coverage vis-a-vis the Vietnam problem, and specifically the role of the Information Agency in that sphere, might be explored. I further believe that you might find this occasion a useful means of raising with the Committee any questions which are of particular concern to the Agency.

Sincerely yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman.

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
Washington, August 16, 1966.

Hon. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Thank you for your letter of August 11, 1966. We shall be happy to appear before your Committee on Wednesday, August 17, 1966 in Room 4221 New Senate Office Building.

I look forward to seeing you at that time.

Sincerely,

LEONARD H. MARKS, Director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee's interest stems from the growing debate on the manner in which the war is being reported to the public. There seems to be some disagreement, both within the Government and outside it, over just what the proper role of Government agencies should be in making relevant information available.

It is obvious that the public has been provided with a wide variety of interpretations on political and military developments, both in the American and the foreign press, but it is not clear to me just what policies guide the U.S. Information Agency. Recent reports that transportation is being provided for foreign reporters to the combat area in an attempt to improve our "image" may place the Agency in a somewhat awkward position, since there will be concern among our citizens about whether this is a legitimate function of the USIA.

It would seem in your Agency's best interests to use this occasion to eliminate, explain, and clarify this and other questions.

At a minimum, I hope this morning's testimony will help explain the procedures by which the USIA provides information in Vietnam and elsewhere, and clarify any misunderstandings about what your officials do, and do not do, to influence newsmen.

Mr. Marks, we are very pleased to have you this morning. Do you have a prepared statement?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, I do, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed, sir?

STATEMENT OF LEONARD H. MARKS, DIRECTOR, U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY; ACCOMPANIED BY SANFORD MARLOWE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF USIA FOR VIETNAM; AND RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, GENERAL COUNSEL, USIA

Mr. MARKS. For the record, I believe it is customary to say that I am pleased to be here and having an opportunity to present testimony to this committee, and I mean that. It is an opportunity that I haven't had since I assumed the office one year ago. The chairman and I and various members of the committee have informally discussed these problems, so I welcome the chance to put it on the public record.

I want to say at the outset, Senator, that there has been no secrecy attached to any of the activities of the U.S. Information Agency with reference to our program in Vietnam. We operate outside of the United States. Sometimes I wish that there was more information published in the United States about our activities abroad so that the citizens and the taxpayers would understand how their money is being spent, and of the heroic and valiant efforts being made by our staff to acquaint foreign audiences with what our policies and objectives are.

USIA PROGRAM TO ASSIST FOREIGN NEWSMEN

I appreciate this invitation to appear before this committee to discuss USIA's program designed to assist selected foreign correspondents to report on the Vietnam scene from firsthand knowledge. It is an excellent program.

This program was started in the fall of 1965. We in USIA are charged with the responsibility of trying to see that full and objective information regarding the Vietnam situation is available to newspapers, radio, and television outlets abroad. The question is not

whether such media favor or oppose the policies of the U.S. Government, but whether they have the facts upon which to form intelligent opinions.

I have said time and time again that a man's opinion is no better than the facts upon which his opinion is based, and unless he has the facts, his opinion isn't worth anything.

We have found that in some instances reporting has been based on lack of information or on misinformation. The best way to correct this situation is to enable reporters to go to the scene of the story, ask questions, and see for themselves what is happening.

I have talked to foreign journalists and invariably they say to me, "I would like to go there and see what is happening, through my eyes. I would like to report it through the eyes of a Latin American, or an African, or an Asian, and not through the eyes of an American."

PRECEDENTS FOR PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION TO NEWSMEN

The technique of providing transportation to correspondents so they can see for themselves and get a firsthand acquaintance with the facts is not new in the field of foreign affairs or anywhere else. It is a time-honored practice and a respected one and a good one.

To a great extent—

Senator GORE. Why would you say "time-honored"?

Mr. MARKS. It has been going on for a long time, sir; and the major correspondents of the world—

Senator GORE. That is a better description.

Mr. MARKS. Yes. It has been going on for a long time and there is no discredit to a newsmen, to an educator, or a scholar, to a scientist, to be the guest of the U.S. Government, or of a business organization, to be transported to a scene so that he can observe for himself.

Senator GORE. The only purpose of my interjection was for clarity. Lots of things have been going on for a long time that are not "time honored."

Mr. MARKS. This has been going on for a long time, and I approve of it. I think every major correspondent in this room, if asked, would tell you that at one time or another he has been pleased to be on the scene of an event, and that the transportation has been furnished through the courtesy of a government or a business organization. I would like to point out that when a new hotel opens in the United States, it is customary to have a flight of newspapermen. I would like to point out that when a new play opens at the National Theater, the newsmen are given tickets so they can report the play. Baseball games take place every day and there are newsmen in the press boxes as guests of the management, so there is nothing new about this, and nothing wrong about it.

Senator GORE. So, in consequence, you take them to Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you mean to equate the significance of these events with the significance of the war in Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

USIA PROGRAM COMPARED TO EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE

But I want to point out, Senator, that we have been under the educational exchange program, bringing people to the United States

for more than 20 years so that they can see for themselves what is going on; they can study in this country; they can talk to their counterparts; they can find out firsthand, what the practices are in their industry, or in their field of learning.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Marks, I hope you won't get too far afield. Do you mean to equate the exchange program with the USIA's program?

Mr. MARKS. The same theory applies, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it? I don't wish to let that stand.

We had a great battle over this very matter about 15 years ago, whether the USIA should take over the cultural exchange program, and it was very thoroughly discussed and considered. We decided, and I think quite rightly, that the cultural exchange program was not a proper part of our propaganda activities.

I would not want anybody to think either the purpose of that program or its administration is for the same purpose as USIA.

Mr. MARKS. They are different programs, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Quite different. But you seem to leave the impression that they are just about the same, or are the same.

Mr. MARKS. No, Senator. What I have tried to say is that we invite foreigners to be our guests, to come to the United States, whether they are educational leaders, or scientists, so that they can see firsthand what is happening.

In the program that we are going to discuss this morning, the U.S. Government, through the USIA, transported foreign journalists to the scene in Vietnam so that they could see firsthand what is happening.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. Leave it at that. Do not try to take in too much territory and bring in the exchange programs. These are very broad programs and have implications far beyond what we are concerned with this morning.

I did not want the record to stand that I accepted the idea that they were comparable activities.

Mr. MARKS. We are in agreement, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

VISITS TO WAR AREAS BY FOREIGN NEWSMEN

Mr. MARKS. Now, working from this premise, USIA, in September 1965, asked its posts worldwide to encourage visits to Vietnam by responsible newsmen, magazine writers, and radio and television reporters. Where financial assistance by the USIS would be required, our posts were advised that the Agency would attempt to help if the posts so recommended. It was understood that correspondents traveling to Vietnam without assistance were not to expect preferential treatment. They would get the same treatment as that given to the resident press corps.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this the first instance, in 1965, that the USIA has ever done this?

Mr. MARKS. To my knowledge, as far as Vietnam is concerned—

The CHAIRMAN. Or, any other war; well, any other activities similar to Vietnam.

Mr. MARKS. The Korean war, sir, was in 1952.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they do it then?

Mr. MARKS. There was no USIA in 1952.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a predecessor agency.

Mr. MARKS. I have not determined that, sir; but I do know that we have in many fields brought outstanding men, whether journalists or otherwise—

The CHAIRMAN. Now, wait a minute. The question is: Has the USIA ever before invited foreign correspondents to do a similar thing? Is there a precedent, in other words, for this particular activity?

Mr. MARKS. To bring them to the United States, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. No. Well, all right, to the United States or to other places.

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not thinking now of the exchange program; you are thinking of the leader grant program.

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

TRANSPORTATION FUNDED BY COUNTERPART FUNDS

Now, the major expense in carrying out this program is the cost of transportation. As the committee knows, all U.S. Government agencies use counterpart funds whenever possible, in lieu of appropriated dollars. The transportation costs, therefore, are funded from this source.

In Saigon the visiting correspondent gets the same assistance as does any other correspondent. This includes expediting prompt press accreditation, arranging briefings on those aspects of the Vietnam situation in which a correspondent has a particular interest, and handling in-country transportation.

NATURE OF NEWS BRIEFINGS

Senator GORE. Do these briefings include brief sessions with General Green?

Mr. MARKS. I am unable to answer that, sir.

A correspondent who comes to Saigon under this program, like all other correspondents in Vietnam, is a free agent in deciding what to report. He goes where he wishes to go. He reports what he wishes to report.

Now, in your letter, Mr. Chairman, you indicated an interest in discussing our Government's news policies in Vietnam. In this regard I should point out to you that the USIA is restricted to non-U.S. correspondents and to the Vietnamese news media. I will be happy to answer any questions concerning the USIS area of responsibility either on the first subject or on the broader question, whichever you prefer.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Marks.

NUMBER OF FOREIGN NEWSMEN WHO WENT TO VIETNAM

The articles have prompted a few questions that I would like to get into the record.

In an article on August 11, it stated that 27 foreign newsmen had their way paid to go to Vietnam so they could provide more objective reporting. Is that substantially correct?

Mr. MARKS. I haven't an accurate list; I am trying to get it. I think it may be a few more than 27. I would say maybe in the neighborhood of 30 or 35.

(The information referred to is classified and on file with the committee.)

The CHAIRMAN. You say 30 or 35?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. 30 or 35 visits have been paid for, is that right?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

COST OF VISITS TO VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. What did they cost?

Mr. MARKS. I am trying to get that, exactly, but I would estimate under \$50,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Less than \$2,000 apiece?

Mr. MARKS. Approximately \$1,000 or \$1,500 is my estimate.

The CHAIRMAN. When you get the figures, you will correct that for the record?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, I will.

(The information referred to is classified and on file with the committee.)

USE OF COUNTERPART FUNDS

The CHAIRMAN. What counterpart funds were used? You say counterpart funds were used. Will you tell us what counterpart funds?

Mr. MARKS. Indian rupees, Israeli pounds—

The CHAIRMAN. How could they use Indian rupees? Did they travel on the Indian airline?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, or on the Israel airlines, or buy tickets through their—

The CHAIRMAN. I want to be precise about this. There is a great misunderstanding, both in the press and among the public, as to what "counterpart" is. I would like for you to be specific.

Mr. MARKS. You buy a ticket with the funds of that country, sometimes it is an Indian airline—

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. Let me make it clear. I understand that. There is a great difference in some of these currencies.

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I have heard German marks referred to by some of my colleagues as being counterpart, but in my view, that is an absolute distortion of the use of the term.

Mr. MARKS. I am talking about excess foreign currency.

The CHAIRMAN. Excess foreign currency which is not convertible?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all you use?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. You will supply for the record exactly which currencies were used?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

(The information referred to is classified and on file with the committee.)

Senator GORE. May I interject?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator GORE. I have doubts that Mr. Marks really means that that is all he used. You don't mean you financed the entire expense, do you?

Mr. MARKS. The transportation expense, sir.

Senator GORE. You financed all of it with counterpart funds?

Mr. MARKS. I am trying to get a complete report, sir.

Senator GORE. I know, but your answer was "all."

Mr. MARKS. To the best of my knowledge now, all transportation came from excess foreign currency.

Senator GORE. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to clarify this point. Now is an occasion to bring some understanding about the nature of counterparts, because we have become accustomed—and I am not blaming you, you understand, at all—to use this term very freely. Very often it is misused, as if counterpart funds didn't cost anything and didn't amount to anything. Now, if it is genuinely nonconvertible excess foreign currency, that is one thing; if it is many other currencies, sometimes referred to as "counterpart," that is quite different.

Mr. MARKS. Well, Senator, my opinion is, that even if it is excess foreign currency, it is still money, and I don't spend it as if it had no value—

LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR PAYING TRANSPORTATION COSTS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Marks, what do you consider to be the legal authority for this particular activity? Is this authorized in your legislation?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, it is; and I have a legal brief on it, and if the committee would like it, I would be glad to supply it.

The CHAIRMAN. Supply it for the record, so we will have this point clarified.

Mr. MARKS. There isn't any doubt about the legal authority, in the opinion of our counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understand you correctly, this particular activity has not been done before—that is, bringing foreign correspondents to the scene of a particular activity for the purpose of reporting it. I think this can be distinguished in principle from the cultural exchange or even the leader grant program, because in the leader grant program I don't believe the intention is to bring people here to report on any particular activity. It is much more general in its nature, and the grantees usually come for 3 months—approximately 6 weeks to 3 months.

Mr. MARKS. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So, I think there is a little variation, at least.

Would you call this program of taking foreign correspondents abroad an educational program?

Mr. MARKS. In the broad sense of the word, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the reason for your belief that your authority over educational programs covers this activity?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir; it is broader than that. We have responsibility under the Smith-Mundt bill in the information field, and as I

say, the brief covers the complete authority, sir, and I will be glad to supply it for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.
(The information referred to follows:)

LEGAL MEMO RE JOURNALIST TOUR PROGRAM—FUNDED WITH EXCESS CURRENCIES

(Prepared by the U.S. Information Agency)

Under the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended (PL 402, 80th Congress) the U.S. Information Agency has a broad mandate "to provide for the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the United States, its people, and its policies through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers and instructors abroad" (Section 5011). The Act further provides in Section 1005 that "In carrying out the provisions of this Act, it shall be the duty of the [Director] to utilize to the maximum extent practicable the services and facilities of private agencies, including existing American press, publishing, radio, motion picture, and other agencies through contractual arrangements or otherwise."

The Agency has been given a Congressional mandate to utilize private individuals and agencies wherever possible in explaining United States policy to foreign peoples. Obviously, private foreign informational media has wide acceptance on the part of foreign nationals. The Agency has therefore, in appropriate circumstances, facilitated wide and objective indigenous reportage on American foreign policy and actions.

The Agency has facilitated travel by foreign newsmen to Vietnam with the expectation that reporting will be objective and give a balanced account of U.S. Government actions and policies.

Wherever possible this program has been funded with excess currencies. These currencies are available through appropriation and are generally available for the same purposes as appropriated dollars. The annual Budget estimates presented to the Congress, have included journalist tours as one of the programs to be carried out with such appropriations.

Inter-governmental agreements for the sale of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities which are paid for in foreign currencies include provisions on the use of such currencies by the U.S. Government. The agreements normally specify a percentage of the total sales price which may be used for the payment of U.S. obligations abroad.

With respect to international transportation expenses, the Department of State has secured agreement to the use of currencies of many countries for such travel costs. The six countries which have agreed to such expenditures are India, Israel, Pakistan, UAR, Yugoslavia and Tunisia.

(Amplification of the above memo appears on p. 115 in the appendix.)

SELECTION OF NEWSMEN

The CHAIRMAN. How were the newsmen selected?

Mr. MARKS. We instructed our posts to pick newsmen, and in doing so, to use the broadest discretion. Now, we didn't ask them to invite everybody because you can't invite everybody; some newspapers are very small, they have a limited circulation within a party. In other words, they are party organs, they are not newspapers of general circulation. We didn't feel that those papers were the ones who should be asked to participate because they were not really general-circulation newspapers. So, we tried to confine it to the general-circulation newspapers. We tried to get those who wanted to see for themselves. Let me give you a few illustrations.

In one country, the North Vietnamese invited two reporters to come at their expense, to visit Hanoi in North Vietnam and report. They did. There was a series of articles on the North Vietnamese activities.

Some Western-oriented newsmen, some people who didn't like what these men had reported, came to us and said, "We'd like to report what is going on in South Vietnam. Can you assist us?" And, "We don't have the funds. We would like to be able to see for ourselves."

Now, we assisted those people by providing transportation.

Generally, sir, we chose papers who were representative of the community. We asked them to get men who were competent in their field. The discretion was left to each individual post, in other words, the public affairs officer of USIS would handle this.

The CHAIRMAN. It was really up to the discretion of your representatives in the field.

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not pass upon them here?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you care to submit those names for the committee?

Mr. MARKS. I will be glad to get them together for you, sir; and let the committee decide what they wish to have.

LIST OF NEWSMEN SENT TO VIETNAM BY USIA

The CHAIRMAN. I was sent an article from the Vancouver Sun, dated the 13th of August, and the headline is "Newsmen Flown to Vietnam 'Not Influenced by United States.'" This prints the names of the people from Canada, so it is not any secret.

Mr. MARKS. No, of course not. And, by the way, on three separate occasions there have been stories about this; a story about an Indian journalist; there was a story by a Finnish journalist, so there has been no secrecy about this and we have not attempted to conceal it any way.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, do you have the names to submit?

Mr. MARKS. I do not. I shall try to get them for you and send it up to you for your information.

(The information referred to is classified and on file with the committee.)

The CHAIRMAN. I will insert in the record at this point, the article from the Vancouver Sun.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the Vancouver Sun, Aug. 13, 1966]

"NEWSMEN FLOWN TO VIETNAM 'NOT INFLUENCED BY U.S.'"

WASHINGTON (CP).—The U.S. Information Agency said Friday the 27 foreign correspondents for whom it provided transportation to South Viet Nam in the last 10 months were on their own once they got there.

A spokesman said that once in Viet Nam and en route, the correspondents paid their own expenses and were completely free to carry out their reporting in any way they wished.

The Washington Post says the reason behind the USIA action was to focus attention on U.S. aid and economic efforts in Viet Nam.

Three Canadians were among the 27 reporters flown to Viet Nam under the program.

To use counterpart funds for the fares of Canadian newsmen, USIA routed them on airlines belonging to nations which have stocks of such funds.

In Vancouver, Erwin Swangard, Managing Editor of The Sun, identified W. T. Galt as one of the Canadians flown to Viet Nam under the program.

Galt, currently on holiday and unavailable for comment, is former Sun bureau chief in Ottawa and Washington and now is The Sun's assistant managing editor. The U.S. only arranged for Galt's plane trip from Montreal to Saigon and return. All Galt's other expenses, exceeding \$2,000, were paid for by the Sun, Swengard said.

NO INFLUENCE

Although Viet Nam is a country at war there is no censorship. And, Swengard added, at no time did the U.S. try to influence Galt in where he would go, what he would see, or what he would write.

"We were pleased to have a reporter of Galt's stature see for himself what is happening in Viet Nam and reports speak for themselves," Swengard said. The other two Canadians who accepted the U.S. invitation were Larry Henderson of the CTV network and Lubor Zine of the Toronto Telegram.

NO PRESSURE

Henderson said:

"Never at any time was pressure put upon me by the United States government to say anything in their favor.

"I was delighted to accept an invitation to travel to Viet Nam to see the facts and report them . . ."

Zine made a similar statement.

DID UNITED STATES PAY TRAVEL EXPENSES ONLY OR PERSONAL AND REPORTING EXPENSES ALSO?

The CHAIRMAN. This article states that you paid only the travel expenses—the transportation expenses—not the personal expenses. Is that correct?

Mr. MANKS. That is my understanding. I believe the paper in that case spent about \$2,000 beyond travel for the reporter's coverage. This is frequently done. For example, when a television team goes over there the expenses of the filming and all the development, is borne by them.

In most cases, we limited ourselves to the travel, and the estimate I have is \$2,000 over and above the transportation.

"HOSTILE" COVERAGE OF WAR BY CANADIAN PRESS

The CHAIRMAN. There is another news item from the Montreal Star, Washington bureau, which says that "At least one Canadian newspaper—the Toronto Globe and Mail—is reported here to have turned down an offer from the USIA to sponsor a Vietnam trip for one of its editorial staff."

Is that true?

Mr. MANKS. I don't know, sir. I read that but I have not attempted to verify it.

The CHAIRMAN. It also said:

For some time now, USIA officials, here and Ottawa, have been concerned about what they consider to be "hostile" coverage of the Vietnam war in certain Canadian news media including the CBC, the Globe and Mail, and the Montreal Star (which was not invited to Vietnam by the Agency).

Do you know whether or not that is a true statement?

Mr. MANKS. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Who does know about this?

Mr. MANKS. The man in charge of our post in Canada. I will be glad to get a report, if you desire.

(The information referred to appears in a letter from Mr. Schmidt on p. 15 of the hearing.)

The CHAIRMAN. It says that, "It is understood that USIA officials have protested to Ottawa about the CBC's coverage."—

Mr. MANKS. It is quite possible that they have, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know anything about that?

Mr. MANKS. It doesn't happen in Washington, it happens in Ottawa.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the CBC is a Government operation—

Mr. MANKS. Yes; it is.

The CHAIRMAN. It would seem to me if we are going to make a formal protest, we would hardly leave that to the discretion of the local man.

Mr. MANKS. Well, the Ambassador is there, and he is head of the country team and, I believe under his authority, he can do that, but I wouldn't pass on that.

DIFFERENCES IN REPORTING THE SAME STORY

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether in Canada the purpose was to give the friendly newsmen a chance to take advantage of our generosity. Is the same offer open to unfriendly newsmen?

Mr. MANKS. Senator, let me get some terms straight.

I have known newsmen all my life. I have the highest respect for their integrity. They attempt to report the facts. Now, no two people will necessarily see a story the same way. I was interested the other day in looking through the press where Ambassador Reischauer made a statement and the Washington Post headline, August 11, said, "Reischauer Backs United States Viet Policy."

The New York Times headline for the same day, "Reischauer Critical of Vietnam Policy."

Now, there you have two distinguished American newspapers; I am sure the reporters are able and have the highest integrity, but they see it differently.

The CHAIRMAN. I read both of those stories and they were not quite as different as the headlines would indicate.

Mr. MANKS. Well, I am just telling you what the leads in the headlines say.

The CHAIRMAN. The headlines indicated what you said. But very often the headlines in papers are in complete variance with the substance of the story. That happens all the time.

Mr. MANKS. Senator, it was my objective, our objective, to give a newsmen a chance to see for himself what is happening. There is no substitute for going there, talking to the people, investigating the scene, determining what is going on. When you tell somebody about a Vietcong atrocity, when you show them a picture of men who have been decapitated, men who have been stabbed because they are schoolteachers or officials, it doesn't mean the same as going there.

Now, we put out a booklet which we cannot distribute in the United States, showing pictures of Vietcong atrocities.

Here is one, sir, of a Vietnamese with a spike about 9 inches long driven through the sole of his foot. It is a horrible picture, but when you see these victims you realize the horror and the intensity of the Vietcong atrocities.

These men wanted to see them. They wanted to take television films of it and show it to their people, as they said, through Latin-American eyes, through Asian eyes, European eyes. So, it isn't a

question of whether they are friendly or they are hostile, it is a question of exposing them to the facts, and if they report the facts as they see them, that is all we can ask for.

Senator GORE. May I interrupt?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

CORRESPONDENTS IN VIETNAM CITE DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING FACTS

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, in connection with the exposure of facts or the privilege of reporting the facts, I recently read an article—by four or five very distinguished correspondents who have served—and some of whom are still serving as reporters or are working as reporters in Vietnam. In this article, the reporters complained rather bitterly about censorship, about the inability to obtain the facts, and the difficulty of reporting the facts.

I do not know to what extent there is censorship in Vietnam; to what extent these foreign reporters will be taken to see what the military wishes them to see; to what extent they will have the liberty of movement. I would like, if the chairman permits at this point, since Mr. Marks has referred several times to the value of seeing firsthand, and obtaining full information, to note to what extent there is censorship, to what extent difficulties are met by reporters, in obtaining and reporting facts.

Mr. MARKS. May I answer Senator Gore's questions, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, I not only saw that article, I asked to get a script of the hour-long television program to see what the details were.

Now, I have no jurisdiction over U.S. correspondents. The article you referred to was based on a television program where there were four U.S. correspondents, so it is not my jurisdiction and I cannot comment on it, as to whether they are right or wrong.

Senator GORE. Well, that is what I asked you to comment on. Are you going to comment on the accuracy or inaccuracy of my statement?

Mr. MARKS. Well, I queried our posts just as a matter of interest, my interest, to get their response to it. Now, I am very concerned that at all times there will be free access to the news. My whole career has been based upon the fact that newsmen and news media should have the right to see for themselves and report the facts.

When I was appointed to this job one year ago, the very first action was to ask Frank Stanton, the chairman of the board of Columbia Broadcasting System, and who is chairman of USIA Advisory Commission, Palmer Hoyt, editor of the Denver Post, and Frank Starzel, who had recently retired as the head of the Associated Press. I asked those three distinguished newsmen to go to Vietnam to meet with correspondents, to investigate, to see whether USIA was meeting its responsibility and affording a free access to the facts for foreign correspondents, and to come back and make any suggestions on how we can improve our program.

I am proud to tell you, sir, that they found we were fulfilling our responsibilities. They made certain suggestions on how we could improve, how we could further assist foreign correspondents. Every one of their suggestions has been carried out.

One year has elapsed. Next month I shall ask three other newsmen of the same caliber, and perhaps Mr. Starzel will go back if he is able to, to make the same investigation, because I want, at all times, to have the complete assurance that we are doing the job of making the facts available to the world.

Now, on top of that, I have tried, whenever a congressional committee visited Vietnam, to get a report from a member of that committee on USIA functions, and I am pleased again to tell you that they invariably have come back with no major criticism of what I regard as the fundamental policy of exposing the facts to the journalists.

We do not carry on military briefings. That is something you will have to talk to the Department of Defense about. My job is to make available information other than military information.

EXTENT OF CENSORSHIP

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, we are not talking about this. I asked a question in line with the comment Mr. Marks made about the value of transporting, subsidizing the visits of foreign correspondents to Vietnam in order that they might have full and firsthand information. I asked to what extent they would have availability of this information, and what the censorship rules there were. I asked Mr. Marks to comment upon the accuracy or inaccuracy of the statement or the article jointly prepared, as I understand it, by four distinguished U.S. reporters who have been working in Vietnam. None of his response related to my questions.

Mr. MARKS. Well, on the censorship question, Senator, there is no formal censorship by USIA. There is no informal censorship by USIA.

Military matters are subject to military briefings, over which we have no jurisdiction. We make available anything within the purview of our responsibility, which is nonmilitary.

Have I answered your question?

Senator GORE. No.

Mr. MARKS. What else?

Senator GORE. I started out by asking you about the accuracy or inaccuracy of the article prepared by the four reporters who had been working in Vietnam.

Mr. MARKS. And I told you that I queried the posts for my personal information to find out whether their criticisms were justified, and I have not yet received their reply.

Senator GORE. You do not know whether they are accurate or not?

Mr. MARKS. I do not.

Senator GORE. Therefore, you don't know whether foreign correspondents will have a similar reaction?

Mr. MARKS. Well, I don't know about unnamed, unidentified foreign correspondents, but I do know about correspondents—

Senator GORE. I am not talking about unnamed and unidentified reporters. I am talking about the ones you have sent there. Do you know whether they will receive the same treatment and whether their reactions will be the same as, or different from, the ones reached by the four reporters which I have just described?

Mr. MARKS. Well, I can tell you, Senator, that the post reports that I have received from the ones we have sent have indicated that

the men who were there had a chance to see everything that they wanted to see within our jurisdiction.

Senator GORE. Within USIA jurisdiction?

Mr. MARKS. That is right; I can't speak for anybody else.

Senator GORE. What is the USIA jurisdiction?

Mr. MARKS. Nonmilitary activities in Vietnam related to foreign journalists.

ESTIMATE OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Senator GORE. I heard a gentleman on a television program this morning, a reporter just back from Vietnam. He referred to an estimate, whether his or someone else's, that 5,000 civilians in South Vietnam are being killed or wounded, I believe he said, per month.

Do you know, or do you have an opinion on that estimate?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir; I have no information on that, and I wouldn't be the source for that.

Senator GORE. I do not imply by that question that the U.S. operations are killing that many. I should be more accurate in my questioning, but I didn't take down his statements. As I recall the meaning of his report, it was that in consequence of the dramatic incident of which we heard a few days ago—the one of fire being called in upon a village from which Vietcong were firing, and, incidentally, when I was there a few years ago this was not an unusual occurrence—the civilian casualties of the fighting—were an estimated 5,000 a month.

Mr. MARKS. I do not know, sir, and it is not my department.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Marks, you mentioned a moment ago that you didn't know about any protests from your Canadian office to the Canadian CBC.

Can you find out for us and inform the committee about that?

Mr. MARKS. I certainly can, sir.

DOES USIA PROTEST REPORTING ON VIETNAM OF FOREIGN NEWSMEN?

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me if the USIA in Washington has ever protested to a Canadian newspaper the reporting of its chief of bureau in Washington?

Mr. MARKS. I would think something like that should come to my attention, and I have no knowledge of that, so I would very much doubt it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, could you check and see whether or not a reporter named Mr. Bruce Phillips was recalled from his position here representing the Canadian newspaper? I have been told that this happened because you had protested his coverage of the Vietnamese war.

Mr. MARKS. I can tell you right now—

The CHAIRMAN. When I say "you," I mean the Washington USIA.

Mr. MARKS. I have no knowledge of that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who would have done it, if you didn't?

Mr. MARKS. The Department of State might have had some relationship with Mr. Phillips, or other correspondents, but I have never heard of this incident so I am not prepared to tell you whether the facts are right or wrong. I will attempt to find out.

(The information referred to earlier and at this point follows:)

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
Washington, August 30, 1966.

Hon. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR Mr. CHAIRMAN: The Director of USIA, Mr. Leonard H. Marks, was asked during his appearance before your Committee on August 17, 1966 whether or not the *Toronto Globe and Mail* had turned down an offer of USIA to sponsor a Viet-Nam trip by a member of its editorial staff. We have contacted our office in Ottawa and are informed that no request for participation by the *Toronto Globe and Mail* was ever made by USIA.

We were further asked whether or not USIA had ever protested coverage of the Vietnamese war by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

We were advised by our post in Ottawa, "USIS has made no formal protest CBC treatment".

Mr. Marks was also asked whether or not a reporter named Mr. Bruce Phillips was recalled from his post in Washington representing a Canadian newspaper because USIA had protested his coverage of the Vietnamese war.

USIA, as stated at the time of the hearing by Mr. Marks, did not make any protest relative to Mr. Bruce Phillips. We attach hereto for your consideration a clipping from the *Ottawa Citizen* dated August 18, 1966 under the byline of George Brimminell of Southam News Services quoting Mr. Charles Lynch of said news services, stating "the transfer of correspondent Bruce Phillips from Washington to Ottawa was in line with the policy of rotating assignments within the news service". Further, the story states "he said he had received no protests regarding Phillips' coverage and would have rejected them if they had been made."

Sincerely,

RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, Jr.,
General Counsel.

[From the *Ottawa Citizen*, Aug. 18, 1966]

CANADIANS BENEFITED FROM FREE WAR TRIPS

(By George Brimminell, Southam News Services)

WASHINGTON.—The head of the United States Information Agency faced a Senate committee yesterday and vigorously defended the agency's program of free trips to Viet Nam for foreign newsmen.

Leonard H. Marks, director of the USIA, was called before the Senate foreign relations committee after its chairman, Sen. J. William Fulbright, read stories about the government-paid flights in the press last week.

Three Canadian journalists were named in the account in the *Washington Post*—the only newsmen singled out by name of the 30 to 35 who have been flown to Viet Nam at the expense of Uncle Sam.

Sen. Fulbright suggested the practice of free trips "may place the agency in a somewhat awkward position, since there will be concern among our citizens about whether this is a legitimate function of the USIA."

Mr. Marks said the program of sending foreign reporters to Viet Nam at U.S. expense was started last fall and "it is an excellent program."

He said the USIA had determined that Viet Nam reporting in some foreign countries "has been based on lack of information or misinformation. The best way to correct this situation is to enable reporters to go to the scene of the story, ask questions and see for themselves what is happening."

Asked if the reports of the foreign newsmen benefiting from the free flights were subjected to any censorship, Mr. Marks insisted they were not.

Chairman Fulbright read into the record an account of the free flights for Larry Henderson, commentator with the commercial private Canadian television network CTV—William Galt, assistant managing editor of *The Vancouver Sun*—and Lubor Zink, Ottawa columnist for the *Toronto Telegram*. He noted that two other Toronto papers, *The Star* and *The Globe and Mail*, had both turned down offers of free flights to Viet Nam from the USIA.

He asked Mr. Marks also about a report that the USIA's representative in Ottawa had complained to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation last week about its coverage of the free flights story. Mr. Marks said he would look into this.

The chairman also asked whether correspondent Bruce Phillips "of Southern News Services" was recalled from here "because you (the USIA) had protested his coverage of the Viet Nam war?"

Marks said he personally had "never heard of this incident. I'll attempt to find out," he said. He suggested, however, that such protests might have emanated with the state department.

(In Ottawa, Charles Lynch, chief of Southern News Services, said the transfer of correspondent Bruce Phillips from Washington to Ottawa was in line with the policy of rotating assignments within the news services. Lynch paid tribute to Phillips' work during his three years in Washington.

(He said he had received no protests from the USIA about Phillips' coverage and would have rejected them had they been made. Lynch said he did not know whether or not USIA officials had made representations to any of the individual Southern newspapers, but that nothing of this nature had any bearing on the transfer of Phillips and the decision to place two men—this reporter and Donald McGillivray—in Washington.)

Members of the foreign relations committee appeared to be divided on the value of the free flights program.

Sen. Karl Mundt (R-S.D.) said he thought the scheme should be expanded and foreign journalists should be sent to other parts of the world to report on U.S. assistance programs.

But Mundt said he was opposed to revealing the names of journalists taking advantage of the free transportation, as chairman Fulbright indicated he was planning to do.

Mr. Marks revealed that the total costs of flying the foreign newsmen to Viet Nam had come to less than \$50,000 in counterpart funds—foreign currencies owned by the United States which are not convertible into dollars.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you more generally, have you ever protested to a foreign newspaper the reporting by its reporters of the Vietnamese war?

Mr. MARKS. I have never protested to any foreign newspaper about its reporter, or its reporting of the Vietnamese war, or any other incident.

The CHAIRMAN. That is very clear.

HAVE VIETNAM NEWS REPORTS BEEN SATISFACTORY?

You stated a moment ago that you had seen some of the reports and articles written by the people you had sent to Vietnam, didn't you?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they generally satisfactory?

Mr. MARKS. Now, let's define the word "satisfactory."

If a reporter reports the events that he saw, then I am satisfied. He may take a different slant on it than I would take, but if he reports what we are doing in rebuilding the villages of Vietnam, building of schools, hospitals, and attempting to pacify the areas which have been taken over; if he reports that the Vietnamese are trying to establish their own government again, that there is an election, then he has reported the facts. How he sees them is up to him, just like the New York Times and the Washington Post may disagree on the same story, and it is not a question of whether it is satisfactory. You can't pass on whether a reporter is right or wrong; it is as he sees it. It is surely subjective, sir. There is no yardstick for saying the reporter did the right thing or the wrong thing; if he is reporting an impression, it is his impression.

The CHAIRMAN. I was asking for your impression. You are the one who instigated and defended the program. Have these reports been satisfactory to you? I didn't mean if they were satisfactory to me. Do you feel that you got your money's worth?

Mr. MARKS. I certainly do.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is all.

Mr. MARKS. The reporters in some cases were critical and in some cases, they found that the effort was far beyond what they had ever dreamed, and they reported the facts.

The CHAIRMAN. On balance, though, you think it was a good investment?

Mr. MARKS. It certainly was.

The CHAIRMAN. I must not take any more time, but something impels me to raise this point which came up first in connection with the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Some of us thought that it was a rather questionable practice for a foreign agent to pay the way of an American newspaper reporter to go abroad and to come back and write articles which usually were favorable to the client's state. We have made a point of this about two years ago. Maybe this situation is different.

Mr. MARKS. It is, Senator, and I want to put on record that I have the highest respect for the integrity of the newsmen. I know a lot of them in this country and elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. I know they all appreciate that. They are all behind you, and they like to hear a word of praise occasionally.

Mr. MARKS. I don't believe that any newsman worthy of his name would slant a story because he was given a free airplane ride to the scene of an event.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure that they wouldn't. They will never do that.

Mr. MARKS. I want my testimony to reflect that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF THE AID AGENCY

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Marks, to what extent does AID, as distinct from USIA, pay the expenses of American or foreign newsmen to go to South Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. I don't believe AID is participating in this at all.

Senator AIKEN. You don't believe they are participating in this at all?

Mr. MARKS. I would be rather surprised if they were.

Senator AIKEN. Does AID consult with you about USIA's programs?

Mr. MARKS. We provide information to foreign journalists on AID programs. In other words, if AID is helping to build a project, we provide the information for the foreign journalists or for the foreign press.

Senator AIKEN. Do you provide information to and from AID?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. If AID did pay expenses of newsmen going to the same area, that would either be a conflicting interest or a parallel endeavor.

NEWSMEN TO HANOI

How many newsmen have you sent into Hanoi?

Mr. MARKS. None.

Senator AIKEN. Would that not be a good idea?

Mr. MARKS. It would be an excellent idea and I wish Hanoi would open its borders and let these people come and see for themselves and report the facts.

Senator AIKEN. I realize you couldn't send American newspapermen there, but a good many other countries have connections with Hanoi and it seems to me that it would be quite helpful if they went there.

Mr. MARKS. I agree, Senator.

EDITING OF USIA MATERIALS AND MANAGEMENT OF NEWS

Senator AIKEN. You furnish photographs and newsreels and so forth to a good many foreign countries, I believe.

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Do you have any control over the editing of this material to make sure it is not turned against the United States? Are you sure that these other countries will produce it as being the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Mr. MARKS. Generally, Senator, when we make a film available or a radio tape, or material of that sort, the stations do carry it intact. Where they tell us they wish to edit it, we may decline to make it available because it can distort and misrepresent.

Senator AIKEN. If you find that they are editing it to our disadvantage, would you simply decline to furnish them any more material?

Mr. MARKS. I have on occasion refused to make our films available where countries wished to delete certain scenes.

Senator AIKEN. I think that is all I have.

We have occasionally heard references to news management in connection with reporting in Vietnam. Would you say that our national interests require any management at all of the news in Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir. We do not require management of the news at all. I think we can stand on the facts as they exist and as the reporters have a chance to see them.

REPORTING OF CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. I don't know how long it has been going on, but in the reports of casualties in Vietnam, the combat casualties only are given—that is, they report only the cases of boys who have actually been injured in combat. As I recall, in one hospital in Vietnam which I visited last fall, about 25 percent of the patients in the hospital were combat casualties. Has there been any change in the method of reporting casualties? If there has been no change, you would have to multiply the number of casualties reported each week probably by four, in order to get the true number of casualties which would include, accidents, hepatitis, malaria, and every other thing that could happen.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, I regret I don't have information on that. That does not come within our purview.

Senator AIKEN. You don't report on that?

Mr. MARKS. We don't report casualties and military actions.

Senator AIKEN. The Defense Department controls those reports?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Of course, the Defense Department would never undertake to mislead anyone. I am sure of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no.

Senator AIKEN. I have no more questions, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

SELLING THE WAR TO THE PUBLIC

Senator GORE. I have asked for a transcript of the broadcast to which I intermittently listened in part, and have not yet located the particular colloquy to which I referred. But I find another here that I would like to read. I believe Mr. Paul Nivon was the moderator of the NET program. He makes this comment:

Getting back to this question of civil war. The President might well take the position that it's his job to sell this war to the Congress and the public. Therefore, he has to paint everything in black-and-white terms. It's your job, presumably, when you feel that things are in terms of various shades of gray to say so. Is it the answer to the eternal conflict between the press and Government?

Mr. BROWN. Paint them in black and white terms, to be sure, but make them accurate ones. Basically, the reason for this war here is the clash between the Chinese and American spheres of influence in the Western Pacific. And they have met here in Vietnam and that's what's going on. We are not here to defend Vietnamese sovereignty or independence or freedom or any of these other things.

Would you agree with the accuracy of that statement?

Mr. MARKS. Senator, that is such a complicated subject. I don't think I am qualified at this point to go into a discussion of the basic foreign policy. I don't make foreign policy, sir; and my job is to run an information program and, therefore, I don't think I am your spokesman on that question.

Senator GORE. Then I certainly will not ask you questions along these lines further; perhaps it was an inadvertent question.

REPORTING OF PACIFICATION AND STRATEGIC VILLAGE PROGRAMS

But, to come back to this question of censorship of these reporters who are on the scene there, I would like to read you another exchange. This is another statement by Mr. Brelis. Let me read all of it here:

Or to give one side, to give a definite one side, I mean pacification, for example, if you were to believe the canned information on pacification, pacification is one of the greatest successes—

Question. Well, I think any one of us can say, who have been out here and seen pacification at work, that it hasn't made the enormous progress that the information people would like you to believe.

Now, are your men the information people to whom he refers here?

Mr. MARKS. There are a lot of information people. There are military, there are others. I don't think that he is referring to us. He is an American correspondent, but I will tell you, sir, that the pacification program, as a matter of fact, and the reporter's opinion is a matter of opinion, whether it is good or bad; whether it is successful or a failure, is his opinion.

The facts are that we are doing certain things with school and hospitals and civilian government.

Senator GORE. In my visit there I was taken to see those strategic villages. The information people there were ready with wonderful trontises already written and mimeographed, and briefings about what

a wonderful success the strategic village program was, and what a great thing it would be. I came to different conclusions, both as to its present and future value. I believe that program has been completely abandoned long since, has it not?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know the program you are talking about.

Senator GORE. You never heard of the strategic village?

Mr. MARKS. I have heard it under various names, but I don't know when you were there or which program; but there are many, probably, that would disagree with you, and some that would agree with you. Every man is entitled to his opinion.

Senator GORE. Thank you. That was but an incident, but it happened that the opinion of one eyewitness observer, to wit, myself, came to a different conclusion from the information people at that time; and subsequent events have verified the accuracy of my view.

It may be that other observers will have some similar experiences. It may be, of course, that some of our programs are enormous successes. I hope they are.

DOES USIA REPORT COMPLAINTS ABOUT CENSORSHIP AND NEWS MANAGEMENT?

To go on to this point—this is Mr. Brown, another reporter on the scene:

Yes, I think, returning to Jack's point on censorship, there are different kinds of censorship. There is formal censorship that involves actually cutting pieces or words out of the copy. And there is the kind of censorship that has been described in recent years as news management.

And then he goes on and refers to Mr. Sylvester's eminent qualifications and success in this regard.

What degree of news management is there in Vietnam by the military?

Mr. MARKS. Sir, you will have to ask the military that.

Senator GORE. You don't report on that?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

Senator GORE. Do you think that is legitimate news?

Mr. MARKS. What?

Senator GORE. The extent of news management and censorship.

Mr. MARKS. I am sorry, sir. I am not going to comment on what the Department of Defense does because I don't know the facts. My opinion wouldn't mean anything since I don't know the facts.

Senator GORE. Since you are a reporting service, do you think those facts would be news?

Mr. MARKS. I think that the opinion of reporters is always news, because they write the stories and it is legitimate for them to criticize if they disagree. I am in favor of any criticism, good, bad, or indifferent, because that is the way a free press should operate.

Senator GORE. Do you not know of reporters, employees of your own agency, who gather news and report it widely?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, we do.

Senator GORE. Do they gather information on these facts?

Mr. MARKS. If you are asking whether we report the criticism of those foreign news correspondents over a local radio station, I doubt very much if that is the kind of news that would be of international interest.

Senator GORE. I am referring to the information gathering and information reporting activities of the USIA.

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Is that one of your functions?

Mr. MARKS. It certainly is.

Senator GORE. Is that not your principal function?

Mr. MARKS. It is one of them.

Senator GORE. Do you gather information with respect to the facts of news management and censorship in Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. To the extent that there are stories in the press which are of international interest, we report it and we report it fully.

IS NEWS MANAGEMENT AND CENSORSHIP IN VIETNAM REPORTED?

Senator GORE. I wasn't asking you if you reported second-hand opinions, I was asking if, in the pursuance of your prime function of gathering and reporting information, you gathered and reported information with respect to the news management and the censorship being practiced in Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. Well, sir, your question is based upon a premise that there is censorship.

Senator GORE. Was my question precise?

Mr. MARKS. I will have to check it. I know of no—

Senator GORE. I am asking you if I have submitted a precise question.

Mr. MARKS. You have, but it is based upon a premise of which I have no knowledge, which I didn't agree with without finding out the facts. I have told you I have no basis for an opinion. I will be glad to find out what the facts are and I will report it to you, sir, but right now I don't know.

Senator GORE. I am asking you, since this is a prime function of your agency, if you have gathered these facts and reported upon them; and if you have not, why have you not?

Mr. MARKS. Well, Senator, we reported on the complaints in the past about news management. We have given that full treatment. Now, whether you are talking about this specific story, I can't answer that; I told you I don't know. Whatever the script contains. We have a tremendous output and you wouldn't ask the publisher of the New York Times about every story that appears in his paper. I will have to investigate it for you.

Senator GORE. I am not asking that—

Mr. MARKS. Then I misunderstood. I thought you were asking about this story.

Senator GORE. I had advanced from reference to that, and was asking you generally about the function of your own Agency in gathering facts and reporting them.

Mr. MARKS. Generally, we do report these facts; yes.

Senator GORE. What facts have you gathered and reported upon with respect to news management and censorship?

Mr. MARKS. I will have to get you specific facts, and times, and places where it was published. But I do know we have reported it.

Senator GORE. That is interesting, and I would appreciate it if I may have that story.

(The information referred to appears on p. 118 in the appendix.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield?
Senator GORE. Yes.

VOICE OF AMERICA COVERS COMMITTEE HEARING

The CHAIRMAN. Do you report on a meeting such as this? Is USIA covering this meeting?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know; I hope they are because the views of this committee are vital in a free society.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wondered as a matter of practice. I thought you might know whether they are doing it here.

Mr. MARKS. I hope we are.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything more?

Senator GORE. Yes.

Mr. MARKS. Let me find out. Is there anybody here from "Voice of America"?

Yes; we are covering it.

OPINION SURVEYS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator GORE. Has the USIA conducted any opinion surveys in southeast Asia?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir; not since I became Director.

Senator GORE. Do you know—does the USIA know—if any other agency of Government, per se, or by contract, has done so?

Mr. MARKS. I know of none personally.

Senator GORE. Do you know if your reporters have reported upon such facts?

Mr. MARKS. I have no knowledge of that, sir. I don't know what you are driving at.

Senator GORE. Do you know whether or not the Rand Corporation has conducted opinion surveys under contract with the Defense Department?

Mr. MARKS. I have no knowledge of the details of any of that.

Senator GORE. If your reporters learned about this survey, is it the kind of thing they would gather facts about and report on in the reports which your Agency would disseminate?

Mr. MARKS. It depends upon what is in the report.

Senator GORE. The fact that the Defense Department was conducting an opinion survey in southeast Asia and Vietnam would be a matter of value, would it not?

Mr. MARKS. Sir, I would have to know what was in that report. I can't give you a general answer. These are specific problems.

Senator GORE. As one nonreporter to another, do you think that would be of some news value?

Mr. MARKS. It could be. It could not be. It depends upon what is in it.

Senator GORE. If you do not know if opinion surveys have been conducted, you, of course, would not know the contents of them?

Mr. MARKS. That is right, sir.

Senator GORE. Do you know if your Agency or the military have at any time suggested to foreign publishers or foreign news services, the removal from an area of reporters?

Mr. MARKS. I never have. And, to my knowledge, during the time I have been in the Agency, it has never engaged in that practice, and I know of none prior to that time.

EVALUATION OF OUR PROPAGANDA EFFORT WITH RESPECT TO VIETNAM

Senator GORE. Let's come to one of the central concerns of today. In your opinion, why is it that the U.S. position and program and policy in Vietnam are subject to such worldwide questioning and doubt? I am really asking you to evaluate the effectiveness of your Agency in penetrating world public opinions.

Please understand, I don't assess you with any blame or lack thereof, because I know there are competing news sources in many other governments. There are propaganda agencies which have been working assiduously. I only ask you to comment upon the effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of our own propaganda program with respect to the Vietnam war.

Mr. MARKS. Sir, I am satisfied that our effort has been effective. I am satisfied that our people are doing a fine and creditable job. I am satisfied that there are major areas of misunderstanding which we must continue to work to correct. I am satisfied that there are some newspapers, there are some governments who are unalterably opposed to our policy and do not wish to have the facts.

Senator GORE. Then why would you say that not only the North Vietnamese, but apparently the Red Chinese as well, and—according to reports—also high Soviet officials, labor under the misapprehension, I think, that public opinion in the United States will force President Johnson to decide to withdraw from Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. Sir, you will have to talk to somebody else about U.S. public opinion. You will have to talk to the Soviets about what their assessment of U.S. public opinion is. I am not qualified to do that.

Senator GORE. I understand the primary function of your Agency is to disseminate information, to affect as much as possible public opinion—informed public opinion—both in the United States and around the world.

Mr. MARKS. I must disagree; for by law we have nothing to do with forming public opinion in the United States.

Senator GORE. I stand corrected.

Mr. MARKS. It is a popular misconception; you are not alone.

Senator GORE. I must say I know that. You are an international agency.

Mr. MARKS. That is right. Our jurisdiction begins at the water's edge.

Senator GORE. I wouldn't call you a foreign agency—

Mr. MARKS. No.

Senator GORE. Your function is outside of the United States.

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

Senator McGEE. Will the Senator yield on that one for just a minute?

Senator GORE. Yes.

IMPRESSION OVERSEAS OF U.S. PUBLIC OPINION

Senator McGEE. I think it might be to the point to indicate that in this morning's press—in somebody's column, I can't remember

whose it was—a thesis was suggested on the reason for the dissemination of this impression of the role of American public opinion reversing our policy in Vietnam. The reason given was that too many individuals, without being named, were circulating this impression by word of mouth through the cocktail circuit to the Soviet Ambassador and some others of that type, and thus leading them to the wrong conclusion.

I don't know whether this reporter is correct, but I supply it because it seems appropriate here to the Senator's question.

Senator GORE. I think it is certainly an interesting observation. I am not sure of the appropriateness, but it is certainly an interesting footnote.

I will read from a paragraph from an article in the current Newsweek magazine:

But it is unlikely that even a Fulbright intercession could convince the Russians.

The only intercession I know that Senator Fulbright has made is a public statement. What I am really trying to get at, perhaps in an awkward way, Mr. Marks, is your assessment of the success or failure of the USIA in portraying accurately the governmental structure, sites of power and intention of the Government of the United States. Why would there be so much doubt about the program and policy of the U.S. Government?

Mr. MARKS. I thought I answered that, sir.

Senator GORE. I am trying to obtain from you an assessment of whether or not you think your Agency has been successful or unsuccessful.

Mr. MARKS. I think we have been successful. I explained the problems that exist. I explained the unalterable opposition that exists. I can't read the Soviet mind and I am not in a position to interpret why they feel certain things are so.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

Senator MUNDT. Thank you.

USIA'S SIZE AND FUNCTION IN VIETNAM

I am a little bit at a loss after reading the last two sentences of your prepared statement, Mr. Marks, as to just what the function of USIA is in Vietnam.

You say:

In your letter, Mr. Chairman, you indicated an interest in discussing our Government's news policies in Vietnam. In this regard, I should point out to you that the United States Information Agency is restricted to non-U.S. correspondents and to the Vietnamese news media.

That sounds as though we didn't have any USIA newsmen at all in Vietnam. I am sure that is not correct. I just can't understand what you mean to imply.

Mr. MARKS. I am sorry, sir, for that impression. What I was trying to say was that we do not have any jurisdiction in the United States, that our jurisdiction is limited to foreign correspondents, foreign newspapers, and that we do inform the Vietnamese news media; for example, presidential statements, reports about activities on Congress and others go into the Vietnamese news press just as we provide them to the press of the world.

Senator MUNDT. How many USIA employees do you have in Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. In the entire service?

Senator MUNDT. In Vietnam.

Mr. MARKS. In Vietnam, we have 113 Americans, 351 Vietnamese employees. Don't hold me to that figure, but it is approximately correct.

Senator MUNDT. A sizable mission.

Mr. MARKS. Yes, it is. It is our largest mission.

Senator MUNDT. Right. And what do you conceive to be the main function of that mission?

Mr. MARKS. One of our main functions is to supply information to the world press about activities in Vietnam.

Let me give an illustration. Let's suppose that the Iranians send a medical team. When that medical team gets there, reports are made as to its activities that go back to Teheran. Let's suppose that the Koreans have supplied certain armed forces and certain assistance.

Senator MUNDT. Which they have.

Mr. MARKS. Which they have. Or the Philippines, or the New Zealanders, or the Australians. We report to those countries about the activities. In addition, we assist the Vietnamese Information Service on their radio programs, on their news coverage. They do not have adequate facilities to handle them themselves. We provide assistance to them in preparing news programs, news releases, booklets, and pamphlets.

Senator MUNDT. In a situation such as we have there, somebody is representing the United States and must have the mission of trying to get across to as many Vietnamese as possible the purpose of our presence and the purpose of the war. Is that the job of the USIA or does someone else have that?

Mr. MARKS. No. It is our job with the Vietnamese Information Service, sir, and we do conduct that. That is why I made reference to the Vietnamese news media. We try to get across to the people of Vietnam through their media what we are there for, what we are trying to do, and what the problems are.

Senator MUNDT. Where is our second largest mission?

Mr. MARKS. Our second largest mission is in India.

PURPOSE OF ORIGINAL LEGISLATION CONSISTENT WITH USIA ACTIVITIES

Senator MUNDT. Back to the original purpose of the hearing—to inquire about whether or not USIA is helping foreign newsmen get to Vietnam and make their reports—may I say, as a member of this committee, I hope you are doing this and I hope you expand the program. That was one of the functions that USIA was established to perform from the outset. The original legislation—Public Law 402, 80th Congress—is referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act. That was precisely one of the jobs set out for, just as we help students in foreign countries go to the American University in Beirut.

It was not intended as just a bilateral exchange between our country and a foreign country, but it was to put the best image of the United States before the world by all legitimate techniques which are available.

My quarrel would be, if any, with the USIA, that we have not done enough of that, rather than the fact that we have done too much of it.

is a legitimate device; it is an effective device. You will always find some people who are going to take the trip and thumb their nose at us and write false things about us. That is human nature. But in the main, on balance, I believe this is a very productive way of helping to try to bring about as much public support as is possible in other countries for our war efforts and for public understanding.

This was done even before we had a USIA. I think you were in error when you say we didn't have a USIA. I believe we have had one since 1949. These programs were started then, and the predecessor organization, the OWI, did them during the war. So, this is a desirable function. It seems to me that the question that should be before us is whether or not this function should be expanded, if it can be done with surplus, excess funds which can't be used in any other way in other countries. It is almost for nothing because we have piled up a lot of excess currencies in some countries like India where we can't imagine ways in which we can utilize it.

U.S. LEADERSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES

I would like to expand it to take foreign correspondents to the Philippines so that they could find out just what happened to identify the United States as the most successful power in history for decolonizing a backward nation. No other country—no other nation in history—has done as much to help underdeveloped countries evolve into a self-governing, democratic power as we did in the Philippines. I think the world should know that story. It doesn't know it. Many Americans don't know it. Many Europeans don't know it. It is a story which could be told by any legitimate newsmen who goes to the Philippines and studies just exactly what is happening in that area.

NAMES OF NEWSMEN SENT TO VIETNAM SHOULD NOT BE MADE PUBLIC THROUGH COMMITTEE

Speaking as one member of the committee, I don't think that we should be given the names for public purposes of the people sent to Vietnam, because it seems to me that it would be tremendously embarrassing for the people who have to work under some of the conditions there—

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield?

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They have been published, the ones I have—

Senator MUNDT. The ones you mentioned?

The CHAIRMAN. I understood the others had been.

Mr. MARKS. The Indian and the Finnish, just the three.

Senator MUNDT. Have they all been published?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

Senator MUNDT. I would hate to see this committee become the vehicle for publishing the names. In most countries, I imagine that a man from a prominent newspaper can't just disappear for three weeks or a month without having his absence known and, perhaps, having to say openly where he is going. I don't think this committee should become the vehicle for publishing the names. It would be too much like stripping the camouflage off of a sniper. We are in a war and we have to adjust ourselves to this war kind of situation.

USIA REPORTING OF DOMESTIC NEWS

Let me ask you a more general question, just as a matter of interest. How do USIA press and radio services treat such items in your news overseas as these unfortunate riots which are occurring, say, in Chicago? I am talking about, not only about race riots, but riots like we had in the House of Representatives yesterday.

Mr. MARKS. We report that fully, Senator, and I will tell you the rationale behind it.

If you will recall when I was examined by this committee before my appointment was confirmed, I was asked this question, and I stated that I felt that a news medium had to tell the truth. In order to maintain credibility, you had to tell the good and the bad alike, and unless you tell the bad as well as the good you lose credibility.

Now it may be harmful to tell a story about riots and some of the activities that take place, protesting official policy and decrying American statements, but at the same time this is a democracy. We operate in a free and open manner and we must always do that. On balance we also report about the progress of a democracy, how we function, how we determine our policy by the people's mandate. That is part of our story. Although it may seem difficult to tell some of these stories, we insist upon it and we do it, but we don't do it out of perspective.

We can talk about riots, let's say race riots. We report that. We also talk about the progress Negroes have made, the fact that there has been civil rights legislation and that it has received the substantial support of Congress, that there are efforts for fair employment practices and progress in housing. And we are making gains, so we try to put the whole picture in perspective, but I want to assure you that we report the event.

Senator MUNDT. Since everybody doesn't see everything that occurs, I think that it is important that both sides should be reported fully—good and bad—in a truthful way.

Mr. MARKS. We try.

Senator MUNDT. Otherwise, somebody might be curious about the situation that happened in the House of Representatives yesterday. It might sound like an insurrection to a foreigner. I think that it is tremendously important that in the same program there be a conscious effort to keep present a balance of the situation.

Mr. MARKS. We endeavor to put a proper perspective on the news event.

SYMPATHY FOR U.S. ROLE IN VIETNAM

Senator MUNDT. Looking back over the last year—during the period that you have been in charge of USIA—would you say that the information media abroad are becoming more or less sympathetic and understanding with regard to the U.S. role in Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. Senator, I would like to claim some credit for the work our people do. I do not want to sound dramatic about it, but they work in many cases under very adverse circumstances. They work in an atmosphere of hostility where the official government policy is violently opposed to our own. They continue to try. They continue to try to get the facts to the editors of the government-controlled papers or the free papers, to the government-controlled radio and

television operation. They try to schedule meetings where American foreign policy can be discussed. They try to distribute pamphlets and books. They have seminars in our libraries and cultural centers and if you could read some of the reports I get every day, you would realize that these men are unsung heroes and they are making progress.

But, I am not here to tell you that all through the world everybody understands us; they don't. As Senator Gore pointed out, there is an opposing force. There are countries at work which disagree with us and have large propaganda machinery and they have indigenous organizations that are working full time. It is a difficult problem but I am satisfied that the year I have spent in this job has been a fruitful one and the U.S. Government has benefited. That is my opinion.

IS THERE A DEVICE FOR MEASURING EXTENT OF SYMPATHY OVERSEAS?

Senator MUNDT. Have you any measurement device which we could use to determine whether or not the information media overseas are more or less sympathetic on any given point in issue in which we may be involved? There must be some way—through clippings, or monitoring, or through reports which you get from your public relations offices overseas—to give you some kind of objective breakdown as to the trend of foreign opinion as manifested by news media concerning the American position in Vietnam.

I am trying to find out from you whether we are gaining or losing in trying to have our position in Vietnam understood by foreign countries generally; excepting, of course, the Communist press which is understandable because it is being supported, of course, by the Communist troops.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, that question isn't susceptible to a yes or no answer and I shall try to answer it to the best of my ability. It has been a subject which plagues me all the time and everybody wants to know the answer in a simple form.

It is not possible to give you a simple answer. Here is my assessment.

If the newspapers and the radio and television outlets of the world would just give the people the facts and give them a chance to make up their own minds, then we have made an improvement. If they will tell about the valiant defense that is being made by the Asian countries who have sent troops there, and why they are fighting, as expressed by their statesmen, if they will talk about the civilian efforts to rebuild that country, if they will talk about the stories of heroism, if they will talk about the statesmen's comments around the world, good or bad, then I am satisfied.

Whether their opinion of us approves or disapproves is a matter of individual temperament. All I am trying to do is to get the facts. Now to answer your question, we have no yardstick. There is no way of putting it, say, putting a piece of paper on a table and saying, we have moved this far. There is no measuring rod, but we can judge from the reports we get today, day in and day out, that we are making some progress, that there are media which are beginning to report more of the facts, and that is a hopeful sign. It is happening now. I have noticed the trend in the past few months.

Now, beyond that, I would have to go to specifics, taking specific countries and specific papers.

USIA MISSION IN INDIA AND INDIAN NEWS MEDIA

Senator MUNDT. Let me ask you a specific question. Your second largest mission is in India, you say?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. India is one of the great, powerful, and developing countries of the world. It has been one of the greatest recipients of American aid. We haven't had much success with India in reciprocity, from the standpoint of votes in the United Nations, or from a general standpoint.

What kind of information does the average person living in Calcutta get through the Indian news media concerning what we are doing in Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. I will give you a specific answer to that because I happen to have read a report quite recently of a newspaperman, quite well known in Calcutta, who was an outright skeptic and in his editorial comments showed his views without any question. He went to Vietnam and reported on some of the programs which I have described to you. He openly stated that, because he had had a chance to see the facts, see what was going on, talk to the people, he had come around and changed his views. He was not completely in support of everything that was happening but he had altered his views and his reports from Vietnam reflected an on-the-scene report. Now, that is the kind of reaction I think we are getting in India.

There were no Vietnam correspondents of Indian newspapers so the few who have gone from India had for the first time an opportunity to give the people a report as seen by Indian eyes. That is the important thing—as seen by Indian eyes.

OPERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO INDUSTRIES IN INDIA

Senator MUNDT. One other question. How are the TV and radio industries operated there, privately or by the Government?

Mr. MARKS. It is an infant industry run by the Government and there is only one transmitter at the present time, I believe, which has very limited coverage.

Senator MUNDT. Radio?

Mr. MARKS. Television.

In radio, it is all government-owned; government-owned radio.

INDIAN RADIO REPORTS ABOUT U.S. PRESENCE IN VIETNAM

Senator MUNDT. Does your monitoring of Indian radio reports indicate what kind of information the listeners generally are getting about our presence in Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. Sir, I would want to check that more specifically, but Vietnam is not the most important issue in India. They are more concerned about their relationship with Pakistan; they are more concerned about the wheat and famine and the monsoon and internal problems. They are more concerned about the disagreement that exists within their government. We must remember that Vietnam may be the biggest story in the United States, but in some areas of the world it is really of passing or indifferent interest.

Senator MUNDT. Big or little, I would like to have you supply for the record—if you don't have it in mind right now—whether or not the main thrust of Radio India is critical, sympathetic, or neutral regarding what we are doing in Vietnam.

Mr. MARKS. I should be glad to report on that for the committee. (The information referred to follows:)

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
Washington, September 20, 1966.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Mr. Leonard H. Marks, Director of USIA, in his appearance before your Committee on August 17, 1966, was asked to file a subsequent report as to whether or not the main thrust of All India Radio was critical of what the U.S. was doing in Viet-Nam, sympathetic or neutral. Our post in India reports that All India Radio has no correspondent in Viet-Nam on a regular basis. Their reporting is for the most part straight news on the Viet-Nam situation. The news is a fairly accurate reflection of material carried by the wire services and statements of Indian officials. Occasional features are carried and they report that press conferences and official statements are treated fairly.

Sincerely,

RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, Jr.,
General Counsel.

Senator MUNDT. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DISTORTED VIEWPOINT OF U.S. VIETNAM POSITION

Mr. Marks, I am rather sympathetic to your predicament in undertaking to make known to the world all the facts concerning our own involvement in South Vietnam.

I am not at all certain that if you were successful in that effort, that many who are now skeptical of the American involvement would be converted into disciples. I certainly had access to all the facts this Government could supply. I have them and remain a skeptic, but I do think that the world is getting an unduly distorted picture of Vietnam. I do not think that this is at all the fault of your Agency or the effort you are making, but I do think it is inherent perhaps in the situation, in the way the world is apt to look at this war.

EUROPEAN CRITICISM OF U.S. EFFORTS IN VIETNAM

I think that the predicament is pretty well capsuled in the August 19 issue of Time magazine. I should like to read this section of the article into the record. It relates to European opinion and, having been in Europe recently, I can personally testify that I encountered very heavy criticism in Europe of the war generally. I think this is a rather accurate summation of European opinion, based upon my own exposure.

Time magazine reports a current poll in France which shows that 30 percent of the Frenchmen think Lyndon Johnson is more dangerous than Communist China's Mao Tse-tung; that 35 percent of the West Germans favor ending the bombing of North Vietnam. "Says West German Vice Chancellor Erich Mende: "There is no question in my mind that the Vietnam war is unpopular largely because of television. People see the horrors and the misery of this war—burning villages,

weeping mothers, maimed children. They see South Vietnamese troops manhandling Vietcong suspects, and they see the more torrid aspects of Saigon's night life.' Belgium's Paul-Henri Spak put it more succinctly. 'The United States,' he said, 'has completely lost the information war in Vietnam.'

Then the magazine continues: "What is to be done about it? Not much. The Vietcong and the North Vietnamese release a negligible amount of news film on their side of the war and of course do not allow foreign TV crewmen to work with their combat units. That leaves television stations all over the world dependent on the film taken mainly by U.S. TV crewmen and of United States and South Vietnamese troops in action. Inevitably, it leaves a lopsided impression."

I think this is without doubt one of the problems that confronts us. But, if it is, it underscores the need to expose foreign correspondents who are interested to the situation in South Vietnam, and I think that was the objective of your action, was it not?

Mr. MARKS. It was, sir.

Senator CHURCH. I can't quarrel with the objective. I think we do face this serious problem of an unduly distorted picture of this war being widespread in the world.

Whether or not you can succeed in your objective, I think, depends upon how you are conducting the program in South Vietnam itself.

EXTENT OF USIA'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOREIGN NEWSMEN SENT TO VIETNAM

Now, as I understand your testimony, these foreign correspondents who do come, whose transportation is furnished, are in your custody, so to speak, or at least you undertake when they do come to South Vietnam to see to it that they get access to whatever information may be available; is that correct?

Mr. MARKS. Just as if they had bought their own airplane ticket, in the same manner and with the same procedures.

Senator CHURCH. Are they perfectly free to go within the limits of military security wherever they want to go, and do you undertake to get them to the places they would like to see, or have you a kind of organized tour for them when they come?

Mr. MARKS. There is no organized tour. They go where they want to go, when they want to go. We provide in-country transportation because otherwise you can't get away from Saigon to Da Nang and other places.

Senator CHURCH. But you undertake to help them get to places they want to see?

Mr. MARKS. Exactly. And they choose the places and the subject that they wish to investigate.

Senator CHURCH. When they report, do they report directly back to their own newspapers from South Vietnam? There is no funneling or channeling through your own agency in connection with the news they release, is there?

Mr. MARKS. Absolutely not, Senator; and we find out what they have reported when we read it in their paper.

Senator CHURCH. There is no condition attached to this transportation that they should first submit stories to your agency?

Mr. MARKS. Absolutely not. It would be a gross insult. I wouldn't even think of it.

Senator CHURCH. I didn't anticipate that there was any such wish. I did think that the record ought to be clear on that.

FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS IN VIETNAM MAKE CONTACTS ON THEIR OWN

To what extent do these correspondents get around the country? How limited are they in where they can go and what they can say?

Mr. MARKS. If you read the reports in the American papers, you will realize that they are getting in everywhere; they are using helicopters, airplanes, and other means of transportation, that are made available so that they can get there. I don't imagine that they all want to go where the fighting takes place, but many of them do want to get to places where actions have taken place; and some do want to see front line battles.

There aren't many frontline battles; as you know the nature of the war doesn't permit that. But if they want to go to a particular place, they are transported; within the limits of transportation, they get it.

Senator CHURCH. Suppose they want to contact critics of Marshal Ky's regime or known opponents, do you help them reach these people?

Mr. MARKS. They are on their own on contacting sources. The only people that we help them with are Americans who are with the mission, people who are in charge of the civilian reconstruction work, field representatives, those who would have the technical information about the nature of the agriculture and the medical programs. They are on their own and I would imagine, although I can't tell you exactly with reference to contacting Vietnamese, if our people know them and can do it, they will, critics or not critics of the Ky administration.

Senator CHURCH. How long, typically, do these foreign correspondents stay when they come under these arrangements?

Mr. MARKS. It depends on their own particular interest; a minimum of two weeks, some of them three weeks, four weeks.

Senator CHURCH. So that they have adequate opportunity to make contacts on their own?

Mr. MARKS. Absolutely, sir.

CONDUCT OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT PROGRAM IN VIETNAM

Senator CHURCH. I think that this is important because, if you are going to serve your own objective, the way that this program is actually handled in South Vietnam is a critical matter.

I was once part of an American delegation that was invited to Moscow under a somewhat different arrangement. We had been at the Interparliamentary Union Conference and were invited by the Russian delegation to come afterward, to Moscow where we had the guided tour. It was very difficult to see anything other than what was scheduled for us.

About the third day, I finally prevailed upon my guide to take me to some other parts of the city than the streets that we had been confined to. The next day, there was a new guide. My general impression was to be adversely affected by the whole experience.

So, I thought we ought to get on the record how you are actually conducting the program in South Vietnam, if the objective to be served is the freest possible access for these foreign correspondents.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, I had the guided tour of Moscow and had the same reaction. I have discussed this with the foreign journalists who have been to Moscow and they deplore this. They tell me one of the greatest benefits they find from our policy is the openness. For example, they are taken down to Florida for the space shots, and if the shot fails, they report that it fails. If there is human error, or otherwise, they are told about it; whores, with the Russians, there is complete secrecy. Nobody knows about it and they report only their successes.

I want our country to continue to operate in the open manner and to the extent that the USIA has any jurisdiction, we will and we have.

Senator CHURCH. This is how you are conducting the foreign correspondents program in South Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. You are correct, sir.

Senator CHURCH. I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

BLACK VERSUS WHITE PROPAGANDA

Senator PELL. Mr. Marks, returning to the basic question of the conduct of the foreign correspondents and the responsibility for it, I was wondering in a more general way, how you would define black propaganda as opposed to white propaganda?

Mr. MARKS. I have no definition for it, sir. I will take your definition.

Senator PELL. Would you bear with me that black propaganda is basically a perfectly legitimate function of any government by the influencing of public opinion abroad in ways not entirely known to the leadership or the listening audience involved?

Mr. MARKS. All right. What is white? Is white the opposite; namely, the complete disclosure of all activities?

Senator PELL. No. Please don't be so sensitive to my questions.

Mr. MARKS. No, no; I just want to understand the contrast.

Senator PELL. We have also discussed in this committee the proper function of the CIA. Some of us have regretted its activity in military operations of one sort or another, and some think it should be involved more in political or in black propaganda operations. I was wondering if this did not fall more precisely under the law as something the CIA should be doing. Please understand that I have no criticism of this program—I wish it were expanded. But does it belong to USIA?

Mr. MARKS. In my opinion, it is properly placed in the U.S. Information Agency. It is entirely overt; it is entirely legitimate. I see nothing wrong, nothing to be critical about, and I believe that anybody who has had any association with our Agency would come to that same conclusion.

Senator PELL. Many think that covert activities are perfectly legitimate.

Mr. MARKS. I understand, but I think that this is an activity that should be overt by the U.S. Information Agency because it is an information function. I cast no aspersions on the CIA or anybody else. This is our job, providing information to foreign correspondents.

Senator PELL. Do you think that all black propaganda operations should go to the USIA?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir. I don't count this in that category and I don't accept your definition.

Senator PELL. I thought you started out by saying you did accept it.

Mr. MARKS. I wanted to know what it was.

QUESTION OF PUBLICATION OF LIST OF NAMES

Senator PELL. Thank you. Please understand I am not in any way critical of the operation. It is a fine one and I hope it is expanded. My only criticism of it is that it could detract from the white propaganda activities which you conduct. If you say there is nothing secret about it—that it is completely open and, therefore, does not fall in my definition of black propaganda—then why shouldn't the list of names be published?

Mr. MARKS. Sir, I will make available to the committee the list. I told the chairman I would get that together and supply it.

Senator PELL. For publication?

Mr. MARKS. Before you came in, sir, I made that statement.

Senator PELL. Thank you. I do wish you luck with that program. As I say, my impression is not directed to you. I simply thought it was a proper function for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, let me add one footnote. You see so much in life is based upon labels, and the term, "black propaganda" could have an odious connotation.

Senator PELL. Not to me.

Mr. MARKS. White propaganda is pure, it's the bride's gown. I am proud of what we do.

Senator PELL. Well, we are not talking about civil rights.

Mr. MARKS. It has nothing to do with civil rights, but I don't want any improper connotation about what we are doing.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's clarify the question about the names.

I understood the Senator from South Dakota to say that he didn't think they ought to be published. You said you would supply the committee with the list for executive use. Are you now saying you think they ought to be made public?

Mr. MARKS. Sir, I leave that to the discretion of the committee. You are well versed in the—

The CHAIRMAN. What is your recommendation? Are you going to make them public yourself?

Mr. MARKS. I see nothing wrong, sir, with identifying anybody who has been involved in this program, and I shall make the names available to the committee. And if Senator Mundt still feels the same, or if Senator Pell has his views, that is another thing.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. I asked him to make a recommendation. It isn't just the committee's recommendation.

Mr. MARKS. It is not my job to make them public.

The CHAIRMAN. You are saying that you are not going to make the names public.

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That's No. 1. No. 2, you are going to supply them to the committee. No. 3, it is up to the committee whether to make them public or not.

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that your position?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That's all I want to know.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, may I say that: one, I think the operation is excellent; and two, I don't think the names should be published.

The CHAIRMAN. If they shouldn't be, let's not emphasize it. It's all open and above ground. Let's not be bigger hypocrites than we have to be.

The Senator from Wyoming.

EMPHASIS ON NONMILITARY ASPECT OF REPORTING

Senator McGEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MARKS, do we understand correctly that the main emphasis of these visiting journalists that are transported to Vietnam is in the nonmilitary field?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

Senator McGEE. But they are not barred from the military field?

Mr. MARKS. On the contrary.

Senator McGEE. What they do there is their business?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

Senator McGEE. Do you feel that the impact of your concentration on the nonmilitary field is making any headway in the headline news against the preponderance of military reporting?

Mr. MARKS. Some, but not enough. I will be satisfied only when there is a full report on the nonmilitary aspects. We have made improvements, and I hope for more.

Senator McGEE. Would you be willing to expand this program outside of the country—that is, outside of the counterpart category? You made a big point of the fact that it was costing you relatively little because it was in soft currency. Would you be willing to spend directly in support of this program?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

Senator McGEE. I am glad to hear you say that. I was hoping that you would justify this, not in an apologetic way, because you are spending out of soft currency.

Mr. MARKS. No.

Senator McGEE. I think this program has a reason for being, and I think you ought to do more of it. And I agree with the Senator from South Dakota and the Senator from Rhode Island, that if there is any indictment to be made here, it is in not expanding it on a broad enough sphere, but that is constructive.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, the only reference to excess currency was to show that we tried to save money. If we can use that currency, we try, but I am wholeheartedly and enthusiastically behind this program, and we will spend any amounts that are necessary in dollars.

INFORMATION PROGRAMS MAKING HEADWAY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator McGEE. I have tried hard to assess this whole session here this morning, and it seems to me that you have cleared up a great many things that were on the record—although I may say it is a little bit of “much to do about relatively less” in terms of the problem. But I do think this session has been helpful in getting the information, and I would hope that the record would show that somebody has been getting through to somebody in southeast Asia and that general part of the world.

The fact that this getting through coincides with your term of office is irrelevant, because it was going on long before you got there. But, just in the last few weeks or months, the head of the government in Singapore has shifted his view quite substantially toward our activities in Vietnam.

In Rangoon the Burmese government has had a perceptible change of inclination; there has been a measurable change in the Philippines; and there has been a dramatic, violent change in Indonesia. There has even been some shifting reported in Cambodia, although this is being kicked back and forth at the present time.

Senator MUNDT. It is a yo-yo.

Senator McGEE. Somebody is getting through with something, so whether it's “Voice of America,” U.S. Information Service, or somebody else's news agency that is doing it, I think it is fair to note that the tendency toward criticism, particularly in Western Europe to show a rising hostility, is not the measure of the area in which the problem itself is being worked out. I think perhaps the word from the Australian Prime Minister who was here—that somehow Europeans get excited only with Berlin walls, and they forget the world is round—is something in point, and I don't attach too much weight to the opinion of the Europeans.

Some of the Asians were not too excited about Hitler, but they got excited about Tojo in Japan.

These are human elements. I don't think you ought to be shy about the measure of the impact of somebody's program which is making headway, about what we are doing, about what the cause is, about why we are there, or about the consequences of the various alternatives that face us at the present time.

It seems to me it has been a terrible thing, and it is wonderful that we have had a change in the whole atmosphere of southeast Asia in the last 12 or 14 months.

That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

DISCUSSION OF TOTAL NUMBER OF CASUALTIES

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If any of these questions have been asked in my absence, just tell me so and I won't press for a repetitious answer.

Mr. MARKS. All right, sir.

Senator CASE. This morning, I understand that a war correspondent, Dean Brelis, said that at least 5,000 South Vietnamese were killed or seriously wounded per month in the current operations in South Vietnam.

Mr. MARKS. That has been asked, and my answer was, sir, that I have jurisdiction only with foreign correspondents. Mr. Brelis is an American and therefore I have no knowledge of it.

Senator CASE. I am not asking whether you knew he said this. I am asking whether it is true.

Mr. MARKS. I have no information on it. My area of interest is nonmilitary and this is a military matter.

Senator CASE. You don't know what the facts are?

Mr. MARKS. I do not know.

Senator CASE. Are you a member, in that connection, of the National Security Council?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Senator CASE. Have you attended meetings and have there been meetings recently on this matter?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. Isn't this a matter of vital statistics in South Vietnam, a matter currently discussed by the Council?

Mr. MARKS. This question that you have asked has not been discussed.

Senator CASE. Hasn't the Council taken note at any meeting of the situation as far as the results of the war go in South Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. To my knowledge; no.

Senator CASE. How about American casualties there, have they been discussed?

Mr. MARKS. American casualties, military?

Senator CASE. Yes.

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Senator CASE. And South Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. And South Vietnam casualties; all casualties. I thought you were talking about the Dean Brelis report. That has not been discussed.

Senator CASE. Dean Brelis just made this report this morning.

Mr. MARKS. I don't know what time period the Brelis story covers—last month, last year, or when.

I don't know anything about this.

Senator CASE. It was this morning, apparently.

Mr. MARKS. I don't know anything about that.

Senator CASE. This morning, apparently on the “Today” show. I didn't hear it myself.

Mr. MARKS. I am not familiar with it.

Senator CASE. I am not interested in whether you heard him say it, or even whether he said it. I am asking you what the facts are.

Mr. MARKS. I do not know.

Senator CASE. About the Vietnamese casualties, the South Vietnamese casualties?

Mr. MARKS. Over what period of time, and where?

Senator CASE. A period of the last 6 months of this year.

Mr. MARKS. I don't have those facts before me, but they have been discussed.

Senator CASE. Have you any general knowledge as to what the rate of casualties is among the South Vietnamese forces?

Mr. MARKS. Military?

Senator CASE. South Vietnamese military.

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Senator CASE. What rate is it?
 Mr. MARKS. I don't have those figures handy; I don't remember them.

Senator CASE. It is a rather important figure.
 Mr. MARKS. It changes, sir, from time to time. It is an important figure, but I don't have those figures at my fingertips.

Senator CASE. Do you have a general idea of what their casualties are in relation to our casualties?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, I do.

Senator CASE. What is the relationship?

Mr. MARKS. I would not want to guess, because I have not reviewed those figures, and I haven't had a chance to even consider that within the last few days. That is not my field. I am not involved in military reporting.

Senator CASE. Now, it would seem to me that information about the military factors are certainly paramount in the news. You could get that from other sources, could you not?

Mr. MARKS. Surely.

PROPORTION OF USIA OFFICERS IN VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator CASE. Your knowledge of the situation is what I am interested in at the moment.

What portion of USIA officers, overall, are in South Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. The number has been given, sir. Out of the total of 12,000, there are approximately 113 Americans and approximately 350 Vietnamese.

Senator CASE. What is the proportion of the total?

Mr. MARKS. That would be 500 out of 12,000—

Senator CASE. We are talking now about officers, I take it, rather than clerical and all the rest of it.

Mr. MARKS. Oh, if you are talking about officers, we have approximately 8 to 10 percent of our Foreign Service officers in Vietnam.

Senator CASE. In Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Senator CASE. How about the proportion in all of southeast Asia?

Mr. MARKS. I would have to get the figure for you.

Senator CASE. Have you a general idea?

Mr. MARKS. In Thailand, Korea, Japan, and the Philippines?

Senator CASE. And Indonesia.

Mr. MARKS. In Indonesia; we have one person, I believe, in Indonesia. I would be guessing, sir. I would say, in all the rest of southeast Asia that would probably be equal to this, another 10 percent.

Senator CASE. Well, 20 percent, although that does not include India?

Mr. MARKS. That does not include India.

Senator CASE. How large is the force in India?

Mr. MARKS. India is our second largest post. I would say there are probably 75 Americans there. Now, when I say Americans I am talking about all personnel, not just Foreign Service officers.

Senator CASE. I want to get a percentage figure on the officers.

Mr. MARKS. I will supply it for you accurately.

(The information referred to follows.)

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
 Washington, September 8, 1966.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
 Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
 U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to a question by Senator Case during the appearance of Mr. Leonard H. Marks before your Committee on August 17, 1966, asking for percentage figures of USIA officers stationed in Viet-Nam, India, and the rest of the Asian area, we submit the following information:

Total number of officers in the USIA Foreign Service.....	1,834
Total number of USIA officers authorized for Viet-Nam.....	136
(Or 7.4 percent of 1,834)	
Total number of USIA officers in Viet-Nam.....	121
(Or 6.6 percent of 1,834)	
Total number of USIA officers authorized for remainder of Far East.....	100
(Or 10.4 percent of 1,834)	
Total number of USIA officers in remainder of Far East.....	170
(Or 9.3 percent of 1,834)	
Total number of officers authorized for all of Far East, including Viet-Nam.....	325
(Or 17.7 percent of 1,834)	
Total number of USIA officers in all of Far East, including Viet-Nam....	201
(Or 15.9 percent of 1,834)	
Total number of USIA officers authorized for India.....	63
(Or 3.4 percent of 1,834)	
Total number of USIA officers in India.....	59
(Or 3.2 percent of 1,834)	

Sincerely,

RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, Jr.,
 General Counsel.

* This figure does not include 184 Foreign Service secretaries and clerks but does include 328 Staff Officers in the Foreign Service.

Senator CASE. Thank you. Do you think you might have 25 percent of the total out there?

Mr. MARKS. Possibly.

Senator CASE. Is that an unreasonable round figure?

Mr. MARKS. It is within the range of 20 to 25 percent, I would guess, in all of southeast Asia.

U.S. IMAGE ABROAD

Senator CASE. I know, or at least I understand, that you do not take polls, but you have access to other people's polls, surveys and opinions, and so forth. What do they show about how we appear to the rest of the world?

Mr. MARKS. Senator, that has been covered, but let me summarize it very briefly.

We cannot generalize. We have to talk about a specific question, asked at a specific time, in a specific country. We have 105 posts around the world.

Senator CASE. I say there were people who at one time talked in very general terms about the American image abroad, and American misdeeds.

Mr. MARKS. Not I.

Senator CASE. You shouldn't; you should stay out of politics.

Mr. MARKS. I am trying to.

Senator CASE. Go ahead.

Mr. MARKS. We have 105 posts; each post is headed by an experienced officer called the country public affairs officer. He is given a large measure of autonomy in determining how we appear to the

program. He would know about polls on particular topics made at a particular time, in a particular city in his country. I am unable to give you that.

Senator CASE. I assume you have a general view about what America looks like today in southeast Asia, and I wish you would tell me.

Mr. MARKS. I made quite a speech on that.

Senator CASE. Then I won't ask you to repeat it.

Mr. MARKS. It is in the record.

Senator CASE. Can you summarize it in 10 words?

Mr. MARKS. No.

Senator CASE. Are you happy about it?

Mr. MARKS. I am never completely happy; I always see room for improvement.

Senator CASE. That is encouraging. You are not downhearted.

Mr. MARKS. I am not downhearted; I am quite encouraged.

BERTRAND RUSSELL AND PEACE MOVEMENT

Senator CASE. What do you think about this Bertrand Russell business?

Mr. MARKS. I think it is deplorable.

Senator CASE. So, you deplore it?

Mr. MARKS. Yes. I intend to see that something is done about it. I intend to see that our information officers are able to refute some of the statements that have been made and some that I anticipate will be made.

Senator CASE. Of course, I don't agree with what has been said, but there is one thing I would like to know. Is it catching on?

Mr. MARKS. It has not so far. From the complement of people on that committee, I think the intelligent critic can discern what it is trying to do. It certainly does not have a reputation for objectivity.

Senator CASE. Not in North America or in the United States, but there are some people whom we might call of odd distinction or great distinction, perhaps, in some parts of the world—

Mr. MARKS. There has not been time to get a reaction on that, sir. We are studying that very carefully and looking forward to reports from our posts to see what reaction there is in other sections of the world.

Senator CASE. Who is financing it, do you know?

Mr. MARKS. No; and I certainly would like to know.

Senator CASE. Has Lord Russell great sums of money of his own to spend on this?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know.

Senator CASE. Who is financing the peace movement, or movements? There are several of them.

Mr. MARKS. I don't know. That is not within my purview, but I would like to know.

Senator CASE. I take it you will be available to let this committee in on any further developing information you get about this matter. For myself, I think it is something that we want to follow very closely, and I know I will appreciate your keeping us posted.

Mr. MARKS. I certainly will, and we will welcome any suggestions by you or the members of this committee, which you may have on how to meet this.

THE BUDGET OF USIA

Senator CASE. One last question. Are you satisfied with the way the budget is going for your Agency?

Mr. MARKS. No.

Senator CASE. Have you discussed that this morning?

Mr. MARKS. No.

Senator CASE. I would appreciate any comments you might make, because my interest goes back to the time President Johnson, then the majority leader, took the meat ax to the Agency, not so many years ago, and I wonder if you think the same thing is happening now?

Mr. MARKS. It is not.

Senator CASE. It is not as bad as it was?

Mr. MARKS. The Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate last year applied a cut to Western Europe. I inherited that when I was appointed to this job. It was a fait accompli. The Bureau of the Budget has given our request every consideration and is understanding. I have not yet had an opportunity to appear before either the House or the Senate Appropriations Committees. However, in talking to individual members of those committees, I am quite encouraged. I think they understand the problem and hope they are sympathetic and I hope they approve of the way we are trying to run the Agency, and the fact that we have tried to economize and make sure we get our dollar's worth.

I do feel the need for greater efforts in particular areas. I will express that to the Appropriations Committee, and hope they will agree with me.

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to say that all this has been said by me as a friend of the Agency, and not otherwise.

Mr. MARKS. I understand, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuing that last question, for the record, what is your budget?

Mr. MARKS. Salaries and expenses, around \$160 million.

The CHAIRMAN. 160? How many employees?

Mr. MARKS. 12,000.

The CHAIRMAN. How many in the United States and how many abroad?

Mr. MARKS. Approximately half in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Six and six.

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have 105 posts?

Mr. MARKS. 105 countries; we have 221 posts. In some countries there are several posts.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh; 105 countries and 225 posts?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, 221, to be exact.

VOICE OF AMERICA

The CHAIRMAN. What proportion of your budget is allotted for Voice of America?

Mr. MARKS. \$30 million.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of your employees are devoted to Voice of America?

Mr. MARKS. 2,000.
 The CHAIRMAN. How many broadcasting stations?
 Mr. MARKS. Over 103 transmitters.
 The CHAIRMAN. How many of those are in the United States?
 Mr. MARKS. Greenville, N.C.; Dixon and Delano, Calif; and Bethany, Ohio.
 The CHAIRMAN. Where are the others? Are they small, local ones?
 Mr. MARKS. No, they are big ones.
 The CHAIRMAN. I mean others, besides those. Are they small ones?
 Mr. MARKS. Wolverton, England; Munich; Manila; Rhodes; Liberia; under construction in Greece; Thailand; and the Philippines, a transmitter in Hue, in Vietnam; and one in Tangiers.

PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS BROADCAST PROPAGANDA OVERSEAS

The CHAIRMAN. In the United States are there any privately owned, shortwave radio stations beaming propaganda programs to foreign countries?

Mr. MARKS. There are.
 The CHAIRMAN. How many?
 Mr. MARKS. Two.

The CHAIRMAN. What are they?
 Mr. MARKS. Station WRUL, owned by the Mormon Church, and a transmitter located at Red Lion, Pa., owned by another religious group.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the last one?
 Mr. MARKS. Red Lion. One transmitter. WRUL is located in Massachusetts and has a number of high-powered transmitters and beams primarily to Latin America.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that primarily religious?
 Mr. MARKS. No, it is a general service.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the Red Lion?

Mr. MARKS. Primarily religious; it has a very minor program service.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the USIA monitor or in any way supervise either or both of those programs?

Mr. MARKS. It does not; it has no association of any kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this not rather unusual for a private company, for purposes which may or may not be consistent with the Government's policies, to be allowed to engage in this kind of activity?

Mr. MARKS. These stations are licensed by the Federal Communications Commission. Station WRUL has been in existence since before World War II. All shortwave services were taken over by the U.S. Government during the war. At one time, the Columbia Broadcasting System, the National Broadcasting Co., Westinghouse, Crosley, and Associated Broadcasters in California had private short-wave stations. After the war they all turned in their permits with the exception of WRUL. As to whether it is unusual, that is a matter of government policy. It is a matter of licensing under existing legislation. The FCC determines that. We have nothing to say about it.

The CHAIRMAN. But it is in your line of business. They could, if they chose to, greatly hinder the effectiveness of your program.

Mr. MARKS. They could.

The CHAIRMAN. Who owns the station at Red Lion, Pa.?
 Mr. MARKS. I am sorry, I don't know the name of the person or the religious organization.

The CHAIRMAN. There are all kinds of religious organizations.
 Mr. MARKS. I am sorry, I don't know the name of it. I will get it for you.

(The information referred to appears on p. 131 in the appendix.)

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't it of sufficient interest to you to warrant your attention? You're not interested in it?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, I am interested in it, sir, but I don't happen to know the name of the denomination. It is a very small religious denomination.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether or not Mr. Edward Murrow complained to the FCC about this station?

Mr. MARKS. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you find out whether he did?

Mr. MARKS. I will.

(The information referred to follows:)

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
 Washington, November 8, 1960.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
 Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
 U.S. Senate.

DEAR Mr. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to your request directed to Mr. Leonard Marks, Director of USIA during his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 17, 1960, we have checked the Agency's records and find that Edward R. Murrow, then Director of USIA, did in 1903, bring to the attention of the Federal Communications Commission international broadcasts of WINB, Red Lion, Pennsylvania.

Also pursuant to your request to Mr. Marks, we submit random audio tape samples of broadcasts over said station taped off the air on September 6, 1960.

Sincerely,

RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, Jr.,
 General Counsel.

(Tape appears on p. 159 of the appendix.)

The CHAIRMAN. I only recently heard about this station just casually. I meant to make an inquiry into it, and really forgot about it. I had forgotten about it until this discussion.

U.S. IMAGE ABROAD

We were talking about our image abroad. I have here the August 22 issue of U.S. News & World Report. An item in "Washington Whisper," reads as follows:

In Europe, Western leaders are beginning to call the United States the sick man of the world, plagued with war, strikes, street riots, including arson and looting, crime running wild, and with the dollar facing an uncertain future.

Do you subscribe to that characterization?

Mr. MARKS. Senator, I head the U.S. Information Agency. If you and I want to talk about domestic politics or other matters, let's do that in private.

The CHAIRMAN. This rather leaves the impression that our Information Agency isn't as successful as it might be in projecting a favorable image of the United States in Europe.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, I think we can discuss that at great length, but I don't think that is anything we want to take up now.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that to say that you can't overcome our policy; that there is a limit to what the USIA can do?

Mr. MARKS. Even I will admit that.

The CHAIRMAN. You will admit that.

Mr. MARKS. But I won't agree with the opinion that you have just read.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I asked you if you—

Mr. MARKS. You are entitled to your opinion. I have a different one.

The CHAIRMAN. It wasn't my opinion. I was reading from the U.S. News & World Report—

Mr. MARKS. They are entitled to their opinion.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). Although I find considerable truth in it.

Mr. MARKS. Each of us has his own views.

The CHAIRMAN. The strife, we know we have had that; the riots, we know we have had; and we have had the crime.

FACT VERSUS OPINION

Incidentally, that reminds me. Early in the day, and on several occasions, you seemed to emphasize the distinction between fact and opinion.

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This confuses me a bit. I wonder if you would enlighten us more precisely as to your idea of the difference between a fact which these reporters observe and the opinion which seems to result.

Mr. MARKS. Well, sir, that could lead into a long and philosophical analysis of what are facts. Opinions are the views held on stated and existing circumstances. Facts are subject to interpretation. Whether I happen to be in a chair, that is a fact. This is a pencil. That is a fact. Whether it is a big pencil or a small pencil, is my opinion.

I happen to be before the Foreign Relations Committee. That is a fact. I happen to regard it as a very prestigious group. That is my opinion. I hope others have it too.

The CHAIRMAN. It could be a fact. I want it made clear that I didn't start this, you started it.

Mr. MARKS. I hope I have enlightened you.

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCarthy, I will yield momentarily, but I want to pursue this.

Mr. MARKS, you started this by being very positive in several of your statements about the facts of Vietnam as distinguished from the opinions about Vietnam of these reporters.

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That's why I have pursued it. I will yield temporarily to the Senator.

FACTS AND TRUE FACTS

Senator McCARTHY. I find more and more in statements not just from the executive branch, but, more commonly, where they talk about

the true facts. Could you distinguish between "facts" and "true facts" for me?

Mr. MARKS. Senator, I am not that able.

Senator McCARTHY. You are not that able?

Mr. MARKS. I have certain limitations.

Senator McCARTHY. This would seem a simple distinction, and I just thought you might be prepared to make it.

I will yield and return the question to the chairman now.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it possible that a fact is a circumstance which agrees with our prejudices, and if it doesn't agree, it is not a fact.

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

Senator CASE. True fact, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MARKS. No, sir; that is a matter of opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, one of the greatest problems of members of the Senate, or anyone else in public life, is communicating—

Mr. MARKS. It certainly is.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). The ability to convey what one means.

Mr. MARKS. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. And we all feel—I suppose everyone feels—that we are misunderstood. I suspect that you feel that way occasionally.

Mr. MARKS. I occasionally do. I hope I have not been misunderstood today.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not been misunderstood.

Mr. MARKS. I don't think so. I think you have given me a very good session, and I appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. You intrigued me a bit with what you conceive to be the facts in Vietnam. Do you have very clear views as to what the facts are?

Mr. MARKS. On certain subjects, I certainly do.

The CHAIRMAN. What, for example?

Mr. MARKS. I know what we are doing in the field of civilian restoration, and the economy of that country; how many hospitals we have built; how many homes we have built; what we are doing to aid agriculture; what we are doing to provide doctors; what we are doing to build roads; what we are doing to educate the children. Those are facts, sir. Whether it is good is a matter of opinion. My opinion is, it is good.

RED LION BROADCASTING STATION

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the Red Lion broadcasting station is tax exempt or not?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know much about it. How powerful is it?

Mr. MARKS. I think it is 50 kilowatts. That is not my business, sir. It is the Federal Communications Commission that licenses them and the Internal Revenue Service determines whether they are tax exempt.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree, technically, but—

Mr. MARKS. I do not have all the information.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry I brought it up. I thought, being in the same kind of business, you might incidentally have heard of it.

Mr. MARKS. I think I know quite a bit about it, but not all you want to know.

The CHAIRMAN. I have not asked very much. I asked you how powerful it was.

Mr. MARKS. Fifty kilowatts.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that 50,000 kilowatts—

Mr. MARKS. No, sir; 50 kilowatts.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that reach Latin America?

Mr. MARKS. It will reach the northern part of Latin America.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it reach Europe or Africa?

Mr. MARKS. It depends upon the directional antenna that is used, sir. The power of the transmitter is amplified by the antenna. You can beam a program in a particular direction by orienting your antenna. So, it depends upon the configuration of their antenna.

The CHAIRMAN. I meant if they chose to broadcast to Latin America, would it go there?

Mr. MARKS. I think so; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You think it would?

Mr. MARKS. I think it would.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the character of their programs?

Mr. MARKS. Not in detail. Generally, it is a religious program.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any copies of some of their recent broadcasts available?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you obtain them?

Mr. MARKS. We would have to get the monitors on that, but the Federal Communications Commission would be better able than I to furnish you with all that. They licensed the station, their inspectors visit it, their employees determine whether they obey the rules of the Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any rules especially provided for people who engage in foreign broadcasting by shortwave?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir; there is a whole section in the FCC rulebook on that subject.

The CHAIRMAN. A whole section?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir; a whole section.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be too much trouble to ask your staff to provide this for me with a sample of their broadcasts?

Mr. MARKS. We will be glad to do it.

(The information referred to is on p. 159 in the appendix.)

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be very interesting to know. I am curious to know what this broadcast is about. I suspect it is the same sort of thing that the Reverend McIntyre and others talk about, isn't it?

Mr. MARKS. I just don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. One other thing I want to clarify. In the course of this, in regards to the newspapers accepting the free trips, I understand your position and I am very sympathetic with it in the same way that the Senator from Rhode Island and others have spoken of it.

QUESTION OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN ACCEPTING TRIPS

The CHAIRMAN. But, why is it, according to the piece I put in the record, that the Toronto Star and Globe and Mail declined your invitation for a free trip to Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know, and I have asked for a report on it.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand here from the staff that the Washington Post has a policy of declining trips offered by the Pentagon or any Government agency. Is that correct, or do you know?

Mr. MARKS. I am told the same thing.

The CHAIRMAN. You have heard the same thing?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do they do this?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know. You will have to ask them.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Isn't this coming back to the same thing I mentioned earlier—the situation that developed in connection with the foreign agents investigation? I am just trying to get at the truth of this. I am not trying to get into a contest with you about it. But isn't there perhaps implicit in this relationship a kind of conflict of interest? Isn't it a fact that the Post as well as the Canadian papers do this because they are afraid it might, in the eyes of their readers, compromise their objectivity? Isn't that really why they don't?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know, but I would assume the Washington Post is wealthy enough to take care of the transportation of any of its correspondents. That might be one reason.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't mean you put this on the basis of poverty, do you?

Mr. MARKS. You asked me why the Washington Post—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MARKS. And I said I didn't know, but I also wanted to make the point that has been made to me by one of the representatives of the Washington Post that they are a pretty wealthy organization and they feel that they can defray the transportation costs. That is up to them, though.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't really believe—or do you believe—that that is the only reason why newspapers decline to accept free trips?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think? I don't know, I haven't talked to them about it.

Mr. MARKS. I just don't know.

Senator MUNDT. Will the chairman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I yield, Senator Mundt.

FORMER USIA POLICY OF EMPLOYING REPORTERS PART TIME

Senator MUNDT. At one time in the history of the USIA, there was a policy of employing the part-time services of reporters and associates of American periodicals. This created a great ruckus, and, to the best of my knowledge, that policy has stopped. I think it was a wrong policy, because implicit in it would be the idea that if you got a lot of reporters, build them up, and gave them extra income, you would induce them to report favorably on USIA, which would be a bad thing? Has that been stopped?

Mr. MARKS. For U.S. correspondents, or what? I am sorry, I missed the first part.

Senator MUNDT. Yes. At one time, the USIA made a practice of employing the services—

Mr. MARKS. Oh, yes; we don't employ anybody in that category. Senator MUNDT. I know that it created a great ruckus. Have they stopped that?

Mr. MARKS. The type of thing we do, when there is a magazine article published, or a periodical story which we want to use we ask for the rights, and in some cases we have to pay for those rights, or in limited instances, if we want an article on a specialty where only a few people have the ability to write it. Let's say it is a complicated space article; we may go to an experienced man in the field of space science and say, "Will you write this?" and pay them for that piece. We do on occasion, employ part-timers, or stringers.

Senator MUNDT. Perhaps due to that practice, and I presume because of other similar experiences, the Washington Post and other newspapers have decided not to accept the gratuity. It is not a good policy, though it was adopted one time generally. I think there were about 15 or 20 names of people who were reporting news domestically and then moonlighting for USIA. I think it proper that that policy has been discontinued.

Mr. MARKS. That was before my time, sir.

Senator CASE. Will the chairman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. I yield for a question.

ARE TRIPS ABROAD OF U.S. NEWSMEN HANDLED BY USIA?

Senator CASE. The Senator from South Dakota has been talking about the former practice of employing part-time American journalists. I would like to know what the practice is. I wasn't here at the beginning of the session today. What is the practice of your Agency paying the expenses of American journalists on trips abroad?

Mr. MARKS. We do not handle American journalists at all, at any time, on any trips abroad. There is some confusion. Senator Gore, for example, was under the impression that we had responsibility in the United States. We do not deal with U.S. journalists in providing them with an opportunity to cover Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. I made that clear. I was talking in another connection about the trips that the Pentagon—the Navy and the Army—offer.

Senator CASE. I understand. That is what I wanted to have cleared up.

The CHAIRMAN. I made that clear. USIA does not have anything to do with that.

Senator MUNDT. That is in the law.

The CHAIRMAN. That is forbidden.

Mr. MARKS. Our appropriation is limited under the Smith-Mundt Act to overseas activities only.

The CHAIRMAN. You are forbidden to brainwash Americans, but not others.

Mr. MARKS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Minnesota.

REASON FOR INITIATING PROGRAM OF TRANSPORTING NEWSMEN

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Marks, the explanation given for the Defense Department program of transporting newspapermen abroad was that there was not enough coverage when they initiated the program.

Was this the same consideration you took into account when you initiated your program for foreign correspondents?

Mr. MARKS. It certainly was, sir, and the fact that there was misrepresentation in addition to lack of information.

Senator McCARTHY. It was generally reported that the Defense Department visitors came back convinced that the war was a worthy one. Have you found the same thing to be the case with the reporters that you took over?

Mr. MARKS. I answered that earlier, but let me try to summarize it.

I made the distinction, as Senator Fulbright pointed out, between fact and opinion. I conceive our mission to give a newspaperman or a journalist an opportunity to see the facts, to investigate the facts. If he reports them, and he has an opinion, one way or the other, I am satisfied because I have given him a chance to report the facts. Now, on balance, I believe that our program has been eminently successful and well worth the effort we have made because it has exposed men, who did not have a chance to learn about the story, to visit the scene.

Senator McCARTHY. Do you have any measure of improved understanding of the American position in Vietnam in consequence of this project?

Mr. MARKS. Sir, if the reams of newsprint that reflect what the correspondent saw, is any indication, the public in their countries have had this opportunity, our reports from the field indicate that there has been a better understanding as a result.

EVALUATION OF AREAS OF SUCCESS

Senator McCARTHY. Do you think we are gaining, then, in the other countries of the world with reference to the Vietnam problem?

Mr. MARKS. I do think we are making some gains; yes, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. How do you measure those gains?

Mr. MARKS. By the reports that I get from our individual officers; by the reports that I get from people who come back from foreign countries and who are versed in the knowledge of what these countries have done in the past and what they are now doing; from reports of Ambassadors.

Senator McCARTHY. Which countries in particular, would you say, showed the greatest improvement or change?

Mr. MARKS. I would say that there is very substantial improvement in Japan. Others, in varying degrees, but again, that depends upon a particular question. You can't make a generalized statement on a particular issue. And you may find a better understanding on another issue with a different set of facts.

TRANSPORT OF JAPANESE CORRESPONDENTS TO VIETNAM

Senator McCARTHY. Do you transport the Japanese correspondents?

Mr. MARKS. We have transported Japanese correspondents to Vietnam.

Senator McCARTHY. Any great numbers?

Mr. MARKS. I would have to get the figures.

Senator McCARTHY. About how many?

Mr. MARKS. Several; I can't tell you how many there were. I am trying to get that list together, but there were several.

(The information referred to is classified and on file with the committee.)

RADIO FREE EUROPE

Senator McCARTHY. How does your operation get along with the Radio Free Europe program?

Mr. MARKS. We have nothing to do with that.

Senator McCARTHY. Do your programs and your information generally conform to theirs?

Mr. MARKS. Again, sir, I don't have specific knowledge of that. Our people in Munich would know what Radio Free Europe is doing. They are separate and apart from the Voice of America, and as I say, I just don't have any specific information about their particular programming at this time.

Senator McCARTHY. Do you take it for granted that they are doing essentially the same thing that you are doing, but you don't know?

Mr. MARKS. I don't say they are doing the same thing. Their whole theory is a little different. They are trying to reach audiences with a different kind of information. They are not aiming at the same subject matter, although they do overlap in part. But as I say, I don't have the current information.

Senator McCARTHY. What do you mean by a different kind of information?

Mr. MARKS. They are talking about what is happening in the countries of Eastern Europe. We are talking about what is happening in the United States and the world, as it affects the locale.

Senator McCARTHY. They don't talk about what is happening in the United States?

Mr. MARKS. Not too much. They focus on internal reporting of Eastern Europe.

Senator McCARTHY. What happens in the country is reported back to the people of the country?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

Senator McCARTHY. And not the U.S. position?

Mr. MARKS. Right.

Senator McCARTHY. You don't feel it is necessary for you to be concerned about what they have to say about internal problems or American problems.

Mr. MARKS. I say our people in Munich do know what is being said; yes. It is a legitimate area of interest for us.

Senator McCARTHY. That is all, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you contribute to the support of Radio Free Europe?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

USIA CONDUCTS POLLS ABROAD ON SPACE AND DISARMAMENT EFFORTS

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say a moment ago you do not conduct polls abroad?

Mr. MARKS. We conduct polls on specific topics. The Senator was asking me about the Rand Corporation opinion poll. I said I didn't know about that. We do conduct polls on particular topics.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be an example?

Mr. MARKS. The progress of the United States in the space race as compared to the Russians; that would be an illustration.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you take a poll to determine the opinion of the people as to whether the Russians or the Americans are ahead, for instance, in France?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know about France.

The CHAIRMAN. Any country; is that the type of thing you do?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What difference does that make? Why take such a poll?

Mr. MARKS. Whether or not there are peaceful uses of space, that is an important issue; and polls on disarmament questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Why would you take a poll on whether the Russians or the Americans are ahead in the space field?

Mr. MARKS. That is an important subject around the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Why is it so important? Is it important to you?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir; it is. The image of the United States as a country with superiority in the space field, dedicated to peaceful purposes, that is an important issue in the world today.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that mean much to you?

Mr. MARKS. It certainly does.

The CHAIRMAN. Why? This is a mystery to me. It has always seemed rather silly to me. This is a good opportunity to enlighten me.

Mr. MARKS. You and I disagree, Senator. I spend 14 hours a day at this job, studying what is important and what is not important, and this is my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you enlighten me a little? Why is it important that we are ahead of Russia in one space field, if we are? I can never understand it. Since it is your profession to enlighten unenlightened people, here is an opportunity for you to enlighten one Senator.

Mr. MARKS. There are some people I cannot convince.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think I am hopeless?

Mr. MARKS. No; I wouldn't put you in that category. I think if I was given enough time, I could give you some facts on which you might change your opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell, do you have a question, or two or three short questions?

RADIO FREE CUBA

Senator PELL. In line with the previous questions, I was curious about Radio Free Cuba. Doesn't it broadcast from American soil, Swan Island?

Mr. MARKS. I have nothing to do with that.

Senator PELL. It would be one more station that broadcasting would affect.

Mr. MARKS. Yes; it would.
 The CHAIRMAN. Where is it from?
 Senator PELL. Swin Island.
 The CHAIRMAN. Is that in America?
 Senator PELL. I thought so.
 Senator MUNDT. It is in the ocean near Cuba.
 The CHAIRMAN. It doesn't belong to the United States, does it?
 Senator PELL. I thought it did.
 The CHAIRMAN. I don't know. Does anybody know?
 Mr. MARKS. I don't know.
 Senator MUNDT. I can give you all the information. It is a very small island, and its nationality is a little bit obscure. We and the Cubans have some jurisdictional disagreement over it.
 The CHAIRMAN. I don't know why.
 Senator MUNDT. It is between Florida and Cuba.
 The CHAIRMAN. Very small, I take it.
 Senator MUNDT. Very small.
 The CHAIRMAN. They have a radio station there?
 Senator MUNDT. There is.

NUMBER OF HOMES DESTROYED IN VIETNAM

Senator PELL. Another question, sticking to the facts about Vietnam, you cited how many homes we have built. Would not the number of homes we have destroyed also be a fact?
 The CHAIRMAN. No; that is opinion.
 Senator PELL. In the assessment of the facts, shouldn't both figures go together? I am wondering what your view is on that.
 Mr. MARKS. I am sure a good reporter will ask questions on every aspect of the topic he is investigating, and if there are homes that we have destroyed, he should know that.
 Senator PELL. Would you submit for the record, figures on how many homes we have built in South Vietnam, with an assessment as to how many homes are being destroyed by military action on the part of the United States and the South Vietnamese?
 Mr. MARKS. I will have to get that from AID or somebody else, but I will submit that to them as your request.
 (The information referred to follows:)

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
 Washington, September 20, 1966.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
 Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
 U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At the hearing before your Committee on August 17, 1966, Mr. Leonard H. Marks, Director of USIA, was asked how many homes the United States has built in South Viet-Nam. Mr. Marks stated that he would have to obtain this information from AID, which we have now done.

We are informed by AID as follows:
 1. All refugee housing built or proposed is financed by Title XXIII, American Aid Chapter of the Government of Viet-Nam budget. Resettlement housing is

built on a self-help basis, with the Government of Viet-Nam supplying 3,500 plasters per family and USAID supplying cement and roofing. It is estimated approximately 70,000 units have been built with an average capacity of five persons.
 2. USAID has built fifty pre-fab homes—two bedroom units—for USAID, US personnel.
 3. Fifty pre-fab homes—four bedroom units for USAID, US personnel.
 4. USAID constructed three dormitory-type buildings to house thirty Korean mechanics at Phu Tho.
 5. USAID is now building two one-bedroom apartments over a garage in GSO-Siagon compound to house USAID, US personnel.
 6. The Cam Ranh housing project is in the planning stage at the present time.

Sincerely,

RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, Jr.,
 General Counsel.

HOMES DESTROYED IN SVN

(Prepared by the Department of Defense)

It is not possible to identify the specific number of homes destroyed by North Vietnamese, Viet Cong, U.S., RVN, or Free World Forces in South Vietnam. The only statistics available in this area relate to indemnification claims made against U.S., RVN, and Free World Forces by residents of that country. The Government of Vietnam is responsible for all claims that are directly or indirectly related to combat activity of friendly forces. The information that follows has been provided by that government.

The Vietnamese program which handles indemnification claims is entitled Military Civic Action Program (MILCAP). MILCAP makes indemnification funds available to all civilians under the control of the Republic of Vietnam arising from military operations against the enemy. Indemnification is made for bodily injury, personal property, and crop damage. U.S. units in the field initiate action in those incidents involving probable compensation for damage, injuries, or death which occur as a result of U.S. military operations. Prompt investigation by unit claims officers is undertaken in such instances in order to record all relevant information. Claims which are determined to have resulted from combat related activity are then referred to MILCAP, wherein appropriate action is taken.

General Westmoreland has provided for full U.S. cooperation to MILCAP in the settlement of claims resulting from our operations. During calendar year 1965, the Republic of Vietnam received approximately 11,000 claims nationwide. These claims are estimated to cost 163 million plasters. Currently, the Republic of Vietnam is vigorously pushing final settlement of all remaining claims for 1965.

Senator MUNDT. The North Vietnamese have destroyed some, too, have they not?

Senator PELL. Yes. Also, add how many have been destroyed by the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong.

RATES OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES ARE CONFLICTING

This brings me back to the question of civilian casualties which was raised, I think, by the Senator from New Jersey.

Actually, last April or May, I asked Secretary McNamara what the rate of civilian casualties was, and he had by chance a table from General Westmoreland which said that up until the 18th of April, presumably that means this calendar year, there were 137 killed and 243 wounded. He said at that time that he was going to give us a more complete report as to what the rate of casualties was. If those figures were correct, it seemed to me that the troops had behaved with tremendous restraint. The figures showed a remarkable record for a country to be able to conduct a war in that limited a way or in that fashion.

There are other reports—including the one cited today, I think by the chairman—which would indicate a considerably larger number of casualties. Just to clear the record, we have been waiting for those figures which were promised to us in two or three weeks ever since last April or early May; and they have not come.

I just wanted the record to show my own view that I think the program that Mr. Marks has been conducting in getting foreign correspondents and reporters to Vietnam is an excellent one. In my opinion it is black propaganda; in my opinion it should be conducted by the CIA; and to my mind, the list of names should not be published.

That is purely an opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say "should not be"?

Senator PELL. To my mind, this is a CIA function.

POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST INVOLVED

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know that there is any use in belaboring this; but I think, Mr. Marks, that the reason the question attracts attention is due to the feeling that, in undertaking to pay their transportation, there arises a certain kind of conflict of interest.

Mr. MARKS. I disagree.

The CHAIRMAN. We have many cases of conflict of interest. Take the people who go into the Defense Department, for example. We had before Mr. McNamara, Mr. McElroy and Mr. Wilson, and you know what the requirements are for these people. The requirements are there not because anyone ever suspects Mr. McNamara or Mr. McElroy or Mr. Wilson, but as a matter of Government policy. It is no reflection on newspapermen that theirs are not honorable newspapers or that they are not honorable reporters any more than it is a reflection on Mr. McNamara that they require, or required Mr. McNamara to dispose of his Ford stock.

Mr. MARKS. I don't see any relevance between the two at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that the weak human character is so immune from influence that it makes no difference whatever whether the trip is sponsored or he goes on his own? You don't think it makes any difference at all?

NO ANALOGY SHOULD BE MADE TO EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

Mr. MARKS. Senator, one of the great programs of the United States in foreign relations bears your name. We bring students to the United States; we bring teachers to the United States; and they are honored guests and they have a chance to see the way the United States conducts itself, the way the people live, and what we believe in.

I am proud of that program and I hope that you are; I know you are.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator CASE. May I interfere in defense of your position? I don't think this analogy is sound. It might possibly be if USIA just provided \$ dollars for every country and that country chose its own reporters to carry out the task, or some journalistic association in that country made the selection, and you simply made the arrangement for the transportation where they made the selection. There is a difference, and a conflict of interest is possible there.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the remarks of the Senator from New Jersey. He sees exactly the point. I was hoping that I could at least elicit a sympathetic hearing from Mr. Marks about this distinction. I very much resent your using this analogy now. I think it has absolutely no relevance at all. The whole exchange program is diametrically opposed to this procedure, as the Senator from New Jersey has said.

Mr. MARKS. You didn't let me make my point.

The CHAIRMAN. You have made your point twice now, and you are using the exchange program as an analogy and it is not an analogy. If that is your justification, I thoroughly disagree.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, all I am saying is, that giving people an opportunity to see for themselves, asking questions for themselves, is the fundamental of communication.

Now, I hoped that the program I have described to you, even though you don't like the analogy, and I wouldn't say it was analogous, made you understand we are trying to give people the chance to see for themselves in countries where the press is unable or unwilling to spend the money and there are many newspapers that can't afford this. How can you get them the opportunity of reporting from Asian eyes, from Latin American eyes? The only analogy that I would like to make is the Fulbright program brings people to the United States to see for themselves.

Our program allows reporters to see for themselves. Other than that, I don't know how to get this across.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXCHANGE PROGRAM AND USIA SELECTION OF JOURNALISTS

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman. The distinction you have not recognized is the matter of whether you have selected a group which you choose to receive transportation and expenses, or whether this is available for anybody chosen by some outside party, particularly the government of the journalist concerned, or an association of press people in that country. The difference is very great. I am not necessarily against this being done, but your agency should not do it if there is involved any kind of selection which would cast doubt upon the complete impartiality and integrity of your operation as a pure information service.

Mr. MARKS. Well, Senator, to the extent that there is any inference that the newspaperman's opinions, his reporting, will be influenced by the fact that he is being given an airplane ticket, I disagree. I know newspapermen. I have known many, many foreign correspondents. They have a high standard of ethics, in many cases as great as American journalists have. They are just as honorable. And the fact that they receive an airplane ticket does not change their reporting any more than an American newspaperman will report differently because he gets an airplane ticket.

Senator CASE. It troubles me that you don't see this distinction.

Mr. MARKS. I am sorry, sir, we disagree.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know that there is any value in pursuing this, but I hope, Mr. Marks, that you will at least think about it. I agree with the Senator from New Jersey that there could well be some value in pursuing this. There is a distinction in my opinion.

I really don't know whether it will do you in the long run much good or not to pursue the matter, but it may.

You became engaged in this program as sort of an affiliate of warfare. Warfare is inhuman and irrational, and I think you are sort of an adjunct of it at the moment. We have to do things that we normally do not approve of, and that, I think, is the final justification for resorting to an unusual method to achieve one's purpose—just as we drop napalm on innocent women and children. It is a sad thing in warfare, but we are doing it. Maybe you have to do this, but I don't like to accept the explanation you gave—that it is the same as the exchange program.

EXAMPLES OF SAMPLE POLLS ABROAD

One last question about the polls. You do consider those polls classified, and not make them available to this committee or anybody, is that correct?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir. We can make anything this committee wants available. Nobody has ever asked for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am just asking to clarify the situation. I think we might be interested in a few sample polls.

Mr. MARKS. We will be glad to furnish them to you, sir.

(Reference to the information referred to follows:)

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
Washington, September 8, 1966.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At the hearing before your Committee on August 17, 1966 at which time Leonard H. Marks, Director of USIA appeared, you asked for samples of USIA polls. We submit herewith two such polls.

Sincerely,

RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, Jr.,
General Counsel.

Enclosures.

(The two polls entitled "Community Attitudes Toward Binational Centers in Five Cities in Argentina," and "The Semantics of Socialism and Capitalism," are on file in the committee office.)

USIA'S RESEARCH PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a research program?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What size is the budget of the research branch?

Mr. MARKS. In terms of dollars?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MARKS. It is a very modest one, I believe, less than 1 percent of our budget. So I would say in the neighborhood of a million and a half dollars.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the nature of that research program?

Mr. MARKS. We try to find out who reads our magazines, who listens to our Voice of America, who watches our films. This is media research and it is primarily that. It is also an analysis of press reporting, editorial opinions, so we know what the problems are in the countries. Those are the fields, primarily.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you hire the Rand Corporation to do research for you?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anyone in your shop who undertakes to assess the effects of certain activities in this country? For example, is there anyone in USIA who worries about whether or not bombing increases or decreases the will of the people to resist or to fight?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you try to assess or evaluate the impact on our troops in Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. That is a constant process throughout.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you assess the social effects? Do you have what you might call a sociologist?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. One thing prompted by that is a recent article—just yesterday or the day before—in the Washington Post which said that the officials in Saigon were worried about the social problem in connection with the use of American troops in the Delta region south of Saigon. Now, this is a problem which is not in your jurisdiction?

Mr. MARKS. Not in my jurisdiction.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't concern yourself about the social conditions of our troops in Saigon?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir. Mine is information.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

USIA'S DIRECTIVES—LIMITED TO NONMILITARY NEWS

Senator McCARTHY. I have one question, which has to do with the White House memorandum in 1963 which describes the mission of the U.S. Information Agency. I assume you are still operating pretty much under that directive?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Senator McCARTHY. The last paragraph states that the Agency staffs abroad, acting under the supervision of chiefs of missions, are responsible for the conduct of overt public information, public relations and cultural activities; that is, those activities intended to inform or influence foreign public opinion for agencies of the U.S. Government, except for commands of the Department of Defense.

How is that distinction made?

Mr. MARKS. Distinction?

Senator McCARTHY. Well, it says that you have responsibility for those activities, information public relations and cultural activities tending to influence foreign public opinion for agencies of the U.S. Government—

Mr. MARKS. Right.

Senator McCARTHY. All agencies?

Mr. MARKS. All agencies.

Senator McCARTHY. Except for commands of the Department of Defense.

Mr. MARKS. Here is how it works, Senator. Let us suppose there is an AID project in a particular country. AID does not have information officers abroad, and we do it for them.

Senator McCARTHY. Who handles the Defense Department?

Mr. MARKS. The military do that themselves.

Senator McCARTHY. All of it?

Mr. MARKS. All of it.

Senator McCARTHY. You have nothing to do with it?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. They tell you what you can say or can't say?

Mr. MARKS. We don't get into it.

Senator McCARTHY. It is all around, the information is around. You just don't take information which is sent to you, do you, by an agency? Don't you screen the news and don't you read the ticker tape and decide what is going to be said and what is not?

THE MILITARY DISSEMINATES ITS OWN NEWS

Mr. MARKS. The military disseminates its own.

Senator McCARTHY. You don't give out any kind of military information?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. Any kind of information about a military action is not handled by you?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. None of that is handled or handed out through the USIA?

Mr. MARKS. It is all handled by the military.

Senator McCARTHY. The question of the bombing in North Vietnam or Cambodia, wherever it happens, is that all handled by military information authorities?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Senator McCARTHY. They told you what to say?

Mr. MARKS. They don't tell us what to say. They say it.

Senator McCARTHY. You said nothing about that. USIA didn't handle any information about that, that is?

Mr. MARKS. Well, the Voice of America would broadcast it, based upon the reports of Associated Press, United Press, two or more services, they will carry commentary on it, but they do not release it. The military releases it.

Senator McCARTHY. You release some information.

Mr. MARKS. We broadcast. We don't release.

Senator McCARTHY. What is the difference between release and broadcast? You seem to make a point about releasing and say there is a distinction, and I don't know what it is.

Mr. MARKS. An event happens, it has military significance, the military officers will brief the press corps or hand out a release or make a statement. Secretary McNamara, General Westmoreland, or other military officers will release such material to the Voice of America and then we will broadcast that statement.

Do I make it clear?

USIA IS AGENT IN BROADCASTING MILITARY NEWS

Senator McCARTHY. Then you are the agent?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

Senator McCARTHY. What about some of the other stories? This is just as good a one as any, I suppose, even though this involves, say, civilian death, you would still be subject to some kind of military

interpretation of whether this should be released or not so far as your agency is concerned?

Mr. MARKS. It is all handled by the military, Senator.

Senator McCARTHY. It is all handled by the military?

Mr. MARKS. Absolutely.

Senator McCARTHY. Then, isn't most of the information that comes out of Vietnam which you put out in Vietnam, originally determined or cleared by the military?

Mr. MARKS. No. We put out nonmilitary information.

Senator McCARTHY. What kind of information?

Mr. MARKS. Civilian; the building of schools, roads, highways, rehabilitation.

Senator McCARTHY. Action in Saigon—

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

Senator McCARTHY. But the other information having to do with the bombing of individuals and things of that sort, that is all determined, whether or not you would use it, that is handled by the military?

Mr. MARKS. We have nothing to do with it.

Senator McCARTHY. Was that true of all of the reporters you took over. Were they limited in that same way?

Mr. MARKS. Limited how?

Senator McCARTHY. Could they report only the things under USIA's jurisdiction?

Mr. MARKS. Sure.

Senator McCARTHY. Not on military matters?

Mr. MARKS. They report on military matters, but I said—

Senator McCARTHY. Only if the military says they may.

Mr. MARKS. We have no authority in the military field.

IS USIA AN OBJECTIVE SOURCE OF NEWS OR A PROPAGANDA AGENCY?

Senator McCARTHY. Do you look upon the Agency primarily as an objective and end source of information and news, or is it primarily a propaganda agency?

Mr. MARKS. It depends upon your definition of propaganda. If you mean by propaganda—

Senator McCARTHY. I am not calling for any misrepresentation, but rather a matter of withholding certain information rather than releasing it so that you could influence opinion?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir; we report these facts as they take place. We do not withhold information.

Senator McCARTHY. You report on all the facts?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir; to the extent they are available, we report them.

Senator McCARTHY. You don't hold them back if they might have an adverse effect—

Mr. MARKS. We do not.

Senator McCARTHY (continuing). Effect on the reaction to the American policy?

Mr. MARKS. We do not, and I made that point quite clear before you came in, and I want to repeat it. We do not. We report bad, we report good, we try to put it in perspective and you can't be a creditable news source without that policy.

Senator McCARTHY. You report the bad and good as given to you by the information officers of the Department of Defense?

Mr. MARKS. You are confusing two things.

Senator McCARTHY. I think this is a vital distinction. If you say that the determination of all the information you put out having to do with military matters depends entirely upon what the Department of Defense says you can say, this is a major area of information in which you are not an independent and objective source of information, by your own determination.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, to the extent that we have any jurisdiction, we are a full, objective, independent, and I hope completely reliable and creditable news service and information service.

Senator McCARTHY. But your jurisdiction is limited.

Mr. MARKS. We do not have any jurisdiction on military matters—period.

I don't know how to make it any clearer.

Senator McCARTHY. That's clear enough. I just wanted it to be clear.

Mr. MARKS. All right.

"THE FACE OF ANGUISH"

The CHAIRMAN. That magazine that you held up a moment ago with the atrocity pictures in it—

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Mr. MARKS. It is called "The Face of Anguish," and it contains pictures of Vietcong atrocities.

The CHAIRMAN. Who published it?

Mr. MARKS. The U.S. Information Service published it and made it available throughout the area.

The CHAIRMAN. Did those pictures come from the military?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know where they came from, sir. I think most of them came from our photographers and the Vietnamese Information Service.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the military or the Pentagon clear it?

Mr. MARKS. No, they did not clear it. We never submitted it to them for clearing, because this has nothing to do with the military. These are civilians.

Senator McCARTHY. If it was a wounded soldier, you couldn't print it unless they allowed it?

Mr. MARKS. I don't think they would say that we couldn't print it, sir. That is not a military action; that is the only thing that needs clearing.

The CHAIRMAN. The only thing what?

Mr. MARKS. We don't have jurisdiction over military combat action, military events. You can certainly take a picture of a soldier.

DIFFICULTY IN REPORTING NEWS—THE "RIGHT TO LIE"

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Arthur Sylvester is reported in the press, I believe, to have a different view about supplying information than you have; is that not correct?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know his views, sir; you will have to ask him.
Senator McCARTHY. He talked about the right to lie.

The CHAIRMAN. It was reported in the press—maybe it was just an opinion of some reporter—but it was stated that he felt he had a right to deceive the reporters and the public in the interest of the prosecution of the war. I thought the point the Senator from Minnesota was making was that you are under some handicap when it comes to reporting about the war because you have to get much of your information from the Pentagon. It is not your fault that you don't have firsthand access to it, which I assume you would not, would you? You would be in a very difficult situation to report this information in a fashion contrary and contradictory to that which the Pentagon reports. I wouldn't expect you to do that.

So, in that particular area, you are under some wraps.

Mr. MARKS. That is not my affair.

The CHAIRMAN. To report about the war.

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. What is this magazine about?

Mr. MARKS. Those are pictures, sir, not about military engagements, they are pictures about the Vietcong atrocities. The Vietcong come in the stealth of the night and take the mayor or the school-teacher and put a knife through his back in order to intimidate and terrorize that village. The Vietcong come and burn homes and exact payment from people who refuse to submit to their jurisdiction. That is what it is. It has nothing to do with the American military.

The CHAIRMAN. Not just the American military, but I thought it was related to the war.

Mr. MARKS. It is related to the war, it is a Vietcong pamphlet.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Marks.

Mr. MARKS. I genuinely appreciate this opportunity to appear before you and I hope that you will let me come back to talk with you on any problems that we may help with.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

We will stand adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee stood adjourned.)

NEWS POLICIES IN VIETNAM

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31, 1966

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221 New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Lausche, Clark, McCarthy, McGeo, and Aiken.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The Committee on Foreign Relations this morning is holding a second public hearing on the subject of Government information policies toward developments in Vietnam and southeast Asia as a whole. We have invited as our witness today Mr. Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

It will be recalled that two weeks ago the committee received testimony from Mr. Leonard Marks, Director of the U.S. Information Agency, concerning both this broad question and the specific issue of USIA-subsidized Vietnam tours by foreign journalists. On the broader question, it is no exaggeration to say that inquiries by committee members on military-related topics were unproductive. Mr. Marks disavowed any direct connection with the dissemination of news about military activities in Vietnam and referred us to the Department of Defense. In these circumstances, I have requested Mr. Sylvester to discuss the policy of the Department of Defense in providing both U.S. and foreign news media with information on developments in southeast Asia.

Almost continuously over the past two years the Defense Department has been charged by responsible journalists and newspapers with managing, or mismanaging, the flow of news from Vietnam. At this point, without objection, I shall insert in the record some of these charges.

(The information referred to follows:)

[From the Congressional Record, June 7, 1965]

NEW YORK TIMES, April 23, 1965: "The credibility of the United States government has been one of the numerous casualties of the war in Vietnam . . . Mistaken judgments are understandable—though, if too frequent, indefensible; but deliberate distortion or obfuscation, or the selection or repression of facts for propaganda purposes, is incalculable. Americans are dying in Vietnam and more will die; there should be no misunderstanding whatsoever about what they are dying for—or why."

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, December 1, 1965: "A government, like a man, can be caught in only a few misrepresentations before people refuse to believe anything it says. Much of the current clamor against the U.S. Vietnamese policy is probably based in just such a feeling. A democratic government has a moral obligation to be candid with its citizens; and lack of candor poisons the open dis-

discussion often necessary to sound policy and public support. But even from the narrow viewpoint of its own self-interest, the Administration should recognize that its credibility is a precious but easily expendable asset."

The *Washington Star*, January 20, 1966: "Now, in 1966, the country certainly could do with a little more truth in government and a little less fiscal sleight of hand."

The *Wall Street Journal*, April 23, 1965: "Time after time high-ranking representatives of government—in Washington and in Saigon—have obscured, confused, or distorted news from Vietnam, or have made fatuously erroneous evaluations about the course of the war, for public consumption . . . Yet the contradictions, the double-talk, the half-truths released in the name of the United States government about the Vietnamese War are not the fault of the USIA alone. The problem goes back to the Pentagon, to the State Department, and to the White House."

Joseph Alsop, in a speech to the American Foreign Service Association, March 25, 1965: "An official is a man by definition doing the public's business. The public has a right, and the public has a need, to know about its business . . . The truth is that practices have grown up in the American government in the last years—and particularly quite recently—of a kind that amount to an unseen and extremely unhealthy change in the basic American system."

"Our government . . . lives and moves and acts by public information. It does not matter what an inner group of policymakers may decide. If the public is not adequately informed, if they do not understand the problem, the decisions that the policymakers make will not be publicly supported, and so the job will not be done."

Walter Cronkite, CBS News, speech to the Inland Press Association, Chicago, February 22, 1966: "The very foundation of the democratic system is built on honesty and the belief in the honesty of our fellow men . . . Yet the political lie has become a way of bureaucratic life. It has been called by the more genteel name of 'news management.' I say here now, let's call it what it is—lying."

"I would like to suggest that one of the reasons for the great confusion which wracks this nation today over the Vietnam War is the fact that we were committed without a proper airing of the facts—all the facts. This Administration and preceding ones did not level with the American people on the nature or scope of the commitment which, I submit, they themselves must have known was one of the ultimates of our policy."

Carl T. Rowan, former Director of USIA, in the *Washington Star*, January 26, 1966: "The question most often asked goes like this: 'Is the government telling the American public the truth about Viet Nam?' . . . 'How much is being held back to cover up other mistakes by McNamara and the rest of the Administration?' You listen and soon sense that the questioners are neither doves nor hawks. They are members of that great middle mass of Americans who want to feel committed in the great Viet Nam debate but feel too poorly informed to take a firm stand . . . The people who have questioned me seem to understand that the national security requires the withholding of certain military and diplomatic information from the public. But these people make the point, a valid one I think, that the public does have a right to know about and discuss the options before major new decisions are made. . . . This is what the public wants and an administration that wants solid public support, as I know this one does, ought quickly to find a way to provide it."

J. Russell Wiggins, editor, *Washington Post*, in his book, "Freedom or Secrecy": "If a government repeatedly resorts to lies in crises where lies seem to serve its interests best, it will one day be unable to employ the truth effectively when truth would serve its interests best. A government that too readily rationalizes its right to lie in a crisis will never lack for either lies or crises."

Richard Reston, *Los Angeles Times*, December 20, 1965: "The President's latest problem is one of failing public confidence in official government pronouncements on the conduct of U.S. diplomacy in Viet Nam. Indeed, Washington is having trouble maintaining both at home and abroad the kind of credibility needed to support its political position. It is this loss of confidence that now gives rise to doubts and even suspicions about whether the Administration really means what is being said . . ."

James Reston, *New York Times*, May 17, 1966: "What he (LBJ) wants is worthy of the faith and confidence of the nation, but this is precisely what he does not have, because his techniques blur his conviction. . . . He is mixing up news and truth. . . . He is confronted, in short, with a crisis of confidence."

David Lawrence, column in the *Washington Star*, April 27, 1965: "Perhaps the whole controversy would not have reached the climax that it has in recent weeks

if there had not been a prelude—namely, an era of so-called managed news at the Pentagon. This has left an unfortunate blemish on the record. When the only news given out is designed to accomplish a political purpose, confidence on the part of the public in the accuracy of what is printed is bound to wane."

Clark Mollenhoff, Cowles Publications, in his book, "Washington Cover-up": "No single factor is more important to the strength of our democracy than the free flow of accurate information about the government's operation. The citizen in a democracy must know what his government is doing, or he will lack the soundest basis for judging the candidates and the platforms of our political parties."

James Deakin, *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, in the *New Republic*, January 20, 1966: "The essential veracity of an American government has seldom been a prolonged case of doubt. This is why persistent charges of a 'credibility gap' in the Johnson Administration merit examination."

Anatole Shub, *Washington Post Foreign Service*, dispatch from Bonn, May 7, 1966: "The 'credibility gap' which has affected the Johnson Administration's pronouncements on Vietnam appears to have spread to this part of the world. A few West German officials still profess to know what U.S. policy here is going to be over the next year, but even these officials show no great confidence in their beliefs. . . . The trouble is that . . . the Administration has been slyly one thing one day, doing something else on the next . . . Wild rumors proliferate in all directions, and most of them seem to have some official source. The impression is strong that either the United States is playing it by ear from day to day, without making up its mind on any of these issues, or else that so many different minds in the Administration have been made up that nobody really knows which one counts."

Doris Fleeson, column in the *Washington Star*, May 4, 1965: "News management in the Nation's Capital is currently more deliberate and sweeping than it ever was during World War II or the Korean period . . . Before the wellsprings of public discussion are further damaged or dried up, the Johnson Administration urgently needs to recognize that there is no point trying to win the world while doing irreparable injury here at home."

Jack Steele, Scripps-Howard, in the *Washington Daily News*, March 7, 1966: "There is a big 'confidence gap' today between Mr. McNamara and key Senate and House leaders in the fields of military and foreign policy who do not share President Johnson's faith in his Defense Secretary. . . . (It is) largely the result of heavy-handed Pentagon censorship of questions raised by Congress about the nation's military preparedness and Mr. McNamara's emotional outburst last week in answering charges that the Viet Nam war has stretched thin the nation's military manpower and equipment."

Baul Pott, *Associated Press*, in the *Washington Star*, March 6, 1966: "In a town of passing prose favorites, this year's phrase so far is the 'credibility gap' in government. Does it in fact exist? It does, or seems to, and coming to, it exists. Among students of the Lyndon Johnson school of window dressing, there are those who detect a tendency to be passionately secretive about innocuous details, to become righteously indignant when transparent political motives are suggested, and to overdress the window. . . . Lyndon Johnson has been known to have an acute sense of secrecy dating back to his Senate days. An old friend and aide once tried to explain it: 'I think it's the gambler or politician in him. He just doesn't like to reveal his next move. He plays things close to the vest.'"

Morley Safer, CBS News, in "Dateline 1966," the annual publication of the Overseas Press Club of America. Mr. Safer reports on an informal meeting of war correspondents covering Vietnam in the summer of 1965 with Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Sylvester at the residence of Barry Zorthian, Minister Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon:

"Zorthian was less relaxed than usual. He was anxious for Sylvester to get an idea of the mood of the news corps. There had been some annoying moments in previous weeks that had directly involved Sylvester's own office. In the first B-52 raids, Pentagon releases were in direct contradiction to what had actually happened on the ground in Vietnam."

"Also, those of us involved in broadcasting were anxious to discuss the increasing problems of communication. There was general opening banter, which Sylvester quickly brushed aside. He seemed anxious to take a stand—to say something that would jar us. He did:

"'I can't understand how you fellows can write what you do while American boys are dying out here,' he began. Then he went on to the effect that American correspondents had a patriotic duty to disseminate only information that made the United States look . . ."

"A network television correspondent said, 'Surely, Arthur, you don't expect the American press to be the handmaidens of government.'

"That's exactly what I expect," came the reply.
 "An agency man raised the problem that had preoccupied Ambassador Taylor and Harry Zorthian—about the credibility of American officials. Responded the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs:

"Look, if you think any American official is going to tell you the truth, then you're stupid. Did you hear that?—stupid."

"One of the most respected of all the newsmen in Vietnam—a veteran of World War II, the Indochina War and Korea—suggested that Sylvester was being deliberately provocative. Sylvester replied:

"Look, I don't even have to talk to you people. I know how to deal with you through your editors and publishers back in the States."

"At this point, the Hon. Arthur Sylvester put his thumbs in his ears, bulged his eyes, stuck out his tongue and wiggled his fingers.

"A correspondent for one of the New York papers began a question. He never got beyond the first few words. Sylvester interrupted:

"Aw, come on. What does someone in New York care about the war in Vietnam?"

PUBLIC DOUBTS TRUTH OF WAR INFORMATION

The CHAIRMAN. In this most complicated of wars, it is vital that the public be accurately informed about the trend of events in the area. Much of the frustration among the American people is not caused by the difficulties we face abroad—we have an outstanding record of meeting hostile challenges—but by the difficulty experienced in understanding this particular conflict. And the problem seems intensified by a public suspicion that our Government is deliberately refraining from providing adequate and accurate information. Recent public opinion polls indicate that a significant number of people do not feel they have been given the truth about the war.

I am hoping this morning's testimony will clarify this issue by explaining Defense Department policies and procedure in the fullest detail consonant with national security.

Mr. Sylvester, we are very pleased to have you this morning.

Do you have a prepared statement to open with?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you proceed, sir.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF ARTHUR SYLVESTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY COL. WINANT SIDLE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLIC AFFAIRS; AND COL. FORREST I. RETTGERS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LEGAL AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the war in Vietnam is the most intensely covered conflict in history.

As of last Saturday, August 27, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was providing around-the-clock assistance to 410 news media representatives from 22 different nations. In addition to coverage of military actions, these newsmen are also reporting to readers and viewers around the world on the political, economic, and psychological aspects of this struggle against Communist aggression. Based on the number of requests for assistance received by my office from media members planning to go to Saigon, the number of newsmen in Vietnam will continue to increase.

One hundred and seventy-nine of the reporters in Vietnam today are Americans. Dozens of foreigners also work for American media. A moment's reflection will suggest the intense competition for news that results from this unprecedented coverage.

As you gentlemen may know, I worked as a reporter for many years before I began my present duties more than five years ago. I am well aware of the benefits and problems created by competition on all operations, including relatively small actions and activities. Platoon, even squad actions often are covered in depth in Vietnam and extended reports appear on TV, in our newspapers, and over the radio from that harassed land that would have rated only a paragraph in World War II or during the Korean war. As a result, the big picture frequently is blurred by the mass of material being reported each day. Moreover, any reporter who has listened in a police court to a number of eyewitnesses describe the same automobile accident soon learns to expect discrepancy and divergency in the accounts. There should be no surprise then when 20 to 50 reporters are spread out over a disjointed and ill-defined battlefield in jungle or otherwise rough terrain. The problem is not mendacity but human fallibility.

AMERICAN NEWSMEN IN VIETNAM NEED GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE

It is obvious, and they are the first to say it, that American newsmen in Vietnam need help from their Government if they are to report accurately and objectively to the American public. The Department of Defense public affairs policy is to provide them with all possible help, both in Vietnam and here in the United States.

I believe strongly that we have met the unique public affairs challenge of this war with a dynamic and successful response. I salute particularly the hard-working information personnel of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam—MACV as it is more commonly called. I fear that only a few of us are aware of the magnitude of the service to the media provided by these dedicated officers and enlisted men in support of Gen. William C. Westmoreland.

STATISTICS OF SUPPORT RENDERED BY MACV

I have available some statistics concerning the scope of the support rendered by MACV information personnel since October 1965 when our troop buildup reached major proportions. Since that time, and exclusive of the activities of scores of information personnel of combat and logistics troop units in the field, the MACV information office has:

Arranged more than 4,700 in-country trips by newsmen, to include ground and air transportation;

Arranged for or conducted almost 6,000 briefings and 108 back-ground meetings;

Answered more than 32,000 telephone queries from newsmen;

Been consulted individually by newsmen on 3,300 occasions;

Conducted daily press briefings in Saigon, 7 days a week; average attendance—130 correspondents;

Conducted the U.S. portion of the accreditation of all correspondents arriving in Vietnam.

To handle this unusually large workload, we have put the very best professional information officers and noncommissioned officers we can

find into the information positions at MACV. We have established daily scheduled plane flights for newsmen out of Saigon to eight major areas throughout the country. We have installed sole-user teletype circuits within Vietnam to assist MACV and the press in providing information, transmitting news copy, and answering questions.

Here in Washington, we have done our best to back up the MACV information effort in every way. I have established an office specifically designed for this purpose, manned by three topflight information officers from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The portion of my office which deals directly and continuously with the press has a southeast Asia desk which does nothing but service media and public requests for information concerning the conflict in Vietnam. Since last October, my office has:

- Issued 577 news releases concerning Vietnam;
- Answered over 16,000 news queries concerning Vietnam;
- Released 641 photos related to Vietnam;
- Released 157 TV-newsfilms about Vietnam;
- Assisted the networks in the production of 24 TV documentaries concerning Vietnam. In addition, MACV assisted with 11 other documentaries;
- Arranged for 74 interviews with DOD officials concerning Vietnam and conducted over 450 briefings for individual newsmen;
- Conducted 28 press conferences to include such individuals as the Secretary of Defense, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Surgeon General of the Army, and top combat leaders returning from Vietnam;
- Arranged for more than 50 background meetings with top Defense officials.

TRANSPORTING U.S. NEWSMEN TO VIETNAM BEGAN IN 1964

I have been talking until now about the public affairs situation in recent months. Back in 1964, this situation was considerably different. Then, there were only about 40 newsmen, including foreign journalists, in Vietnam. As a consequence, there was considerable concern within the Defense Department that the people of the United States were not receiving adequate factual information concerning our efforts in Vietnam.

To assist in remedying this situation we began, in July 1964, a temporary program to transport U.S. correspondents to Vietnam. We had three main reasons for this program: (1) to give U.S.-based newsmen a better understanding of Vietnam and our involvement there, (2) to help assure a balanced output of on-the-scene news, and (3) to stimulate the news media to send experienced reporters to Vietnam under their own sponsorship.

The concept called for transporting two to four newsmen every 4 weeks for a stay of approximately 10 days each. Selection was based on requests for participation, the type of media concerned and the geographical spread of the media involved. Except for transportation all other costs were paid by the news media.

The program began on July 17, 1964, and we sent 82 newsmen to Vietnam before we terminated the program in August of 1965. These newsmen came from large and small newspapers and newspaper groups,

wire services, syndicates, magazines of all types, and TV and radio stations and networks. Every part of the nation was represented.

You will recall that we began our military buildup in Vietnam—first by increasing the number of advisers and later by dispatch of combat troops—in the summer of 1964. By the summer of 1965, the press corps in Vietnam had conducted a buildup of its own and had increased from 40 to about 450. There was a steady increase of newsmen from the United States going without Defense Department assistance, and the flow of news to the American public had been expanded. Since our objectives were largely accomplished, the program was terminated in mid-August 1965.

Since then, the Department of Defense has not approved any military travel by newsmen to Vietnam.

RESULTS OF PROGRAM

I cannot, of course, claim that our program was solely responsible for the attainment of the objectives I mentioned. However, I consider the program to have been a success in that it clearly contributed significantly to "priming the pump" of U.S. and world media interest in the struggle for freedom in Vietnam. Not only are our major media now represented in Vietnam, but also they are generally represented by first-rate correspondents characteristic of first-rate American news organizations.

These newsmen are searching out and filing reports which contribute to broadening public appreciation and understanding of the situation in Vietnam. Some reporters of both sexes, brave men and women like Dickie Chappell of Readers Digest and Sam Kasten of Look, have unfortunately paid with their lives as a result of their untiring search for news. There is no greater evidence of devotion to profession.

PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY

Let me say in conclusion that the public affairs policy of the Department of Defense as it relates to Vietnam or, for that matter, to any part of the world or any military activity, is based on two principles.

First, the safety of our fighting men which, of course, relates directly to the safeguarding of information of value to the enemy.

Second, within the limitations of the first principle, the provision of the maximum amount of truthful-factual information to the people of the United States, whether it be sought by news people or not.

I believe that these two principles must govern the public affairs activity of any department or agency of the Government. I also believe that the Department of Defense has applied these principles effectively in its public affairs activities.

I will be glad to try to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sylvester.

SAFEGUARDING INFORMATION VALUABLE TO ENEMY

Regarding the last statement you made—the question of reconciling your No. 1 principle, which you mentioned is the safety of our fighting men, with the limitations on factual information—who makes the decision as to whether or not any given bit of information threatens the safety of our fighting men? Do you make that decision?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I do not, Mr. Chairman. That decision has been made and a certain number of ground rules have been accepted by newsmen in Vietnam as a consequence of considerations by General Westmoreland and his commanders. They are very few, but important.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not quite follow that. Does Westmoreland exercise a censorship on this basis?

Mr. SYLVESTER. There is no censorship exercised at all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps the word "censorship" offends you. However, if these two principles guide the availability of news, it means that someone has to judge whether any given story will affect the safety of our fighting men. Who applies these principles? This is what I meant by censorship, in a broad sense.

Mr. SYLVESTER. There are few agreed-upon voluntary restrictions which the newsmen in Vietnam observe at the request of our military people out there. There is no other restriction and there is no way any given story is seen beforehand by our people. This puts on each newsmen the responsibility for observance of these agreed-upon principles.

The CHAIRMAN. And if the newsmen does not conform to your Department's views as to what is useful or dangerous to our fighting men, then he no longer receives the cooperation of the Department?

Mr. SYLVESTER. There have been two cases of men who have jeopardized the security of our troops in the judgment of the military people in Vietnam. These two men have had their accreditation lifted for 30 days. One of them has since gone back; the other one is also operating.

The CHAIRMAN. Who were they? Is that a public matter?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, I would consider it in the case of Mr. Jack Foisie—who told the Associated Press that he was wrong and made, in effect, a public confession—a public matter. He writes for the Los Angeles Times.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not urging you to reveal anything.

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, Mr. Foisie, himself, was interviewed by the Associated Press. The stories ran all over the country.

APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF CENSORSHIP

The CHAIRMAN. What I was leading to is that I do not know how you apply these principles. These principles mean nothing if they are just in a vacuum. Somebody has to determine whether or not a given story is in any way prejudicial to the safety of the fighting men. I just wondered how that is applied.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think we have to point out first that we ask the newsmen out there not to reveal the arrival of troops, not to reveal that troops have been put in action until the military people feel that there is no further value in withholding this information from the enemy. Each newsmen has to use his judgment on that. He has at his beck and call a large corps of information officers in Vietnam headed by Col. Rodger Bankson, who can inform him whether this material is releasable.

The CHAIRMAN. I would not think that kind of discretion is particularly difficult for the newsmen. But the way you report how the

war is going, the conditions under which our people fight, and so on, can become very interesting and could arouse feelings in this country about the war that might not be in accord with the views of the Defense Department. I think this is the area where it gets very difficult to apply these principles.

RIGHT OF GOVERNMENT TO LIE

I have a statement, where you are reported to have said at the Sigma Delta Chi dinner in New York:

*** It's inherent in that government's right, if necessary, to lie to save itself when it's going up into a nuclear war. This seems to me basic. ***

That is consistent, I assume, with the first principle. I think it is one that probably all governments follow if that actually is the case. The trouble is deciding when you are going to apply this, is it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Well, Mr. Chairman, the allegation that I have stated the government has a right to lie is without foundation.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that not so?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I can only tell you what I have already told two congressional committees under oath. Obviously, no government information program can be based on lies. It must always be based on truthful facts. When any nation is faced with nuclear disaster, with the life of its people at stake, the representatives of those people do not immediately tell all the facts to the enemy merely to respond to a news inquiry. That and that alone is what I have talked about, despite quotations and misquotations to the contrary.

No government official ever has the right to lie, but he always has the duty to protect his country.

The CHAIRMAN. I am very glad to have you clear up that matter. Sometimes the protection of the country might require a lie, might it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not visualize any. I can understand withholding information for a given time.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad you clarified that. Is that also true of a statement attributed to you in which you said, according to Morley Safer of CBS News,

Look, if you think any American official is going to tell the truth, then you're stupid. Did you hear that? Stupid.

Is that not true, either?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would like to say categorically, no. I would like to say the meeting Mr. Safer discussed was a meeting at the home in Saigon of the Minister Counselor of the U.S. Embassy, Mr. Barry Zorthian in July. The meeting included Mr. Safer of CBS. He and his colleagues went there for drinks; drinks were served. It was a completely off the record meeting. There was an exchange—a rather frank exchange of views. Mr. Safer's misrepresentations of what I said are comparable to his misrepresentation of the Marines which won him a prize. I did not say that. I do not believe that. I never lived as a newsmen that way.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad you have an opportunity to clarify the record.

Mr. SYLVESTER. It has been clarified. My denial has been in the Congressional Record, but it does not seem to have had much effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Lots of things get in the Record and people pay no attention to them and it takes some different occasion to draw attention to them.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I appreciate the opportunity granted to me.

USIA'S ROLE IN SAIGON

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Leonard Murks in his statement stated that USIA has nothing to do with the news media in Saigon.

It is my understanding that Mr. Barry Zorthian is the head of the U.S. public affairs office in Saigon and that that office basically controls the information given to all journalists in the area.

Is that correct?

Mr. SYLVESTER. May I answer it at some length?

It is basically correct. Historically, Mr. Zorthian was formerly attached to the USIA. Because of that association, there was a tendency on the part of some news heads and others to criticize, I think unfairly, the fact that a USIA man was Minister Counselor or the head of information in Saigon. This, of course, is a pattern followed, as I am sure you know even better than I, in all our missions around the world. The Ambassador is basically—not only basically—is actually the head of our operation, regardless of what it may be, information or anything else. He usually has as his chief information officer a USIA man. This had been the case in Vietnam. As I said, some news heads in this country and elsewhere criticized this, saying that inevitably, Mr. Zorthian, as the USIA man, is under a requirement to put our best foot forward. Mr. Zorthian some time back, about two years ago, was detached from the USIA. He reports directly to the State Department. He is the overall head responsible to the Ambassador, who is responsible for all of the news operation.

As a practical matter, this has been divided into two halves, the military and the nonmilitary. The military half is directed by Col. Rodger Bankson under the direction of General Westmoreland. All other information, all other activities in the information field are under Mr. Zorthian. That is the setup today.

I would say that Mr. Leonard Murks was correct in what he said.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES FOR NEWS RELEASES

The CHAIRMAN. Then as far as the military goes, Zorthian merely transmits, you might say, the data from military commanders. Is that correct?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Mr. Zorthian and Colonel Bankson have a very close working arrangement. Over the years that he has been there, Mr. Zorthian has been one of the strongest exponents for making sure that a wide flow of news has emanated from Vietnam. He continues to advise, he continues to work with, he continues to meet with Colonel Bankson, and there is a very fine back-and-forth flow of information and advice. The military information is given by military officers and the MACV staff, both at briefings and throughout the 24 hours of the day. This information of course is available to USIA and of course, since our Government officials are Government-cleared for security, they have access to even more information.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Defense Department have policy guidelines on what information may be released to the press in Vietnam?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The guidelines have been worked out in Vietnam by Colonel Bankson's office with the newsmen out there. They are the usual guidelines that always develop and are always applied where military operations take place.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you furnish the committee with copies of the guidelines?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, I would be happy to.

(The information referred to follows:)

GUIDELINES CURRENTLY VOLUNTARILY USED BY NEWS MEDIA IN VIETNAM CONCERNING RELEASE OF COMBAT INFORMATION

The current guidelines are contained in three separate documents, all attached. They are:

1. "Release of Combat Information," dated July 14, 1965.
2. "Release of Air Strike Information," undated.
3. "Combat Photography," dated April 25, 1966.

July 14, 1965

RELEASE OF COMBAT INFORMATION

In recent weeks the war in South Vietnam has been characterized by relatively protracted and large-scale engagements. This intensification of combat action beyond that similar periods in previous years raises serious questions about the methods we have hitherto employed to brief newsmen on the military situation. In the past, in view of the scattered and small-scale nature of most combat actions, it has been the practice to (a) report casualties into three categories (KIA, WIA and MIA) on a daily basis with unit identification, and (b) identify and report the deployment of military units even before their commitment to battle.

In the interest of military security, it is essential that we deny the Viet Cong and the Hanoi regime information that would be of value to them in their prosecution of the war effort. Information on the movements to actions and their losses in those actions gives the enemy a tremendous advantage in making tactical decisions. These decisions may relate to deployment of his forces, when, where, and in what strength to launch an offensive or counter-offensive, whether he should establish and ambush or withdraw in the face of superior strength. Therefore, effective July 15, 1965, it has been agreed between the GVN and U.S. Mission that:

1. There will be no casualty reports and unit identification on a daily basis or related to specific actions except in general terms such as "light, moderate or heavy." Casualty summaries will continue to be reported on a weekly basis, without unit identification, in the weekly briefings in Saigon and the statistical summary released at the Pentagon. Procedures for notifying next of kin will not be changed, nor will the practice of releasing in Washington the name, rank, casualty status, branch of service and emergency addresses of casualties following notification of next of kin.
2. Troop movements or deployments will not repeat not be announced nor confirmed until such time as military evaluation determines such information is clearly in the possession of the Viet Cong.
3. When battles have been joined, units participating therein will not be identified by specific type or number, although the general magnitude of friendly involvement will be announced.

Correspondents are requested to observe these limitations on a voluntary basis.—Particular caution should be exercised in regard to information which correspondents may obtain from their own resources on the movement of troops before their commitment to battle, on identification of units in combat and on official casualty figures. It is recognized that correspondents may speculate on casualty figures based on eyewitness reports but that they are particularly requested to regard any information received from official sources as privileged until announced by appropriate MACV channels.

RELEASE OF AIR STRIKE INFORMATION

The release of information on air strikes in North Vietnam must take into account considerations of military security. Official briefers as well as all other U.S. and Vietnamese civil and military personnel are under instructions to observe necessary security requirements in providing information to correspondents.

However, under the circumstances existing in Vietnam, correspondents frequently will come into possession of such information. In order to provide the maximum protection possible to our military forces, the American Mission requests all correspondents on a voluntary basis to refrain from filing such information or discussing it over communications facilities. This request is made purely for reasons of military security and is based on the assumption that the press corps is prepared to cooperate in observing necessary military security.

The following represents a listing of the ground rules on information pertaining to air strikes which must be observed by official briefers and other American and Vietnamese official personnel. It is made available to correspondents in order to provide a guide to their own observance of what falls under the heading of military security and also to forestall questions which may not be answered at briefings.

The following information will normally be released as soon as available:

1. Target or targets hit, giving location and general category of target.
2. Statement as to whether it was VNAF, U.S. or joint VNAF/U.S. strike.
3. Whether aircraft were land-based and/or naval aircraft. Names of carriers when naval aircraft are involved.
4. Number of crew members who have been picked-up. Total number of aircraft down will not be released as long as it can adversely affect SAR efforts on behalf of crew members not yet retrieved.
5. Time of attack.
6. General characterization of success of the mission.
7. Ordnance expended in general terms such as 250 lb frags, 500 lb general purpose bombs, rockets, 50 calibre ammo, 20mm. Tonnage of ordnance in round numbers.
8. Number of strike aircraft in mission in round numbers. Number of associated support aircraft in round numbers but differentiated from strike aircraft figures.
9. Types of aircraft involved.
10. Weather enroute and over the target during the strike.
11. Enemy anti-aircraft ground fire in general terms as to volume and type.
12. Pilot sightings of unfriendly aircraft.

The following restrictions will be observed for security reasons

1. No information on aircraft taking off for strikes, or on strikes actually in progress or on aircraft enroute to or returning from the target areas. Strikes will be confirmed and available information released as soon as possible after the return of aircraft to their bases.
2. No official comment or identification of names of land bases, either in or out of Vietnam, or any indication of location of bases from which aircraft launched.
3. No information on number of aircraft damaged. Total aircraft lost will be released only when SAR operations have been completed and release of information cannot adversely affect SAR efforts on behalf of crew members not yet retrieved.
4. No tactical specifics such as altitudes, courses, speeds, angle of attack. May use general terms such as "low and fast."
5. No information on planned or future strikes.
6. No confirmation or discussion of planned strikes which do not take place for weather or other reasons.
7. No official comment or discussion on rules of engagement.
8. No information on enemy air reaction other than that actually seen by strike personnel, or on effectiveness on anti-aircraft ground fire and damage to U.S. aircraft.

Members of the Military Assistance Command press information offices are available to discuss with you any questions you may have in regard to the above request.

COMBAT PHOTOGRAPHY

1. The most personally sensitive information in any war is that pertaining to casualties. This is particularly true with respect to the notification of next of

kin. It is for this reason that the services have been directed to insure that an officer of the service concerned personally delivers the first notification to the next of kin of a U.S. casualty.

2. During the war in Vietnam there have been instances in which the next of kin first have learned of the death or injury of a loved one through news media coverage. Such instances almost invariably involve visual media. Casualty photographs can show a recognizable face, name tag, distinctive item of jewelry or other identifying feature or item of apparel. Next of kin must learn about casualties first through official channels. The anguish that sudden recognition through unofficial news sources can cause is, without exception, out of all proportion to the "new value" of any commercial news photograph or film.

3. The casualty reporting and notification systems of the services are in effect around the clock and use high priority communications. Names of casualties whose next of kin have been notified can be verified by the MACV Information Office or by the Directorate of Information Services in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

4. An equally important consideration is the fact that a man recently wounded usually is in a state of shock and often is under the effects of pain suppressants. Therefore, he is not normal in his actions, not in the mental condition to remember or be concerned about his right of privacy and not in the physical condition to protect himself. This situation places the burden of responsibility on the media to respect the right of privacy and to observe the principles of propriety and good taste. A man who has been hurt has the right to suffer in private.

5. In the war in Vietnam complete reliance has been placed on news media representatives. There has been no effort to impose restrictions on movement of audio-visual correspondents in the field or to require in-country processing, review and editing of audio-visual material produced by accredited correspondents. We hope to preserve these freedoms and ask that correspondents cooperate by—

- a. Not taking close-up pictures of casualties that show faces or anything else that will identify the individual.
- b. Not interviewing or recording the voices of casualties until a medical officer determines that the man is physically and mentally able, and the individual gives permission.

CHARGE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE AGAINST NEWSMEN

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sylvester, the general manager of the Associated Press, as I understand it, has charged that you have conducted guerrilla warfare against the newsmen. What does he mean by that?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have not the slightest idea, Mr. Chairman. I do not believe it can be documented.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought perhaps you had some explanation of that charge.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will you repeat your first question on this subject?

The CHAIRMAN. I asked Mr. Sylvester to explain why the general manager of the Associated Press has charged him with conducting a guerrilla warfare against newsmen in Vietnam? He did charge that, I am told. Is that right?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Are you referring to Mr. Wes Gallagher?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SYLVESTER. It does not come to my mind what he charged. He has been unhappy, but I do not recall things he has charged. I would only say there is no guerrilla warfare and I think the record of any newsmen who has written about this in public or in private would indicate that. Obviously, Mr. Gallagher may have reasons, may have cases which he is unhappy about. If he has, I would be happy to try to straighten them out.

The CHAIRMAN. He never complained to you? You were not aware of his unhappiness?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes; when I stated his unhappiness, it was on the basis of personal knowledge. It goes back to, as I recall, to the Cuban crisis, when we asked news people at that time to observe certain self-imposed restrictions, which they did magnificently, as they are doing now. Mr. Gallagher felt very strongly in his expression to me, at least, that we ought to have censorship in Vietnam. I believe he has changed that position.

The CHAIRMAN. One of the reports we had was that there was not an official censorship, but if the press persists in writing unfavorable stories that the military does not like, then they are not assisted in their travel. Is there anything to that?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think it is absolutely a baseless charge.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not so?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Absolutely not. The interesting thing to me, Mr. Chairman, is that on the one hand, we have complaints from citizens of the United States, much of it coming through congressional offices, that we are permitting too much coverage—television, radio, too much detail, too much horrible material, too much telling the enemy. On the other hand, we are being charged with not having enough coverage. I believe these are mutually exclusive.

NEWS ARTICLES CONCERNING WAR COVERAGE

Almost anybody who wants to get up off his feet and cover it, does. I have brought along a number of articles, although I do not want to clutter your record. I have had newsmen say that never before has there been such easy coverage. One was Eric Sevareid, another was Mr. Veysey of the Chicago Tribune. There are a large number of them. I think if you take a broad sampling, you will find that so far as our assistance is concerned, it is the best that has ever been.

Senator McGEE. Would it be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, to have these articles made a part of the record? Also if you have the others.

The CHAIRMAN. Which ones do you want?

Senator McGEE. The ones to which Mr. Sylvester just referred.

The CHAIRMAN. If you would like, yes.

Senator McGEE. I would think in the interest of having the record balanced, that they should be inserted in one record.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have them, you may put them in the record.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have them available. I will be glad to put them in the record.

(The articles referred to appear on p. 147 in the appendix.)

Senator LAUSCHE. Would you repeat what the statements are?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The statements are that never before has it been so easy to cover a war.

STATEMENT BY ERIC SEVAREID

I will be happy, if you will bear with me, to read a short statement by Eric Sevareid. It also, I think, highlights some of the problems of coverage. This is the result of his being there.

Mr. Sevareid said:

The really puzzling problem of reporting this war lies right with the nature of news and its processing. Distance lends excitement if not enchantment. The lens of the camera or the lead paragraph of the newspaper story are like a flash-

light beam in the darkness. They focus upon what happens to be moving. All else ceases to exist, and the phenomenon focused upon tends to become in the minds the distant readers and viewers, the total condition.

So one small riot in Saigon suggests at a distance that all of Saigon is in an uproar. It's not. The shooting up in Danang suggests that all of Vietnam is collapsing into civil war. It's not.

Even if the news itself is not distortion, its effect is distorted. What we have not sufficiently developed in this business are effective and immediate corrective techniques.

For journalists, the physical facilities here, especially transportation, are the best that I have ever seen, and the military press officers, the best trained. The normal, inevitable, and necessary tensions exist between press and military, but the mutual trust here is certainly higher than it is inside the Pentagon.

The CHAIRMAN. Inside the Pentagon. Is that a real compliment or damning with faint praise?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Since Eric does not appear very often in the Pentagon, I just leave it where it is.

The CHAIRMAN. I have the article by the general manager of the Associated Press referred to a moment ago. It appears in the Congressional Record on June 7, 1966, page A3057. I just want to call it to your attention. This is Mr. Wes Gallagher's statement. I shall not read it all. But he says in part:

The war in Vietnam more than any other of recent history has invoked these two axioms. First let us deal with this "inexperience" charge. It is a "Sylvesterism" having been used frequently by the government, principally Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense who conducts his own private guerrilla war against correspondents.

The inexperience charge is neither accurate nor pertinent to the situation.

I do not know whether you are aware of that or not.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am not aware of any guerrilla warfare.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not aware of any guerrilla warfare?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That I am conducting.

Senator McGEE. It sounds like we might need a National Liberation Front in the press.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe they do.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Sometimes there is, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio, do you wish to ask any questions?

REPORT WRITTEN BY ARTHUR VEYSEY

Senator LAUSCHE. You have quoted the statement made by Mr. Sevareid. Is there another statement that you have, quoting someone else on the same subject?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will you read it, please?

Mr. SYLVESTER. This is a report written by Arthur Veysey, London bureau chief of the Chicago Tribune. The interesting part is that he wrote this—rather, it appeared in the Tribune June 20, 1965, dateline, Saigon, Vietnam, June 10.

Covering the war in Vietnam is easy for a reporter. Stories are everywhere waiting to be told. Contrary to often stated charges, reporters willing to skip the conferences of Saigon are free to go wherever they want. If they leave the bars and the restaurants, they are welcome anywhere among American military men. Military transportation of all types is open to the reporter for the asking. He even gets preference on scheduled flights carrying troops and supplies.

I might add that this was written before we had completely instituted the daily flights of a single plane devoted to the press around Vietnam.

If no scheduled flight is available, the reporter need only wait on an airfield and, sooner or later, a plane will come along, the pilot happily giving the reporter a lift. There is no censorship. In two months moving about the country, I met no restrictions that I considered unreasonable. Of course, the reporter is expected to use his commonsense. The reporter who, for example, files a story that planes have taken off for North Vietnam while the planes are still on the way is quite properly shunned by flyers, who feel the reporter's irresponsibility endangers their lives.

Senator LAUSCHE. But does not the shunning by the flyer of the particular reporter who issues news about planes being in flight when they are still on the ground interfere with the principle of free press?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No; I think not, not unless free press means the endangering of our fighters' lives.

Senator LAUSCHE. An argument might be made. But go ahead.

Mr. SYLVESTER. As a former newsman, I am happy to take the other side on that. It seems to me our main interest should be the protection of our flyers' lives. Because some men did do that—in other words, sent news around the world while planes were in flight to a target—that the agreement was made with the newsmen that there would be no reporting of flights until their return. We did not foresee that there would be some people, as Mr. Veysey said, whose commonsense would not tell them that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Proceed with your quotation.

Mr. SYLVESTER (reading):

In Saigon, the reporter lives in a hotel or apartment he provides for himself. Army dining rooms, bars, shops, and motion pictures are open to him. In Danang, the military has taken over a seaside motel for reporters, covering the war from there.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that is enough. You have placed the rest of it in the record.

MR. SYLVESTER'S BACKGROUND BEFORE ENTERING DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

What has been your background before you went into the Department of Defense?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I graduated from Princeton University and worked a year with the Macmillan Co. in New York. In 1924, I began as a reporter on the Newark News, a large independent eastern newspaper. I was with the Newark News for 5 years as a reporter and rewrite man. Then in 1929, I became assistant city editor and for the next 15 years was on the executive side. In 1944, I was sent to Washington to head up that office, and from 1944 to 1961 I was the Washington correspondent of the paper. That is about 36 years plus.

Senator LAUSCHE. How old are you?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Sixty-four, shortly will be 65.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thirty-six of your sixty-four years were connected with actually working with a newspaper?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. I suppose that in those 36 years you developed an affection and a pride in the profession?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I did.

Senator LAUSCHE. And you are familiar with the zest that newspapermen have in getting the scoop and getting the story out first before any of their competitors do?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is that a pretty dominating force in the psychology of a newspaperman?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I like to think it is.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, then, since you became connected with the Department of Defense, you have become acquainted with the problems of the Department, especially in a period of war.

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is absolutely so, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. Are the reporters in Vietnam provided with the accommodations of your planes—I believe you have already stated so—to take them up into the battlefield?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes; indeed, they are. It is the only way they can get there and they are there all the time.

ACCIDENTAL NAPALM BOMBING OF U.S. TROOPS

Senator LAUSCHE. And there they can see what our troops are doing?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Very much. As a matter of fact, a very good instance was the recent unfortunate occasion on which our planes dropped napalm on our own troops. Immediately, Major General DePuy, who was the commanding general concerned, went to Saigon, met with the newsmen, and gave a complete account of what had happened. There were newsmen with him who saw this, as there were other places. They were there only because we took them there. I think it is a very good example of our complete candor in telling bad and good, telling it factually and quickly.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I happen to have a very good illustration of this specific incident right here if you would like me to read it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Go ahead.

ARTICLE REGARDING ACCIDENTAL NAPALM-BOMBING

The CHAIRMAN. The article referred to what you just mentioned that a CBS radio correspondent was sitting about 50 yards away. I will read it:

Safer had just witnessed the accidental napalm bombing of members of an American battalion by American Air Force planes.

The battalion, in heavy and close combat with a Vietcong battalion, had radioed for a napalm attack on the Vietcong. Two American jet planes dropped a canister of napalm each. The canisters exploded on the American soldiers. The jellied gasoline burst into flames and set afire an estimated 40 to 50 of our soldiers.

Safer, who was no more than 50 yards away from the scene, described the horrible sight. In a voice that almost broke under the emotional burden of his experience, the CBS correspondent said the American boys streamed out of the jungle, running like madmen, trying to get away from the jellied flames on their bodies which was cooking them alive.

One soldier, his hair and body on fire, ripped huge strips of his flesh off.

Another, a medical corpsman, cut large pieces of his burning flesh with his medical scissors, then dropped to the ground and died.

Still another soldier, afire on one side of his body, from head to foot, raised his unburnt arm and shook his fist at the sky and the disappearing American planes, shouting: "You SOB's, we are down here."

Pretty bad, but I assume that is a firsthand eye witness report of just what you said, is it not?

Senator McGEE. Who wrote that?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Safer did.

Senator McGEE. The same one we were talking about earlier?

The CHAIRMAN. Of CBS.

Mr. SYLVESTER. It is the same one.

The CHAIRMAN. He was 50 yards from that incident, and he was taken there by you, I assume.

I just thought the Senator might be interested.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

NEWS DISTORTION FROM PICTURES

I have been intrigued by a part of your statement made a moment ago that when you, with camera, take an isolated picture and publish it, you frequently fail to tell the whole truth and by merely telling the part which is reflected in the picture, you make even that part false. You did not say that, but that is the implication of it. I have seen pictures of American soldiers with gun over a prostrate Vietcong man. It shocked me. Will you illustrate exactly what you mean, that when you emphasize one isolated fact and do not give the whole context, you give bad information instead of truthful information?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I doubt very much that I can improve on what you said, Senator. You express my views as to the overdramatization that inevitably results when, by reason of a limited frame, you editorially take out part of the whole. Since the viewer does not see what goes on in the background and around it, he does have, I think, a distorted picture. This is one of the difficulties and one of the things, I think, that television is learning, will have to overcome and is overcoming.

Senator LAUSCHE. Has the Government suffered that experience?

Mr. SYLVESTER. In my judgment, and particularly in the reporting of the so-called Marine burning of the village, Cam Ne, by Mr. Safer, which I thought, still think, and other newsmen agree with me, was a complete distortion of what took place.

Senator LAUSCHE. If you have, let's say, three or four men around a helpless Communist Vietcong and he lies there sort of begging for mercy, that picture does not tell whether that Vietcong Communist had previously been killing some brother or some comrade of these soldiers?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is the very heart of the problem, Senator, absolutely true, in my judgment, absolutely true. We are not able to get pictures very often of the atrocities, true atrocities, committed by the other side. They do not wait for our cameramen to go there. Those we have are so bad that most newspapers—in fact, no newspapers want to publish them.

IMPACT OF NEWS ON SAFETY OF FIGHTING MEN

Senator LAUSCHE. Getting into the philosophy of this whole problem of your properly performing your function in the matter of news release, you must take into consideration what the impact of that news

will be upon the safety of the men who are either in planes or on the battlefield?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, we do not, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. You do not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, we do not. This would be impinging on the freedom of press, the right of the editor or the right of the newspapers, the right of the television people to make their own decision on what is published and what is not. We do ask them on a voluntary basis, and they are following it, to refrain from using certain military information until it has been released. But we have no control over the sort of thing I understand you are talking about, that sort of information which makes an unfortunate impact such as the material read by the chairman. We do not attempt to assert ourselves in such instances.

From time to time, when something seems to be a complete distortion, we have the right, and I think we have the responsibility, to discuss with the agency or with the organization using it whether this is really what they want to do.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do I understand correctly, then, that the rules of the game are that the right of freedom of press and speech are unlimited?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is correct.

REPORTERS IMPOSE VOLUNTARY RESTRICTIONS

Senator LAUSCHE. You merely request that they impose upon themselves voluntary restrictions?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Military restrictions, right.

Senator LAUSCHE. So you rely completely upon the integrity of these—how many men are there now, 180?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Americans. Four hundred and fifty, altogether.

Senator LAUSCHE. How many Americans?

Mr. SYLVESTER. About 180.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then you rely upon their integrity?

Mr. SYLVESTER. And their good judgment and their bosses' good judgment.

Senator LAUSCHE. And it is only after they have committed an act that has endangered the lives of our men that you challenge them?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. How do you impose this 30-day suspension that you mentioned a moment ago?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The reporter loses his right to access to transportation, to attend briefings, for support or help or information of any kind. He is on his own.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then from what you have said, it would mean that the 180 reporters motivated by their ardent desire to get scoops and news are confronted with their pledge to impose upon themselves voluntary restrictions against the publication of news that will endanger our men?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is the struggle that each one of those men has, and it is a tough one, is it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, Senator, most of them have reported that these agreed-upon restrictions do not very much interfere with their

gathering of legitimate news. Because these restrictions only concern the sort of thing that the reporters themselves, as Americans, and even some non-Americans, would not want to make available to the enemy at any time or in any form since such information would be detrimental to the security of our people.

AN EVALUATION OF REPORTING FROM VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. I do not know whether you would want to answer this question; it is my last one. Summarizing the news that has been published and the pictures that have been carried, what is your evaluation as to the net result of what has been done that is helpful in the presentation of the true facts of our position in Vietnam?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Senator Lausche, I would suggest that one would have to look at this at different periods of time. But I would say in the last two years that the overall and general effect of the reporting from Vietnam has been good, good in the sense that the information is basically correct, basically sound. I think that the news profession as such, regardless of media, in the last 15 or 20 years has suffered a good deal from so-called interpretive reporting. But I would say the overall effect has been to bring home to the American people important, factual, truthful material.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, it is a strange coincidence that last night, I was reading the second volume of James Boswell's biography on Samuel Johnson. Johnson had great wisdom and commonsense. He wrote the initial English dictionary and he wrote the lives of the poets and the writers of his days prior to 1775. There is one page in which Johnson is in a discussion with Boswell.

Senator MCGEE. This is Samuel Johnson?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, and James Boswell.

The discussion revolves around whether you are ever justified in telling a lie. A number of them were in the discussion. One of them said there are times when telling the truth is hurtful and wrong. Johnson took the position that telling a falsehood is always wrong. One then raised the question, is it proper when information has been given you confidentially to tell what has been said to you? Johnson says that you are not to tell.

Then the climax is reached, if you do not tell, you imply that what has been asked is true. This subject of telling the truth has been one that has not only come into existence in Vietnam, it has been with people through the ages. I think many of us have different views. I am one who believes there are times when a lie is a better thing than the truth, especially if you are going to cut into the flesh and into the soul of someone unnecessarily. That is a white lie. I believe, of course, implicitly in telling the truth and our country will be better off if it does tell the truth.

That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CASUALTIES WHICH ARE COMBAT CASUALTIES

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Sylvester, every week the Department of Defense lists the numbers of our combat casualties—whether 600 or 900 a week. What percentage of our total casualties are represented by those figures?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Every week on Thursday, Senator, the Department of Defense puts out a complete list of casualties, regardless of combat or how they may have died.

Senator AIKEN. If I read that as a list of combat casualties, then, I am not correct. What do you do with this list?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Make it available to newsmen every Thursday at the Pentagon.

Senator AIKEN. The lists I have been reading have related to combat casualties.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have with me a copy of the sample list which is the kind we put out every Thursday. I will be happy to make it part of the record.

Senator AIKEN. My question is what percentage of our total casualties are represented by the combat casualties?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not carry that in my mind. If you will bear with me, I will look at something here.

Senator AIKEN. Would 30 percent be a fair estimate?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have the exact figures here. It will take 1 second.

For the week ending August 25, the total combat deaths since 1961 is 4,832.

Senator AIKEN. You mean since 1959. That is the last 6 years.

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, 1961. From January 1, 1961, through August 20, 1966, issued August 25.

Senator AIKEN. And what is the total?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The total killed in combat, 4,832.

Senator AIKEN. That is killed and wounded?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Killed and wounded or killed?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Killed.

Senator AIKEN. And the wounded, how much?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The total wounded, 20,550. That figure is slightly deceiving, because it means every single person who has had any sort of a wound, scratch, or scrape, whereas the number actually wounded and hospitalized is a very small percentage of that.

DEFINITION OF CASUALTIES

Senator AIKEN. Say the Vietcong would toss a bomb into the Metropole and American soldiers or half of them were killed or wounded, would that be considered a combat casualty?

Mr. SYLVESTER. It is represented in this list, enemy action.

Senator AIKEN. It is considered as a combat casualty?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes. We list them here, casualties resulting from action by hostile forces; killed, wounded, or injured, dead of wounds, nonfatal wounds, missing, died while missing, returned to control, current missing, captured or interned, died while captured or interned, returned to control, current captured or interned; deaths from aircraft accidents, incidents, fixed wing, helicopter, from ground action.

Then come casualties not the result of action by hostile forces: current missing, deaths from aircraft accidents, incidents, fixed wing, helicopter, from other causes, whether it be sickness or collision of jeeps.

Senator AIKEN. Would it include the 40-odd men that we lost through the dropping of napalm bombs?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Oh, yes.

Senator AIKEN. It would include that?

Mr. SYLVESTER. It will. I do not know whether this report has it, but the next report out will.

Senator AIKEN. Will it include casualties inflicted by our own forces as well?

Mr. SYLVESTER. We have made every effort to have all casualties completely, truthfully, and factually reported.

CASUALTIES OTHER THAN COMBAT

Senator AIKEN. And it would include casualties which are caused, for example, by the bombing of the Metropole Hotel? There was a total of 125 Vietnamese and Americans killed.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. It would include those casualties. It would not include casualties caused by disease?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes; it would exclude those.

The CHAIRMAN. Which item on this list would they be?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Other causes.

Senator AIKEN. It would include disease casualties, hepatitis, malaria, respiratory, and everything else?

The CHAIRMAN. Was that 4,832 purely combat?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How many others are there from other sources?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Casualties not from action by hostile forces, 1,028.

Senator AIKEN. Those who are incapacitated by disease, then, would not be listed. Do you not keep a record of that except as they are discharged from service?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is right.

FREEDOM OF FOREIGN NEWSMEN IN VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. I notice that the majority of the newsmen in Vietnam are from other countries. Do they have the same freedom of operation as the Americans do?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Those accredited by MACV do.

Senator AIKEN. Do you transport them, too, if they want to go?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Are they restricted in any way? Are they permitted to go out of the South Vietnamese area, perhaps, and consult with Vietcong leaders, or do the Vietcong leaders come into Saigon and consult with them there?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I cannot help you on that. I do not know who they talk with on the Vietcong side.

Senator AIKEN. There is no control over that?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No; because we are guests, of course, in a host country. The Vietnamese are our hosts and we cooperate with them.

Senator AIKEN. I noticed particularly the stories printed by, I think, the London Observer, Le Monde in France, and an Australian paper which had some rather vivid portrayals a year or so ago.

Are messages from reporters back to the press monitored in any way?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No; they are not.

Senator AIKEN. They have free use of all communications media.

LEAKING OF NEWS REGARDING THAILAND

I notice you do not get much news from Thailand, where we have about as many men now as we had in South Vietnam a little over a year ago. Are there news restrictions at all in Thailand that do not apply to Vietnam?

Last fall when I was part of the Mansfield mission, we were told what we are doing in Thailand and that it would be very disastrous if we released any of that information. Before we got home, we read a whole story in the New York Times—

Mr. SYLVESTER. That often happens.

Senator AIKEN (continuing). Showing the location of the fields, the ones under construction, the purpose for which they were being constructed, and all the things we were told must not be released under any circumstances. How do news stories like that get out? Because I think the New York Times story was accurate.

Mr. SYLVESTER. It could be.

The CHAIRMAN. This commercializing is going too far.

Senator AIKEN. How does it happen that the press comes out sometimes with a story that the Defense Department tells us a few weeks or months or years later?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That simply, I think, is an evidence of the complete freedom of information and freedom of the press that operates all the time.

Senator AIKEN. The astuteness of the reporters, I suppose?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would say so.

Senator AIKEN. We have very good ones over there, I guess.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if he would answer the first question you asked.

I never did get your answer about Thailand. You looked as if you were about to answer, and did not quite finish.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am disturbed that you asked me that question in public. I would be happy to talk to you about it in executive session.

Senator AIKEN. Do you think that an official of the Defense Department could not tell a lie under any circumstances?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I certainly try not to tell any lies.

Senator AIKEN. Suppose I should ask you a question which you thought might be of comfort to a potential enemy. Would you be sure to give me the right answer?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, Senator Aiken. I would be, of course, surprised that any such question would come from you. I would certainly appeal to you on the ground of what it seemed to me would happen. I certainly cannot give you anything but the truth, whether I was under oath or not.

QUESTIONING OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS

Senator AIKEN. I think the questioning of Defense officials is based on news stories which we have read sometime previously.

Mr. SYLVESTER. It seems to me, sir, if I may add, that if you have knowledge of the 39 or 40 reporters covering the Defense Department, topflight reporters, the picture of them standing around waiting for me or one of my colleagues to hand them something is rather absurd.

Those men get news all the time. Every reporter can get news. It is a matter of pride with them. Or the idea that 1,000 or 2,000 reporters in Washington can be led around by the nose by information officers of the Government is another, to my mind, absurd picture. It does not work that way.

You will not find complaints along that line from top reporters. They get the story.

Senator AIKEN. A few months ago, Secretary McNamara made a statement that I believe I quote correctly, as it was in the press report, that we have stopped losing the war. Do you recall any Government announcements or other information prior to that date which would have indicated that we were losing the war?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Well, I would like to go back and look at what the Secretary said in its full context. Without that, I do not think I can comment very intelligently. My guess would be that there were stories and statements made by all sorts of people on both sides, whether you are winning the war or whether you are not, what does winning mean, what does it not mean and so on.

Senator AIKEN. It was not very many days ago that Secretary McNamara made the statement that things might get worse over there. Was there any particular purpose in that?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Without attempting to add to or subtract from what the Secretary said, the statement that we have stopped losing the war, as I recall in time, was directed to a situation about a year ago, in February or March of 1965, when the Vietnamese Government was under pretty heavy pressure from the Vietcong and things looked pretty black. Given the time of the statement my understanding is that it had become clear then that the Vietcong would not take over South Vietnam by military means. I think that is what he meant.

USE OF OIL FROM NORTH VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. Are you able to give a statement as to what percentage of the oil supplies of North Vietnam have now been destroyed?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would have to go back and look at the figures. I have a newspaperman's suspicion of figures, generally, so I would have to go back and check.

Senator AIKEN. Have you any information which would indicate that the Vietcong in South Vietnam were dependent on oil from Hanoi at any time?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think it is clear that the transportation of materiel from north to south in trucks is dependent on oil coming into North Vietnam.

Senator AIKEN. For the transportation of supplies from Hanoi, they had to have oil?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Right.

Senator AIKEN. But have you any information that South Vietnam itself, the Vietcong territory, relied upon Hanoi for oil? Other than to fill their trucks at the other end of the trip?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The use of trucks at the other end is very limited. It is mostly shanks' mare on the part of the Vietcong. The supplies I refer to are those transported by motorized carrier on land or sea.

Senator AIKEN. Is it probably not a fact that we use more oil in a single area than the Vietcong uses in a long time?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would bow to you on that.
Senator AIKEN. I do not know that this has anything to do with reporting on Vietnam.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Wyoming.

HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

Senator McGEE. What do you do, Mr. Sylvester, in cases which I assume arise, where to report the information at all would disclose details about our own sources of intelligence with regard to the enemy?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I try not to comment or in any way discuss it.

Senator McGEE. But you are probed on this for questions by the press?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, the information is sought by the press. But the reporters in the Pentagon that I deal with recognize that there are certain sources that they do not expect me to reveal and if I did, they would not think very well of me.

Senator McGEE. What about the reporting out in the field where the action is?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think there is a very good realization on the part of the reporters in the field in Vietnam, basically.

Senator McGEE. That does not create any real problems, then; in terms of having to impose some tighter strings on what is reported and what is not reported?

Mr. SYLVESTER. As of now, Senator, I see none. I think that the news media, taken overall, have done a rather magnificent job as they always do, being very careful about not handling information or using information that would endanger our troops.

Senator McGEE. I remember a conversation I had over there in April with a minister of a nearby government, who said he still could not understand why the Americans felt they had to talk so much about what was going on. He said, "You want a searchlight on everything; you want to have a public dialog on it and then you want to have a hearing on it." He said, "We appreciate, of course, that you believe in freedom of ideas and freedom of discussion, but, this is a war." And he said, "We orientals, some of us, are mystified by your insistence on putting up in neon lights everything that is taking place."

I suppose you get pressures the other way, to try to restrain some of this, and thereby getting critics on both sides.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, we are in the middle most of the time, Senator.

Senator McGEE. I have had occasion to reflect on the unhappy job that is yours—trying to strike an even balance in all of this. What luck do you have in getting reporters to report anything that goes right?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think we have good luck. If we make available the material, I think we come out pretty well, given the type of news industry we have. I think it is pretty good.

REPORTING OF GOOD NEWS

Senator McGEE. It seems to me from some reading that occasionally, it is rather dullsville if you write about everything going OK this week, no new problems; you have to pick up that which happens

to go wrong if you are going to get a reader. This is not strictly the newsmen's responsibility. I think it is that of those of us who buy the paper or those of us who listen to the newscast. We could not care less after a couple of days that everything went all right again today. But if it goes wrong, we prick up our ears. So we are almost in a built-in slant on this, I would think.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think you are right. Basically, people expect their government officials and their government to run right and when it runs right, government officials, regardless of what branch, are doing what they should do and what the people expect of them. When it goes wrong by reason of human fallibility, then it becomes a matter of news.

Senator McGEE. Where you get the wrong, then it becomes the dominant note of the time, does it not? That is, if you repeat this again and again, it is picked up by several.

Mr. SYLVESTER. It can be and has been in many cases.

Senator McGEE. Is it understandable, then, that people get the idea that nothing is going right, everything is going wrong, and somebody has loused up the war in Vietnam?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That would be true. I must also add that since, as I have said, I have spent 15 years on the executive side of the newspaper business, I have argued with many people who insist that the only newsworthy thing in our papers is conflict or bad news. But I think a good many studies have shown that in relation to the total amount of news in the paper, the percentage of constructive or non-conflict or nonsuperdramatic news is heavily in our favor.

PROBLEMS OF REPORTING EVENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

Senator McGEE. Surely, you have had occasion to reflect on the problems that stem from the one-sidedness of the news reporting of this war? I do not mean the slant of the writers of the news, but the fact that every step we take gets full reporting and the only thing we can learn from the other side is what we can learn from a visiting professor or a self-appointed peace-maker or traveler of some sort. Would you mind suggesting the kind of problem that poses to you?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The problem, of course, is that we do not get any reporting, any free world reporting, with a few exceptions, of what is happening to the North Vietnamese, and the result is, I think, to make it appear that we alone have problems, whereas I suspect that, compared to what our problems may be, theirs must be many times worse. But since they manage to insure that there is no real news coverage, we do not get that picture. So we stand before the world pretty well exposed most of the time and they stand before the world pretty much clothed as they desire. I think that is one of our basic problems around the world, plus the fact that we do have reporters covering our activities from governments and countries who are not convinced of the validity of our policies, or afraid that they will have to stand up some day and participate, or fearful that our actions will drag the world into war. This is a problem we have.

But these reporters have access to everything everybody else has.

Senator McGEE. Have you thought of any formula or any potions that could be cranked into a formula that would make any allowance for this one-sided coin picture that we are getting?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I must say, Senator, that I do not have a formula. I believe that the freest flow of facts that we can get will eventually result in overall comprehension of what we are doing. As a matter of fact, I think that our people have a pretty clear comprehension of what is at stake. It is painful, but the elections and the primaries this year in our own country have suggested to me that the American people are pretty clear in their evaluation of what their country is confronted with and what it must do.

Senator McGEE. I believe the American people are not deluded, but I believe they are deeply troubled. This surely stems in large measure from the fact that this is the first war they have ever fought themselves in the living room, spilled the blood on the rug, so to speak.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Right.

Senator McGEE. They have never had an experience like this. So I suppose we would have to allow for a sophistication or maturing or growing up on our own part here.

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is certainly one of the all-important factors that we face. As you said, this is the first war covered by television; in other words, in everyone's living room.

Senator McGEE. This may have something to do with the continued bombardment you got.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am sure it has. As a matter of fact, we get calls concerning certain TV shows the next morning or even that night. I do believe that in time, television will improve its coverage. Great as TV is, I think that some larger background explanation will be normally offered together with the dramatic incident, as Mr. Severeid suggested. That will help, I think. As you say, our people will become accustomed to this.

VIETNAM NEWS COVERAGE COMPARED TO WORLD WAR II

Senator McGEE. I had lunch a week or 10 days ago with one of our correspondents just back from Vietnam, where he said he had been for six or eight weeks. He made this observation; I do not know how valid it is. He had also reported World War II on the European front. He said there was all the difference in the world in the coverage problems. According to him, from his experiences there seemed to be a much tighter lid on the reporters in World War II than there is in Vietnam. He raised the philosophical question about whether we could afford it that way or whether we were being smart playing it that way. But he was ready to confess that he had no alternatives in view of our continual existence on a no censorship or a freedom basis. I thought it was an interesting observation.

Have you picked up anything like that in the trade?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, I have talked with a great many men who have covered both wars, some who, I think, have become confused by the fact that this is not World War II, it is utterly different—something I think our people have not faced since our great, great grandparents fought in the French and Indian wars where they were subject to attack at anytime while they were plowing. They plowed with a gun. In this war you have that. You do not know your enemy by dress, place, face, language. It is an entirely different sort of operation, much harder to cover, much harder to report, an undeclared war in the sense that people are being killed. No one has declared war,

though it is very real. All of these facts, I think, contribute to a very, very difficult reporting problem and a very difficult problem of understanding.

Senator McGEE. I was just thinking, as the chairman read the description of the napalm bombing of our own troops that was narrated by Mr. Safer of CBS, how it might have been a good idea if he could have closed his broadcast coverage with a reminder that he was actually reporting this, with no attempt being made to bar him from it. But you see, we take that for granted. We assume that this will be the case and therefore it is not plugged. So we end up with the criticism that comes when someone has an unfortunate experience and we get this slant on reporting in Vietnam.

I would hope, however, that you never let up on listening to this bombardment and keeping the question as open as possible.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I can assure you I shall not, Senator.

Senator McGEE. Again, I want to say that you have the most thankless job of all. I suspect, regardless of your ducking the term, that there is a little bit of guerrilla activity with the press on this business, and probably it is even healthy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sylvester, in order to complete that first matter concerning the Safer article, which I know caused a great deal of soul scorching since I realize that you disagreed with it, I will put his article and your reply in the record. You wrote a reply, did you not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And I will include also two comments by Murray Fromson and Malcolm Browne.

(The material referred to follows:)

TELEVISION COVERS THE WAR

(By Morley Safer)

There has been no war quite like it. Never have so many words been churned out, never has so much 16-mm. film been exposed. And never has the reporting of a story been so much a part of the story itself.

This has been true whether you are reporting television's first war, as I have been, or for one of the print media. Washington has been critical of American newsmen in Saigon almost continuously since 1961. That criticism has manifested itself in a number of ways—from the cancellation of newspaper subscriptions to orders to put certain correspondents on ice to downright threat.

As my friend and colleague Peter Kalischer puts it, "The brass wants you to get on the team."

To the brass, getting on the team means simply giving the United States government line in little more than bandaid form. It means accepting what you are told without question. At times it means turning your back on facts.

I know of few reporters in Vietnam who have "gotten on the team." The fact is, the American people are getting an accurate picture of the war in spite of attempts by various officials—mostly in Washington—to present the facts in a different way. That is why certain correspondents have been vilified privately and publicly.

By late winter of 1964-1965 the war was clearly becoming an American war. And with it came an American responsibility for providing and reporting facts. American officials thus were able to deal directly with reporters. The formality of "checking it out with the Vietnamese" ceased to be relevant.

In Washington the burden of responsibility for giving, controlling and managing the war news from Vietnam fell to—and remains with—one man: Arthur Sylvester, assistant secretary of defense of public affairs.

By early summer of 1965 the first set of ground rules had been laid down for reporting battles and casualties. There was no censorship, but a very loose kind

of honor system that put the responsibility for not breaking security on the shoulders of correspondents. The rules were vague and were therefore continually broken.

For military and civilian officials in Vietnam there was another set of rules—rather another honor system that was not so much laid down as implied. A policy of total candor was to be adhered to. "Total candor" is a phrase used by Harry Zorthian, minister-counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. Zorthian is what *Time* calls "the information czar" in Vietnam.

If Zorthian does not have the admiration of all the newsmen in Saigon, he at least has the respect of most of them. It would not be naive to say that the feeling is mutual, even when background briefings are held at the tops of our voices.

The breaking of the vague ground rules was something that annoyed everyone. Correspondents were rocketed by their editors, and the military in Vietnam felt that Allied lives were being endangered. So in midsummer, when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara came to Saigon and brought Sylvester with him, we all looked forward to the formulation of a clear-cut policy. Sylvester was to meet the press in an informal session to discuss mutual problems. The meeting was to take the vagueness out of the ground rules.

I know that Zorthian looked forward to this confrontation. He had been concerned for a number of reasons about what he described as the credibility of the United States being questioned. In this he echoed former Ambassador Maxwell Taylor. Zorthian had, on Ambassador Taylor's instructions, assembled four correspondents to meet the ambassador in private and take soundings on the whole question of American credibility. I was one of the four, and what was discussed then remains privileged. The ambassador showed a great deal of sympathy and said questions would be put to people in high places. Unfortunately, before the week was out he announced his resignation.

The Sylvester meeting, on the other hand, was surely one of the most disheartening meetings between reporters and a news manager ever held.

It was a sticky July evening. Zorthian had made the usual Thursday callout to what is known as the inner circle of American correspondents in Saigon. The time was fixed for 9 p.m., just after everyone had finished dinner.

I was with Murray Fromson, C.B.S. Southeast Asia correspondent. As we returned from our nightly broadcast to New York we looked forward to the cool drinks that are always available at Zorthian's villa.

Inside it was cool. The chairs had been arranged around a low settee where Zorthian usually holds court.

Zorthian opened by saying that this was not to be the usual briefing "for information," but a bull session. "Let's face it, you fellows have some problems covering this war," he said. "I want Arthur to hear what they are. Maybe we can get something done."

Zorthian was less relaxed than usual. He was anxious for Sylvester to get an idea of the mood of the news corps. There had been some annoying moments in previous weeks that had directly involved Sylvester's own office. In the first B-52 raids, Pentagon releases were in direct contradiction to what had actually happened on the ground in Vietnam.

Also, those of us involved in broadcasting were anxious to discuss the increasing problems of communication. There was general opening banter, which Sylvester quickly brushed aside. He seemed anxious to take a stand—to say something that would jar us. He did:

"I can't understand how you fellows can write what you do while American boys are dying out there," he began. Then he went on to the effect that American correspondents had a patriotic duty to disseminate only information that made the United States look good.

A network television correspondent said, "Surely, Arthur, you don't expect the American press to be the handmaiden of government."

"That's exactly what I expect," came the reply.

An agency man raised the problem that had preoccupied Ambassador Taylor and Harry Zorthian—about the credibility of American officials. Responded the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs:

"Look, if you think any American official is going to tell you the truth, then you're stupid. Did you hear that? —stupid."

One of the most respected of all the newsmen in Vietnam—a veteran of World War II, the Indochina War and Korea—suggested that Sylvester was being deliberately provocative. Sylvester replied:

"Look, I don't even have to talk to you people. I know how to deal with you through your editors and publishers back in the States."

At this point, the Hon. Arthur Sylvester put his thumbs in his ears, bulged his eyes, stuck out his tongue and wiggled his fingers.

A correspondent for one of the New York papers began a question. He never got beyond the first few words, Sylvester interrupted:

"Aw, come on. What does someone in New York care about the war in Vietnam?"

We got down to immediate practical matters—the problems of communication, access to military planes, getting out to battles.

"Do you guys want to be spoonfed? Why don't you get out and cover the war?"

It was a jarring and insulting remark. Most of the people in that room had spent as much time on actual operations as most G.I.'s.

Two television correspondents walked out, saying they had had enough. A few minutes later, two more correspondents left. The discussion went on. It got worse—more offensive. Only a few stayed—in vain out of regard for Zorthian.

The relationship between reporters and P.I.O.'s in Saigon, on the other hand, has been a good, healthy one. The relationship in the field is better, and in dealing with the men who fight the war it is very good indeed.

The P.I.O.'s in Saigon have been as devoted to their jobs as an officer or enlisted man in the field. And in many ways they have it a whole lot tougher. They are hog-tied by impossible ground rules. Certain items may be released by them, others only by Sylvester himself. Pity the career man who forgets it.

The implied threat of the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs—"I know how to deal with you through your editors"—gives some indication of the way the Pentagon tries to exert pressure. Among my colleagues in Vietnam I know of no one who has been asked by an editor to "ease off" or to follow any kind of official line. I do know of attempts by certain American officials in Washington to vilify certain correspondents, among them this one.

It's no secret that the former president of C.B.S. News, Fred W. Friendly, was informed that I was married to an Asian and therefore presumably had some kind of bias in favor of Asians and therefore presumably was not 100 per cent American in my thinking. The fact that I'm not married at all makes the whole thing even more ludicrous.

The pressure can take less subtle forms: "Unless you get Safer out of there he's liable to end up with a bullet in his back."

This is television's first war. It is only in the past few years that the medium has become portable enough to go out on military operations. And this has raised some serious problems—problems, incidentally, which every network correspondent and cameraman in Vietnam is acutely aware of.

The camera can describe in excruciating, harrowing detail what war is all about. The cry of pain, the shattered face—it's all there on film, and out it goes into millions of American homes during the dinner hour. It is true that on its own every piece of war film takes on a certain antiwar character, simply because it does not glamorize or romanticize. In battle men do not die with a clean shot through the heart; they are blown to pieces. Television tells it that way.

It also tells what happens to civilians who are caught in the middle of battle. It tells what happens to soldiers under the stress of the unreal conditions in which they live, American soldiers are not always 100 per cent sterling characters, just as American policy is not always exactly what is right for the world or for Vietnam's smallest hamlet.

The unfavorable has always been reported along with the favorable—but television tells it with greater impact. When the U.S. blunders, television leaves little doubt.

So when a government official, either in Saigon or Washington, denies what television plainly reports and then attempts to give verisimilitude to his denial by damning the reporter—at best that is pure humbug.

The war in Vietnam has become almost entirely an American responsibility. And responsible American officials must accept it. For the most part they have. But there have been glaring examples of miscalculation and a few examples of downright lying. The miscalculations have been reported, the lies have been found out. And it is that kind of honest reporting that in the end measures the rightness of our cause in Vietnam or anywhere else.

COMMENT OF ARTHUR SYLVESTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

While the readers of the current *Dateline*, which is locked up for the year, were denied an opportunity to hear the other side and misled as well, I appreciate the opportunity to be heard in the *Bulletin*.

Why its editor chose, in the April 30th issue, to subject me to further abuse by reprinting from the *Dateline* only to attack me, again without opportunity to reply, is beyond me. Furthermore, I can't understand why the *Bulletin* rewrite couldn't even report Safer correctly. The *Bulletin* said that Safer "told of a briefing held between Vietnam correspondents and the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, Arthur Sylvester." What Safer actually wrote was "Zorthian opened by saying that this was not to be the usual briefing 'for information,' but a bull session." Strange to say Safer got that right but otherwise his recollection of the evening was "bull."

The *Bulletin* excerpted from Safer that statement that "One newsmen asked Sylvester, after he had announced to them that it was their duty to report only information that made the U.S. look good, if they were expected to be the 'hand-maidens of government.'" That's exactly what I expect, was Sylvester's reply.

This is utterly untrue. Additionally, I must say Safer is the only man I ever heard refer to another man as a "hand-maiden," especially a newsmen.

Perhaps I shouldn't be surprised at Safer's distortions, misstatements of fact and self-created quotations attributed to me in view of the fact that he wrote: "I was with Murray Fromson, C.B.S. Southeast Asia correspondent. As we returned from our nightly broadcast to New York we looked forward to the cool drinks that are always available at Zorthian's villa." Apparently Safer's primary interest that night was in working over the drinks and then came his working over me as a clouded and confused afterthought.

Perhaps I shouldn't squawk when I consider the distortion of U.S. Marine Corps activity Safer perpetuated on C.B.S., for which he won a prize and the underlying contempt of the Marines.

Maybe I would brush it all off but it was this same Safer who was cited by Colonel Ben W. Legare in Saigon, last August 11, for his violation of well-articulated security rules, thereby endangering American troops. Even Safer's former boss, Fred W. Friendly, vice president of C.B.S., expressed concern at this performance.

Nevertheless, I do feel the treatment given a member of the club by both the *Dateline* and the *Bulletin* was shabby, to say the least.

On receipt of *Dateline 1968* I was startled to read in the Contributor's Column that the article which Arthur G. Milton, publisher of the Overseas Press Club's annual magazine, had asked me to write was billed as a reply to an abusive piece in the same issue by Morley Safer. Since I had not seen Safer's gem of misrepresentation until it appeared, since your people had not advised me that he was going to write for the issue, and since I was never offered an opportunity to reply, I think this sort of editorial dishonesty directed against a club member is inexcusable.

The enclosed copy of my full article with the deleted portions underlined will show you the sort of editing to which it was subjected. The deleted sections contain much of the thought and substance of my views toward the television medium. It makes me wonder what sort of editorial policy Messrs. Milton, Jess Gorkin and Edwin Klester, Jr., adhere to. I say this because Safer's attack on me is based on his recollection of what took place on a Saturday night in July, 1965, in Barry Zorthian's home in Saigon.

ARTHUR SYLVESTER,
Washington, D.C.

SAFER REPLIES

Have just seen May 14 bulletin with Sylvester insulting letter. All this does is confirm to my who might have doubted the nature of his activities. As usual he attacked the reporter personally rather than the substance of the report. Let Sylvester produce one eyewitness who would challenge the facts of my article. Congratulations to the *Bulletin* for publishing Sylvester letter because it will provide fleeting moment of hilarity for Saigon correspondents as well as mission personnel who have ceased to be shocked or dismayed by Pentagon press agent.

If Sylvester wants to know something about "undying contempt" he should consult some of his own PIO and Joint USIS public affairs people in Viet Nam.

MORLEY SAFER,
London.

'BASED ON CONSENSUS'

It seems that Mr. Sylvester is always asking for equal time to rebut something written or said by a correspondent in Viet Nam. Given the opportunity he invariably engages in some form of character assassination. His letter published in the Bulletin May 14 is the latest example. What Sylvester fails to comprehend is that Morley Safer's recollection of how the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs acted that summer night at Harry Zorthian's was based on a consensus of several correspondents who were in attendance. Mr. Sylvester could have made a stronger defense of himself if he had produced just one correspondent who disagreed with the substance of Safer's article. Having failed to do that he should take Harry Truman's advice—if you can't stand the heat get out of the kitchen.

MURRAY FROMSON,
CBS News, Saigon.

BROWNE'S TWO-CENTS

My copy of the May 14 Bulletin arrived today, and I noted Arthur Sylvester's reply to Morley Safer. Since I have some knowledge of this incident I would like to add my two-cents-worth.

At the time of that Sylvester session with newsmen in Saigon I was chief A.P. correspondent for Vietnam. I had just returned from the field that day (July 17, 1965) and asked Ed White to represent me. (Ed replaced me as A.P. chief when I left A.P. last August.) The following day Ed gave me a memo covering the events of that evening, which I have saved in my private files. Morley Safer had no way of seeing that memo so there could have been no collusion. I quote in part from that memo:

"The exchanges often became bitter and personal. Morley Safer, followed closely by Murray Fromson (both of C.B.S.), stalked out indignantly after one hour, slamming the door of Zorthian residence with loud bang. Keyes Beech (Chicago Daily News), followed by Sol Sanders (U.S. News and World Report), left short time later, but suspect they more concerned with threat of missing dinner rather than issues or principles.

"Sylvester engaged specific correspondents in near name calling wrangles, twice telling Jack Langguth (New York Times) he was stupid. Banter between Sylvester and Joe Fried (New York Daily News) provided occasion tragic-comic relief.

"At one point Sylvester actually made statement he thought press should be 'handmaiden' of government. Later tried to retrieve that one by passing it off as joke. But his many serious-face statements included such things as 'don't you guys know men are dying out here?'

"It was a long disagreeable night."

This version certainly tends more to support the Safer version than the Sylvester version, including the reference to "handmaiden of government." In fact, one is basically confronted with the choice of believing Sylvester or the correspondents who were there; there is no middle ground.

In deciding whether the correspondents or Sylvester reported the evening correctly it is well to remember that this is the same Sylvester who, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, went on record with these statements of policy:

"The generation of news by actions taken by the government becomes one weapon in a strained situation. The results, in my opinion, justify the methods we use."

And: "It's inherent in government's right, if necessary, to lie to save itself when it's going up into nuclear war. This seems to me basic."

This attitude has characterized all of Sylvester's dealings with correspondents in Vietnam, and has done more to obstruct fair and comprehensive news coverage here than any other factor that comes to my mind at the moment. And I've lived here for nearly five years.

I do not sleep better at night knowing The Hon. Arthur Sylvester is a member of the Overseas Press Club. It seems to me that considering his past record giving him the right to reply to Safer's piece at all is giving him more than his due.

MALCOLM W. BROWNE,
Saigon, Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know Murray Fromson?

Mr. SYLVESTER. He describes himself as Mr. Safer's CBS colleague.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know him?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I know the name. I do not believe I would be able to identify him if I bumped into him.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know who Malcolm W. Browne is?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Oh, yes; I do. He is a man who reported with the Associated Press for awhile, then went with television. He is not now reporting as an active associate with any organization.

The CHAIRMAN. He is no longer active with either one of them?

Mr. SYLVESTER. He is no longer active with any organization that I am aware of. I believe he is freelancing.

SIGNIFICANCE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE DESERTERS

The CHAIRMAN. Yesterday, August 30, Jack Steele, a Scripps-Howard writer, reported in Saigon that informed sources estimated that South Vietnam now has as many as 400,000 deserters from its armed forces on a cumulative basis. Other news services are reporting that the desertion rate is currently rising. Do you have any way to account for these desertions?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not know the accuracy of the figures. I question the number. But if you will recall, in our War of the Revolution, men from New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine, and others went home from time to time to plant crops and came back to fight again. In Vietnam people are very attached to their home district. There is a good deal of going home in Vietnam. The desertions are not to the Vietcong. Very often they are to the home district.

I think, without attempting to discuss the matter at length because I am not qualified to, the question of pay, the question of being away from their families, all of those things are factors in desertions.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no reason to question the numbers that they used?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I question any numbers. I do not know what they are based on.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Steele suggests, I think, that the desertions have increased as the war becomes more Americanized. That would be a logical conclusion, I suppose, would it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Well, I would be doubtful about the logic in these matters. I would think it would be primarily emotional. But I respect Jack Steele's very fine report. I simply do not know the basic figures. I read the story. Probably somebody else could develop another set of figures.

The CHAIRMAN. So you can just take your choice and get any kind of figures you like.

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is right.

PUBLIC FAITH IN OPINION POLLS

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know Mr. Deakin who covers the White House for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have met him; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He wrote an article which says:

Although Mr. Johnson personally retains his lofty standing in the polls, a public-

Broadcasting System showed that 67 percent of the American people believe that their government only "sometimes" tells the truth about the Vietnam situation. Thirteen percent said they thought they "almost never" get the truth in official statements about Vietnam, 15 percent said "the government always tells the truth, and 5 percent had no opinion.

It is a rather bad situation for the American people to have such doubt about their information, is it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. If your basic assumption is the assumption that that poll is correct, it certainly would be. However, I question it.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think the poll is correct?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have great skepticism about polls since 1948.

The CHAIRMAN. All polls, or just the recent polls?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No; I have great suspicion about polls.

RELEASE OF BOMBING PHOTOGRAPHS

The CHAIRMAN. Area photographs of bombing results in Hanoi and Haiphong seem to have been made freely available to the press. Have photos of other bombing raids over Vietnam been released to newsmen without restriction?

Mr. SYLVESTER. We have released pictures of other air activities from the air and their effects. Off the top of my head, I cannot answer. I would be glad to make a check on that.

The CHAIRMAN. It is my understanding that journalists have been strictly excluded from accompanying flyers on bombing raids against North Vietnam. Is that correct?

Mr. SYLVESTER. In South Vietnam?

The CHAIRMAN. North Vietnam.

Mr. SYLVESTER. We have not had newsmen on attack aircraft going to North Vietnam. A large percentage of those aircraft are single-seaters. The remainder are two-seaters. In addition, the search and rescue problems involved are very great. For these and other basic reasons, newsmen have not covered attacks on North Vietnam.

There is a problem also of what their status would be if captured, what would happen to them, et cetera.

The CHAIRMAN. Newsmen do accompany flyers in South Vietnam?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, sir; and on B-52 raids from Guam.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, that is a practical consideration?

Mr. SYLVESTER. It is exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. The danger and so forth.

Mr. SYLVESTER. The danger and the lack of room on one-seaters; a question of whether the two-seaters should be used for these men. There are search and rescue problems.

RECENT CAMBODIAN BORDER INCIDENT

The CHAIRMAN. We had a situation in Cambodia recently leading to at least one diplomatic rebuff. You are familiar with that, I take it.

I shall refresh your memory. First, we denied quite categorically that the United States had bombed any Cambodian village. Then we denied that the particular village was in Cambodia. Next we read the maps again and decided it was in Cambodia. So we then agreed that we had done what Cambodia had said we had done in the first place.

How do you explain this kind of operation?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Without reference to that specific incident, it seems to me that maps that are available, regardless of whose they are—Cambodian maps, South Vietnamese maps, our own maps—that are certainly something less than precise on the boundary. This leads to that sort of problem, I would say.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me it would have been much better to resolve the indecision in favor of saying "We are sorry if we did, we apologize," rather than doing what we did. It resulted in a cancellation of the trip of Ambassador Harriman, did it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am afraid you are out of my field on that.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in the press. I did not mean you had responsibility for that.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I was not ducking it; I merely meant the details of it. I read the story. I do not know that that was the reason, but I read the story.

FREE TRANSPORTATION FOR JOURNALISTS IN 1965

The CHAIRMAN. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense in 1965 provided free transportation to Vietnam for about 80 American journalists. Is that correct?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes; I testified to that in my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you state why you thought it necessary to send 80 American journalists?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes; I gave three reasons in that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you refresh my memory on that?

Mr. SYLVESTER (reading):

Back in 1964 this situation was considerably different. Then, there were only about 40 newsmen, including foreign journalists, in Vietnam. As a consequence there was considerable concern within the Defense Department that the people of the United States were not receiving adequate factual information concerning our efforts in Vietnam.

To assist in remedying this situation we began, in July 1964, a temporary program to transport U.S. correspondents to Vietnam. We had three main reasons for this program: (1) to give U.S.-based newsmen a better understanding of Vietnam and our involvement there, (2) to help assure a balanced output of on-the-scene news, and (3) to stimulate the news media to send experienced reporters to Vietnam under their own sponsorship.

The concept called for transporting two to four newsmen every four weeks for a stay of approximately ten days each. Selection was based on requests for participation, the type of media concerned and the geographical spread of the media involved. Except for transportation, all other costs were paid by the news media.

The program began on July 17, 1964, and we sent 82 newsmen to Vietnam before we terminated the program in August of 1965. These newsmen came from large and small newspapers and newspaper groups, wire services, syndicates, magazines of all types, and TV and radio stations and networks. Every part of the nation was represented.

The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand that it was for 10 days only?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Even though they paid their own expenses?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Precisely.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did you limit it to 10 days?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Because our capability to maintain a continuous flow of newsmen during that time and at the same time try to meet the tremendous number of requests resulted in 10 days being about the best period of time for which we could guarantee transportation back

as well as out. If they wanted to stay on—and a number did—then, although we would pay transportation out and return, they had to arrange their own flight, seat, and whatnot. But for an orderly operation we could not go much beyond the 10-day period and guarantee return.

TRANSFER OF AIR FORCE INFORMATION OFFICER

The CHAIRMAN. Here is another story I thought you perhaps should clarify if you can.

In the Washington Post on August 11 this story reports that a basic disagreement had broken out between the U.S. military and an Air Force captain in Saigon. This story is written by Mr. William Tuohy. You probably know who he is.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Los Angeles Times?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The article says:

The controversy surfaced when it was learned that the highly regarded Air Force Information Chief, Colonel William J. McGinty, is being summarily transferred from Saigon to a non-information post in Washington.

His information policy ran afoul of the Military High Command information office in Saigon, where frankness and efficiency are in chronic short supply.

How would you comment on that article? Is it correct?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would say first that Mr. Tuohy apparently lost an important source of information. That would be my first comment. I am not aware of what the case of the colonel's—Colonel McGinty, is it?

The CHAIRMAN. Col. William J. McGinty.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am not aware of what, for what reason the Air Force transferred him, if they did.

The CHAIRMAN. Is not the Air Force information office under you?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It is entirely independent?

Mr. SYLVESTER. All of the information effort within MACV reports through Colonel Bankson, but the replacement and removal and assignment and changing of Air Force officers, does not come under me.

The CHAIRMAN. So you think this story is probably motivated by Mr. Tuohy's friendship for McGinty?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not want to make any comments.

The CHAIRMAN. You know nothing about it, in other words?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not know anything about the reason for his transfer.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see, Mr. Sylvester, on August 25 a UPI report of a story in the Santa Barbara News Press that a U.S. Army sergeant told newsmen of having helped train a battalion of North Vietnamese soldiers two months before they slipped away. Do you know anything about that story and is it accurate?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I did not hear it all, Senator. I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe this article was printed here in the Washington Daily News. As it is described here, a U.S. Army sergeant told the newsmen of having helped train a battalion of North Vietnamese soldiers for two months before they slipped away. Do you know anything about it? Is it an accurate picture?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The sergeant apparently has denied in writing the truth of the story.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it is not so, to your information?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I conclude that that is not so.

ARMY EXHIBITION AT JEFFERSON MEMORIAL

The CHAIRMAN. Here is another story. I wonder if you could say whether it is so or not so. Are you familiar with Mr. Drew Pearson's column of August 27 in which he drew attention to and described an Army exhibition of how to kill the enemy? Apparently this torchlight tattoo is being staged weekly in front of the Jefferson Memorial. Is it true that the Army is sponsoring such a program?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I believe it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you explain why they are doing it, particularly at the Jefferson Memorial?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Mr. Chairman, I got back from vacation on Monday and I pretty well devoted my time to preparing myself for this meeting with you and your colleagues. I saw the story when it was handed to me. I have not made an inquiry into why they are doing it. I intend to once I have fulfilled my obligations to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this not a part of your public relations? Apparently it is designed to have some effect upon the general public, is it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I certainly think it does, yes, Mr. Chairman. I simply do not know, and I expect to find out, which section of the Army is responsible, whether this was cleared and how it was put on. I do not know. It would certainly raise some questions in my mind.

The CHAIRMAN. It does in mine, too. I thought surely you would say this did not happen. I did not know you were going to admit it. You caught me unprepared.

The program began with one soldier attacking another from behind and strangling him with a piano wire. As the strangulation started, the Army announcer said:

The garrote. Some people feel it is old-fashioned but when pulled taut and twisted violently I can assure you it is most effective.

I cannot understand why the Army would be putting on such a program. I really did not expect you to admit you were doing it. I thought you would say "That is a figment of his imagination."

Mr. SYLVESTER. Well, my reputation for truth has been upheld.

The CHAIRMAN. It has.

Another soldier sneaked up and lunged with a huge sword at an unsuspecting Vietcong played by a marine. I cannot understand the motive of the Defense Department. Can the colonel sitting by you give us a justification for this program?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if your associate, the colonel from the Defense Department, can give us an idea why such a program is being conducted.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not think either of us has had time to delve into the details of it. I understand from what I have heard that it is a show of about 80 or 90 men and this was a very small part of it. It is the sort of demonstration that is made on Army installations and has caused some reaction, as you have noted. Apparently it is about

four or five minutes out of an hour and a half show, but it is the part that got reported.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think from reading the press about riots, and snipers and various other things, that the general public is sufficiently belligerent and warlike already without being encouraged in violence?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Senator, without knowing all the facts about this show, and assuming, which is a bad assumption, that this story is correct, there would be a great question in my mind whether I would put it on. I would have grave doubts about putting it on. But I do not want to be in a position of responding to something which I have not had an opportunity to see, hear, or get into. But on the face of it, it appears to be something that I think would be better used on military facilities, installations, and training grounds.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me how long it has been going on?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The show itself?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I cannot.

The CHAIRMAN. Apparently, it had not been going on long enough to attract attention. Was the first you heard of it in Drew Pearson's column?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That was the first I heard about it.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the first I heard of it, too.

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, I think I recall an armed services night show in the armory a few years ago in which a part of the show was a demonstration—it may not have been of refined techniques of killing such as these—but as I remember, that program had a demonstration of a mock battle with killing. So this evidently has been going on by way of public display for some time, has it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Senator, I simply do not know the facts. I cannot answer the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sylvester, you are an old experienced man in this field.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Certainly old.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not mean that. To me you are very young because we are about the same age.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I consider that young, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean you have had long experience in journalism. That is what I mean to say.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, sir.

REASSURING AMERICAN PUBLIC ABOUT NEWS

The CHAIRMAN. I realize there is great competition in this field and that journalists, I am sure, are as sensitive as other people to any kind of slight. But is there anything you can think of that might be done to reassure the American people that the news is not being managed? Do you have any suggestion at all that might be made to reconcile some of these journalists who have complained so bitterly about it with some, as you have already said, who do not complain at all? I do not know that I believe in polls. I do believe very much in the integrity of representatives of some of the great newspapers, and I do not think Mr. Deakin would deliberately mislead us. Even if the poll is only half right, it is a very serious matter that so many American

people think they only sometimes get the truth. Do you have any suggestions or comments you would like to make on this problem?

Mr. SYLVESTER. If you are asking me to address myself to managed news—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, and how would you disabuse the public's mind that it is managed news? You say it is not. It looks as if we could do a better job of communicating what you are really doing if the news were not managed.

Mr. SYLVESTER. First, I would suggest that the only place where news is managed, the only place where it can be managed, the only place here it should be managed and is managed, is in every news office. Newspapers have managing editors. That is their job. Television and radio news departments have, too. That is the only place that I know of where news can be managed, is managed, and should be managed.

But I think that the use of the term "managed news" on the part of government has never really been taken apart and examined. If you ask somebody what he means, I have yet to find a definition or a case history of what is being talked about. If I, as a reporter, could use a phrase like "managed news" to heat somebody on the heat while the thought that I could get something out of him that I could not obtain otherwise, it would be an effective technique. But it does not happen to be true.

It frankly puzzles me. I do not know what "managed news" means.

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.

INTERPRETATION OF SECRETARY McNAMARA'S REMARKS

Senator McCARTHY. I think it was last February that the Secretary of Defense appeared before this committee and said that the estimate of the capacity of the North Vietnamese to infiltrate support troops into South Vietnam after the resumption of bombing was up to 4,500 a month. He again appeared before our committee some four or five months later. The report was that they were then infiltrating 5,000 to 7,000 a month. When asked about the "up to 4,500," he said that when he said "up to 4,500," it did not mean that that was the limit. He said the number might be π .

Now, how would you have read it, if you were a member of the Senate committee listening to him, or interpreting his remarks, when he said "up to 4,500"? Would you have assumed that that was an upper limit, or did "up to 4,500" mean, as the Secretary later said, π ?

Mr. SYLVESTER. If I had been following the situation in Vietnam as he has, if I had had the opportunity to do it since 1961, it would have meant to me that the figure was valid as of that time. It would have also meant that that was the best estimate that the intelligence people had at that time, and that the intelligence people in Vietnam—in Saigon—attempt to be as precise as they can.

Senator McCARTHY. So that we should not have assumed that the resumption of bombing was really going to necessarily slow down or set a top limit on the number of troops that might be infiltrated, even though he said that up to 4,500 was what at least we thought he meant as an upper limit. But he came in later and said "up to" does not mean "up to." "Up to" means " π ."

Mr. SYLVESTER. I cannot very well—
 Senator McCARTHY. You have to interpret his remarks, do you not?
 Mr. SYLVESTER. I cannot very well speak for the Secretary of Defense.

Senator McCARTHY. We are trying to get help.
 Mr. SYLVESTER. I shall be glad to help any way I can.
 Senator McCARTHY. That is what I am asking you. I am trying to interpret this particular remark. I was surprised when he said "Up to does not mean an upper limit."

Mr. SYLVESTER. I was in Saigon with him at the time that we were briefed, and he was briefed by the intelligence people. That was the figure that they gave. But I think that of all figures, in view of the way you have to get information—

Senator McCARTHY. I think he should have said in February that we do not know how many, that we are going to resume bombing whether it is going to have any effect or not. But this is the approach used which has led to what we refer to as the credibility gap. This issue, which now concerns the Senate, I think would be much less serious if the Secretary had spoken differently.

CONTINGENCY STUDIES OF WAR

There have been a number of newspaper stories to the effect that the executive branch is conducting contingency studies of the war, the number of troops needed, the cost, and so on. These stories have been denied officially several times. Should we accept these denials? Could you say whether or not the administration is conducting contingency studies as to the number of troops that will be needed in Vietnam, the possible duration of the war, and the possible cost of the war?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I would not attempt to discuss what the studies and contingency plans are. If you are referring, and you may be, to a story out of Vietnam that there were contingency plans for a number of troops, the fact is that, to the best of my knowledge and that of the best sources that I can get in the Defense Department, there is no authority for that figure or any other figure.

Senator McCARTHY. Does that mean there are no studies, or does that mean the studies indicate it is open end? You say there are no studies which have said a certain number of troops. But are there studies which indicate that nobody knows the number of troops that may have to go in? That kind of study may be just as significant as one which said 400,000 or 500,000 or a million men.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am not aware of any.

NUMBER OF 500,000 TROOPS

Senator McCARTHY. Are you aware of the number of 500,000 troops which is being talked about now?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, I am aware of that number.

Senator McCARTHY. Does that have any standing at all in the Department of Defense? Is there any recognition being given to it as a ceiling or as a point that may be passed at a certain time, or as an unusually high estimate?

Mr. SYLVESTER. As the number of troops are approved, to go out there. There has been in each case historically a request from the

commander. The President has made clear that as the commander, General Westmoreland, asked for more troops, they would be provided. So far they have been provided. I cannot predict what the future will be, and I have not any idea what General Westmoreland and his colleagues will do. It is completely out of my area of knowledge.

Senator McCARTHY. You mean that the number of troops that are likely to go in there will be determined solely by the requests of General Westmoreland?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I beg your pardon?

Senator McCARTHY. You mean that the Pentagon is making no estimates, no projections?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think what you are saying would be incorrect, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are taking no part in it.

Senator McCARTHY. The 500,000 figure, is that a Westmoreland figure originally, or is this one which has—

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have no idea what the figure is. I would put no value on it one way or the other. I have not the slightest idea whether it has validity one way or the other.

Suppose tomorrow the Vietcong should cease fighting. Then the figure would certainly have no validity. I have no idea what the figure is. My guess in the past has not been worth anything.

Senator McCARTHY. The point is, you do not know whether or not, if things continue as they are, we will increase the number of troops by 200,000 as quickly as we can.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have no information, sir, that I can give you or that I should attempt to give you. I am simply ignorant. I do not, know. Figures basically in the past seem to me to be figures, news stories. I have written many of them.

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS

Senator McCARTHY. What is the current estimate of the number of the Vietnamese troops?

The CHAIRMAN. South Vietnamese?

Senator McCARTHY. Yes, South Vietnamese.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have not that figure in my head, Senator, but I think it is somewhere between 280,000 and 300,000 in their regular army. I would not want to be held to it. I would rather get the figure accurately for you.

Senator McCARTHY. I do not need it exactly. If we were to send in 500,000 and they maintained roughly the same number they have now, it would be up around 750,000 troops with a population of 15 million. That would be one soldier for every 20 people, would it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, it would.

Senator McCARTHY. Do you think that might help to control the area?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think that comments from me on this would be worthless.

Senator McCARTHY. You are dealing in ratios down there now, and you are doing your publication. You are giving us kill ratios as if they were pretty absolute. What about the ratio of one soldier to 20, to 30? How many soldiers do you think you will need to control the population of that size in that part of the world?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Senator, on the contrary, we have kept away from hard ratio figures. As a matter of fact, as I think the Secretary has testified, as I know he has testified, the question of ratio is a matter of dispute based on the judgment of different people. Any ratio figure must include consideration of the impact in Vietnam of fire-power and mobility. But for me to attempt to give you or discuss seriously what the ratio should be would simply mean that I was "talking through my hat."

Senator McCARTHY. I think there was some talk about if the kill ratio got up to four or five to one advantageous on our side, this would be significant; that if it were three to one, it was not significant. Was that a Pentagon judgment?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am not aware of the official Pentagon judgment. Again, these ratios, as hard, fixed ratios or facts, do not appeal to me very much. I do not put any faith in them one way or another. I have not seen anything to convince me what the ratio should be.

Senator McCARTHY. Can we say then that there is no real, relatively firm judgment about what we have to do to achieve what may be called a victory in Vietnam and that there is no conception as to what such a victory would be?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I would not say this. I would simply say I am not the person to talk substantively with you about it.

Senator McCARTHY. There may be one, but you do not know about it?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am not the person, really, to discuss it, because I am not fully aware of it.

MANAGEMENT OF NEWS BY EDITORS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sylvester, coming back to our discussion of a moment ago about managed news, you did not think it is managed by you or by the reporters. You seemed to leave the impression that if it is managed, it is managed by the managers of the newspapers, I suppose the news editors. Is that what you meant?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They exercise the discretion?

Mr. SYLVESTER. If you regard the flow of news today, coming from every part of the world and being provided to the news desks of every sort of news organization, and then consider the fact that the so-called white space—space available for news in newspapers and time on the air—is fixed to deciding and is decreasing; obviously there is a problem what news to use and what news not to use. In a political campaign, I would certainly bow to your experience, but newspapers in a political campaign certainly manage the news. This is the only place that I know where news can be managed. A decision has to be made about what you as a reader are going to read. You as a reader do not get everything that comes into the newspaper; you get what the editor under our system of a free press and free decision, decides that he can sell. That is the basic decision. That is the only way that I know how news can be managed.

I think the question that arises is whether news is accessible and do you have an opportunity to get at it? That is what I, as a newsman, would look for more than anything. I think by any measurement you wanted to take, by pound or liquid measure or any measure,

that the flow of news from the Pentagon in the last five years has been tremendously increased. In fact, we know it has.

The CHAIRMAN. And the selectivity as to what is used, you think, resides primarily in the news editors of the various papers?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Precisely.

MAJOR NEWSPAPERS' CONNECTION WITH TELEVISION STATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think of this suspicion on the part of the public that they do not get the truth? Could it be influenced by the fact that so many of our major newspapers have now become connected with television stations, which are more profitable enterprises, and are more sensitive to what the Government position is on any given fact? The Government has complete control, actually, over the existence of a television license, does it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I had not thought about it, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. You had not thought about it? As an old pro you should have thought about it.

Mr. SYLVESTER. That could be.

The CHAIRMAN. It could well be, could it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. It could be.

DO MANY NEWSPAPERS CRITICIZE GOVERNMENT POLICIES?

The CHAIRMAN. It is very interesting that so many of our prominent newspapers have become almost agents or adjuncts of the Government; that they do not contest or even raise questions about Government policy, isn't that true?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not find that so in my job.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have a very friendly press in Washington.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I hope we do.

The CHAIRMAN. You do. No critical articles which have come to my attention have originated in any of the local press. All that we mentioned, even the criticism in the Los Angeles Times, although affiliated with a local paper, is not the local paper's own.

I think it is remarkable how far the consensus has gone in recent years, do you not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Again, my daily life does not necessarily support that view. But we have been bolted here in Washington. I expect we will be in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. I have not been aware of it.

Mr. SYLVESTER. If you will look at my back, I have been.

The CHAIRMAN. Most of these accounts I have heard were from individual reporters in the field—CBS's Safer, Browne, to mention a few of them. There may be a degree of personal friction between you and others which affects all of us. I have experienced that myself on occasion. I have gotten into those personal differences.

But I think it is fairly obvious from the volume of criticism that there is a feeling on the part of the American people that they do not get the full truth. I suppose that has always been more or less true.

NEWSPAPERS' ASSOCIATION WITH TELEVISION STATIONS

I have regretted very much the fact that great newspapers become, in a sense, an adjunct of a great television station, which is more profitable. Generally television stations—the large ones—make more money than most newspapers, do they not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. If I answered that I would be really talking through my hat. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You have heard that, have you not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have heard it and I have seen financial statements which certainly suggest that television is profitable.

The CHAIRMAN. Once television stations become the major partner, they become very sensitive to Government regulation, do they not? Newspapers are free from this.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would say the television stations are pretty free in their reporting. I do not see signs of any sensitivity on their part.

The CHAIRMAN. In television?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I do not see it. I think radio and television people are completely free. I do not think they have one iota of this type of concern for the Government at all.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No. If they did, we are in a bad way.

The CHAIRMAN. Some people think we are in a bad way.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not, Senator.

CBS DID NOT TELEVISION VIETNAM HEARINGS

The CHAIRMAN. If the hearing before this committee does not suit everybody, it is very easy not to use it, is it not? And no one can really ever question this. These are decisions and policies that no one can prove, because they can be justified on other grounds, which you have already mentioned. But there are circumstances which raise doubts in people's minds, do they not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think that the doubts that arise in people's minds are due to a lack of access or lack of presentation to them of the full facts.

The CHAIRMAN. For example, the fact that CBS refused to televise hearings of this committee on Vietnam raised a doubt regardless of what the facts were; whether or not they were directed not to is beside the point. I certainly know nothing about it and could not suggest that they were; however, it did raise a doubt. Why did they not wish to broadcast our hearings?

Mr. SYLVESTER. One of the reasons would be that you are not offering any prizes. I do not think that you can compete with the sort of programs that turn into money. I think it is as simple as that, Mr. Chairman. I am sure you do, too.

The CHAIRMAN. One broadcasting network did do it and the other one did not. Is one more greedy or venal than the other?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I think that, again, is a demonstration of freedom of editorial decision.

The CHAIRMAN. Freedom of decision. All right.

LETTERS OF CONGRATULATIONS TO EDITORS

One last thing. You do not think a letter of congratulations from the CIA would ever affect the attitude of an editor of a newspaper, would it?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. A letter of congratulations from the CIA, or even the White House, would not affect, by any chance, the attitude of an editor of a newspaper, would it?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Not a Republican newspaper.

The CHAIRMAN. Why are Republicans more immune than Democrats?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think it depends on who the editor is and how easily he is flattered and a lot of things like that.

The CHAIRMAN. I do, too. I think a lot of things do influence the question of managed news.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we understand each other. I think that is right. And that is where the managed news comes in?

Mr. SYLVESTER. In each newspaper office, television, radio.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Government has ways of being very flattering to people who manage the news, does it not? I do not mean you particularly, but there are people who do.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Oh, I cannot think offhand—all of them are subject to—yes, a newspaperman likes to be close to sources, whether it is a Senator or a Member of the House, member of the executive branch, or what. He likes to be on the "in" and in the know, as I did and would again if I had the chance. But I think that is the most successful way of influencing newsmen—taking them in.

The CHAIRMAN. There is some difference between the availability of news to you from a Senator and, say, the Secretary of Defense, is there not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Not always.

The CHAIRMAN. For example, you do not like to talk about Thailand. I am very curious about Thailand. In fact, we have asked your Defense Department to come up and testify about Thailand. I assume you know that they are very reluctant to do it in public session at this time. You know that, do you not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, I am aware of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you been advised not to testify about it also?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I have not been advised. My own good judgment, knowing what the situation is, which I am sure you know also, would suggest to me to ask you not to ask me that in public.

FUNCTION OF THE SENATE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The CHAIRMAN. You see, this is what really presents me with a great dilemma. I feel that I was led into the Tonkin Gulf resolution, and I have only myself to blame for it because I should have been more intelligent, more farsighted, and more suspicious, but I was not and I fell for it. Now we are faced with what looks like a repetition—by that I mean, faced with a fait accompli, a situation that we have to take. If I have any responsibility at all as chairman of this committee, I think we ought to know what we are getting into and to have an

opportunity to express our opinion about it. I do not know what other function this committee and the Senate should perform in the field of foreign relations unless it is to give some kind of opinion and advice. Certainly we were not created and are not paid to be a rubberstamp. I do not want to be a rubberstamp if I can help it. That is the only reason I want to know what the administration has in mind in Thailand; that is all. It is just that simple. It is not idle curiosity.

I want to know what the obligations and commitments are and how far the administration is going to go. Are we going to have another Vietnam there? I really think we are entitled to know it, or the Senate ought to just give up any pretense of being a junior partner, even, in this advise-and-consent aspect of foreign relations.

Do you see what I mean? Do you think that is an unreasonable attitude on the part of a Senator?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Not in the least. On the contrary, I concur completely.

The CHAIRMAN. Obviously, we are having some difficulty. I do not wish to violate any security. I do not want to give the enemy anything. I am not at all sure as I look back on the Tonkin Gulf resolution, that it would have prejudiced our case at all. I think it would have been a great service to the country if we had had very thorough hearings on what we were getting into. But I have already apologized for that publicly. I shall not repeat it.

The Senator from Pennsylvania?

VIEWS OF NEWS POLICY IN VIETNAM

Senator CLARK. Mr. Sylvester, I would like to make an observation which you may or may not want to comment on. I have no questions.

In my judgment, our news policy in Vietnam is barbarous, revolting, manipulated, lacking in candor, and largely responsible for the growing gap in credibility as to the point of view of the administration all over the country. I do not know whether you or USIA paid the transportation expenses of all these reporters that went over and who write back pretty much as trained seals what they were told in Vietnam. I thank God for the free American press, for television, and for photography which, despite official policy, is keeping open to the American people a reasonably good flow of information as to what is actually going on in Vietnam. I congratulate you on one thing, and that is that you have not yet imposed censorship.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Senator, you have made some very serious charges without documentation. I realize they are your views. I think they are ill founded in relation to the facts.

I think that your Government, as the testimony that I have tried to give here shows, has made it possible for newsmen of all kinds to cover this war in a way that no other war has ever been covered. I suggest that you are libeling a large number of newsmen by suggesting that they can be bought for a plane ride to Vietnam and back. I do not believe it, and I do not think there is any record to show that they do.

I do not believe, for example, that the Philadelphia Bulletin was bought when they had one of their men go that way or was any other big paper. I would say we are in complete disagreement.

Senator CLARK. I would only reply that the documentation, in my opinion, is to be found in the daily pages of the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Philadelphia Bulletin. I know that you cannot buy John McCullough but I am not sure that all the other reporters are in that same category.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would like the record to show that there are very many more than John, whom I admire greatly, but I would put with him scores of reporters who have been there and are doing a very fine job. I think if you have the time to examine into each one, your judgment would not be quite as harsh as it is.

Senator CLARK. I notice in the article printed about you in the New York Times on Wednesday, August 31, that it is said that you always like to have the last word, and I am quite content to give it to you.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, Mr. Sylvester, it is a very complicated thing. I do not quite agree, myself, with the Senator from Pennsylvania's baldly stated idea that people are bought by such things.

POLICY OF PRESS REGARDING FREE TRAVEL

But let me refer to an exchange we had here with Mr. Marks. USIA pays the way of foreign correspondents abroad. You know that?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. The Washington Star is extremely critical of the chairman of this committee; it says that the Senator is seeming to try to impose American press ethics on foreign nations. Then it goes on, "This newspaper, in common with most of the Nation's major newspapers, makes it a practice not to travel on Government-provided transportation whenever there is commercial transportation available."

In other words, they would not take a free ride from here to Vietnam but they would from Saigon out to the field, because that is the only transportation available. I think that is a fairly commonly accepted principle, and I do not think this means that anybody who did take one was necessarily prejudiced in his reporting.

As a matter of fact, I agree with what you said. I find very little evidence, if any, that reporters, either here or abroad, distort the news themselves. I think they report it as they see it. The change results as a matter of individual policy. I do not wish to question the motives of the editors. They have their policies and beliefs. If they believe in one approach to a major activity, then they believe it is their duty to report it as they see it, as all of us do, through our own colored glasses. I think it is a fact of life. I do not mean to question the motives of the local newspapers or anybody else.

It is a fact of life that one of their major operations, television, is subject to Government regulation. This has nothing to do, I think, with the morality of the owners. But if they are going to take a position for or against a particular Government policy, I think they are bound to be influenced by what they think is important and what ought to be printed. I do not think this is any particular reflection upon their ethics.

DID THE WASHINGTON STAR ACCEPT GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION?

Some of the most reputable institutions are very careful about becoming entangled, just as is the Star. However, much as I disagree with their attitude, this is what I think is the common feeling by great newspapers. Do you not agree with what the Star says?

Mr. SYLVESTER. In what part, that the Star does not accept transportation support, you mean?

The CHAIRMAN. That this newspaper, in common with many of the Nation's major newspapers, makes it a practice not to travel on Government-provided transportation whenever there is commercial transportation available.

Do you think that is true, not just peculiar to the Star? Or can you tell me did the Star accept transportation from you?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I can tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. Did it?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes. There is hardly a single big newspaper in the United States that did not.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about within Vietnam.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am not talking about that, either.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there commercial transportation available?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Of course.

The CHAIRMAN. Then this report was quite wrong.

I may say it is not the first time I have found the paper to be in error, but on other subjects.

One of the great papers in my State takes this position and I happen to know they were offered, not by you, but by the executive branch, a free trip and they turned it down on the basis that "we will pay our own way."

REPORTING FROM VIETNAM IN 1964

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think you have to look at it, as I pointed out in my statement, in terms of time. In 1964 we did not have very many men out there and Vietnam is 12,000 miles away. It goes, in a sense, as you said about the Tonkin Gulf, that if you could do today what you did then, have another opportunity, you might look at it differently. The newspapers of our country, the news media of our country, were not paying very much attention to Vietnam.

In fact, they were not spending very much money on covering it. The coverage was by young men and by lower priced help. That is why we invited major news organizations in the country to go out and look for themselves. Then, as the conflict escalated, the newspapers, radio, television, magazines, everyone else devoted a tremendous amount of resources and money to their coverage of it. What we attempted to do in 1964 was to interest them in it, and they were not interested at that time.

As a matter of fact, of all the choices they had to make in respect to the expenditure of their money, Vietnam was way down on the list. Now it is way up on the list. They see nothing that they have committed themselves to, nor has it affected anybody's reporting.

The CHAIRMAN. We are not talking about reporting now. We are talking about how the newspaper manages it. I agree with you that that is where it is managed.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Again, in using the word "managing" the news at home, I see nothing evil in it. You cannot put out a news operation unless you manage it.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not say news managing was evil. We were trying to figure out whether the news is managed or not and how it is done.

NEWSPAPERS WHO ACCEPTED FREE TRANSPORTATION

I do not want to leave this record incomplete by simply asking if the Star accepted a trip. I have to ask, did the Washington Post also accept your favors?

Mr. SYLVESTER. An adjunct of the Post, Newsweek did. Post Newsweek did.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the other adjunct, WTOP? They have lots of adjuncts.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not recall that. I have the list and could make it available to you, if you wish.

The CHAIRMAN. It clears up one point, that this is a myth—a myth that the editor of the Star ought to be aware of so he will not write such foolish editorials at the same time that his newspaper is accepting these free junkets.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not know, but I do not see any intentional misrepresentation on their part whatsoever.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think it is intentional. He just did not know what his own newspaper was doing.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not accuse him of doing anything intentional. I think that is the same when he writes about me; he just does not know any better.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am in the same boat.

WHAT IS CONSIDERED MANAGED NEWS?

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to clarify what you said managed news is, what it consists of. Do you think if the White House should call an editor and publisher and complain bitterly about a news article and they responded, would this be considered managed news or not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would rather not involve myself in the White House, because I have always been very careful not to.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a hypothetical question.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Well, if you will accept a change to the Defense Department.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, if the Defense Department did.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would approach my answer from my own operation as a newsman. I feel very strongly and did feel very strongly that if you or any other Senator took an exception to my reporting, you would have that right and should exercise that right to report to my superiors. I would have felt better if you had asked me first, but if you did not, I would not get emotional about it. I think anybody has a right to raise a question about such a story, any Government official, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that remark attributed to you, that you do not care what a reporter thought since you had access to his publisher? Is that a true statement?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I do care for what the reporters think, when you go to an editor, you want to be very sure of your ground, because his basic reaction is to support the reporter, if he is good. I expected to be supported by my editors and usually was. Every man in this room expects to be supported by his editor.

You should have very good ground if you go. You cannot go over the head of reporters in the field, to their editors unless you have a very good factual case.

The CHAIRMAN. You feel, then, as I understand it, that the Secretary of State is within his rights and should call up a publisher if he disagrees with an article, and complain about it and set him right?

Mr. SYLVESTER. If he has gotten no satisfaction from the reporter.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean. Then, if he does respond properly, it would also be quite proper for him to invite him over to lunch and have a nice private chat.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would prefer that method.

The CHAIRMAN. So you work it both ways; you have the carrot and the stick?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Definitely.

The CHAIRMAN. I think this would apply to all departments of Government. It is not peculiar to yours.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I can only speak for my own, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been around for awhile.

Mr. SYLVESTER. It is difficult to step out of the character of an official, but if that is possible, I would say my answer to that in 1960 would have been yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it still is the custom. I do not know if there is anything you can do, or if anything should be done about it. I think it is well to know about these things. It is like the Foreign Agents Registration Act. We do not prohibit agents from representing a foreign nation, but we do require, by law, that they are put on record so that we know how their activities are carried out.

PUBLIC'S UNDERSTANDING OF NEWS MANAGEMENT

I think it is very reassuring to the American people to know how the news is managed, as you have described it, and I think you have made a good contribution. And if news management is a fact, since it is obvious that it not only is, but is always going to be, it is good to know that there is absolutely no possibility of avoiding it or preventing it. Knowing about it, we can evaluate the news more accurately. Would you not agree with that?

Mr. SYLVESTER. If I were a wiser man, I would not have gotten into this, but I do agree with it. Yes, I think that is obvious.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not wish to have an attitude of criticism. All I was trying to do was review as much as I could. I do not know if news management is subject to ethical judgment. It is the way we operate. We may as well accept it.

Do you have anything else you would like to say?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Only to thank you very much for giving us this opportunity and for the very fair treatment I have had.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope it is. We are flooded, as all of us are, with all of these stories. I can understand how conflicts arise. Some of them do not look very good in print. I had an idea you would have

some explanation to make, even though there may be some truth in it, that there are always personal conflicts. Goodness knows, public life is made up of them, and it is a matter of degree how far you go. I think you have made a real contribution, telling us how the news actually is managed.

Thank you.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the hearing adjourned.)

APPENDIX

AMPLIFICATION OF LEGAL MEMORANDUM

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
Office of the Director,
Washington, September 8, 1966.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In the absence of Mr. Marks, I have been requested to respond to your letter of August 29, 1966 requesting amplification of the legal authorities cited to your Committee in support of the Agency's program of sponsoring tours to Southeast Asia by foreign newsmen.

As stated in the legal memorandum submitted to your Committee, our basic authority is Section 501 of the U.S. Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948 (Public Law 402—80th Congress). That Section defines the authorized mission of the Agency "To provide for the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the United States, its people, and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media . . ."

This Section of the law constitutes the authority under which all informational activities of the Agency are conducted. Materials prepared under this authority about United States activities and policies in any sector of the world for use in all media of communications, radio, press, television, motion pictures, etc., are disseminated abroad by any available means which will give the widest possible distribution. When feasible, local media within a particular country are used. This not only assures broad distribution but enhances the credibility of the information disseminated.

Agency supported travel of foreign newsmen to areas of the world, particularly where United States policy is in controversy, is an effective and economical program activity. By this means our story is told in newspapers of key countries by local reporters who write about what they have seen and heard.

Funds appropriated for USIA program activities have been used in past years for this and similar programs. The appropriation committees of the Congress have been made aware of the program. For example, in testimony before the House and Senate Appropriations Committees (FY 1963) about the Berlin situation, former director Edward R. Murrow recorded what this Agency had done.

In his testimony before the House Appropriations Committee (for Fiscal Year 1963) Mr. Murrow stated:

"We have cooperated with the Berlin Government in bringing hundreds of foreign leaders and journalists to the city for a personal look." (emphasis supplied) (Page 22 House Hearings, FY 1963)

Further, in hearings before the House Appropriations Committee (Fiscal Year 1960) a statement submitted for the record in justification of budget requests for the European area contained the following statement:

"One of the tested methods of obtaining desirable coverage in foreign publications is the arranging of conducted tours for editors, government officials, and other opinion leaders not only within the United States but also to NATO installations in Europe, Berlin, and to United States Navy ships in or near European ports. Resultant published items—photographs, articles, and books—have reached all types of audience." (emphasis supplied) (Page 127 House Hearings FY 1966)

Tours of foreign newsmen to key areas of the world exemplify how this method is put into practice.

As you were informed, this program is funded, where possible, with excess foreign currencies. This consists of paying transportation costs from excess currency countries which have agreed to the use of its currencies for travel.

The Department of State has negotiated such agreements with six countries, India, Israel, Pakistan, UAR, Yugoslavia, and Tunisia. Expenditures for these costs are, of course, made against the special foreign currency appropriation included in our annual appropriation act. The provisions for Fiscal Year 1960 (P.L. 86-164) reads as follows:

"For payments in foreign currencies which the Treasury Department determines to be excess to the normal requirements of the United States and for payments in Brazilian cruzeiros, for necessary expenses of the United States Information Agency, as authorized by law, \$11,112,000, to remain available until expended. Estimated travel cost chargeable to these funds are included each year in our budget estimates for foreign currency appropriation.

I hope the foregoing will clarify the Agency's legal authority for this program. Sincerely,

HOWARD L. CHERNOFF,
Executive Assistant to the Director.

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D.C., September 23, 1960.

B-150083.

Hon. J. W. Fulbright,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in reference to your letter of August 20, 1960, enclosing for our attention a copy of a memorandum which the United States Information Agency provided the Committee on Foreign Relations as legal justification for that Agency's program of supporting tours in Southeast Asia by foreign newsmen. Such tours, it is reported, are funded with excess foreign currencies wherever possible. You request our views both on the validity of the memorandum and on the Agency's program of subsidizing foreign newsmen.

Section 501 of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, 60 Stat. 9, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 1461, cited in the memorandum as the basic authority under which all informational activities of the Agency are conducted, contains the general authorization "to provide for the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the United States, its people, and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers and instructors abroad." In addition reference is made in the Agency memorandum to section 1005 of the act, 22 U.S.C. 1437, directing the utilization, to the maximum extent practicable, of private agencies.

Under these broad statutory directives, the Agency, as indicated in the memorandum and as shown by its actions, has determined that the facilitation of travel by foreign newsmen to Vietnam will promote reporting that will be objective and give a balanced account of the United States Government actions and policies. Appropriations are made available to the agency for "expenses necessary to enable the United States Information Agency, as authorized by Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act (75 Stat. 527), and the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. 1431 et seq.) to carry out international information activities . . ." (Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and related agencies Appropriation Act, 1960, 70 Stat. 620). Also, authority for payment in foreign currencies is provided in the same act as follows:

"BALANCE AND EXPENSES (SPECIAL FOREIGN CURRENCY PROGRAM)

"For payments in foreign currencies which the Treasury Department determines to be excess to the normal requirements of the United States and for payments in Brazilian cruzeiros, for necessary expenses of the United States Information Agency, as authorized by law, \$11,112,000, to remain available until expended."

Article I, section 9, clause 7, of the Constitution states that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law," and section 3078, Revised Statutes, 31 U.S.C. 638, provides:

"Except as otherwise provided by law, moneys appropriated for the various branches of expenditure in the public service shall be applied solely to the objects for which they are respectively made, and for no other."

Generally, the Congress in making appropriations leaves largely to administrative discretion the choice of ways and means to accomplish the objects of the appropriation. Administrative discretion may not, of course, transcend the statutes, nor be exercised in conflict with law, nor for the accomplishment of purposes unauthorized by the appropriation. The expending of funds to facilitate tours of foreign newsmen to Vietnam with the expectation that such will be an effective means of disseminating information abroad about the United States does not, in our opinion, transcend the statutes here involved nor conflict with law. As to whether it is one of the ways contemplated for carrying out the object for which appropriations are provided, an examination of the legislative history of the appropriation for the fiscal year 1960 discloses the following statement in the budget justification as set forth on page 127 of the hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, on Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1960:

"One of the easiest methods of obtaining desirable coverage in foreign publications is the arranging of conducted tours for editors, government officials, and other opinion leaders, not only within the United States but also to NATO installations in Europe, to Berlin, and to U.S. Navy ships in or near European ports. Itemized published items—photos, articles, and books—have reached all types of audiences."

As to the above reference to "tested methods" we note that it has been in use at least since 1902, for on page 22 of the hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, on the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1903, the late Mr. Edward H. Murray, former Director, stated to the Subcommittee that "We have cooperated with the Berlin Government in bringing hundreds of foreign leaders and journalists to the city for a personal look." In the hearings on the same appropriations before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Mr. Murray stated, concerning on page 406, that "In cooperation with the West German Government we arranged to send large numbers of journalists, editors, and reporters to Berlin, in order to let them see for themselves what was happening. We also spent large amounts for films and television to exploit the Berlin wall." The Agency's program of supporting tours in Southeast Asia of foreign newsmen is a continuation of this method. Under these circumstances it is our view that funds appropriated for the Agency are available for supporting such tours.

In regard to funding the program from excess foreign currencies, as you know, the United States has accumulated substantial amounts of foreign currencies throughout the world principally through the sale of surplus agricultural products under the provisions of Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (commonly known as Public Law 460). Under this program the Department of State enters into agreements with foreign countries which provide for the sale of United States agricultural commodities for foreign currencies. Where possible the instant program is financed from such funds and in this connection the Agency advised us that the Department of State has negotiated agreements with India, Israel, Pakistan, UAR, Yugoslavia, and Tunisia, whereby excess currencies may be used to pay transportation costs. The use of such currencies in lieu of United States dollars for the payment of travel costs is consistent with efforts being made to alleviate the balance-of-payments problem facing the United States today. So in this connection our report to Congress on failure to effectively utilize excess United States-owned foreign currencies to pay international air travel ticket costs being paid in dollars, B-140749, April 15, 1965, a copy of which is enclosed for your ready reference. The fact that the expenses of the tours are being paid to the extent possible from excess foreign currencies does not circumvent congressional control since estimated travel costs are included each year in the budget estimates for the foreign currency appropriation, and a special foreign currency appropriation is included in the annual appropriation acts. The appropriation provided for the Agency for fiscal year 1960, hereinabove quoted, would in our opinion be properly chargeable with costs of tours such as here concerned.

Sincerely yours,

ELMER H. STAAR,
Comptroller General of the United States.

Enclosure.

1 On file with the Committee on Foreign Relations.

EXAMPLES OF USIA REPORTING CONCERNING NEWS MANAGEMENT AND CENSORSHIP

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY, Washington, September 20, 1968.

Hon. J. W. Fulbright, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At the appearance of Mr. Leonard H. Marks before your Committee on August 17, 1968, he was asked to provide examples of reporting by USIA concerning "news management and censorship".

We submit material that was broadcast on the news programs of the Voice of America and sent to all of our posts by our Press Service. The example enclosed concerned hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the material was reported on February 4, 1968.

We also submit samples on the subject "Freedom of the Press" carried on the Voice of America news and current affairs features at various times during 1965. Sincerely,

RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, Jr., General Counsel.

Enclosures.

SENATE ON VIETNAM—FEBRUARY 4, 1968

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee began a searching inquiry into the Vietnamese situation. It questioned U.S. AID Administrator David Bell and his assistant, Rutherford Potts, for much of the day at a session that was nationally televised.

And next week it is scheduled to hear Defense Secretary McNamara and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—General Earle Wheeler.

A request from Mr. McNamara and the general that the hearing be private for security reasons drew protests from several Senators. Senator Wayne Morse called it "government by secrecy" and said the American public has the right to know everything.

Committee Chairman Fulbright said he understood the problem but would not predict what the committee would vote to do.

He told newsmen there is no war between the committee and the administration. He said the Senators are simply trying to find out what is going on.

AID Administrator Bell during his appearance said the current situation in Vietnam is about the same as a year ago. But he said he still believes that the allies can overcome the enemy if current efforts to reach a negotiated settlement should fail.

He said the United States is in Vietnam resisting aggression in the interest of peace. And he pointed out that in this work the South Vietnamese are furnishing the most men and suffering the greatest casualties.

Mr. Bell contrasted America's economic help to South Vietnam with the use of terror by the Communists.

At the White House a spokesman said in answer to a question that President Johnson feels the Senate Committee is performing its responsibilities by conducting the hearings.

At his news conference, however, the President defended the right of Mr. McNamara and General Wheeler to testify in closed session.

SENATE HEARINGS—FEBRUARY 4, 1968

The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee today began a public inquiry into the Nation's Vietnam policy. It heard testimony today from U.S. Foreign Aid Director David Bell.

Committee Chairman William Fulbright had invited Defense Secretary McNamara and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Earle Wheeler to testify at

a public hearing on Monday. But Mr. McNamara said an open meeting would not be in the national interest.

Senator Wayne Morse—a leading critic of U.S. policy in Vietnam—challenged Mr. McNamara's statement and demanded an open hearing. The Oregon Democrat was backed by other committee members in his request. Senator Morse said a closed hearing would be government by secrecy.

At today's hearing, Mr. Bell told the committee that the United States is in Vietnam "resisting aggression in the interest of peace."

He said that only a combination of economic aid and military action can bring peace and security to South Vietnam * * *. That these objectives cannot be achieved by military means alone.

The Foreign Aid official also said most of the 400,000 people in refugee camps had fled from Vietcong terrorism and not from damage resulting from Allied military action.

In answer to questions by Chairman Fulbright, Mr. Bell said he had found considerable support in South Vietnam for the Saigon government. He also agreed that some past statements by U.S. officials about an improving outlook in South Vietnam were more optimistic than the facts justified. He said the current situation is about the same as a year ago.

VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS FEATURES

FEBRUARY 7, 1968.

SPECIAL FEATURE—FREEDOM OF THE PRESS NO. 4

THE WASHINGTON POST

(Tape inserts available in program documentation unit)

ANNOUNCER. The Voice of America now presents another in a series of programs on "Freedom of the Press." Today, this freedom in relation to a daily newspaper is discussed by the editor of the Washington Post.

NARRATOR. The right to a free press was guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This freedom was vital to the success of the American Revolution; today, when mass media of communication reach into the farthest corners of the world it is a vital factor in world understanding. Is news in the United States really free, uncontrolled by federal and local government? If so, how is this freedom maintained? How does it work?

For a discussion of these and other questions concerning freedom to print and speak the news in the United States, the Voice of America has gathered the views of responsible editors in press, radio and television.

James Wiggins is the editor of a respected and influential daily newspaper, the Washington Post, published in the nation's capital.

NARRATOR. The Washington Post is a substantial newspaper in every sense of the word. It carries its name across the eight-column front page in the traditional Gothic lettering, still favored by most of the older newspapers. Its daily edition may run to fifty or more pages, arranged in a number of separate sections giving full coverage to international news, local area news, business, sports, entertainment, diplomatic and social activities and so on. In its news presentation it is moderate with the stability of outlook built up through its eighty-year history. In the words of Mister Wiggins—

Tape—Wiggins:

"It pursues a policy of an independent paper above any party affiliations and seldom endorses national candidates for office. It usually tries to discuss the ideas and the principles of government and avoid a personal approach to politics."

NARRATOR. Such a newspaper with such a policy can be found in most, if not all, of the large cities in the United States but, in one respect, the Washington Post is different. It's a matter of geography. For the Post is published in the nation's capital. Its readership includes a high proportion of U.S. government workers and representatives of every foreign government which maintains diplomatic relations with this country. Also, the Post is the only morning newspaper in Washington, so the question that is obviously going to be asked is: does the paper cater to its special audience? Is it a vehicle for the views of the administration? Mister Wiggins—

Tape: Wiggins:

"There are no newspapers in America that have..."

NARRATOR. So the *Washington Post* is not influenced by the administration; it is not either wholly or in part supported by the state, nor can it be deprived of its legitimate commercial support. That is, the circulation cannot be restricted, its advertising revenues cannot be controlled, nor can its supply of newsprint be tampered with.

Tape: WIGGINS:

"I have no knowledge of this occurring anywhere in America or anywhere in America's past. The newsprint rate is quite uniform and standard. It is a commercial rate fixed by the market and the government does not distribute newsprint."

NARRATOR. So here is the capital's morning newspaper, read by foreign diplomats and federal employees and the government can't make any use of it—either to publish or suppress news stories.

If you were to glance through a copy of the *Washington Post*, however, you would probably notice one characteristic which identifies it with the area in which it is read. Compared with some other newspapers, it devotes a great deal of space to international news and to the actual workings of government—the debates in Congress, developments in the various federal agencies, statements of ministers and congressmen and, of course, the President himself. As Mister Wiggins points out, such items have a definite news value.

Tape: WIGGINS:

"The papers frankly put a very high estimation on the news value of official utterances by the government, at least by the President. I would say that the major newspapers feel a strong compulsion to convey the essence of what the President says on almost any occasion, but, in no case, does the government possess or use the power to require newspapers, in order to stay in existence, to publish anything that is furnished them by the government. The press possesses the right both affirmatively and negatively to be free. They have the right to print what they want to print and not to print as well."

NARRATOR. There is one thing the government is free to do in regard to the press. It has the right to criticize a publication; just as a publication has the right to criticize the government—its own or that of another country.

Tape: WIGGINS:

"There are, of course, frequent conversations between our reporters and people in the State Department, between our reporters abroad and people in the governments abroad, and, occasionally, if an individual in the government feels that the newspaper has been unfair to somebody, they do not hesitate to say to the reporter that they think so—or they think we have been unfair to a government or misinformed about a situation in a foreign country. They might suggest to us that we had been unfair."

NARRATOR. And the press is free to accept or ignore suggestions made by government representatives. So this is the external picture: there are no rules and regulations by which an administration can control what appears in the nation's newspapers. Nor are there any economic measures they can take to enforce a certain viewpoint. But perhaps there are more subtle means of controlling the flow of news. As the *Washington Post* has so many readers in the foreign embassies and in their governments overseas, is it possible that the administration in some way filters foreign news to the *Post* in order to further United States relations with these various countries? As Mister Wiggins points out, the many sources from which the *Post* draws its information would make such channeling of news an impossibility.

Tape: WIGGINS:

"We have foreign correspondents in Vietnam, in Japan, in South America, in England, Germany, France, Italy and the Soviet Union, and we are affiliated with the *Los Angeles Times* in a news service so that we utilize many of their correspondents elsewhere in a secondary role to our own."

NARRATOR. And coming into every newspaper office is an endless flow of news items from the various independent news gathering services, usually referred to as "wire" services. The *Washington Post* uses seven wire services in addition to its own correspondents. Such broad coverage gives reasonable assurance that the news that goes into the paper is accurate.

Tape: WIGGINS:

"You try to employ responsible reporters and utilize the services of responsible and independent wire services so the material arrives in your office as fast as

NARRATOR. But even if the raw material of news is reliable and accurate, wouldn't it be possible to select and present it in the light of policy considerations? Does the editorial policy of the newspaper itself influence news presentation?

Tape: WIGGINS:

"If you mean—to use the news columns to persuade or convince in conformity with the editorial policy of the paper, the answer would be 'no.' We try very hard to keep news columns devoted to relaying events and facts on the world situation and to confine opinions to plainly labeled comment by columnists or interpretive writers on the editorial page."

NARRATOR. In summing up his views as editor of an old-established and responsible newspaper, Mister Wiggins affirms his belief that freedom of the press in the United States means "freedom" in the broadest sense of the word.

Tape: WIGGINS:

"It contemplates (indicates) a situation in which the press has free access to information, has the right to print without prior restraint, the right to print without fear of confiscatory or fatal punishment for mistaken or wrongful publication, and the right of access to the materials of publication. Also, the ability to get newsprint and buy printing materials, and the right freely to distribute. These rights or privileges all have to exist if a country is to enjoy a press that's free from governmental intervention. I think we enjoy it to a larger degree here than it is enjoyed in any other country in the world."

ANNOUNCER. You've been listening to "Freedom of the Press"—another in a series of programs reporting on newspapers and news services in the United States. Today's speaker was James Wiggins, editor of the *Washington Post*. The program was brought to you by the Voice of America.

CONGRESSMAN'S DIARY NO. 16—DONALD RUMSFELD

JULY 6, 1960.

"FREEDOM OF INFORMATION"

(Tape inserts available in program documentation unit)

ANNOUNCER. The Congress of the United States—the nation's legislature—is made up of five hundred and thirty-five elected men and women who meet in Washington to help carry on the affairs of the nation. One of those members of Congress is Donald Rumsfeld of the mid-western state of Illinois. This is his diary:

Tape: RUMSFELD:

"Should, for example, the photographs of the moon be made available as quickly as they are made available to NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) or is a twenty-four hour delay acceptable? Those questions are constantly being debated in the country and I think that it's a healthy thing that they are debated, it's a healthy thing that we are going to have legislation which will provide some statutory guide lines for the first time—and I personally consider the legislation one of the most important bills to pass in the last twenty years."

NARRATOR. The bill Congressman Rumsfeld refers to was one of several signed by President Johnson on July 4th. The day—the anniversary of the American Declaration of Independence—was particularly significant for this new law. For, as President Johnson said upon signing the bill: "This legislation springs from one of our most essential principles: A democracy works best when the people have all the information that the security of the nation permits. No one should be able to pull curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without injury to the public interest."

Called the "freedom of information" bill, the legislation provides that a citizen may insist on seeing records held by the Federal Government—with certain specified exceptions—which he believes he has a right to see. There are also procedures established by the new law with which a person can go to court and allege that the Federal government has withheld such information. The court will then decide whether the government action was legal—or illegal. Congressman Donald Rumsfeld has been directly involved with this new law, both as a member of the House of Representatives which gave final passage to the bill, and as a member of the congressional committee that gave the bill its initial consideration. He explains what the bill does:

Tape: RUMSFELD:

"Since this country has been a country—and I suppose since there's been government—there is a tendency on the part of individuals in government, from time to time, for various reasons, real or imagined, to feel that it is either in their interest or the government's interest to withhold information from the people. In some cases, it's to protect errors. In some cases it may be to cover up an error of a political party or an individual. But we in this country have staked everything on the involvement of the people in the government. We have said we have a government of the people, and by the people, and for the people."

NARRATOR: The government by the people was a magnificent gamble, says Congressman Rumsfeld—"but it has worked." But in order for the people to guide and direct the course of government, he adds, they cannot operate in a vacuum of ignorance. This has become more crucial in this age when the United States is a nation of over one hundred and ninety-five million people—an age of great complexity—an age when the Federal government is becoming increasingly involved in many aspects of daily life. These factors have had a significant impact on the nature of government today:

Tape: RUMSFELD:

"They tend to make it increasingly difficult for a citizen to be knowledgeable about government, to have full information so that they can be good citizens and help to share and guide and direct the course of government. And so at the time it's becoming more difficult for the citizen, it's becoming more important that he do so. So without government secrecy, it's difficult for a citizen to exercise his responsibilities thoughtfully. With government secrecy it's impossible."

NARRATOR: With these thoughts in mind, Congress has spent about ten years attempting to find an answer—to resolve the problem of a citizen's right to information while still protecting the national security.

Tape: RUMSFELD:

"I am a member of the Government Information and Foreign Operations sub-committee of the Government Operations Committee. The sub-committee, chaired by John Moss, a Democrat, was the legislative committee in the House (of Representatives) which introduced the legislation early last year, which held hearings over a period of many weeks and then participated in the drafting and re-drafting and shaping of the legislation."

NARRATOR: This was a long and complex process. There were hearings—occasions when witnesses from various organizations appeared to testify before the congressman. They represented such interests as newspapers, lawyers, legal associations, civil liberties groups and so forth—all supporting a "freedom of information" bill. And then there were the witnesses from the government—the departments which would be directly affected by the legislation:

Tape: RUMSFELD:

"Every single witness, without exception, from the executive branch of the federal government who appeared or submitted a statement was opposed to it (the bill). So it was perfectly split—they felt it was a bad bill, they felt they couldn't operate with it, they felt it would result in the disclosure of information that would be harmful to the country, some said it was unconstitutional, some said it was unworkable, some said it was all right if you made these exemptions to protect their area of information. And after hearing all the evidence, all the information, we drafted a proposal which we think is a balance and which we think will serve the country well."

NARRATOR: The bill was then placed before the Congress—both the House of Representatives and the Senate—and in its final form, was passed unanimously—a rare occurrence in Congress. The bill was then sent to the President for his signature, making it a law. After signing it, he remarked: "I have always believed that freedom of information is so vital that only the national security, not the desire of public officials or private citizens, should determine when it must be restricted." The Chief Executive continued: "I sign this measure with a deep sense of pride that the United States is an open society in which the people's right to know is cherished and guarded." In July 1967, the "Freedom of Information" law will become effective. Individual citizens will of course be concerned—but of more importance, according to Congressman Rumsfeld, the news media which serve as a communication link between the government and the people have a vital interest in making the legislation work.

Tape: RUMSFELD:

"It's going to require that the press continue to be vigilant, continue to be free and energetic and willing to undertake, if necessary, a legal battle to prove that there was an unlawful withholding (of information). My guess is that the mere existence of this legislation will tend to have a very helpful effect on bureaucrats, on individuals in government who are, for the most part, very fine people, working hard and trying to see that we have a very efficient and responsive government. But the existence, the threat, the ability for a citizen to go into court in the event that an individual unlawfully withholds, I think, will tend to force their conduct into the 'goldfish bowl' theory: to the extent that human beings function in a location that other people can see what they're doing, they seem to function more honorably and more in a way that they would want other people to view them."

NARRATOR: This new law will also be of interest to members of the political parties—especially the opposition party. Currently the Democrats are in the majority in the Congress. The Republicans, including Congressman Rumsfeld, believe that the law will give them access to certain information which until now, says the congressman, has been difficult to find—

Tape: RUMSFELD:

"One example, very recently, was a situation where the United States Government's Post Office hired a host of employees for the summer period, mostly young men, to work in the Post Office Department. The names were requested and they were denied (circulation) by the Post Office Department. Now obviously there is nothing security or sensitive about the names of minor postal officials. These should be public information. It was denied by the majority party executive branch of the federal government. After a great deal of work and effort we managed to pry this information out as properly the opposition party should do, and it turned out that the reason that they were being withheld was the simple fact that there were some politicians who had appointed their relatives or had their relatives appointed, and it didn't put them in too good a light."

NARRATOR: Although Congressman Rumsfeld believes this legislation is of major importance, he observes that it has not been of "overwhelming interest to the American people, because for the most part they do have access to information." But he emphasizes his belief that the philosophy behind the new law—freedom of information—is fundamental to American democracy:

Tape: RUMSFELD:

"I think that to the extent any country or any group of people contend that their system is based on the involvement and interest and participation of the people, there's precious little excuse for them not very carefully and diligently seeing that as the problems in the country change, that this communication, this open channel, doesn't remain open, because it belies our position if we don't take these steps."

NARRATOR: The "Freedom of Information" bill was one of many separate pieces of legislation which have been considered by the four hundred and thirty-five members of the House of Representatives and one hundred members of the Senate this year. Such work is part of the job of a man representing the people—a job highlighted on this, "Congressman's Diary." **ANNOUNCER:** This has been—"Congressman's Diary"—a series of programs about the work of a man representing the people in the United States House of Representatives... seen through the eyes of Congressman Donald Rumsfeld of the mid-western state of Illinois.

VOICE OF AMERICA, CENTRAL PROGRAM SERVICES DIVISION, FEATURES BRANCH

AUGUST 10, 1965.

SPECIAL FEATURE—FREEDOM OF THE PRESS NO. 1

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

(Tape inserts available in program documentation unit are based on interviews obtained by Cambodian Service Chief Philip A. Damon)

ANNOUNCER: The Voice of America presents the first (one) of a series of programs on "Freedom of the Press"

more important now, in an age when mass-circulation newspapers, periodicals, radio and television news reach into the furthest corners of the world. Is news in the United States really free? Uncontrolled by federal or local government? How is this freedom maintained? How does it work?

For a discussion of these and other questions concerning freedom to print and speak the news in the United States, the Voice of America has gathered the views of responsible editors in press, radio and television. Today, we shall hear the views of Erwin D. Canham, editor-in-chief of a widely respected, national newspaper, the *Christian Science Monitor*.

In talking about freedom of the press in the United States today, Mister Canham stressed the long history of a free press in this country. It was no accident, he said, that freedom of the press was the first amendment to the Constitution—

TAPE: CANHAM:

"It played a large role in the American revolutionary period. It is useful to remind ourselves we rebelled against colonialism and when we created our own government it was freedom of press, freedom of information, and it was freedom of expression—little flysheets (one page leaflets), little newspapers which came into being—which were essential in establishing the American revolution and making possible its victory over that age of repression."

NARRATOR: And freedom of the press didn't stop there. As in other countries of the Western world, it developed along with the democratic institutions of the nation.

TAPE: CANHAM:

"As freedom, as self-government, as the right to choose, the right to vote, the right to have opposition parties, the right to have diversity and conflict and internal criticism, as this grows up, so the media of information will come to be more and more independent."

NARRATOR: And the information outlets also become more and more numerous. There are today in the United States over seventeen hundred daily and evening newspapers and over five hundred Sunday papers. Many of these serve a particular city or area; others are known nationally and internationally. Among the latter, the *Christian Science Monitor* occupies a special position as a serious and responsible publication. In only one way is it different from other newspapers on the same level of responsibility: it is owned by a religious organization. But, Mister Canham emphasizes, it is not a religious newspaper as such.

TAPE: CANHAM:

"It is a newspaper writing about general affairs, a broad, public affairs newspaper which happens to be owned by a religious organization."

"This newspaper, which was established in 1888, has at all times had a keen interest in international affairs. It maintains its own staff correspondents throughout the world and has, from its inception to the present day, specialized a good deal in the coverage of world affairs. The circulation is also rather widespread. We publish an edition in Western Europe, printing it in London, another on the Pacific Coast of the United States, but our editing and publishing headquarters are in Boston, Massachusetts, in New England."

NARRATOR: With readers in many countries of the world, it might be thought that the *Monitor* would present its news in a way to influence foreign opinion or that it might, in some way, be induced to present the actions of the United States government in a way that would further the U.S. foreign policy objectives. Not so, says Mister Canham.

TAPE: CANHAM:

"Government is one source of news, a major source of news, but our relationship to the government is essentially no different than that of any other independent newspaper to government. Our position is completely uncontrolled and undominated by government as is that of all other newspapers in the United States."

NARRATOR: It is the aim of the *Monitor* to be independent, accurate and informed and this is the spirit in which it reports on the government; the administration and the public personalities connected with it.

TAPE: CANHAM:

"We are willing, of course, to not only listen respectfully but try assiduously to understand the significance of government policies, but it is the role of the press to be independent and sometimes to be critical and so, sometimes, quite frequently, we express our own views which are critical of governmental position."

NARRATOR: Newspaper editors in the United States are fiercely proud and protective of this freedom of the press—the freedom to report as truly as it knows how what is going on. Even if a news story makes temporary trouble; if it means, for example, that a U.S. installation overseas is closed up, in the long run, they feel that is not too big a price to pay for the free flow of information. And Mister Canham points out that this tradition is not a new one, nor is it exclusively American. He cites a case involving the *Times of London* during the Crimean War between England and Russia in the middle of the nineteenth century.

TAPE: CANHAM:

"During the Crimean War, the *Times* sent a very talented military correspondent to the Crimea. He cabled back to London every night dispatches which were ruthlessly critical of the nepotism (favoritism) and ineptitude of the British officers, the Generals, the aristocracy-ridden, corruption-ridden outfit that had, through apathy, got into control of the British army. This correspondent's dispatches were printed in London, were picked up at once by agents of the Russian Imperial Government, were cabled to St. Petersburg and were used by the Russian general staff to plan its campaigns against the British armies in the Crimea. British lives, no doubt, were lost as a result of the dispatches sent by the *Times* military correspondent but on the long pull, the British nation and the integrity of its military forces were saved because of the role of a free press."

NARRATOR: Applying these standards of reporting news might also lead the *Monitor* or any other U.S. newspaper, to print a story embarrassing, even potentially harmful to the government of this country. In such a case, could the United States government ask the newspaper to tone down or omit such adverse comment? Again the answer is "no".

TAPE: CANHAM:

"No, the government can do practically nothing. The government can make its pitch (argue) if it wishes—make its case—say to the editor of a newspaper, 'Look, your publication is getting us into trouble. I wish you'd take it easy.' This is not likely to work, and the government can do nothing by force. It can do nothing to prohibit the publication of such material."

NARRATOR: Even if this material is irresponsible or offensive to a foreign power, there is nothing either positive or negative the United States government can do to stop its publication. That is, there are no special laws that can be invoked to restrain the reporting of news, nor can the government exercise negative control by withholding newsprint or funds from the newspaper concerned. And as Mister Canham says—

TAPE: CANHAM:

"I think it is far better to have a sense of decency and restraint, self-applied by the press, rather than have laws which can easily be abused. There have to be some laws. There are laws against the abuse of the privileges of the press in the United States. There are laws about libel. There are laws about indecency and blasphemy and things of that sort. There are a considerable number of laws but the more laws you have and the more ambiguous their language, the easier it is to use them as tools of repression and therefore it is not productive to have these laws."

NARRATOR: Furthermore, says Mister Canham, if restrictions are imposed on the press, public opinion will go underground. And even though it may not be expressed, it will exist and may constitute a powerful force.

TAPE: CANHAM:

"Man will be informed. The human race is interested in what is going on. In those days it must know what is happening and the more repressive a regime, the more vigorous are the clandestine or underground sources of information."

NARRATOR: Such is the case, supported by Mister Canham and all other newspaper editors in the United States, for a free press within its own country. But what country today can consider only what happens within its own boundaries?

TAPE: CANHAM:

"We live in a magnificent age of universal simultaneous communication. One man's voice could be heard, theoretically at least, by every man on our planet at the same time. In such an age, people sooner or later will be informed. The magic of radio is even more compelling than the jungle tom-tom and the gongoloso. So there is this universal appeal, and urgency, and need and hunger of people

for news, for information. Now, if this is denied them by the repressions of government they will get it in some other way, somehow or other, sooner or later." NARRATOR. And so the ideal of a free society is a free flow of information, unimpeded and undistorted by government pressure or private means * * * Information which may reflect adversely on the conduct of government, information which may be unpalatable to other countries, information which must nevertheless be published. For, as Mister Canham says, "There must be internal criticism in any good society * * *"

Tape: CANHAM:

"The society which refuses to listen to analyses of its own short-comings is on the way to ultimate decay and degeneration and collapse. The society which can withstand the most rigorous internal criticism is the society which is going to stand down through the years and the decades and the centuries."

NARRATOR. And Mister Canham looks forward to a day when freedom to publish in whatever medium will be a reality, not for some but for all countries.

Tape: CANHAM:

"I have a deep faith that as the time goes on in our world, the conflict of ideas, internal criticism, will come to be a greater reality and that sooner or later a world society based upon the free flow of information and the free flow of ideas will be a fact. A lot of things will be said which won't be pleasing to those who are criticized, but in the long pull (in the end) they, and all the rest of us, will be the stronger and the more healthy, and the sounder, for it."

ANNOUNCER. You've been listening to "Freedom of the Press"—one of a series of programs reporting on newspapers and news services in the United States. Today's speaker was Erwin D. Canham, editor in chief of the *Christian Science Monitor*. The program was brought to you by the Voice of America.

AUGUST 27, 1955.

SPECIAL FEATURE—FREEDOM OF THE PRESS NO. 2

TIME MAGAZINE

(Tape inserts available in Program documentation unit)

ANNOUNCER. The Voice of America now presents another in a series of programs on—"Freedom of the Press." Today, this freedom in relation to a weekly news periodical is discussed by the head of the Washington Bureau of *Time Magazine*.

NARRATOR. The right to a free press was guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This freedom was vital to the success of the American Revolution; today, when mass media of communication reach into the furthest corners of the world it has a vital factor in world understanding. Is news in the United States really free, uncontrolled by federal and local government? How is this freedom maintained? How does it work?

For a discussion of these and other questions concerning freedom to print and speak the news in the United States, the Voice of America has gathered the views of responsible editors in press, radio and television. John L. Steele is head of the Washington Bureau of *Time Magazine*, an influential and widely read weekly news publication.

On newstands all over the world, *Time Magazine* is readily identifiable, its red-lined cover bearing a portrait of a personality outstanding in the news of the day. Political news, foreign and domestic, is the magazine's main concern, but each week *Time* also reports newsworthy facts under such headings as Business, the Arts, Books, and Sports. As distinctive as its cover is the style of writing—it is colorful, hard-hitting, outspoken, and it may, on occasion, disturb the sensibilities of readers who do not hold the same opinions as the editors. Yes, *Time* does have a viewpoint of its own; part of its function is to interpret the facts and this, says Mister Steele, has always been its policy.

Tape: STEELE:

"*Time* from its very first days has never felt that it should be completely (in the traditional journalistic sense of the word) objective. We have felt from the very outset that we should have readers with some ideas and some points of view. We feel that nobody has to read us, nobody has to accept what we have to say, but we don't feel that it is our function to be above the battle. We feel we should be engaged, that any good journalist is engaged, and indeed I personally feel that

the only completely unengaged publication, the only completely objective publication in the world, is the telephone book."

NARRATOR. This editorial outlook has inevitably caused the magazine to be labelled controversial.

Tape: STEELE:

"We are not willfully controversial but we think that a publication worth its salt and a publication doing the job we try to do should have something to say and that does very often lead us into the realm of differing opinions and controversy both in domestic politics, domestic legislation, foreign politics, and foreign affairs."

NARRATOR. This attitude could conceivably get a news magazine into trouble—particularly if the controversial material were to be concerned with events in another country and unpopular with the head of state of that country.

Would *Time*, therefore, use a more cautious approach to affairs in foreign countries than to domestic matters? Mister Steele—

Tape: STEELE:

"Basically our coverage abroad is the precise kind of journalism that we practice here in the United States. We are interested in people, we are interested in the events that happen around us. We try to do as thorough and as accurate a job as possible. So there is really no great separation between our operations abroad and our operations at home."

NARRATOR. And Mister Steele also points out that there is no difference between the reporters who cover the domestic scene and those who are sent overseas. All correspondents come under the supervision of the Chief of Correspondents and there is a fairly rapid interchange of personnel between the various press posts—very much in the same way that diplomatic personnel are rotated from one country to the other with periods in their home country. So all these reporters are professionals and they are trained simply to report. It is not their intention either to be offensive nor to make a conscious effort to please. As Mister Steele reaffirms—

Tape: STEELE:

"Our aim is to tell everything about a situation if we think the situation is worth reporting. In other words, we don't believe that statesmen or people abroad need special handling, need easier handling or different handling than our own people. We try to be fair. We try to be fair when we report on a piece of legislation in the United States Congress. We try to be fair when we report on a problem in India."

NARRATOR. However with all the efforts made by *Time's* editors and staffers to be fair and accurate, the fact that they are involved, "engaged" to use Mister Steele's word, in what goes on does sometimes lead to a protest from a foreign government. But Mister Steele does not believe that the protest is made because the foreign power thinks that the United States government can restrain the offending publication.

Tape: STEELE:

"It is pretty well known in almost all countries that the press of the United States is not responsible to the government (except in rare instances of classified information or security information) and that the government of the United States has no real control over the press of the United States. Perhaps in the newer, very new countries this may not be understood, but certainly in the older countries with foreign services who have operated in Washington and London and elsewhere around the globe, this is very well understood—that the press of the United States is not a governmental affair. I think often, I think sometimes at least, that the protests made to governments by governments concerning a press report are done as a matter of tactic and for political reasons. They know full well that the government of the United States isn't responsible but it looks pretty good at home. Just as sometimes our own politicians at home do things for tactical reasons and for appearances' sake."

NARRATOR. This does not mean, of course, that the protest is not conveyed to the publication, be it *Time Magazine* or another news medium, but it is done informally, usually by a simple telephone call from the State Department.

Tape: STEELE:

"I think our government people here are pretty sophisticated and they are glad to bring a matter to our attention but not very often, if ever, do they ask us to do anything except tell the truth. In this connection, lest I sound a little

too belligerent, we don't like misunderstandings, we don't like fights, we try to be right. As with every publication in the world, under a system of a free press, we are not always right. We are glad to correct mistakes when we are shown to be wrong. We publish many letters each year in the magazine itself which take issue with us, and the words, 'Time is in error' are by no means unknown by our publication."

NARRATOR. As Mister Steele points out, *Time* will make its own correction where it has erred in matters of fact but there is no agency which can force it to distort or omit facts in its treatment of a news story. Mister Steele also feels that in spite of the occasionally controversial tone of *Time Magazine* that there is no need for any regulation of the press. In common with other responsible news people—

Tape: STEELE:

"We are, we believe, good citizens as well as good journalists. There are some things you happen on that you simply don't report. I don't care to go into them to any great extent but simply to say that they, at times, involve information about future movements, which you know from long experience and which your editors know should not be reported until they occur. This is in the field of high national security policy and it is a question of judgment."

NARRATOR. And this question of judgment being the responsibility of the editorship of the newspaper or magazine holds true even in cases of national crisis or emergency—as in the case of the removal of missile sites from Cuba, in the reporting of the South Vietnam situation today. The result, in the opinion of Mister Steele, is a large body of readers in the United States who are provided with all available information, without pressure from government authority, and equally without harm to national security. And he concludes—

Tape: STEELE:

"We have a very virile, controversial, thought-provoking, interesting press and magazine and radio and television industry."

ANNOUNCER: You've been listening to "Freedom of the Press"—another in a series of programs reporting on newspapers and news services in the United States. Today's speaker was John L. Steele, head of the Washington Bureau of *Time Magazine*. The program was brought to you by the Voice of America.

SEPTEMBER 23, 1965.

SPECIAL FEATURE—FREEDOM ON THE PRESS NO. 3

NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY

(Tape inserts available in program documentation unit)

ANNOUNCER. The Voice of America now presents another in a series of programs on "Freedom of the Press." Today, this freedom in relation to radio and television news services is discussed by the Director of News at the National Broadcasting Company in Washington, D.C.

NARRATOR. The right to a free press was guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This freedom was vital to the success of the American Revolution; today, when communication facilities reach into the farthest corners of the world it is a vital factor in world understanding. This is particularly so in the case of radio and television news, which is likely to reach an even wider and more varied audience than news in print. Is the news which is heard on the airwaves really free, uncontrolled by federal or local government? How is this freedom maintained? How does it work?

For a discussion of these and other questions concerning freedom to print and speak the news in the United States, the Voice of America has gathered the views of responsible editors in press, radio and television. William Monroe is one of them—Director of News for the National Broadcasting Company in Washington, D.C. The guarantee of a free press is as old as the Constitution but radio and television (as mass media) are as new as the twentieth century so why should we suppose that broadcast news has equal freedom with the press? Mister Monroe?

Tape: MONROE:

"The regulations affecting the establishment of radio and television do contain provisions that freedom of speech and freedom of the press apply to radio and television just as they do to the printed media."

NARRATOR. The only difference is that radio and television stations are obliged to have a license to operate, issued by the government, through the Federal Communications Commission. To safeguard the stations, however, there are very rigid restrictions on the FCC and other regulatory agencies in regard to the stations' operations.

Tape: MONROE:

"They are not supposed to get into the matter of influencing programs. They are not supposed to tell a local station to put on more of one kind of program, less of another kind of program, and particularly they are forbidden to get into the matter of news coverage and attempt to influence a station's news coverage. The journalists in radio and television are absolutely as jealous as the journalists in the print media to guard their freedom to say what they feel should be said, and to report the things that they feel need to be reported."

NARRATOR. As Mister Monroe points out, the issuing of a license by the FCC in no way affects the operation of a station as regards the kind of programming and perhaps a word here would be in order as to just why there has to be a license. The license is to ensure certain standards of programming—of responsibility to the listening public. The station obligates itself to provide a certain number of hours of news, of public service programs, of music, entertainment and so on and a license is only withdrawn when the station itself does not live up to its commitments. Incidentally, the National Broadcasting Company itself does not have a license to operate (as a network) but it owns five television stations and six radio stations and each station is licensed.

Tape: MONROE:

"Now if NBC offended a particular president, the president would find it difficult, if not impossible, to influence the FCC, in any way, to punish one of the stations involved, owned by NBC, or to punish the network."

NARRATOR. For one thing, the law requires that the members of the Federal Communications Commission be drawn from both major political parties and this makes it very unlikely that either a president or a party could control it. For that matter, even NBC itself has no editorial control over the stations in its network because the network is made up mainly of stations not owned by but affiliated with the Company. They are, in a sense, customers who make use of the Company's product, which happens to be material for broadcasting. The great majority are privately owned and, says Mister Monroe, are perfectly free to disagree with the network's opinions.

Tape: MONROE:

"The affiliate stations all are free to editorialize, and many editorialize regularly. I was connected with a station in New Orleans, Louisiana, as News Director, a few years ago, and I remember one occasion when the head of the Federal Communications Commission, Newton Minow, made a speech in which he was very extreme about the deficiencies of television."

NARRATOR. This speech, widely quoted since then, referred to television as a "vast wasteland"—a criticism aimed mainly at entertainment programs.

Tape: MONROE:

"We felt that his indictment of television was terribly sweeping and revealed a certain ignorance of some of the better things in television on Mister Minow's part, and this station editorialized on the air critically of Mister Minow; disagreed with what he had to say, gave examples indicating that his indictment of television was extreme. And having put this editorial on the air both on television and on its sister radio station, wrote Mister Minow and invited him to answer the editorial criticizing him in an amount of time equal to the time occupied by the editorial."

NARRATOR. Mister Minow responded by writing to thank the station for its offer of equal time.

Tape: MONROE:

"He said that he did not wish to avail himself of it but he thought the editorial policy of the station was a good one, a vigorous one, and he liked to see stations editorializing and he recognized the right of the station to editorialize even though the station was criticizing the head of the regulatory agency."

NARRATOR. Perhaps one of the best examples of the independent operation of networks and stations is in their relationship to the President of the United States.

Tapo: MONROE:

"There are generally three different times in which the matter of a presidential appearance on the air comes up: one is his news conferences; another is a speech or statement which is to be made available to television, but the White House is not necessarily officially requesting that the speech or statement be put on the air—live or otherwise; and thirdly, an official White House request to the networks that the President be allowed to appear on the air to make an important statement or give a message to the people. Very seldom does the White House ask for time. It may happen only once or twice a year in the middle of a major crisis when the people of the country are worried about something and the President feels that a foreign crisis or a domestic crisis needs explanation."

NARRATOR: Mister Monroe believes that the fact that such a request is made so seldom shows that the President takes special care not to appear to be demanding time. There is, also, the fact that he could be refused. However, what usually happens is that the White House makes known to the networks that a speech or statement by the President is available and from there on they make their own arrangements to broadcast it. Each of the major networks decides for itself whether to give the speech live, that is simultaneously, to record it and put it in a different time period, or to edit it for use in a regular news program.

And so from major presidential speeches to the opinions of a news editor on a local station, there can be no regimentation of broadcast news by government on any level. There is no way to force radio and television stations to reflect government aims or policy. Equally, there is no way in which they can forbid news stories they might consider unfavorable, nor can any legislators forbid access to legitimate news sources.

Referring again to his work in New Orleans, Mister Monroe cited an event concerning the Louisiana State Legislature.

Tapo: MONROE:

"We had to decide whether we were going to attempt to cover the floor debates of an upcoming session of the Louisiana Legislature, and we decided that we wanted to cover the floor debates, if possible, with a sound camera so we could have sound film to let people in our television audience see and hear their legislature as they debated various issues. The State Legislature in Louisiana is located about ninety or one hundred miles from New Orleans so most people in New Orleans have never had a chance to go into the legislature and watch it operate."

NARRATOR: The station decided not to ask permission but simply to send a cameraman and reporter with a sound-camera to the debates. Each day the highlights were shown on television and heard on radio. After five or six weeks, one of the legislators protested this form of reporting but, by that time, says Mister Monroe, the station had established the seriousness of its journalistic intentions.

Tapo: MONROE:

"The legislators who were familiar with the coverage that we were providing in New Orleans of the legislature had concluded that we were presenting, when any particular issue was being debated, what people had to say for a bill and what people had to say against a bill, so that we were scrupulous in our fairness of approach. They felt that we were performing a legitimate journalistic job and that people in New Orleans were learning more about the legislature than they knew before."

NARRATOR: A small example, but typical of radio and television throughout the United States, showing that broadcasters consider their first responsibility is to the public they serve, and their freedom to exercise it.

ANNOUNCER: You've been listening to "Freedom of the Press"—another in a series of programs reporting on newspapers and news services in the United States. Today's speaker was William Monroe, Director of News for the National Broadcasting Company, Washington, D.C. The program was brought to you by the Voice of America.

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
Washington, D.C., September 8, 1960.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At the hearing before your Committee on August 17, 1960 at which time Leonard H. Marks, Director of USIA appeared, you asked for material concerning private international broadcasting facilities in the United States. The Federal Communications Commission has furnished us information concerning these operations and we submit herewith the following items:

1. List of International Broadcast Stations currently authorized by the FCC.
 2. List of pending International Broadcast applications.
 3. FCC rules and regulations covering international broadcast stations, and
 4. The Commission's Order of April 17, 1963, imposing a "freeze" on international broadcast station applications.
- Please note that station WNYW is the one referred to in Mr. Marks' testimony as WRUL, which has since changed its call sign.
- Sincerely,

RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, Jr.,
General Counsel.

INTERNATIONAL BROADCAST STATIONS AUTHORIZED BY THE COMMISSION

1. Station WNYW, Radio New York Worldwide, Inc. is licensed to operate from a site at Scituate, Massachusetts using one 80 kilowatt and four 50 kilowatt transmitters with programs directed to Mexico, Central and South America, Western Europe and western Africa. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, a Utah Corporation Sole. The station holds a construction permit to change transmitter site to Chatsworth, New Jersey, change antennas, and change to two 250 kilowatt, one 100 kilowatt, and two 50 kilowatt transmitters.
2. Station KGBE, Far East Broadcasting Company, Inc. is licensed to operate at a site in Belmont, California using one 50 kilowatt transmitter broadcasting programs directed to Mexico, Central and South America. It is a non-stock corporation.
3. Station WINH, World International Broadcasters, Incorporated holds construction permit to operate from site at Red Lion, Pennsylvania using one 50 kilowatt transmitter with programs directed to areas bounding Mediterranean Sea—Southern Europe, Holy Land, Northern Africa. It operates under program test authorization. 80% of the corporate stock is held by John M. Norris and 20% by his son, John H. Norris.

PENDING INTERNATIONAL BROADCAST APPLICATIONS

1. Application of licensee of Station WNYW for construction permit for new stations with two 250 kilowatt transmitters located on Island of Guam to broadcast to East and West Australia, New Zealand, Philippines and Japan.
2. Application by licensee of WNYW for CP for new station with one 250 kilowatt transmitter located near Deer Park, Florida to broadcast to Europe, North Africa, Central and South America.
3. Application by licensee of Station WNYW for modification of outstanding construction permit (authorizing change in site from Scituate, Massachusetts to Chatsworth, New Jersey and other changes) to change to three 250 kilowatt and two 100 kilowatt transmitters and change antennas.
4. Application by licensee of Station WNYW for renewal of license.
5. Application by licensee of Station WNYW for license to cover construction permit to increase power of one transmitter.

- 6. Application by licensee of KGEI for renewal of license.
- 7. Application by licensee of Station KGEI for authorization to broadcast to Japan.
- 8. Application by permittee of Station WIND for license to cover construction permit.

[Excerpt from FCC Rules and Regulations, vol. I, pt. 1, sec. 1.574]

§ 1.574 Processing of international broadcast applications.

(a) Applications for international broadcast facilities are divided into two groups.

(1) In the first group are applications for new stations for new or additional target zones, or for major changes in the facilities of authorized stations, i.e., a substantial change (other than local) in transmitter location or a significant change in the delivered median field intensity at the target zone: *Provided, however*, that the Commission may, within 15 days after the tender for filing of any other application for modification, advise the applicant that such application is considered to be one for a major change and therefore is subject to the provisions of § 1.580.

(2) The second group consists of applications for licenses and all other changes in the facilities of authorized stations.

(b) If an application is amended so as to effect a major change as defined in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, or so as to result in an assignment or transfer of control which, in the case of an authorized station, would require the filing of an application therefor on FCC Form 314 or 315 (see § 1.540), § 1.580 will apply to such amended application.

(c) Applications for international broadcast stations will be processed as nearly as possible in the order in which they are filed.

Note: Pending rule making pertaining to the authorization of international broadcast stations, no application seeking authority to construct a new international broadcast station or seeking authority to operate a greater number of frequency hours than authorized on April 25, 1963, will be granted, and, after April 25, 1963, no such application will be accepted for filing.

§ 1.578 Amendments to applications for renewal, assignment and/or transfer of control.

[Excerpt from FCC Rules and Regulations, Vol. III, Pt. 73, Subpart F]

SUBPART F—INTERNATIONAL BROADCAST STATIONS

DEFINITIONS AND ALLOCATION OF FACILITIES

§ 73.701 Definitions.

The following definitions apply to terminology employed in this subpart:

(n) *International broadcast station.* A broadcasting station employing frequencies allocated to the broadcasting service between 5950 and 20100 kc, whose transmissions are intended to be received directly by the general public in foreign countries.

(b) *Frequency-hour.* One frequency used for one hour.

(c) *Day.* Any twenty-four hour period beginning 0000 EST and ending 2400 EST.

(d) *Sunspot number.* The predicted 12 month running average of the number of sunspots for any month as indicated in the National Bureau of Standards CIRPL Series D publications.

(e) *Vernal equinox season.* That period of any calendar year starting at 0000 EST on 1 February and ending at 2400 EST on 30 April.

(f) *Summer season.* That period of any calendar year starting at 0000 EST on 1 May and ending at 2400 EST on 31 July.

(g) *Autumnal equinox season.* That period of any calendar year starting at 0000 EST on 1 August and ending at 2400 EST on 31 October.

(h) *Winter season.* That period of any calendar year starting at 0000 EST on 1 November and ending at 2400 EST on 31 January.

(i) *Maximum usable frequency (MUF).* The highest frequency which is returned to the surface of the earth for a particular path and time of day on 50 percent of the days of the reference month.

(j) *Optimum working frequency (OWF).* The frequency which is returned to the surface of the earth for a particular path and time of day on 90 percent of the days of the reference month.

(k) *Reference month.* The middle month of any season listed in § 73.704 "Daily Frequency Hour Availability Table."

(l) *Delivered median field intensity or field intensity.* The field intensity incident upon the target area expressed in microvolts per meter, or decibels above one microvolt per meter, which is exceeded by the hourly median value on 50 percent of the days of the reference month.

(m) *Target area.* Geographic area in which the reception of particular programs is specifically intended and in which adequate broadcast coverage is contemplated.

(n) *Contract operation.* Any non-Government operation of an international broadcast station pursuant to a contract with an agency of the United States Government and subject to Governmental control as to program content, target areas to be covered, and time of broadcast.

(o) *Private operation.* Any non-Government operation of an International Broadcast station which is not contract operation.

§ 73.702 Assignment and use of frequencies.

Note: Paragraphs (c) through (k) do not apply to stations when engaged in contract operations as defined in § 73.701.

(a) Frequencies will be assigned by the Commission from time to time and in accordance with the provisions of this section, to authorized international broadcast stations for use at specified hours and for transmission to specified target areas. Licensees may request the assignment of specific frequencies for transmission during given hours of operation to specified target areas by filing informal requests in triplicate with the Commission no less than 15 days prior to the start of a new season. Such requests will be honored to the extent that interference and propagation conditions permit and that they are otherwise in accordance with the provisions of this section. Requests for changes in frequency or hour assignments at other times during the year or which are received less than 15 days before the start of a new season will be processed as rapidly as practical. All specific frequency authorizations will be made only on the express understanding that they are subject to immediate cancellation or change without hearing whenever the Commission determines that interference or propagation conditions so require and that each assignment of frequency hours for a given season is unique unto itself and not subject to renewal, with the result that completely new assignments must be secured for the forthcoming season. Where a station is simultaneously engaged in both private and contract broadcasting, as defined in § 73.701, it must receive separate frequency hour authorizations for each of these operations.

(b) Any foreign standard target areas shown in Figure 1 of § 73.702 may be specified by the licensee, in which case field intensity calculations should be based on the transmission path between the corresponding reference points listed in § 73.703. In the event a broadcast is to be directed to more than no target area in the same region, the primary target area should be specified and the reasons for selecting that particular target area given, with special reference to the nature and special suitability, if any, of the programming proposed. Field intensity calculations should be based on the transmission path to the standard reference point in § 73.703 for the primary target area. In the event a licensee wishes to specify target areas other than those shown in Figure 1 of § 73.702, adequate justification must be given to show that the use of standard target areas is inappropriate, with special reference given to any specialized programming proposed which appears suitable only for the nonstandard target areas designated. When nonstandard target areas are proposed, special reference points must be specified (by geographical coordinates) and reasonably chosen so as to insure complete and adequate coverage of the target areas.

(c) Frequencies assigned by the Commission will be within the following bands:

	Kilocycles
Band A.....	5950-0200
Band B.....	0500-9775
Band C.....	11700-11975
Band D.....	15100-15450
Band E.....	17700-17900
Band F.....	21450-21750
Band G.....	25000-20100

(d) No frequency will be assigned which would provide a Delivered Median Field Intensity, either measured or calculated, of less than 150 uv/m—50 percent or 43.5 decibels above one uv/m at the distant foreign target area. (This value of Delivered Median Field Intensity is expected to provide protection against atmospheric and industrial noise for at least 90 percent of each hour during the

percent of the days of the month.) With each request for frequency assignment licensees must submit computations which adequately show that this requirement would be met.

Note: Standard OMF propagation curves and Delivered Median Field Intensity curves for the various hours and seasons throughout the eleven year sunspot cycle have been computed for transmission paths between standard reference points listed in § 73.703 for the standard target area shown in Figure 1 of § 73.702. These curves, which were developed and used at the Mexico City High Frequency Broadcasting Conference (1948-1949), are available at the Commission's Washington offices and may be used in calculating the propagation data which licensees are required to provide under these Rules. The methods used in computing these data are described in Chapter 7, paragraph 7.7 of the National Bureau of Standards Circular 462. In lieu of that data, and in all cases where nonstandard target areas are specified as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, licensees must develop their own propagation curves for use in computing values of OMF and Delivered Median Field Intensity for the particular transmission paths involved. In doing so, use may be made of the published propagation data of the National Bureau of Standards known as CMT's Series D, "Basic Radio Propagation Predictions", published monthly in conjunction with National Bureau of Standards Circular 405, "Instruction for the use of Basic Radio Propagation Predictions." These publications are available from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington 20402, D.C. A typical example of a computation for a transmission path between standard target areas is from New York (Area 8) to Hines Ales (Area 15). The Delivered Median Field Intensity for the equinox season, sunspot 8, and for the 6 Mc band for the hours 0300 to 0400 GMT is indicated by the appropriate propagation curves as 24 decibels above one microvolt per meter for 1 kw radiated power. The transmitter power output of 20 decibels (100 kw) is added. The transmitting antenna gain of 12 decibels is added. The resultant total (56 decibels) exceeds the level of 43.5 decibels required to deliver a median field intensity of 150 $\mu\text{v/m}$ at the distant target area.

(o) Frequencies assigned will be as near as possible to the Optimum Working Frequency. In no case will they exceed the Maximum Usable Frequency for more than a total of 15 minutes during any period of transmission. With each request for frequency assignment, licensees must submit computations which adequately show that this requirement would be met. (See note in paragraph (d) of this section regarding methods for computation.)

(f) Not more than one frequency will be authorized for use at any one time for any one program transmission except in instances where a program is intended for reception in more than one target area and the intended target areas cannot be served by a single frequency.

(g) No authorization for use of a particular frequency will be issued which fails to provide a minimum co-channel Delivered Median Field Intensity protection ratio of 40 db to the transmissions of other broadcasting stations at the reference point in the target area being served by such stations which, in the opinion of the Commission, have priority of assignment.

(h) Authorization for use of a particular frequency will not be issued which does not provide a minimum adjacent channel Delivered Median Field Intensity protection ratio of 11 db to the transmissions of other international broadcasting stations at the reference points in the target areas being served by such stations which, in the opinion of the Commission, have priority of assignment.

(i) Any frequency authorized to an international broadcast station shall also be available for assignment to other international broadcast stations.

(j) Not more than one frequency shall be used simultaneously under the same authorization and call letter and equipment installation number designation.

(k) Subject to all other pertinent provisions of this subpart, the total maximum number of frequency-hours which will be authorized to all licensees of private international broadcast stations for private operation combined in any frequency band for any pertinent season during any one day will be those in § 73.704 less the number of frequency-hours in these bands scheduled for use by both (1) government international broadcasting stations, and (2) international broadcast stations licensed by the Commission to use frequencies in these bands for contract operations.

(l) In the event the total number of frequency hours in any band scheduled for both (1) government international broadcasting stations, and (2) international broadcast stations licensed by the Commission to use frequencies in these bands for contract operations equals or exceeds 75 percent of the frequency hour figures given in § 73.704, the maximum number of frequency-hours which will be authorized to all licensees of international broadcast stations for private operation in any frequency band for any pertinent season during any one day will be 25 percent of the frequency hours shown in § 73.704.

(m) If the requests for international broadcasting frequency-hours for private operation in any band or bands exceed those available under the terms of these Rules, in the absence of any voluntary agreement for reduction of frequency-hours requested, the Commission will designate all requests for frequency-hours in the band or bands in question for hearing. Pending such hearing the Commission will temporarily assign the available frequency-hours equally among the several applicants. Provided, however, that with respect to such temporary allocation:

(1) An existing license shall not, to the extent such frequency hours are available, receive less than the number of frequency-hours utilized during the preceding season or requested for the forthcoming season, whichever is lesser.

(2) Where the number of frequency-hours available for private international broadcasting during a forthcoming season are insufficient to permit existing licensees to secure a temporary allocation equal to that previously utilized or requested, whichever is lesser, the allocation shall be pro-rated among such persons in a manner which will give them a share of the available frequency-hours proportionate to that utilized in the preceding season.

(3) In any event, where an applicant's share of the available frequency hours would be more than requested, the surplus shall be divided among the remaining applicants in the manner herein prescribed.

§ 73.703 Latitude and longitude of areas used for field intensity calculations.

Area No.	Latitude degrees	Longitude degrees
1	65 N.	160 W.
2	60 N.	125 W.
3	60 N.	100 W.
4	60 N.	80 W.
5	70 N.	40 W.
6	40 N.	130 W.
7	40 N.	100 W.
8	40 N.	80 W.
9	50 N.	60 W.
10	70 N.	100 W.
11	10 N.	80 W.
12	10 E.	70 W.
13	10 E.	80 W.
14	20 W.	60 W.
15	25 E.	80 W.
16	46 E.	70 W.
17	63 N.	20 W.
18	65 N.	15 E.
19	65 N.	40 E.
20	70 N.	60 E.
21	70 N.	80 E.
22	70 N.	100 E.
23	70 N.	120 E.
24	85 N.	140 E.
25	85 N.	160 E.
26	65 N.	180 E.
27	60 N.	0°
28	50 N.	20 E.
29	30 N.	40 E.
30	30 N.	60 E.
31	50 N.	80 E.
32	60 N.	100 E.
33	60 N.	120 E.
34	85 N.	140 E.
35	85 N.	160 E.
36	40 N.	25 W.
37	20 N.	0°
38	20 N.	20 E.
39	30 N.	40 E.
40	30 N.	60 E.
41	20 N.	80 E.
42	40 N.	85 E.
43	35 N.	100 E.
44	30 N.	120 E.
45	35 N.	140 E.
46	10 N.	5 W.
47	10 N.	20 E.
48	10 N.	40 E.
49	10 N.	100 E.
50	10 N.	120 E.
51	0°	140 E.
52	10 E.	20 E.
53	10 E.	40 E.
54	1 E.	103 E.
55	15 E.	140 E.
56	20 E.	165 E.
57	30 E.	23 E.
58	25 E.	130 E.
59	35 E.	150 E.
60	40 E.	170 E.
61	20 N.	160 W.
62	20 E.	170 W.
63	20 E.	180 W.
64	15 N.	140 E.
65	10 N.	170 E.

NEWS POLICIES IN VIETNAM

§ 73.704 Daily frequency hour availability table.

Band	Season	Equipment Numbers	0-20	20-35	35-50	50-65	65-80	80-95	95-110	110-125	125-140
M/f	June
	March-September
	December
	March-September
	December
	June
	March-September
	December
	June
	March-September
	December
	June
March-September	
December	
Totals			198	208	220	227	240	238	238	228	228
			200	198	198	179	179	186	186	154	143
			183	180	202	212	188	152	152	143	141

1 No limit.

NEWS POLICIES IN VIETNAM

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

§ 73.710 Cross reference.

See Subpart D of Part 1, of this chapter, for general requirements as to applications, filing of applications and description of application forms, other forms and information to be filed with the Commission, the manner in which applications are processed, and provisions applying to action on applications. See § 1.1111 of Subpart G of that part for the fees to be paid in connection with applications for facilities in the services covered in this subpart.

§ 73.711 Application for international broadcast stations.

(a) If the application is for a construction permit or for modification of an existing authorization, FCC Form 300 shall be filed; if for a license, FCC Form 310 shall be filed; if for a renewal of license, FCC Form 311 shall be filed.

Note: Until these forms are revised, information required by these Rules and not required by the forms shall be submitted as a supplement to the application and will be considered a part thereof.

(b) Authorizations issued to international broadcast stations by the Commission will not specify the frequencies or hours of use, but will be authorizations to permit the construction or use of a particular transmitting equipment combination and related antenna systems for international broadcasting.

Note: Requests for the use of frequencies and frequency hours for transmissions to specific target areas should be submitted separately as provided in § 73.702.

(c) In the case of applications for authorizations to permit contract operations, as defined in § 73.701(n), the contracting agency and contract number should be indicated for each operation.

§ 73.712 Notification of filing of applications.

In order to minimize harmful interference at the National Radio Astronomy Observatory site located at Green Bank, Pocahontas County, West Virginia, and at the Naval Radio Research Observatory at Sugar Grove, Pendleton County, West Virginia, an applicant for authority to construct a new international broadcast station or for authority to make changes in the frequency, power, antenna height, or antenna directivity of an existing station within the area bounded by 30°15' N on the north, 78°30' W on the east, 37°30' N on the south, and 80°30' W on the west shall, at the time of filing such application with the Commission, simultaneously notify the Director, National Radio Astronomy Observatory, P. O. Box No. 2, Green Bank, West Virginia, 24944, in writing, of the technical particulars of the proposed station. Such notification shall include the geographical coordinates of the antenna, antenna height, antenna directivity if any, proposed frequency, type of emission, and power. In addition, the applicant shall indicate in his application to the Commission the date notification was made to the Observatory. After receipt of such applications, the Commission will allow a period of twenty (20) days for comments or objections in response to the notifications indicated. If an objection to the proposed operation is received during the twenty-day period from the National Radio Astronomy Observatory for itself or on behalf of the Naval Radio Research Observatory, the Commission will consider all aspects of the problem and take whatever action is deemed appropriate.

§ 73.716 Equipment tests.

(a) During the process of construction of an international broadcast station, the permittee after notifying the Commission and Engineer in Charge of the radio district in which the station is located may, without further authority of the Commission, conduct equipment tests for the purpose of such adjustments and measurements as may be necessary to assure compliance with the terms of the construction permit, the technical provisions of the application therefor, and the rules and regulations. No programming shall be conducted during equipment tests.

(b) The Commission may notify the permittee to conduct no tests or may cancel, suspend, or change the date for the beginning of equipment tests as and when such action may appear to be in the public interest, convenience, and necessity.

(c) Equipment tests may be continued so long as the construction permit shall remain valid.

(d) Inspection of a station will ordinarily be required during the equipment test period. After construction and after adjustments and measurements have been completed to show compliance with the terms of the construction permit, the technical provisions of the application therefor, and the rules and regulations.

the permittee should notify the Engineer in Charge of the radio district in which the station is located that it is ready for inspection.

(c) The authorization for tests embodied in this section shall not be construed as constituting a license to operate but as a necessary part of construction.

§ 73.718 Normal license period.

All international broadcast station licenses will be issued so as to expire at the hour of 3 a.m. eastern standard time and will be issued for a normal license period of 1 year expiring November 1.

LICENSING POLICIES

§ 73.731 Licensing requirements; necessary showing.

A license for an international broadcast station will be issued only after a satisfactory showing has been made in regard to the following, among others:

- (a) That there is a need for the international broadcast service proposed to be rendered.
- (b) That the necessary program sources are available to the applicant to render an effective international service.
- (c) That directive antennas and other technical facilities will be employed to deliver maximum signals to the target area or areas for which the service is desired.
- (d) That the production of the program service and the technical operation of the proposed station will be conducted by qualified persons.
- (e) That the applicant is technically and financially qualified and possesses adequate technical facilities to carry forward the service proposed.
- (f) That the public interest, convenience and necessity will be served through the operation of the proposed station.

EQUIPMENT

§ 73.751 Power requirement.

No international broadcast station will be authorized to install equipment or licensed for operation with a power less than 50 kilowatts.

§ 73.752 Frequency control.

The transmitter of each international broadcast station shall be equipped with automatic frequency control apparatus so designed and constructed that it is capable of maintaining the operating frequency within 0.003 percent of the assigned frequency.

§ 73.753 Antenna.

The antenna shall be so designed and operated that the signal (field intensity) toward the specific foreign country or countries served shall be at least 3.16 times the average effective signal from the station (power gain of 10).

§ 73.754 Frequency monitors.

- (a) The licensee of each international broadcast station shall operate at the transmitter a frequency monitor independent of the frequency control of the transmitter.
- (b) The frequency monitor shall be designed and constructed in accordance with good engineering practice and shall have an accuracy sufficient to determine that the operating frequency is within one-half of the allowed tolerance.

§ 73.755 Modulation monitors.

The licensee of each international broadcast station shall have in operation at the transmitter a modulation monitor.

§ 73.756 Required transmitter performance.

(a) The construction, installation, operation, and performance of the international broadcast transmitter system shall be in accordance with good engineering practice.

NOTE: The establishment of specific levels of attenuation for spurious emissions will be the subject of further Rule Making in Docket 10002 pending the completion of additional studies of this matter.

(b) In addition to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section in the event spurious emissions cause harmful interference, such additional steps as may be necessary to eliminate the interference must be taken immediately by the licensee.

§ 73.757 Auxiliary transmitters.

Upon showing that a need exists for the use of auxiliary transmitters in addition to the regular transmitters of an international broadcast station, a license therefor may be issued provided that:

- (a) Auxiliary transmitters may be installed either at the same location as the main transmitters or at another location.
- (b) A licensed operator shall be in control whenever auxiliary transmitters are placed in operation.
- (c) The auxiliary transmitters shall be maintained so that they may be put into immediate operation at any time for the following purposes:
 - (1) The transmission of the regular programs upon the failure of the main transmitters.
 - (2) The transmission of regular programs during maintenance or modification work on the main transmitter, necessitating discontinuance of its operation for a period not to exceed 5 days. (This includes the equipment changes which may be made without authority as set forth elsewhere in the rules and regulations or as authorized by the Commission by letter or by construction permit. Where such operation is required for periods in excess of 5 days, request therefor shall be in accordance with § 1.542 of this chapter.)
 - (3) Upon request by a duly authorized representative of the Commission.
 - (d) The auxiliary transmitters shall be tested at least once each week to determine that they are in proper operating condition and that they are adjusted to the proper frequency except that in the case of operation in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section during any week, the test in that week may be omitted provided the operation under paragraph (c) of this section is satisfactory. A record shall be kept of the time and result of each test. Such records shall be retained for a period of two years.
 - (e) The auxiliary transmitters shall be equipped with satisfactory control equipment which will enable the maintenance of the frequency emitted by the station within the limits prescribed by the regulations in this part.
 - (f) The operating power of an auxiliary transmitter may be less than the authorized power of the main transmitters, but in no event shall it be greater than such power.

§ 73.758 Alternate main transmitters.

The licensee of an international broadcast station may be licensed for alternate main transmitters provided that a technical need for such alternate transmitters is shown and that the following conditions are met:

- (a) Both transmitters are located at the same place.
- (b) Both transmitters shall have the same power rating.
- (c) Both transmitters shall meet the construction, installation, operation, and performance requirements of good engineering practice.

§ 73.759 Changes in equipment and antenna system.

Licensees of international broadcast stations shall observe the following provisions with regard to changes in equipment and antenna system:

- (a) No changes in equipment shall be made:
 - (1) That would result in the emission of signals outside of the authorized channel.
 - (2) Specific authority, upon filing formal application (FCC Form 309) therefor, is required for any of the following changes:
 - (1) Changes involving an increase or decrease in the power rating of the transmitters.
 - (2) A replacement of the transmitters as a whole.
 - (3) Change in the location of the transmitting antenna.
 - (4) Change in location of main studio, if it is proposed to move the main studio to a different city from that specified in the license.
 - (5) Change in the power delivered to the antenna.
 - (6) Change in frequency control and/or modulation system.
 - (c) Other changes, except as above provided for in this section, may be made at any time without the authority of the Commission, provided that the Commission shall be promptly notified thereof and such changes shall be shown in the next application for renewal of license.

TECHNICAL OPERATION AND OPERATORS

§ 73.761 Time of operation.

(a) All international broadcast stations will be licensed for unlimited time operation except as may be directed by the Commission from time to time. In an emergency however, when, due to causes beyond the control of the licensee, it becomes impossible to continue operation, the station may cease operation for a period not to exceed 10 days, provided that the Commission and the Engineer in Charge of the radio district in which the station is located shall be notified in writing immediately after the emergency develops.

(b) Persons desiring to enter into a voluntary sharing arrangement of an international channel may file application therefor with the Commission. Copies of the time-sharing agreement should be filed with the application.

§ 73.762 Station inspection.

The licensee of any international broadcast station shall make the station available for inspection by representatives of the Commission at any reasonable hour.

§ 73.763 Station license, posting of.

The original or each station license shall be posted in the transmitter room.

§ 73.764 Operator requirements.

One or more licensed radiotelephone first-class operators shall be on duty at the place where the transmitting apparatus of each station is located and in actual charge thereof whenever it is being operated. The original license (or FCC Form 759) of each station operator shall be posted at the place where he is on duty. The licensed operator on duty and in charge of an international broadcast transmitter may, at the discretion of the licensee, be employed for other duties or for the operation of another station or stations in accordance with the class of operator's license which he holds and by the rules and regulations governing such stations. However, such duties shall in no wise interfere with the operation of the broadcast transmitter.

(Sec. 312, 49 Stat. 1069, as amended; 47 U.S.C. 312)

§ 73.765 Operating power; how determined.

The operating power, and its maintenance, of each international broadcast station shall be in conformity with good engineering practice.

§ 73.766 Modulation.

The percentage of modulation of the transmissions shall be maintained as high as possible consistent with good quality of transmission and good broadcast practice and in no case less than 50 percent nor more than 100 percent on peaks of frequent recurrence during any selection which normally is transmitted at the highest level of the program under consideration.

§ 73.767 Frequency tolerance.

The operating frequencies of international broadcast station transmitters shall, at all times, be maintained within the frequency tolerances specified in § 73.752.

§ 73.768 Antenna structure, marking and lighting.

The provisions of Part 17 of this chapter (Construction, Marking, and Lighting of Antenna Structures) require that certain antenna structures be painted and/or lighted in accordance with the provisions of that part. Where the antenna structure of a facility authorized under this subpart is required to be painted or lighted, see §§ 17.37, 17.39, 17.40, 17.41, and 17.42 of that part.

§ 73.769 Discontinuance of operation.

The licensee of each station, except stations operating in Alaska, shall notify the Engineer in Charge of the radio district in which the station is located of any of the following changes in the status of such station at least two days before such change:

- (a) Temporary discontinuance of operation for a period of ten days or more;
- (b) The date of resumption of operation after temporary discontinuance of operation for a period of ten days or more;
- (c) Permanent discontinuance of operation.

In all cases of permanent discontinuance of operation the licensee shall, in addition to notifying the Engineer in Charge of the radio district in which the station is located of intention to discontinue operation, immediately forward the station license to the Washington, D.C., office of the Commission for cancellation.

OTHER OPERATING REQUIREMENTS

§ 73.781 Logs.

The licensee or permittee of each international broadcast station shall maintain program and operating logs in the following manner:

- (a) In the program log:
 - (1) An entry of the time each station identification announcement (call letters and location) is made.
 - (2) An entry briefly describing each program broadcast, such as "music", "drama", "speech", etc., together with the name or title thereof, language, and the sponsor's name, with the time of the beginning and ending of the complete program.
 - (3) An entry showing, for each program of network origin, the name of the network originating the program.
- (b) In the operating log:
 - (1) An entry of the time the station begins to supply power to the antenna, and the time it stops.
 - (2) An entry of the time the program begins and ends.
 - (3) An entry of each interruption to the carrier wave, its cause, and duration.
 - (4) An entry of the following each 30 minutes:
 - (i) Operating constants of last radio stage of the transmitter (total plate current and plate voltage).
 - (ii) Frequency monitor reading.
 - (5) A log must be kept of all experimental operation. If the entries required above are not applicable thereto, then the entries shall be made so as to fully describe the operation.
 - (c) Where an antenna structure(s) is required to be illuminated, see § 17.38, *Recording of lower light inspections in the station record*, of Part 17 of this chapter (Construction, Marking and Lighting of Antenna Structures).

§ 73.782 Retention of logs.

Logs of international broadcast stations shall be retained by the licensee or permittee for a period of two years: *Provided, however*, that logs involving communications incident to a disaster or which include communications incident to or involved in an investigation by the Commission and concerning which the licensee or permittee has been notified, shall be retained by the licensee or permittee until he is specifically authorized in writing by the Commission to destroy them; *Provided, further*, that logs incident to or involved in any claim or complaint of which the licensee or permittee has notice shall be retained by the licensee or permittee until such claim or complaint has been fully satisfied or until the same has been barred by statute limiting the time for the filing of suits upon such claims.

§ 73.783 Logs; by whom kept.

Each log shall be kept by the person or persons competent to do so, having actual knowledge of the facts required, who shall sign the log when starting duty and again when going off duty. The logs shall be made available upon request by an authorized representative of the Commission.

§ 73.784 Log form.

The logs shall be kept in an orderly manner, in suitable form, and in such detail that the data required for the particular class of station concerned are readily available. Key letters or abbreviations may be used if proper meaning or explanation is contained elsewhere in the log.

§ 73.785 Correction of logs.

No log or portion thereof shall be erased, obliterated, or willfully destroyed within the period of retention provided by the rules. Any necessary correction may be made only by the person originating the entry who shall strike out the erroneous portion, initial the correction made, and indicate the date of correction.

§ 73.786 Rough logs.

Rough logs may be transcribed into condensed form, but in such case, the original log or memoranda and all portions thereof shall be preserved and made a part of the complete log.

§ 73.787 Station identification.

(a) A licensee of an international broadcast station shall make station identification announcement (call letters and location), at the beginning and ending of each time of operation and during the operation of the hour.

(b) Station identification, program announcements, and oral continuity shall be made with international significance (language particularly) which is designed for the foreign country or countries for which the service is primarily intended.

(c) Identification announcements during operation need not be made when to make such announcement would interrupt a single consecutive speech, play, religious service, symphony concert, or any type of production. In such cases the identification announcement shall be made at the first interruption of the entertainment continuity and at the conclusion thereof.

§ 73.788 Service; commercial or sponsored programs.

(a) A licensee of an international broadcast station shall render only an international broadcast service which will reflect the culture of this country and which will promote international goodwill, understanding, and cooperation. Any program solely intended for, and directed to an audience in the continental United States does not meet the requirements for this service.

(b) Such international broadcast service may include commercial or sponsored programs: *Provided, That:*

(1) Commercial program continuities give no more than the name of the sponsor of the program and the name and general character of the commodity, utility or service, or attraction advertised.

(2) In case of advertising a commodity, the commodity is regularly sold or is being promoted for sale on the open market in the foreign country or countries to which the program is directed in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section.

(3) In case of advertising an American utility or service to prospective tourists or visitors to the United States, the advertisement continuity is particularly directed to such persons in the foreign country or countries where they reside and to which the program is directed in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section.

(4) In case of advertising an international attraction (such as a world fair, resort, spa, etc.) to prospective tourists or visitors to the United States, the oral continuity concerning such attraction is consistent with the purpose and intent of this section.

(5) In case of any other type of advertising, such advertising is directed to the foreign country or countries to which the program is directed and is consistent with the purpose and intent of this section.

(c) The geographic areas to be served by international broadcast stations are the foreign standard target areas shown in Figure 1 of § 73.792, or foreign non-standard target areas as provided in § 73.792(d), and directive antennas shall be employed to direct the transmission to these specific target areas.

(d) An international broadcast station may transmit the program of a standard broadcast station or network system: *Provided, That* the conditions in paragraph (v) of this section in regard to any commercial continuities are observed and when station identifications are made, only the call letter designation of the international station is given on its assigned frequency: *And provided further, That* in the case of chain broadcasting the program is not carried simultaneously by another international station (except another station owned by the same licensee operated on a frequency in a different group to obtain continuity of signal service), the signals from which are directed to the same area. (See section 3(p) of the Communications Act of 1934 for the definition of "chain broadcasting.")

§ 73.789 Sponsored programs, announcement of.

(a) When an international broadcast station transmits any matter for which money, services, or other valuable consideration is either directly or indirectly paid or promised to, or charged or received by, such station, the station shall broadcast an announcement that such matter is sponsored, paid for, or furnished, either in whole or in part, and by whom or on whose behalf such consideration was supplied: *Provided, however, That* "service or other valuable consideration" shall not include any service or property furnished without charge or at a nominal charge for use on, or in connection with, a broadcast unless it is so furnished in consideration for an identification in a broadcast of any person, product, service, trademark, or brand name beyond an identification which is reasonably related to the use of such service or property on the broadcast.

(b) The licensee of each international broadcast station shall exercise reasonable diligence to obtain from its employees, and from other persons with whom it deals directly in connection with any program matter for broadcast, information to enable such licensee to make the announcement required by this section.

(c) In any case where a report (concerning the providing or accepting of valuable consideration by any person for inclusion of any matter in a program intended for broadcasting) has been made to an international broadcast station, as required by section 508 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, of circumstances which would have required an announcement under this section had the consideration been received by such international broadcast station, an appropriate announcement shall be made by such station.

(d) In the case of any political program or any program involving the discussion of public controversial issues for which any records, transcriptions, talent, scripts, or other material or services of any kind are furnished, either directly or indirectly, to a station as an inducement to the broadcasting of such program, an announcement shall be made both at the beginning and conclusion of such program on which such material or services are used that such records, transcriptions, talent, scripts, or other material or services have been furnished to such station in connection with the broadcasting of such programs: *Provided, however, That* only one such announcement need be made in the case of any such program of 5 minutes' duration or less, which announcement may be made either at the beginning or conclusion of the program.

(e) The announcement required by this section shall fully and fairly disclose the true identity of the person or persons by whom or in whose behalf such payment is made or promised, or from whom or in whose behalf such services or other valuable consideration is received, or by whom the material or services referred to in paragraph (d) of this section are furnished. Where an agent or other person contracts or otherwise makes arrangements with a station on behalf of another, and such fact is known to the station, the announcement shall disclose the identity of the person or persons in whose behalf such agent is acting instead of the name of such agent.

(f) In the case of any program, other than a program advertising commercial products or services, which is sponsored, paid for or furnished, either in whole or in part, or for which material or services referred to in paragraph (d) of this section are furnished, by a corporation, committee, association, or other unincorporated group, the announcement required by this section shall disclose the name of such corporation, committee, association, or other unincorporated group. In each such case the station shall require that a list of the chief executive officers or members of the executive committee or of the board of directors of the corporation, committee, association or other unincorporated group shall be made available for public inspection at the studios or general offices of one of the international broadcast stations carrying the program in each community in which the program is broadcast.

(g) In the case of broadcast matter advertising commercial products or services, an announcement stating the sponsor's corporate or trade name, or the name of the sponsor's product, when it is clear that the mention of the name of the product constitutes a sponsorship identification, shall be deemed sufficient for the purposes of this section and only one such announcement need be made at any time during the course of the program.

(h) Commission interpretations in connection with the foregoing rules may be found in the Commission's Public Notice entitled "Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules" (FCC 63-409; 28 F.R. 4732, May 10, 1963) and such supplements as are issued from time to time.

§ 73.790 Rebroadcast.

(a) The licensee of an international broadcast station may, without further authority of the Commission, rebroadcast the program of a United States standard, FM noncommercial educational, or FM broadcast station, provided the Commission is notified of the call letters of each station rebroadcast and the licensee certifies that express authority has been received from the licensee of the station originating the program. The notice and certification of consent must be given within 3 days of any single rebroadcast, but in case of the regular practice of rebroadcasting certain programs of another broadcast station several times during a license period, notice and certification of consent must be given for the ensuing license period with the application for renewal of license, or at the beginning of such rebroadcast practice if begun during a license period.

Note: The broadcasting of a program relayed by a remote pickup broadcast station is not subject to the above rules.

(b) No licensee of an international broadcast station shall rebroadcast the programs of any other class of United States radio station without written authority having first been obtained from the Commission.

(c) A licensee of an international broadcast station may authorize the rebroadcast of its programs by any station outside the limits of the North American continent without permission from the Commission; *Provided*, That the station rebroadcasting the programs cannot be received consistently in the United States.

(Sec. 322, 48 Stat. 1091; 47 U.S.C. 322)

§ 73.791 Supplemental report with renewal application.

A supplemental report shall be filed with and made a part of each application for renewal of license and shall include statements of the following:

(a) The number of hours operated on each frequency, listing contract operations and private operations separately.

(b) Outline of reports of reception and interference and conclusions with regard to propagation characteristics of assigned frequencies. (If such information is not available to the applicant in the case of contract operations, a statement to this effect will be considered adequate.)

FCC 63-360B
33472

BEFORE THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

IN THE MATTER OF AMENDMENT OF SECTION 1.337 OF THE COMMISSION'S RULES AND REGULATIONS, CONCERNING PROCESSING OF APPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCAST STATIONS

ORDER

At a session of the Federal Communications Commission held at its offices in Washington, D.C. on the 17th day of April, 1963,

The Commission having under consideration Part 3, Subpart F, of its Rules and Regulations, pertaining to private international broadcast stations;

It appearing, That several factors point to an immediate need to undertake comprehensive revision of these Rules and Regulations, which were adopted in 1939 and last modified in 1955; and


It further appearing, That the most important such factor is mounting frequency congestion and resultant shortage of available frequency hours in the international broadcast bands for both private and governmental use; and

It further appearing, That this situation has been brought about by (1) decreasing sunspot activity, (2) an increase in frequency hour usage by both private international broadcast stations and by Voice of America facilities since the present rules were adopted, (3) pending applications seeking authorizations for international broadcast stations now on file with the Commission, and (4) an increase in the worldwide level of international broadcasting; and

It further appearing, That the mounting frequency congestion in the high frequency broadcast bands tends to jeopardize the entire international high frequency allocations structure, and may therefore affect the ability of all radio services to make full and effective use of the high frequency region of the spectrum; and

It further appearing, That a second factor necessitating changes in the international broadcast rules is the incompatibility of certain sections of the present rules with Article 10 of the Radio Regulations annexed to the International Telecommunications Convention (Geneva, 1959), which Convention and Regulations have been ratified by the President of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate; and

It further appearing, That the acceptance of new applications for private international broadcast stations or for increased frequency hours by present stations or the granting of such applications currently pending would serve to compound the problems of frequency congestion noted above and could seriously prejudice the results of the rule-making proceeding now necessary in this area (which rule-making will be initiated in the near future), and, therefore, that further acceptance and grant of such applications would not be in the public interest; and



It further appearing, That the notice of rule-making and effective date provisions of Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act are not applicable to the rule change set out in the Appendix since the rule change adopted herein is procedural, relating to the manner in which and the time at which the Commission accepts and considers applications.

Accordingly, *It is ordered,* That, effective April 25, 1963, Section 1.357 of the Commission's Rules is amended as set forth in the Appendix hereto. Authority for the adoption of this rule is contained in Sections 4(i) and 303(r) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,¹
BEN F. WAPLE, Acting Secretary.

Released April 19, 1963.

¹ See attached dissenting statement of Commissioner Hyde.
NOTE.—Rules changes herein will be covered by T.S. (63)-1.

APPENDIX

Section 1.357 of the Commission's Rules is amended by the addition of the following note at the end of the present text:

NOTE: Pending rule-making pertaining to the authorization of international broadcast stations, no application seeking authority to construct a new international broadcast station or seeking authority to operate a greater number of frequency hours than authorized on April 25, 1963, will be granted, and, after April 25, 1963, no such application will be accepted for filing.

DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER HYDE

I dissent to the issuance of the attached freeze order. The text of the order, as well as its ordering clause, clearly identify it as a change in regulations defining substantive policy. Such a change in rules should not be made without notice and an opportunity for submission of views by interested persons as contemplated by the Administrative Procedure Act. Labeling the change as "procedural" only compounds the basic error. The situation with respect to applications in this service has not changed in months. No emergency exists which would justify departure from the procedures prescribed by law.

There are important questions on which the Commission might well ask for information and views before making a judgment such as announced in this order:

1. Should the United States conserve frequencies for international broadcasting while engaged in a world competition with other countries which make greater use and show no tendencies to curtail such uses?
2. Would it be advantageous to the United States to restrict international broadcasting largely to a single government agency?
3. Isn't it probable that non-government independent broadcasting from responsible private entities may in many circumstances be more effective in presenting the American concept of a free society than broadcasting by a government agency?

NEWS ARTICLES CONCERNING VIETNAM WAR COVERAGE

[From the Indianapolis Star, July 27, 1966]

ALICE WIDENER SAYS—GOVERNMENT HAS RIGHT TO MAINTAIN SECURITY

NEW YORK.

Nothing is harder to correct than a much publicized untruth; nothing is harder to repair than a vendetta-type injustice.

I don't like untruths, half-truths or injustice, and so I believe it is time to try to correct some unfair propaganda against Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Arthur Sylvester.

Recently I sought an exclusive interview with him to find out facts about his alleged opinion "It's the inherent right of the government to lie to save itself." Also, I wanted to find out some facts about the problem of press reporting on the Viet Nam War in relation to an attack on Secretary Sylvester by Morley Safer, former CBS News correspondent in Viet Nam, which appears in the 1966 annual issue of "Dateline," a publication of the Overseas Press Club, in which I am an active member.

Actually, the headline-getting statement of Secretary Sylvester about the right of government to lie to save itself was only a part of his response to a questioner at a free-swinging discussion during a meeting of Sigma Delta Chi, a newspaper fraternity, in New York City, Dec. 8, 1962. Sylvester addressed that meeting and it was only in the ensuing question period that a questioner, who originally used the term "lie," elicited the secretary's response which, in all justice, should be put in its fair and proper context concerning the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

On the Friday preceding President Kennedy's Monday address to the nation in the eyeball-to-eyeball nuclear U.S.-USSR confrontation, an inquiry was put to the Defense Department information office about the rumored existence of offensive Soviet missiles in Cuba. In a routine answer, a subordinate in the press office—not Secretary Sylvester personally—gave a misleading statement, not out of deliberate falsehood but because he just didn't have the secret information to which only an extremely limited number of highest government officials had access.

In reply to my recent direct question about what Secretary Sylvester believed in 1962 and believes now, he said, "I can only tell you what I told two Congressional committees under oath: Obviously, no government information program can be based on lies; it must always be based on truthful facts. But when any nation is faced with nuclear disaster, with the life or death of your nation, you do not tell all the facts to your enemy. That, and that alone, is what I am talking about."

Moreover, in the Viet Nam War, no reporter has a right to divulge information endangering the lives of our fighting men, and none has a right to divulge information about troop movements or planned military maneuvers that would so endanger them. I believe in government of the people, by the people, and for the people. I do not make an arbitrary separation between government and the people.

"When the government is taking life or death emergency measures to protect the people—as was being done over the weekend prior to President Kennedy's address to the nation in the Cuban missile crisis—it is essential not to give the enemy an advantage by letting him know exactly what you are doing. That is essential to the people's right to survival in a nuclear era. In such event, the interests of the people and the government are one, and I am confident that is the way we want it to be."

I personally am in full agreement. Also, I believe it to be entirely right that President Johnson has asked the FBI to investigate who leaked to a newspaperman advance information about our recent air attacks on the Hanoi and Hai-phong oil installations. Our pilots are human beings with a right to maximum survival chances. No reporter or government employee has a right to leak vital

information about our military action in Viet Nam in defiance of press ground rules laid down by the military, regulations faithfully observed by most reporters.

It is a fact that Assistant Secretary Sylvester's main critic, Morley Safer—who wrote the recent article in the *OPC "Dateline"*—was cited by Col. Ben W. Legare in Saigon, last August 11, for violation of well articulated security rules, thereby endangering American troops. This fact was stated in Secretary Sylvester's letter dated May 10, 1966, to the President of the Overseas Press Club.

Many critics of our anti-Communist policy in Southeast Asia and Viet Nam are waging vicious propaganda warfare against U.S. officials responsible for conducting the war and furnishing information about it. If Joe Donkes were in Secretary Sylvester's place, then Joe Donkes would be the victim of deliberate attacks for the purpose of discreditation at home and abroad.

I am no respecter of persons and don't believe anyone is perfect—me first. But I think it is about time that my colleagues in the press and the American people give Secretary Sylvester a decent break.

[From the *Denver Post*, Jan. 23, 1966]

HOYT REPORTS ON WAR, PRESS

CASPER, Wyo.—The American public is not being "deceived" about the war in Viet Nam, and is getting the facts "substantially" from the press, but the press could do a better job in gathering and presenting them, according to Palmer Hoyt, editor and publisher of *The Denver Post*.

Hoyt, a member of the United States Advisory Commission on Information, who recently checked on problems of the American press in Viet Nam in covering the war, described the situation in an address Friday night at the annual banquet of the Wyoming Press Association.

He laid part of the problems of informing the public on the extraordinary nature of the Vietnamese war and in part on the tendency of many reporters to concentrate on the fighting to the exclusion of social, economic and political factors of considerable significance.

LESS THAN CANDID

Hoyt acknowledged that "serious charges" had been made "to the effect that the American public is being deceived about the war in Viet Nam." But, he added, "this is not true."

"I do not say that the government's spokesmen have at all times been candid with the press and public or that they wouldn't like to cover up much that has happened in Viet Nam," the publisher explained. "Nor do I say that the press has covered the war to my satisfaction.

"But I do say that the contention that the American public is not able to get the truth out of Viet Nam is, in itself, not true."

Hoyt criticized military briefing officers for attempts to cloud the facts or present them in the best possible light. This he attributed to "the fact that the military does not have its best public relations officers running this phase of the operation in Viet Nam."

He pointed out, however, that good reporters had learned to check questionable points for themselves and that they were thereby able to get the story for the public at home.

CODE ACCEPTED

"There is very little censorship, at least in the accepted sense," said Hoyt. "The newsmen there have agreed voluntarily to a code under which they will not disclose in advance the pending movements of the military. They have also agreed, somewhat more reluctantly, that they will not disclose the number of casualties suffered by our side in any particular engagement."

Other than this, Hoyt explained, the reporters are not restricted in what they can write about, or what they can say.

He said he would like to see more written about the constructive things that are being done—the land reform, the houses that are built, the help being given—but he said this was an approach editors could do something about.

He called on editors to demand more information than they are getting of a non-military nature, and to publish this when they get it.

[From the *Chicago Tribune*, June 20, 1966]

REPORTER FINDS VIET WAR EASY: PROVIDING

(By Arthur Veysoy)

SAIGON, Viet Nam, June 19—Covering the war in Viet Nam is easy for a reporter. Stories are everywhere, waiting to be told.

Contrary to often stated charges, reporters willing to [sic] conferences of Saigon are free to travel where they like. They restaurants, bars, and the press leave the air conditioned hotels, find a welcome everywhere among American military men.

Military transportation of all types is open to the reporter for the asking. He even gets preference on scheduled flights carrying troops and supplies. If no scheduled flight is available, the reporter need only wait on an air field and sooner or later a plane will come along. The pilot happily gives the reporter a lift.

There is no censorship. In two months moving about the country, I met no restriction that I considered unreasonable. Of course, the reporter is expected to use his common sense. The reporter who, for example, files a story that planes have taken off for North Viet Nam while the planes are still on the way is quite properly shunned by sicers who feel the reporter's irresponsibility endangered their lives.

In Saigon, the reporter lives in a hotel or apartment he provides for himself. Army dining rooms, bars, shops, post exchange shops and movies are open to him. In Da Nang, the military has taken over a seaside motel for reporters covering the war from there. Elsewhere, the reporter bunka with whatever outfit he happens to be with at meal time or bed time. The outfit usually gives him the best it has and charges him 50 cents or a dollar.

Each military outfit has an officer or sergeant assigned as public information officer. By and large, the P. I. O.'s do their best to see that the reporter gets the story he seeks, as well as transportation and quarters.

Some reporters accuse the command of using the P. I. O.'s as "prison wardens" to make sure reporters "don't get out of line." But my experience is that the P. I. O.'s are a much greater help than hindrance to an experienced reporter who understands military ways.

The best P. I. O.'s see that the reporter gets to the people with the story. Introduces him, and then leaves him to get the facts himself. Sometimes, P. I. O.'s who have had unfortunate experiences with reporters sit in on interviews by reporters they are meeting for the first time.

Some inexperienced or lazy reporters expect P. I. O.'s to do the work for them and give them the story. Ironically, these same reporters are usually those who protest about "restrictions" and "spoon feeding."

The reporter's worst problem lies in poor communications between Saigon and the rest of the world. The cable service is bad and 24 hour delays are common on big news days. The service is expensive—about 25 cents a word to American cities. This is one of the world's highest press rates. Agencies are arranging their own radio circuits. These would tie into existing cable networks in Manila, Hong Kong or Tokyo.

Despite the ease with which a reporter can travel within Viet Nam, most of the reporters spend most of their time in Saigon. A daily briefing by the command P. I. O. in the air conditioned United States information service auditorium supplies the raw material for the bulk of stories filed daily from Viet Nam.

At the briefing, a P. I. O. officer hands out two or three mimeographed pages listing incidents. Reporters can ask for further details, but rarely get them. Sometimes, the P. I. O. produces one or two military men directly involved in some incident. These men seem to speak from carefully prepared statements and seem to hedge when asked for further details.

The briefings lead to charges that the military is "guiding" the news. If a reporter is content with the briefings as his main source of material, the charge sticks. But any reporter is free to seek facts elsewhere and as soon as he leaves headquarters he finds a free world for news gathering.

This is no new situation. It existed in World War II and in the Korean war. In those wars, censorship and long distances between the fronts and the cable head made the reporter's role much more difficult than that which the reporter meets today in Viet Nam.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Mar. 4, 1966]

THE UNTOLD STORY: REPORTING

(By Joseph Alsop)

WASHINGTON.—It is against custom, but it is an unfortunate necessity to end this series with a warning. Every one should now be warned to suspect some of the most important reporting from Viet Nam.

Consider, for example, a very great newspaper's two successive stories, sent from Saigon on Feb. 17 and 18. Both concerned the big spoiling operation Gen. Westmoreland mounted not long ago in Binh Dinh province. The operation's aim, according to the first story, was to find and destroy four regiments of enemy regulars, half Viet Cong and half North Vietnamese.

In reality, the original aim was to strike only two enemy regiments, the 18th Regiment of the North Vietnamese 325th Division and the 2nd V.C. main force regiment. Almost at once, however, a third predominantly Northern regiment with the enemy code name of "Quyet Tam," was discovered by our troops. All were operating under a temporary divisional headquarters with the code name "Sau Vang." None of this matters much, compared to the following flat, unqualified assertion in the first of these two stories:

"Not one of these (enemy) regiments has yet been drawn into battle."

The story did not stop there, either. Both the Binh Dinh operation and Gen. Westmoreland's basic strategy were roundly condemned as failures, on the ground that the target-regiments were not "drawn into battle." An accompanying editorial all but crowed over this report of failure of American troops in the field.

Hence it was a bit bewildering to learn from the second story, by another reporter, on the same paper, that our troops had captured a very high ranking V.C. officer, Lt. Col. Dong Duan, commander of the 93d Battalion of the 2d V.C. main force regiment. This story also repeated that our troops had "not made contact" with their four target-regiments; but now these regiments were differently described as entirely North Vietnamese.

This change of description was wholly incorrect; for the 2d V.C. main force regiment had been one of the target-regiments from the very outset, as implied in the first story. But as this was the perhaps inconvenient fact, and if Lt. Col. Dong Duan's outfit was never "drawn into battle," how the devil did a battalion commander get himself captured on the battlefield?

These fairly lurid inconsistencies led to consultation of this reporter's Vietnamese notes, and far more important, to telegraphic inquiries to Gen. Westmoreland's headquarters in Saigon. In summarizing the results, one must begin by pointing out that a lot depends on what you mean by "contact" and "battle." The Binh Dinh fighting certainly did not resemble the Ia Drang fighting last October.

The regular troops of the target-regiments were instead brigaded, in battalion and even in company strength, with units of the V. C. local forces and even with guerrilla bands; and all were supported by press-ganged groups of peasant porters. Thus in any engagement, the regulars were likely to be encountered in a mixture with the other listed elements.

Even so, before this reporter left Saigon, Gen. Westmoreland gave the considered judgment that two of the target-regiments of enemy regulars had suffered losses that would put these outfits out of action for another three months.

By Feb. 28 (for the operation in Binh Dinh continued defiantly, despite its stern condemnation as a sad failure on Feb. 17) the U.S. field headquarters was reporting indications of the "complete collapse" of a third target-regiment. These signs of collapse were the continuous increase in numbers of weapons abandoned on the battlefield, plus numbers of defecting enemy troops without precedent in previous experience.

Thus three of the target-regiments, though allegedly never "drawn into battle," were at least very gravely damaged; and one of the three may well have been scrubbed right off the order of battle. As of Feb. 28, Gen. Westmoreland's headquarters tally of the enemy troops killed in action had reached 1700 by body count, with another 1700 estimated as killed but not counted.

There are three things to be said about this. First, duplications in body counts sometimes occur in the heat of combat. Second, these duplications are normally trifling, compared to the enemy losses that are uncounted because of the Communist habit of running extreme risks to remove their dead from the battlefield. Only a very rare body count will include victims of our air power, for instance; yet this is the arm the V. C. fear the most.

Third, it is highly conservative to assume that severely wounded enemy troops were at least double the number of those killed. Add that over 400 enemy troops have been captured, and defecting enemy's losses of all categories, including guerrillas as well as regulars, must clearly run far above 7,000 men.

It can be seen, then, why Gen. Westmoreland's headquarters now estimates that 11 enemy battalions, or the equivalent, have been put out of action in the Binh Dinh fighting, which is proudly characterized as "the most successful combined operation to date." The characterization is justified, unless Gen. Westmoreland's staff are playing ducks and drakes with the facts.

And who is more likely to play ducks and drakes with the facts—reporters rather obviously reflecting the outspoken preconceptions of a great newspaper, or Gen. Westmoreland, who is one of the soberest and most brilliant field commanders in U.S. history?

[May 28 1966]

SAN FRANCISCO (UPI).—Representative John E. Moss, chairman of a House subcommittee on Government Information, said Sunday night the U.S. public was being adequately informed about the war in Viet Nam.

"The quality of the reporting, the availability of the men who have the information and the access to areas of activity are without parallel in any other military action," said the California Democrat.

Moss made the statement on arriving here from a fact-finding mission in Saigon, Bangkok and Taipei. He is chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information.

Moss and his committee, consisting of six other Congressmen and a full staff, also investigated alleged black marketing in Saigon. He said such activities existed and that his committee would "have to come up with recommendations."

"More attention will have to be paid to day-to-day housekeeping details," he said.

[From the Congressional Record, Mar. 21 1966]

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed on another subject.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, in the winter issue of the Columbia Journalism Review is an article by Martin Gershen entitled "Press Against Military in Vietnam: A Further View." Anyone who feels confused over some of the press reports from Vietnam would do well to read this article, because it helps to explain the reason for some of the confusion—and the reason, Mr. Gershen points out, lies with a few of the members of the press themselves. During my recent trip to South Vietnam, I had occasion to discuss this problem with some of our military commanders. Their comments were uniformly to the effect that the great majority of members of the press handled themselves and their reporting commendably, but there were always a few who had to abuse the situation. Mr. Gershen's article gives examples of the "abuse." I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

"PRESS VERSUS MILITARY IN VIETNAM: A FURTHER VIEW"

(NOTE.—Martin Gershen, who wrote the following observations, is a feature writer-photographer for the Newark Star-Ledger, on leave to study in Columbia's advanced international reporting program. He covered the war in Vietnam last summer.)

"There is a basic law of journalism which says that every story should have at least two sides.

"Yet, in too many reports involving censorship in Vietnam, the press seems to have the last word.

"And that word leaves the reader—or viewer—at home no alternative but to assume that the American war in southeast Asia not only is against communism, but against the entire U.S. Military Establishment.

"In an article, 'Censorship and Cam Ne,' by Richard Rustin, which appeared in the fall, 1965, issue of the Columbia Journalism Review, the writer made some

attempt at giving both sides of the controversy that continues between the press and the brass.

"But one had to read carefully and dig deeply to learn that the possibility exists that the press may be partly to blame for its troubles with the censors.

"Edward P. Morgan suggested this possibility when he was quoted as saying there was a 'passel' of young stringers in Vietnam who are trying to become the Ernie Pyles of this war by baiting military officials at press briefings.

"But generally the article seemed to consist of quotations from one famous byliner after another who self-righteously attacked censorship in Vietnam and blamed the military for shackling the free press.

"One of the more disturbing quotations was reported to have been made by UPI foreign news analyst Phil Newson, who said: 'It is doubtful * * * if the story of U.S. Marines burning a village near Da Nang ever would have come out if newsmen had not seen it.'

"Newson, of course, was referring to a CBS television report of the burning of Cam Ne—a report which aroused much controversy at home because it suggested that marines arbitrarily burn Vietnamese villages. He implied that a hard-digging U.S. press corps took on a hard-to-get-along-with U.S. Marine Corps and uncovered a terrible secret.

"If this were true, then bully for the newsmen.

"But it wasn't true. The fact is that it is doubtful if newsmen ever would have seen the village razed if it weren't for the U.S. Marines inviting them to the burning.

"I was at the Da Nang press camp when the marine invitation was extended. I turned it down because I had a previous commitment to go on an air raid aboard a B-57 fighter bomber. The squadron took newsmen on flights only one day a week.

"The real reason for burning Cam Ne, of course, was that it was a Vietcong stronghold and William F. Buckley, Jr., who also was quoted in the Rustin article, made this point clear.

"To report properly the story of the Marine operation at Cam Ne would have meant explaining that villages and their civilian populations play a key role in guerrilla warfare.

"This is the why of the story, which of course is too complicated to make a good lead.

"One of the major problems facing U.S. forces in Vietnam is being able to distinguish friend from foe.

"The Marines, like all the services there, are aware too that they must win the people if they are to win the war and they lean over backward to avoid antagonizing local populations.

"It must have taken Marine intelligence a long time to determine for certain that Cam Ne was a Vietcong stronghold.

"Then, when they decided to destroy the village, they invited the press to come along.

"Is it any wonder that they became annoyed when stories of their operation depicted Marines as no better than SS troops who burned villages and pushed around women, children, and old men?

"But even more annoying to military men in Vietnam is the caliber of many of the correspondents out there.

"A ranking Pentagon officer observed recently that editors told him they were having difficulty getting good newsmen to cover Vietnam.

"The problem, he said, was money. It costs about \$1,300 round trip to fly a newsmen to the other end of the world and for that amount of cash you would expect him to stay for a while.

"But if he is an experienced newsmen, he has a wife and family so the news service would have to bring them along and settle them in Hong Kong or Bangkok.

"Add periodic trips for the newsmen to his family, additional life and accident insurance, education expenses for the kids and war becomes an unprofitable news story.

"As a result, the Pentagon officer said, 'American news services are hiring people out there they would never touch at home.'

"It's obviously cheaper to pick up a 'passel' of young stringers who have already paid their way to Vietnam and who will work for peanuts.

"In an effort to encourage the U.S. press to cover the war in Vietnam, the Defense Department last year flew 84 newsmen to southeast Asia.

" 'We did it, frankly, to prime the pump,' the Pentagon officer said.

"The military believed that by encouraging more newsmen to come to Vietnam, competition would become keener, resulting in less sensational stories and in more straight reporting.

"The project was discontinued last summer as escalation of the war began in earnest because 'we reasoned the American press was interested enough to pay its own way to Vietnam.'

"It didn't work out that way.

"Of the 100 civilian news organizations from around the world who were represented in Vietnam last August, about 40 were American. Of the 200 newsmen present, approximately 175 were American.

"Three months later, in November, the number of news organizations in Vietnam had increased to 130 but the proportion of U.S. services to the total rose less than 10 percent while U.S. troop strength had increased by the tens of thousands.

"Of the 200 accredited newsmen covering the war, fewer than half were Americans. Foreign newsmen were hired by nearly all the American media. In some of the larger organizations 20 to 60 percent of the staff was foreign.

"In the last two weeks of 1965, the number of U.S. services and staffers had begun to increase slightly, according to a Pentagon official.

"Obviously, a certain number of foreign newsmen are needed on American staffs to overcome language barriers. The rest probably are hired to overcome budgetary problems.

"I remember meeting one of these non-American U.S. correspondents the day after the Cam Ne incident. We both were leaving Da Nang. He was carrying a pouch of television film, which he was bringing to Saigon. I was returning to Pleiku.

"We were picked up at the press camp by two U.S. enlisted men who were ordered to drive us to the airfield where we were to catch a military flight south.

"On the way to the airfield my colleague began berating the two enlisted men over the Cam Ne operation.

"He implied that the Marines were no better than the Gestapo.

" 'Imagine you Yanks burning a village. I never saw anything like that in my life,' said this correspondent, who obviously was too young ever to have covered a war before.

"Enlisted men are taught to treat civilians with respect, especially if they are from the press. The two GI's looked at each other but said nothing.

"I tried, at first, to keep from getting involved, because we newspapermen have to stick together even if we're wrong.

"But his criticism continued and finally I said, 'For Christ's sake, shut up.'

"He looked at me in surprise. Then he said, partly as an explanation, partly as an appeal to my journalistic loyalties and partly to get the last word in:

"But I actually saw a Marine push an old man around."

"I thought of the night I had spent with a Marine company surrounded in a jungle outpost by 300 Vietcong. I remembered the next morning walking down a road with a Marine sergeant who smiled at all the villagers he met because he couldn't tell the good guys from the bad guys and he didn't want to antagonize friendly Vietnamese.

"I thought what a crazy, mixed-up war this is, where you can't tell the front from the rear, Vietcong from Vietnamese, civilians from soldiers. I turned to this young correspondent and very gently said:

" 'Look, it was a Vietcong village. How did you expect the Marines to handle that situation?'

"He hesitated for a moment, then said, 'Why don't you Yanks get out of Vietnam?'

"And if he is typical of U.S. press representation in Vietnam, then the military people there have been very kind to us.

—MARTIN GERSHEN."

[From the New York Times, Feb. 13, 1966]

IT'S A DIRTY WAR FOR CORRESPONDENTS, TOO

(By Jack Raymond)

WASHINGTON.—Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman, the leader of the Civil War march through Georgia, once undertook to have a correspondent hanged for espionage. Angriily, he wrote that he would rather be governed by Jefferson

Davis than "abused by a set of dirty newspaper scribblers who have the impudence of Satan."

"They come into camp," he went on, "poke about among the lazy shirks and pick up their camp rumors and publish them as facts, and the avidity with which these rumors are swallowed by the public makes even some of our officers bow to them. I will not. They are a pest and shall not approach me and I will treat them as spics which in truth they are."

In more restrained language and with no outward evidence yet that any correspondent in Vietnam is in danger of hanging as a spy, military officials here and in Saigon have expressed concern over security breaches in the reporting of the war. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said that the Government will have to "take a very hard look" at the possibility of imposing military censorship. Short of that, however, the Government already has called upon the press to follow certain rules of self-censorship. These rules, pertaining to troop unit identifications and deployments, are similar to restrictions that have been applied formally in past wars and are not serious impediments to free news coverage.

Far more serious are the sporadic clashes between the press and officialdom over the very facts of the war. Dispatches from Vietnam from time to time have questioned the accuracy of official statements. In retaliation, Government spokesmen—military and civilian officials alike—have questioned the competence, good judgment and even patriotism of correspondents. As a consequence, an undercurrent of doubt greets much of the news from Vietnam, official and unofficial. In a war that has engaged the United States for more than a decade, with ever-increasing casualties, both press and Government face crises in credibility.

This is doubly serious. In the United States belief in the reliability of the news media is crucial to the governmental process. At the same time, because in this war there was no Pearl Harbor to arouse emotions, no blatant Communist invasion across a border as in the Korean war, the Government is crucially dependent for support upon the people's belief in and understanding of what they are told is happening that requires Americans to fight and die half way around the world.

All wars are hard to cover. The so-called "fog of war" which envelops combatants does not spare the most professional observer. The war in Vietnam, however, poses unusual problems for the correspondent, although he enjoys more creature comforts than he had in World War II and the Korean war. For example, because South Vietnam is a relatively small country, it is possible to fly to one of the combat positions, spend a few hours and return to Saigon in time for dinner and a comfortable night's sleep in a reasonably good air-conditioned hotel or apartment. The facilities in Pleiku or Danang are not quite so favorable, but only rarely do correspondents have to live in the field with the troops over an extended period of time.

About 300 correspondents are accredited to headquarters in Saigon, 200 of them in the country at any given time. Many correspondents, with home bases elsewhere in the Pacific area, cover the war at intervals. Half of the resident correspondents are American. These totals compare impressively with the 250 to 300 correspondents, half of them American, who covered the much larger Korean war. As in past wars, the official information services are overwhelming in the sheer physical effort to provide the correspondents with facilities, although the never-satisfied press corps can cite chapter and verse on occasional lapses.

Military transport is available to correspondents most of the time. Once having signed the "death chit" absolving authorities in case of accident, a correspondent usually can get a ride in a helicopter or cargo plane. At least one helicopter is permanently assigned to the Saigon press corps on a stand-by basis. Arrangement recently were made to have an airplane similarly assigned for a press run to entry dispatches, film and passengers on a round-trip route including Saigon, Danang, Pleiku and other major places. When military transport is not available, there is always Air Vietnam, the commercial airline, with its daily flight schedule. Typically, Charles Taylor of The Toronto Globe and Mail found military information officers "eager to guide me into the heart of the fighting and disappointed if the action turned out to be tame."

Yes, the military authorities are quite cooperative in facilitating coverage most of the time. The trouble begins when the journalistic practices has profession, and much of the trouble is due to objective causes.

In other wars a correspondent knew what the likely action was - at the front. He got stories by going there. He chose a unit and arranged to spend days or weeks - even months with it - knowing that it had certain military objectives.

On dull days, he wrote hometown features, but there was a geographic and quantitative coherence to the campaign and its battles. When territory was taken, cities captured, strongpoints demolished and enemy prisoners, dead and wounded rounded up—these were indicators of military success, just as surely as retreat, surrender and heavy casualties denoted failure. Of course, there were Pyrrhic victories and "tactical" retreats but such events could be reported in a meaningful context.

In this war, not only are there no battle fronts, there are relatively few battles. The insurgency by the Vietcong supported by North Vietnamese Army units is designed to harass the people and shake their confidence in Government security. Despite the increasing number of military clashes, most of the war consists of relatively small-scale attempts to counter Vietcong propaganda, arson, kidnappings, terror raids, murders and various forms of sabotage.

The correspondent refers to most of these with statistical summaries. He cannot afford to spend a month in a village, waiting for a terrorist attack or studying how its people react to Communist propaganda, although that is the substance of the war. It is not feasible for a correspondent to travel with Government forces in professional anticipation of an ambush. The ambush may not occur for days, or even weeks—or ever—with the unit he has selected. Thus, while reporters compete to cover the larger-scale activities of the American combat forces, many of them are nagged by their consequent neglect of the wider role of the South Vietnamese military and civil guard in coping with the enemy.

The distortion of the "real war" as presented in coverage of skirmishes that would not have made the official communiques in past wars is indicated by the estimate of 28,000 incidents provoked by the Vietcong during 1965, compared with 28 combat operations in which more than 200 Vietcong were reported killed. The press picture of the situation in Vietnam is further distorted when reporters, concentrating on the headline-making American troops, find little time to cover political and economic developments without which the military effort is meaningless. Only a few big newspapers devote occasional feature pieces to the undramatic but perhaps decisive effort to "win the hearts and minds" of the people through cultural and economic assistance programs.

Even the correspondent with a unit that engages the enemy is hard put to keep the action in perspective. Most often, he is near but not at the battle. Even when he can see part of it, he is as dependent as a traffic cop at an accident on the coherence of the participants and other witnesses. While this is always true in war, the absence of the customary perspective of territory to be captured leaves the correspondent with no independent criterion for the significance of a battle. He is at the mercy of the excited soldiers, some of whom exaggerate in defeatism and despair as others exaggerate with claims of triumph.

Without place names as milestones toward an enemy capital, the correspondent is almost compelled to play up the sights and sounds of battle. It takes only a few casualties in any skirmish to generate descriptions worthy of the Battle of Iwo Jima. With TV and still cameras on the scene, with color film and sound equipment, the blood and cries of war are soon transported to every living room in America, and then it almost makes no difference what anybody says really happened.

The absence of formal censorship has its good and bad points. In the first place, it facilitates speedy communications, and that is good. Lack of censorship also encourages some officers in the field to speak candidly. Most of them observe the American's traditional sense of obligation toward the public's "right to know." As in other wars, local commanders vie for the attention of reporters because they are proud of the job they and their men are doing. Often, officers use the press as a channel of appeal when they find official responses negative or slow.

But the absence of censorship also inhibits some officers. Uncertain of how far they can go, many hardly go far enough in helping the press understand what is taking place. Inevitably, without formal rules of censorship, newsmen in the field will come into conflict with officers over specific wording of their dispatches, or specific scenes filmed in TV newscasts, even when there is no disagreement in principle. In other wars, the official censors could settle such disputes.

While many correspondents go into the field with the troops—seven have been killed and one died of a tropical disease—most correspondents are compelled to spend much of their time in Saigon where they have ready access to international communications. There they attend the daily military briefings and watch political developments with the help of a South Vietnamese interpreter assistant. Most stories from Vietnam are based on the regular briefings.

The military briefings are rough affairs. When I was in Vietnam last summer I could not help noticing that Pentagon news conferences, notorious for their waspish atmosphere, were mild compared with those held in Saigon. The briefers distribute mimeographed summaries of reported combat operations of the previous 24 hours, adding orally any late-breaking developments they are authorized to mention. Sometimes, combat men are brought in to describe particular actions. But in an ordinary briefing, the official spokesman often is less informed than correspondents who may have just come in from the field. And, while courtesies are observed, correspondents' questions drip with skepticism. Spokesmen are defensive and resort to brief answers, fearing that elaboration will only get them into trouble. In that atmosphere, it is not surprising that correspondents believe the spokesmen are ignorant or less than candid. Rumors and speculation spread easily.

Yet, if the press finds it hard to get at the truth, the men with responsibility for issuing the communiqués and other official information also find it hard to serve the press. In Vietnam, as in other areas of national defense, the authorized American policy calls for full disclosure consistent with national security. But, as Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, once pointed out: "Stating a Government policy is easier than applying it."

First of all, there is the matter of security. Certain incidents have outraged American military men. At one time, newsmen customarily reported when military aircraft took off on missions from Danang air base. To complaints about this practice the answer was: "If we can see them take off, so can the Vietcong, so what's the difference?" Officials finally prevailed upon the newsmen to hold off, explaining there was no need to enhance the enemy intelligence with additional and speedier American press bulletins.

One time, despite an informal injunction against reporting troop movements, the press flashed news of reinforcements on the way to relieve a besieged camp. The incident was written off as an accident that ultimately did no damage. But it is still being cited by officials as an example of the kind of accident which, if repeated, could be responsible for serious casualties.

In addition to security, commanders face the problem of morale. This is a subtle issue, for newsmen have learned from experience that precautions against damage to troop morale are often designed to cloak foul-ups. Nevertheless, military commanders are concerned by reporting that concentrates on the grimness of battle, casualties, ambushes, illness and materiel shortages in certain areas without the perspective of the entire war effort. Troop morale has been good, officers point out, but dispatches emphasizing the horrors of battle have aroused the concern of wives, mothers and fathers, and have prompted letters from home that have a depressing effect. As one high officer says: "It would be foolish if I extended cooperation to the press to the point where it endangered my mission."

Perhaps most serious among the military command's press problems is that of obtaining and presenting its own version of what happens before the press presents its version. In battle situations, the squad leader reports to the platoon leader and the platoon leader to the company commander and so on up the line to division headquarters and Saigon. These reports are checked and refined. No commander would accept an afteraction report without verifying its details, for battle-wise commanders know that men under shock always exaggerate. The military reporting process takes time.

But the correspondents, in all honesty, interview the men who fight, take pictures of the wounded and file their accounts with competitive speed, unhampered by censorship delays. Early estimates of casualties may be corrected afterward, but the initial impression already has obtained the headlines and prime time on TV even before military headquarters in Saigon has received its own reports.

On one occasion that distressed Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the American commander, he was advised by telephone from Washington that two major newspapers were headlining a reported ambush in which United States troops had been caught and forced to retreat. The troops had not been ambushed. They had unexpectedly come upon an unsuspecting North Vietnamese Army unit. Both sides were surprised into instantaneous combat. The lead Americans assumed at first they had been ambushed and said so in an on-the-spot interview. Ironically, when it was over, General Westmoreland described the clash as the "greatest victory of the war" up to that time.

TV has caused special concern to the authorities. Intrepid cameramen have gone into battle wherever they could find it and have sent back extraordinary film

depicting war's horrors. One that aroused the American public was the Marines' burning of a South Vietnamese village in order to evict Vietcong snipers. A sequence in the film showed a Marine applying his cigarette lighter to the grass roof of a hut. The emotional impact of that scene was far greater than the most vivid word picture of napalm bombing.

Moreover, American officials point out, American television can show the "inhumanity" of the American side of the war without censorship—burly Marines towering over blindfolded, half-naked little men in shorts, wailing women and battered children. They cannot, however, match these scenes with pictures of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese terrorism. For this, the Vietcong field commanders and the authorities in Hanoi do not cooperate.

TV, of course, is no more guilty than any other news medium in seeking out the best stories. But compared with the writing newsmen's battle for column inches of space, the TV correspondent is prodded by a more acute competition with expensive television diversions. He thus specializes in brief scenes with tremendous emotional impact. In addition, his very presence among the troops, far more than that of a correspondent, may create news angles where none otherwise exists. As one reporter wryly remarked: "Some persons will do things in front of a camera that they would not do in front of a pad and pencil."

To combat these problems the authorities naturally contemplate censorship. While they keep warning of its possibility, however, most American officials would like to avoid it. They fear that outright censorship would only add to the already substantial body of suspicion over the official version of the war. They concede also that censorship would be difficult to apply, since it involves a sovereign right of the South Vietnamese Government. American public opinion, it is assumed, would not accept the ham-handed censorship the South Vietnamese Government exercises over its own press, and two systems of censorship could lead only to confusion resulting in news blackouts and security breaches by turn.

How long the present system of voluntary self-censorship can last is anyone's guess. However, it is important to recognize that many of the current difficulties in the press coverage of the war would exist even with censorship. And it is important also to recognize that while the "crunch" between press and Government is inevitable in American affairs, the hope of easing its consequences is as dependent upon the talent and attitude of the Government as upon the self-restraint of the press.

Moreover, while the press tolerates and cooperates in forms of self-censorship, it cannot ignore distortions, dissimulations and depletions of trends that have turned out to be wrong such as have marred Government information policies on Vietnam for years. A few examples are pertinent:

Early in the war American correspondents reported that it was going badly. They got most of their information from American military advisers in the field, and presumably the White House and Pentagon had the same sources. Yet in October, 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, fresh from a trip to Vietnam, announced that most American troops would go home by the end of 1965.

Similarly, American correspondents at that time reported that the South Vietnamese program to fortify hamlets was making no progress and that official statistics were exaggerated. Again, the correspondents got most of their information from American military advisers in the field, and presumably the White House and Pentagon had the same sources. But the correspondents were assailed by officials. Only last year did Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor concede in a national magazine that the United States had been lied to by the South Vietnamese as to the extent of progress with the hamlet program.

In recent weeks, press dispatches have contained several additional complaints of official distortions. One of the most frequent complaints deals with the so-called "body count" or "kill ratio." This refers to the practice of counting dead bodies of the enemy following a battle, because earlier in the war South Vietnamese estimates of enemy dead were found to be ludicrously exaggerated. Now American estimates similarly are being ridiculed as WEG's (wild-eyed guesses).

In one incident, a military spokesman reported that 90 enemy bodies had been counted hanging on barbed-wire fortifications. But a reporter who went to take a picture while the battle was still under way was told by troops on the scene that there never had been bodies on the wire and that they had never made a count of 90 dead. Another time, in a hot exchange, a reporter offered to show a briefing officer a picture of a disabled Marine Corps tank that the officer said had not been knocked out.

Confidence in official reports is not reinforced, either, with distortions intended to avoid embarrassments. One communique reported that a Vietcong had been shot while attempting to escape, then evacuated and given medical aid. But a reporter was told that the wounded "Vietcong" was a deaf-mute son of a loyal Vietnamese villager who presumably had been unable to hear an order to stop running. The incident was unavoidable in war—the untruth was not.

The handling of the Christmas truce further reinforced press skepticism of the official word. Throughout the truce period, information officers in Saigon insisted there were no truce violations. When it was over, on instructions from Washington, they released information of violations known to them all the time.

The news media have by no means all been paragons of professional competence or other virtues. They have been guilty of their usual quota of inaccurate and even "needled" reports. One serious flaw in the coverage of the war is that many newspapers devote insufficient space to it. In the choice and play of articles about the war, interpretive pieces are sacrificed to the hard-hitting day's developments. The diet of "straight news" and "color stories," unenriched by interpretive background for this most complicated of modern wars, is inadequate for a real understanding of what is going on. In addition, even many rich papers are understaffed in Vietnam and rely upon the news agencies, whose coverage is good but geared to speed rather than depth.

Perhaps the accusatory tone of the press, however justified by official treatment of the facts, is one of the most serious problems in coverage. For example, the reporting last year of the use of non-lethal gases, similar to those used by police, was dramatized as though these were poison gases. The stories did not say they were poison, but the tone of the reporting implied that. Another example, small but symptomatic, concerns an Air Force colonel who was grilled as though he were on trial at a news conference in Saigon. He later vowed never to meet the press again, thus cutting himself off as a source of news.

Yet the frequent allegation by many officials that their troubles are due largely to inexperienced, sensation-seeking youngsters out for journalistic fame overlooks the complaints of many veterans on the scene. Denis Warner, an Australian who has covered every Far Eastern war since World War II, charges that the American military information services in Saigon "are the worst I have known in any war anywhere." Jack Folsie of The Los Angeles Times, a veteran of World War II and Korea, recently reported: "However well the war is going at the moment, the American high command seems unable to speak with candor on battle activity, even after the battle is over."

While most of the press complaints concern "little things" and frequently stem from individual rather than policy actions, the total impact must undermine confidence in the "big things." Thus, it could hardly have been otherwise, when two successive reports of peace offers by Hanoi broke into print in a context that implied they had been rejected by the United States, that Arthur Goldberg, the United States Representative to the United Nations, conceded openly: "The credibility of our Government has been assailed."

No American Government subject as it is to frequent tests of popular approval, can afford repeated assaults upon its credibility. Yet this is precisely what President Johnson's Administration has had to endure with respect to the war in Vietnam, partly at least because a past, calculated policy of optimism in public proved unjustified. The consequent skepticism of the official word has lingered and has become further sharpened by the customary Government penchant for obscurity in diplomacy and domestic politics. Public suspicion is a frequent outgrowth of fear of growing sacrifices in war, but the Administration is paying an additional penalty now, in draft-card burnings and other demonstrations of less than total support, for its early public-relations inadequacies.

The irony of the present situation is that the Government is doing an increasingly good job of facilitating news coverage of the war. Of course, like its predecessors, this Administration has sought to "manage the news" in order to cast a favorable light on its efforts. Managing the news is not only a prerogative of government, but its proper responsibility. News should not be mismanaged, however. If, as has been contended, news is a weapon in the governmental arsenal, then distortions and cover-ups—even when few in number—can lead only to self-inflicted wounds.

EXAMPLE OF RED LION, PA., STATION BROADCAST

R. K. SCOTT COMMENTARY—NEWS BEHIND THE HEADLINES, SEPTEMBER 6, 1966,
WINB, RED LION, PA.

Does the great menace of the Communist conspiracy come from its military threat? So long as we are strong and willing to defend the United States, we can counter and if necessary meet that threat but what about the much more insidious threat of Communist infiltration and subversion here at home? There is danger, of course, through espionage, sabotage and so on as we ought to know by now but even more dangerous is the carefree attack on American institutions because it is carried on not only by avowed Communists but by secret and underground conspirators and much worse, by well meaning but deluded Americans. This brings us to the basic principles which should guide all questions attacking our domestic policies. It is common for nearly all Americans to say they stand for the preservation of the American form of constitutional government and our free enterprise economic system. Even our modern Liberals claim they are merely trying to make that system work better but because they either deliberately ignore or do not understand the basic principles of this system, they unknowingly make the job of the Communists easier and the Communist, no matter what his guise, is dedicated to the eventual destruction of that system. The great underlying principle of this system is freedom, freedom of the individual under God to order his own life as he sees fit, freedom of each sovereign state in the union to run the affairs of its people as they may decide without interference or direction from a central authority. The Declaration of Independence put it briefly and eloquently that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights. This is the direct opposite of all collectivist systems whether Communism, Socialism, Welfareism or Fascism. Their principle is that man has no natural rights as an individual, that all his rights are conferred on him by government. Therefore, freedom's greatest enemy is bigot government. The Communist knows this and works always to give more power to government. The modern Liberal works toward the same end but under the delusion that he is doing good to the greatest number. In reality, he is undermining the finest forms of the free society the world has ever known. Now, in just a moment I will have a further note on basic principles to guide our domestic policy but first, this message.

Communism is more than a political, economic or social doctrine, it is a way of life, false, brutal, materialistic form of despotism. Communism would strip man of his belief in God, his heritage of freedom, his trust and love, justice and mercy. Under Communism, all would become as so many already have, Twentieth Century slaves. But before you can fight this Godless menace, you must understand what the Communists want and how they go about getting it.

A new twenty-four page pamphlet entitled "The Enemy's New Tactics" will take you behind the scenes in America to show you the people and the organizations behind the student riots and the anti-Vietnam demonstrations. Names, places, dates and details, it is must reading for every American who loves his country and wants to protect it from its sworn enemy, Communism. For your free copy of this timely pamphlet, write to me, R. K. Scott, Box 4460 Grand Central Station, New York, New York, ask for "The Enemy's New Tactics" and remember it is free. And I will repeat that address later in the program.

Now to continue with our commentary. Nowadays whenever one talks about freedom, the Constitution and capitalism, a smart-aleck replies "you can't eat the Constitution." People who talk like this are not necessarily enemies of the American system but two things have happened to them. Their minds have been poisoned by Leftwing propaganda and they have lost the understanding of the genius of the American system. First, about the poisoned minds. This is where we see the terrible danger from the internal tactics of our native Reds and their dupes. The Communists in the United States do not work through great mass movements. They know that the American people cannot be sold on Communism or Socialism as such but if the Communist can sell the American

people on Communist objectives under pretty labels, he can count on us cutting their own throats. The major objective is to kill freedom since big government is freedom's greatest enemy, the government Communist method is simple. His technique is to get non-Communist America to advocate measures which always bring more power to the central government. He finds his unknowing allies among many excellent people who are in the right places to influence public opinion. Through a feeling of wanting to do good or through a misunderstanding of the nature of freedom or through sheer ignorance they work to kill the only system under which they themselves are free. There is, for example, the college professor or high school teacher who instills in his students the notion that the government owes them certain material benefits. There is the newspaper editor who tells his readers the government must take care of the farmers or that it must build houses or schools. There is the labor leader who sells his union members on the notion that the government owes them special privileges. There is the television or movie producer who slants his entertainment toward these and other objectives who considers capitalists and defenders of the traditional Americanism as fair game to be cast in the role of demons. And there is the politician who garners votes by promising pie in the sky from the government. There is even the business man who thinks he must make some sort of compromise with Communist objectives to save his own skin or like the lady who was a little bit pregnant thinks a little socialism or a little Communism is okay. All of these and others like them, even though unaware of what they do, are responsible for the poisoning of many minds. These people have lost or never had an understanding of the genius of the free system. Otherwise, they could not sanction so silly a statement that you can't eat the Constitution. The answer is that you cannot eat, certainly not very well, without the Constitution. This is another way of saying that it is our constitutional system and a free economy operating under the system which has made us the most free and abundant land in the world. And if you stop to think about it, you will realize there are other nations which have resources and energies just as great as ours.

Why then, why, we must ask, has the United States surpassed them all because here for almost the first time in history our energies and resources were released to do their amazing work in the air of freedom and this freedom meant freedom from the depressing and debilitating hand of big government. The system of government blueprinted by the American Constitution has always been called limited government. Its real genius, however, lay in the fact that so long as we lived and acted within the true meaning of the Constitution, a central government with a power to oppress its citizens was impossible in the United States. This was because that government was made the servant, not the master of the people. In reality, the central government was the creature of all individual states, thirteen of them originally, fifty now. They set up a national government under the Constitution to do certain things for all the states which an individual state alone could not do for itself but the Constitution reserved to themselves and to their peoples certain rights and areas of activity which the central government could never touch. They did this to insure that the central government would always remain their servant and never grow big enough to oppress them but in this century we have gradually forgotten this great heritage which the framers of our Constitution bequeathed to us. Almost without realizing it, we have tortured and twisted the meaning of the Constitution or simply brushed it aside in order to bring ever more power to the central government. In so doing, we have played directly into the hands of our Communist enemies. We grow to resemble more and more the thing we hate. Fortunately, we have not gone so far we cannot reverse our steps and return to freedom but we will not do so unless we understand our own basic American principles. Therefore, so far as our domestic policies are concerned, no matter what is proposed, the big test should be this. Does it give more power to the central government? Does it impinge in any way on the rights reserved to the states or the person in the Constitution? If it does, then out with it. For down that road lies slavery. This is the greatest crusade to which Americans must rededicate themselves, not a crusade for a great or good or welfare society but for a free society is also the only kind that brings with it the good things of life.

We are up against an implacable world enemy, an enemy that cannot be divided into bad Reds in Asia and good Reds in Russia. That enemy is Communism in Vietnam, in China, in Russia, in Cuba, in the United States. His tactics may vary from place to place but his goals always the same, world conquest by Communism. What Americans must learn is that we can't fight Communism unless we understand the nature of the enemy, the enemy's tactics. The Enemy's

Tactics is the title of a new 24-page pamphlet, written by Reuben Morey, Pulitzer prize winning chief editorial writer of the New York Daily News. In this hard-hitting, no holds barred pamphlet, Mister Morey takes you behind the scenes of a so-called new Left in America and shows you the people and organizations behind those student riots and anti-Vietnam demonstrations and if you want the full and in many ways fascinating though horrendous story of Communism with names, dates, places and details, you should read this pamphlet. It is a story every real American owes to himself and his children to be fairly informed about. For your free copy of The Enemy's New Tactics, just write to me, R. K. Scott, Box 4400 Grand Central Station, New York. Ask for the pamphlet, "The Enemy's New Tactics" and remember, it is free. You may also have one free copy of this entire broadcast by writing to the same address: R. K. Scott, Box 4400, Grand Central Station, New York, New York.

Now, this is R. K. Scott speaking from New York. Thank you for listening and inviting you to join us next week at this same time over these same stations.

(Other tapes are on file with the committee.)

APPENDIX D

ATTACHMENT 1



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**FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE PRESS
IN MILITARY OPERATIONS:
A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENTS
AND RELATED POLICY ACTIONS, 1725-1991**

Prepared at the request of the Senate Subcommittee on Government
Information and Regulation.

Harold C. Relyea
Specialist in American National Government
Government Division
February 20, 1991



**FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE PRESS
IN MILITARY OPERATIONS:
A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENTS
AND RELATED POLICY ACTIONS, 1725-1891**

This brief chronology highlights developments and related policy actions concerning American military press regulation. Included are matters involving wartime reporting as well as the evolution of defense information safeguards such as security classification policy and related criminal penalties. Largely an overview or capsule account, this chronology is neither exhaustive nor definitive in its coverage.

- Pre-Federal Era
- "Colonial governments frequently resorted to censorship in wartime. Typical of such precautions was a Massachusetts Order-in-Council of 13 May 1725, declaring that 'the printers of the newspapers in Boston be ordered upon their peril not to insert in their prints anything of the public affairs of this province relative to the war without the order of the government'.¹
 - "The American government, during the Revolutionary War, made ineffectual efforts at secrecy but was patient under dangerous disclosures and opposed in principle to concealment of some kinds."²
- 1846-1848
- The Mexican War was purportedly "the last American conflict where the idea of press censorship was not entertained, possibly because the war came too soon for the telegraph system."³

¹ James Russell Wiggins. *Freedom or Secrecy*. Revised edition. New York, Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 94.

² *Ibid.*

³ Jack A. Gottschalk. "Consistent with Security" . . . A History of American Military Press Censorship. *Communications and the Law*, v. 5, Summer 1983, p. 36.

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- 1856 • During the British campaign in the Crimea, military control of the telegraph introduced significantly effective regulation of press reporting of war events.⁴
- 1861-1865 • During the Civil War, "while Southern censorship was rigid, it was, at least, consistent—a trait badly lacking in the North where censorship policy shifted on a daily basis."⁵
- In the North, after having tried an unsuccessful voluntary, self-imposed newspaper censorship, Federal authorities "moved to enforce a compulsory system that essentially consisted of after-the-fact (of publication) suspension of offending newspapers and close supervision of what was transmitted by the press over the far-flung system of telegraph 'lines.'"⁶
- On some occasions, "several [newspaper] publishers were denied postal privileges by the [Federal] government as a punishment for censorship violations."⁷
- Press censorship in the North extended to anti-administration editorial views and "the release of unfavorable news about command cowardice and bad judgment."⁸
- 1869 • The War Department issued a formal directive, General Orders No. 35, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, April 13, 1869, stating: "Commanding officers of troops occupying the regular forts built by the Engineer Department will permit no photographic or other views of the same to be taken without the permission of the War Department."⁹

⁴ Phillip Knightley. *The First Casualty*. New York, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1975, p. 16.

⁵ Gottschalk, *Consistent with Security*, p. 36.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

⁹ U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. *Government Secrecy*. Hearings, 93rd Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S.

- 1898 • During the Spanish-American War, "better transportation enabled correspondents to reach places in days rather than weeks, and stories could be filed quickly because of ever faster communications."¹⁰
- Regulation of telegraph communication was effected by placing Navy censorship units in seven New York City cable offices as well as those located in Key West, Florida, and Washington, D.C.¹¹ In addition, the Army Signal Corps severed some submarine cables to Cuba and had control over messages transmitted over certain other cables in the Caribbean.¹²
- 1911 • Criminal penalties of not more than a \$1,000 fine and/or not more than one year of imprisonment were statutorily set for anyone who, "for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense, to which he is not lawfully entitled," enters a military facility "or other place connected with the national defense;" or, "when lawfully or unlawfully upon any vessel, or in or near any such [national defense] place, without proper authority," obtains or attempts to obtain or receives or attempts to receive documentary materials "or knowledge of anything connected with the national defense to which he is not entitled" or "communicates or attempts to communicate the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or to whom the same ought not, in the interest of the national defense, be communicated at that time."¹³
- 1912 • The War Department formally established the first complete system for the protection of national defense information within the Army, devoid of special classification markings, with General Orders No. 3 of February 16, 1912. This directive set forth certain

Govt. Print. Off., 1974, pp. 846-847.

¹⁰ Gottschalk, *Consistent with Security*, p. 37.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

¹² Howard A. Giddings. *Exploits of the Signal Corps in the War with Spain*. Kansas City, Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Company, 1900, pp. 23-46, 115-116.

¹³ 36 Stat. 1084.

classes of records that were to be regarded as "confidential" and, therefore, kept under lock, "accessible only to the officer to whom intrusted."¹⁴

1914 • "American naval censorship was imposed in 1914 at Vera Cruz following U.S. intervention there"¹⁵

1917 • "Censorship [for Americans during the nation's involvement] in World War I commenced on 24 March 1917 with the promulgation of a set of regulations by the State, War, and Navy Departments. Newspapers were asked to adhere to them voluntarily. One of them requested that 'no information, reports, or rumors, attributing a policy to the government in any international situation, not authorized by the President or a member of the cabinet, be published without first consulting the Department of State'.¹⁶

• As Congress approved the declaration of war against the German and Austrian empires on April 6, President Woodrow Wilson ordered the Secretary of the Navy to assume superintendance over all means of radio communication within the United States.¹⁷

• On April 14, President Wilson issued E.O.2594 establishing the Committee on Public Information. Its members included former journalist George Creel as chairman, with the secretaries of State, War, and the Navy as members. The Committee was charged with promoting the dissemination of information in support of the nation's war effort and the suppression of information of value to the enemy. With regard to its latter mission, the Committee had no legal authority to censor; it could only seek voluntary compliance. In pursuit of this objective, the Committee issued some

¹⁴ U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations, *Government Secrecy*, p. 848.

¹⁵ Gottschalk, *Consistent with Security*, p. 38. James Russell Wiggins, *Freedom or Secrecy*, p. 95.

¹⁶ Wiggins, *Freedom or Secrecy*, p. 95.

¹⁷ Pursuant to 37 Stat. 302, 303; Susan J. Douglas. *Inventing American Broadcasting, 1899-1922*. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987, p. 276.

guidance—*A Preliminary Statement to the Press of the United States*—on May 28, 1917. "Though these regulations were to be voluntary, the statement emphasized the responsibility of editors to prevent publication of dangerous news and to report people who broke the rules."¹⁸

- The President, on April 28, issued E.O. 2604, which subjected all telegraph, telephone, and submarine cable traffic to and from the country to War and Navy Department regulation.

- The Espionage Act of June 15 provided a basis for regulating—with the threat of a \$10,000 fine and/or 20 years of imprisonment—various types of expression. Title I, for example, prohibited obtaining information "to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation" by entering a national defense facility or trafficking in national defense information to which one was not entitled or authorized to receive or communicate. It also made it punishable to "willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies." Title III made it similarly punishable to "endanger the safety" of American vessels, their cargo, or persons on board. Title XII set restrictions on the use of the mails if the material in question was determined to be in violation of any of the provisions of the act or otherwise was found to contain "any matter advocating or urging treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the United States."¹⁹

- The Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6 also set restrictions on expression. "Whenever, during the

¹⁸ Stephen L. Vaughn. *Holding Fast the Inner Lines*. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1980, p. 219. A version of the Committee's voluntary censorship principles may be found in U. S. Committee on Public Information. *Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information, 1917: 1918: 1919*. Washington, U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1920, pp. 10-12. Also see James R. Mock. *Censorship 1917*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1941; James R. Mock and Cedric Larson. *Words That Won the War*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1939.

¹⁹ 40 Stat. 217.

present war, the President shall deem that the public safety demands it," said the statute, "he may cause to be censored under such rules and regulations as he may from time to time establish, communications by mail, cable, radio, or other means of transmission passing between the United States and any foreign country he may from time to time specify, or which may be carried by any vessel or other means of transportation touching at any port, place, or territory of the United States and bound to or from any foreign country." Furthermore, section 19 of the act made it "unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, or association, to print, publish, or circulate, or cause to be printed, published, or circulated in any foreign language, any news item, editorial or other printed matter, respecting the Government of the United States, or any nation engaged in the present war, its policies, international relations, the state or conduct of the war, or any matter relating thereto." unless, prior to mailing, "a true and complete translation" was "filed with the postmaster at the place of publication."²⁰

- On October 12, President Wilson issued E.O. 2729A, which established the Censorship Board. Composed of representatives of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Postmaster General, the War Trade Board, and the chairman of the Committee on Public Information, the Board was tasked with implementing the information control authority conferred upon the President by the Trading with the Enemy Act, and was "authorized to take all such measures as may be necessary or expedient to administer the powers hereby conferred."²¹

- On November 22, 1917, General Orders No. 64, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Force, prescribed a national defense information security system for the A.E.F. utilizing three classes of

²⁰ 40 Stat. 411.

²¹ See Mock, *Censorship 1917*, pp. 55-72; Dorothy Ganfield Fowler. *Unmailable: Congress and the Post Office*. Athens, The University of Georgia Press, 1977, pp. 109-125.

information sensitivity—the beginning of the modern security classification system.²²

1918

• The Sedition Act of May 16 made several kinds of expression punishable, including causing or attempting to cause, or inciting or attempting to incite "insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States;" uttering, printing, writing, or publishing "any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States," the Constitution, U.S. military or naval forces, the American flag, or the uniform of the Army or Navy, or using language bringing any of the same into "contempt, scorn, contumely, or disrepute;" using language promoting the cause of the enemy; or otherwise urging, inciting, or advocating "any curtailment of production . . . essential to the prosecution of the war." The statute also gave the Postmaster General authority to deny the use of the postal system, to "any person or concern . . . using the mails in violation of any of the provisions of this Act."²³

• The American Expeditionary Force in France initially made a veteran newspaper correspondent its chief press censor. "He let out too little to please the journalists and too much to please the generals. He had too much responsibility and too little authority."²⁴ He "was soon replaced by a committee composed of ex-journalists, who had been commissioned as reserve officers for public relations duties, and Regular Army officers. The combination was chaotic and, in retrospect, it is amazing that only five journalists out of approximately sixty correspondents assigned to cover the war lost their AEF press credentials."²⁵

²² U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations, *Government Secrecy*, p. 851.

²³ 40 Stat. 553.

²⁴ John Hohenberg. *Free Press/Free People*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1971, p. 184.

²⁵ Gottschalk, *Consistent with Security*, p. 39.

1940

- The President issued E.O. 8381, the first presidential directive establishing security classification policy and practice for national defense information.²⁶

- On December 31, the Secretary of the Navy formally asked the media to cease disclosing information, including photographs or other depictions, concerning troop movements, vessel or aircraft deployments, new Navy ships or aircraft, and Navy construction projects ashore. "Communications media generally cooperated."²⁷

1941

- In September, "both the Army and Navy announced that press censorship plans had been formulated to control information flowing from the United States in the event of a national emergency."²⁸

- The day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 8, when the United States declared war on Japan, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation "was given temporary powers to direct all news censorship and to control all other telecommunications traffic in and out of the United States."²⁹

- Eleven days after the Pearl Harbor attack, the First War Powers Act was signed into law, conferring on the President authority to censor all communications from the United States with foreign countries.³⁰

- On December 19, the President, pursuant to the First War Powers Act, issued E.O. 8985, establishing the Office of Censorship, which was directed by a former

²⁶ U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations, *Government Secrecy*, pp. 854-855.

²⁷ Wiggins, *Freedom or Secrecy*, p. 96; Gottschalk, *Consistent with Security*, p. 39.

²⁸ Gottschalk, *Consistent with Security*, p. 39.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ 55 Stat. 838.

Associated Press executive news editor, and relieving the F.B.I. Director of his censorship responsibilities.³¹

- The Pacific Theater provided the first opportunity in World War II for U.S. field commanders to practice press regulation. "There, a combination of [General Douglas] MacArthur's almost dictatorial censorship and the overtly antipress attitudes of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King made attempts at news coverage difficult at best."³² Restrictive practices were eased somewhat in 1942 due to the intervention of the Director of the Office of War Information, but "U.S. naval censorship in the Pacific continued to remain rigidly effective throughout the war," largely because it is "far easier to censor news correspondents aboard warships." Because "the Army recognized that press censorship in Europe would require a different approach, . . . a special observer group [was] sent to England in late 1941 to study recent British experience and to reach agreement with the British on a censorship policy that would become effective once U.S. forces entered the European theater."³³

1942

- The Office of Censorship issued its first voluntary code of wartime practices for newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals on January 15.³⁴

- The Office of Censorship issued its first voluntary code of wartime practices for radio programming and broadcasting on January 16.³⁵

³¹ Gottschalk, *Consistent with Security*, pp. 39-40; Wiggins, *Freedom or Secrecy*, pp. 97-98.

³² Gottschalk, *Consistent with Security*, p. 40.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

³⁴ Gottschalk, *Consistent with Security*, p. 40; Wiggins, *Freedom or Secrecy*, p. 98; Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Military and the Media. *Battle Lines*. New York, Priority Press, 1985, p. 29. Also see Robert E. Summers, ed. *Wartime Censorship of Press and Radio*. New York, The H. W. Wilson Company, 1942.

³⁵ Summers, *Wartime Censorship of Press and Radio*, p. 101.

• By the time the first U.S. troops arrived in Great Britain in January, an Army special observer group had completed its study of British military censorship and a joint British-American censorship policy had been reached and put into effect. "Four American officers initially constituted the entire U.S. military press censorship group, which was housed with British censorship at the Ministry of Information."³⁶ As the U.S. Army commenced field operations, beginning in October 1942 with the invasion of North Africa, censorship teams advanced with the fighting forces and attending war correspondents and cameramen. London remained the primary military censorship clearinghouse until Paris was secured in September 1944 and became the "main" headquarters and the British capital was designated the "rear" command.³⁷ Certain military operations, notably the D-Day invasion at Normandy, necessitated special censorship command and control arrangements.³⁸

• The Office of Censorship announced on March 18 that, effective at the beginning of April, a licensing system to expedite censorship of publications containing scientific, technical, or professional data for mailing abroad would be operational. Prior to mailing, such material would be subject to review and approval by a division of the Board of Economic Warfare.³⁹

• With E.O. 9182 of June 13, the President established the Office of War Information, which was directed by a former veteran radio broadcaster who "was powerless to force government agencies (including the military) to supply more accurate and timely non-sensitive information to the public, a situation that made relations between O.W.I. and the media extremely tense."⁴⁰

³⁶ Gottschalk, *Consistent with Security*, p. 41.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

³⁸ See *Ibid.*, pp. 43-45; Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, *Battle Lines*, pp. 30-45.

³⁹ Summers, *Wartime Censorship of Press and Radio*, p. 115.

⁴⁰ Gottschalk, *Consistent with Security*, p. 40.

- 1945 • With the conclusion of hostilities in the European and Pacific Theaters, military censorship "continued to be invoked in modified form when troops were engaged in occupation duties."⁴¹
- 1948 • In a March 3 speech before the Voluntary Security Conference, consisting of 22 representatives of news agencies, magazines, radio, and other news media, the Secretary of Defense made a plea for the cooperation of the press "in voluntarily refraining from publishing information detrimental to the national security." Urging the establishment of an information advisory unit within the Pentagon to answer media inquiries and offer guidance, the Secretary said he was "mainly concerned with the security of technical information, facts about new developments and weapons, about new military techniques, the knowledge of which would be of value to hostile or possibly hostile powers, and thus detrimental to the future security of this country."⁴² A media group formed to respond to the Secretary's proposal soon indicated it did "not believe that any type of censorship in peacetime is workable or desirable in the public interest."⁴³In the face of this opposition, the Secretary abandoned the idea.⁴⁴
- 1950-1953 • In late June of 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th Parallel into South Korea and, in three days of their advance, captured the capital, Seoul, where the American news wire services had the only journalists then located in South Korea. In very early July, U.S. armed forces moved by sea and air from Japan to Korea to check the invaders, and American newsmen went with them.⁴⁵ The U.S. Far East Commander, "General [Douglas] MacArthur, although authorized by Washington to impose censorship, refused to do so,

⁴¹ Wiggins, *Freedom or Secrecy*, p. 99.

⁴² Robert E. Summers, ed. *Federal Information Controls in Peacetime*. New York, The H. W. Wilson Company, 1949, pp. 102-104.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 104-108.

⁴⁴ Wiggins, *Freedom or Secrecy*, p. 100.

⁴⁵ Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, *Battle Lines*, pp. 48-49.

declaring it 'abhorrent,' in July 1950.⁴⁶ Thus, initially, "press censorship was completely voluntary," and "[t]his arrangement lasted from June 1950 until late December of that year when field censorship was placed in effect."⁴⁷ Field censorship was implemented through U.S. Eighth Army headquarters in Korea, though Far East Command in Tokyo was not without influence, and the "Air Force followed the Army's lead, operating through a security division in its Korean public information office."⁴⁸ In January 1951, Far East Command relinquished all censorship responsibility to Eighth Army censors. "Apparently," however, "during the ensuing sixty days, the field army did not censor enough, because on March 13, Tokyo headquarters announced that it was going to review all news material passed in the field for publication," a policy that "remained in effect until Far East Command finally relieved the Eighth Army completely of its censorship duties in the spring of 1951."⁴⁹ A final Korean military press censorship organizational structure was inaugurated in January 1953. A Joint Field Press Censorship Group, Far East Command, was created, headed by a Chief Field Press Censor, who was responsible for "supervision and implementation of field press censorship with regard to all United Nations and Far East Commands," and necessarily had "detachments at Far East Command, Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force Headquarters and at the Panmunjom armistice negotiation site."⁵⁰

1962

• Following the Korean War, military press censorship remained a matter of consideration and rethinking in the Pentagon. "Public information planning and organization had been refined (with the Army having the only media censorship capability) by the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. Within an

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 50.

⁴⁷ Gottschalk, *Consistent with Security*, p. 45.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid. Also see Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, *Battle Lines*, pp. 50-60.

hour of President Kennedy's October 22 address to the nation in which he announced the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the Army's field press censorship detachments were partially and quietly mobilized."⁶¹

1964-1973

• "Almost as soon as the United States entered the Vietnam War on a massive scale in August 1964, media censorship for purposes of military security became a Pentagon planning consideration.⁶² Reportedly, "World War II-style censorship was considered in 1965 at the Defense Department's request. But it was ruled out at the urging of U.S. officials in Saigon" and "ground rules worked out after discussion with newsmen in Saigon were adopted instead."⁶³ Voluntary compliance ground rules on press release of combat information were issued on July 14, 1965, followed by subsequent guidance concerning the release of air strike information and, on April 25, 1966, combat photography.⁶⁴ In general, "the press voluntarily observed the military security rules that were established even though the conflict was unpopular with the media and the public."⁶⁵

1983

• At the direction of the President, U.S. armed forces invaded the island of Grenada on October 25. The action was planned and executed largely in secrecy; no American news media representatives accompanied the invasion forces. "The decision to keep the press away from the initial operation . . . was the express wish of General John W. Vessey, Jr., chairman of the Joint

⁶¹ Gottschalk, *Consistent with Security*, p. 48.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, *Battle Lines*, p. 66.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 65; U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *News Policies in Vietnam*. Hearings, 98th Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966, pp. 73-75. Also see U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. *United States Information Problems in Vietnam*. H. Rept. 797, 88th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1963.

⁶⁵ Gottschalk, *Consistent with Security*, p. 49. Also see Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, *Battle Lines*, pp. 62-75.

Chiefs of Staff."⁶⁶ The day after the invasion occurred, in response to "growing media complaints about being excluded from the Grenada scene and about the lack of Pentagon planning for journalists," efforts were made to establish a Joint Information Bureau in Barbados to accommodate journalists. In the face of military communications problems and other organizational difficulties, Army public affairs officers organized a pool of newsmen to visit Grenada under carefully managed conditions on October 27-30.⁶⁷ There was, however, no censorship policy governing reporting on the situation. Overall, the experience seemed to indicate that American major news organizations did not want to be excluded from or restrained from reporting on Grenada-style military operations and, consequently, that better planning in these regards was in order.⁶⁸

- Eleven days after the Grenada invasion, General John W. Vessey, Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced he would create a panel of officers and journalists "to review the restrictions in the first days of the invasion."⁶⁹

1984

- Under the chairmanship of retired Major General Winant Sidle, the Pentagon special Grenada invasion study panel met from February 6-10, 1984, at the National Defense University, receiving testimony "by 25 senior media representatives speaking for 19 news organizations, including umbrella organizations."⁶⁰ In its final report, the Sidle panel indicated, as a general principle, that "it is essential that the U.S. news media cover U.S. military operations to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission security and the safety

⁶⁶ Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, *Battle Lines*, p. 90.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 94-96.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 102-109.

⁶⁹ Jonathan Friendly. U.S. Press Curbs in Grenada May Affect International Debate. *New York Times*, November 8, 1983, p. A10.

⁶⁰ U. S. Department of Defense. *Report by the CJCS Media-Military Relations Panel (Sidle Panel)*. Washington, D. C. [undated], reproduced in Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, *Battle Lines*, p. 164.

of U.S. forces."⁶¹ It offered several recommendations consistent with this statement.⁶² Notably, a few weeks earlier, American journalists had protested their being barred from attending naval exercises in the Gulf of Fonseca near El Salvador and Honduras.⁶³

• When releasing the Sidle panel's report on August 23, the Secretary of Defense said in an accompanying press statement that he had "directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) to take the necessary steps to implement those portions of the final report which meet the Panel's criteria of providing maximum news media coverage of U.S. military operations 'consistent with military security and the safety of U.S. forces'." He also indicated he would "form a panel of eminent journalists and former war correspondents to advise me on the best ways to meet these objectives."⁶⁴ As a consequence of the efforts of the Pentagon, a stand-by press pool was developed for activation for the coverage of the initial stages of any surprise military operations.⁶⁵

1989

• Shortly after U.S. armed forces invaded Panama on December 20, American news media organizations complained about restricted access to the operational setting due to military limitation of the number of individuals included in the accompanying press pool,

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

⁶² See *Ibid.*, pp. 166-168.

⁶³ United Press International. U.S. Bars Reporters From Naval Exercises. *Washington Post*, May 6, 1984, p. A28.

⁶⁴ U. S. Department of Defense. Statement by the Secretary of Defense. News release No. 450-84. Washington, D. C. August 23, 1984.

⁶⁵ Fred Hiatt. Pentagon Plans Media Pool to Cover Missions. *Washington Post*, August 24, 1984, pp. A1, A18; Richard Halloran. Pentagon Forms War Press Pool; Newspaper Reporters Excluded. *New York Times*, October 121, 1984, pp. A1, A10.

the late arrival of pool members, and controls imposed by U.S. field commanders.⁶⁶

1990

• In the aftermath of the Panama invasion, the Defense Department conducted an examination of the problems experienced by U.S. news media organizations involved in covering the operation. A report, prepared by former Associated Press reporter and Pentagon consultant Fred S. Hoffman, was released on March 20. Criticizing the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs for failing to properly plan and execute media pool organization and to enlist the help of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to transport pool members to Panama in a timely fashion, the report offered 17 corrective recommendations. An accompanying memorandum for correspondents from the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs indicated that five of the recommendations "will be implemented immediately;" six others "are agreed to in principle but require some refinement." The six remaining recommendations, according to the memorandum, "are under consideration and will require further consideration and coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified Commands, and the media pool members."⁶⁷

1991

• After some negotiation with the news media community, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs issued ground rules and guidelines for correspondents "in the event of hostilities in the Persian Gulf."⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Michael Specter. Panama: Firsthand Coverage and Secondhand Diplomacy—News Organizations Struggle With "Pool" Format. *Washington Post*, December 21, 1989, pp. D1, D13; Michael Specter. Second-Hand News Coverage Blamed on Military. *Washington Post*, December 22, 1989, pp. A29, A32.

⁶⁷ Fred S. Hoffman. *Review of Panama Pool Deployment, December 1989*. [and accompanying Memorandum for Reporters, March 20, 1990]. Washington, Department of Defense, March, 1990; Patrick E. Tyler. Officially, Pentagon Takes Blame. *Washington Post*, March 21, 1990, p. A19.

⁶⁸ Guy Gugliotta. Reporters Try to Be All That They Can Be. *Washington Post*, January 4, 1991, p. A21; Howard Kurtz. Pentagon to Ease Coverage Rules. *Washington Post*, January 5, 1991, p. A20. Howard Kurtz. Pentagon Sets Rules for War Reporting. *Washington Post*, January 10, 1991,

p. A25; U. S. Department of Defense. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). *Memorandum for Washington Bureau Chiefs of the Pentagon Press Corps; Ground Rules and Guidelines for Correspondents in the Event of Hostilities in the Persian Gulf.* Washington, D. C. January 15, 1991.

APPENDIX E

ATTACHMENT 1



NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIR)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

General John W. Vessey, Jr.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Pentagon, Room 2E872
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear General Vessey:

As you requested, enclosed are the final report and recommendations of the Sidle Panel, together with pertinent enclosures. The panel is unanimous in its strong belief that implementation of the recommendations, both in fact and in spirit, by the appropriate military authorities will set the stage for arriving at workable solutions for media-military relations in future military operations. We also believe that these solutions will be satisfactory to reasonable members of both the media and the military.

The report has three sections: an introduction, a recommendations section, and a comment section. We adopted this format because, while we were unanimous on the recommendations, there were some differences of opinion on some points in the comments. However, we all agreed that the comments were necessary to help explain the recommendations and that even the points on which we were not unanimous were worthy of consideration as suggestions and background for those who will implement the recommendations, should they be implemented. In any case, the entire panel has formally endorsed the recommendations, while I signed the comments. I should add that, where appropriate, I have mentioned the panel's degree of support in the comments.

The panel asked that I put three points in this letter that were not exactly germane to the report but required some comment on our part.

First, the matter of so-called First Amendment rights. This is an extremely gray area and the panel felt that it was a matter for the legal profession and the courts and that we were not qualified to provide a judgment. We felt justified in setting aside the issue, as we unanimously agreed at the outset that the U.S. media should cover U.S. military operations to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission security and the safety of U.S. forces.

Second, Grenada. We realize that Grenada had shown the need to review media-military relations in connection with military operations, but you did not request our assessment of media handling at Grenada and we will not provide it. However, we do feel that had our recommendations been "in place" and fully considered at the time of Grenada, there might have been no need to create our panel.

Finally, the matter of responsibility of the media. Although this is touched on in the report, and there is no doubt that the news organization representatives who appeared before us fully recognized their responsibilities, we feel we should state emphatically that reporters and editors alike must exercise responsibility in covering military operations. As one of the senior editors who appeared before us said, "The media must cover military operations comprehensively, intelligently, and objectively." The American people deserve news coverage of this quality and nothing less. It goes without saying, of course, that the military also has a concurrent responsibility, that of making it possible for the media to provide such coverage.

The members of the panel have also asked me to express their appreciation for being asked to participate in this important study and their hope that our work will be of value to the military, the media, and to the American people.

Finally, the panel considers this covering letter an integral part of our report.

Sincerely,



Winant Sidle
Major General, USA, Retired
Chairman

Enclosure
Report

INTRODUCTION

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Media - Military Relations Panel (known as the Sidle Panel) was created at the request of the Chairman, General John W. Vessey, Jr., who asked that I convene a panel of experts to make recommendations to him on, "How do we conduct military operations in a manner that safeguards the lives of our military and protects the security of the operation while keeping the American public informed through the media?"

Major General Winant Sidle, USA, Retired, was selected as chairman of this project and asked to assemble a panel composed of media representatives, public affairs elements of the four Military Services, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD(PA)), and operations spokesmen from the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS).

The initial plan, concurred in by CJCS and ASD(PA), was to invite major umbrella media organizations and the Department of Defense organizations to provide members of this panel. The umbrella organizations, such as the American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA), the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE), the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), and the Radio Television News Directors Association (RTNDA), and their individual member news organizations decided that they would cooperate fully with the panel but would not provide members. The general reason given was that it was inappropriate for media members to serve on a government panel.

This decision, unanimous among the major news media organizations, resulted in a revised plan calling for the non-military membership of the panel to be composed of experienced retired media personnel and representatives of schools of journalism who were experts in military-media relations. The Department of Defense organizations involved agreed to provide members from the outset. Final panel membership is at Enclosure 1.

To provide initial input to the panel for use as a basis for discussion when the panel met, a questionnaire was devised with the concurrence of CJCS and ASD(PA) and mailed to all participants. It was also sent to a number of additional organizations and individuals who had expressed interest and to some who had not but were considered to be experts in the matter. As the result of these mailings, the panel had available 24 written inputs to study prior to meeting. Of these, 16 were from major news organizations or umbrella groups. All inputs are at Enclosure 2. The panel regretted that all who indicated interest could not appear before it, but time did not permit.

Although the news organizations involved did not agree to provide panel members, they all agreed to provide qualified personnel to make oral presentations to the panel. The only exception was an individual news organization which felt that its umbrella group should represent it.


The panel met from 6 February through 10 February 1984 at the National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. The meetings included three days for media and military presentations in open session and two days for panel study and deliberation in closed session. The presentations included those by 25 senior media representatives speaking for 19 news organizations, including umbrella organizations. The chiefs/directors of Public Affairs for the Army, Navy, and Air Force also made major presentations during the open sessions with the USMC, OJCS, and ASD(PA) panel members making informal comments during the closed sessions. The open sessions were covered by about 70 reporters representing nearly 30 news organizations. The schedule of presentations is at Enclosure 3.

The attached panel report is composed of two sections.

1. The Recommendations section, concurred and signed by all panel members.

2. The Comment section, explaining the recommendations and including comments, when appropriate, made by all concerned, to include both written and oral inputs to the committee and by the panel itself. This section is signed by the chairman but was approved unless otherwise indicated by the members of the panel. It is made available to explain the recommendations and to assist, via suggestions, in their implementation.

The panel recommends approval and implementation both in fact and in spirit of the recommendations made in Section I of this report.



Winant Sidle
Major General, USA, Retired
Chairman

Enclosure
Report

REPORT

by

CJCS MEDIA-MILITARY RELATIONS PANEL (SIDLE PANEL)

SECTION I: Recommendations

Statement of Principle

The American people must be informed about United States military operations and this information can best be provided through both the news media and the Government. Therefore, the panel believes it is essential that the U.S. news media cover U.S. military operations to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission security and the safety of U.S. forces.

This principle extends the major "Principle of Information" promulgated by the Secretary of Defense on 1 December 1983, which said:

"It is the policy of the Department of Defense to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and members representing the press, radio and television may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy. Requests for information from organizations and private citizens will be answered responsively and as rapidly as possible. . . ." (Copy at Enclosure 4)

It should be noted that the above statement is in consonance with similar policies publicly stated by most former secretaries of defense.

The panel's statement of principle is also generally consistent with the first two paragraphs contained in "A Statement of Principle on Press Access to Military Operations" issued on 10 January 1984 by 10 major news organizations (copy at Enclosure 5). These were:

"First, the highest civilian and military officers of the government should reaffirm the historic principle that American journalists, print and broadcast, with their professional equipment, should be present at U.S. military operations. And the news media should reaffirm their recognition of the importance of U.S. military mission security and troop safety. When essential, both groups can agree on coverage conditions which satisfy safety and security imperatives while, in keeping with the spirit of the First Amendment, permitting independent reporting to the citizens of our free and open society to whom our government is ultimately accountable.

"Second, the highest civilian and military officers of the U.S. government should reaffirm that military plans should include planning for press access, in keeping with past traditions. The expertise of government public affairs officers during the planning of recent Grenada military operations could have met the interests of both the military and the press, to everyone's benefit."

Application of the panel's principle should be adopted both in substance and in spirit. This will make it possible better to meet the needs of both the military and the media during future military operations. The following recommendations by the panel are designed to help make this happen. They are primarily general in nature in view of the almost endless number of variations in military operations that could occur. However, the panel believes that they provide the necessary flexibility and broad guidance to cover almost all situations.

RECOMMENDATION 1:

That public affairs planning for military operations be conducted concurrently with operational planning. This can be assured in the great majority of cases by implementing the following:

- a. Review all joint planning documents to assure that JCS guidance in public affairs matters is adequate.
- b. When sending implementing orders to Commanders in Chief in the field, direct CINCPAC planners to include consideration of public information aspects.
- c. Inform the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) of an impending military operation at the earliest possible time. This information should appropriately come from the Secretary of Defense.
- d. Complete the plan, currently being studied, to include a public affairs planning cell in OJCS to help ensure adequate public affairs review of CINCPAC plans.
- e. Insofar as possible and appropriate, institutionalize these steps in written guidance or policy.

RECOMMENDATION 2:

When it becomes apparent during military operational planning that news media pooling provides the only feasible means of furnishing the media with early access to an operation, planning should provide for the largest possible press pool that is practical and minimize the length of time the pool will be necessary before "full coverage" is feasible.

RECOMMENDATION 3:

That, in connection with the use of pools, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to the Secretary of Defense that he study the matter of whether to use a pre-established and constantly updated accreditation or notification list of correspondents in case of a military operation for which a pool is required or the establishment of a news agency list for use in the same circumstances.

RECOMMENDATION 4:

That a basic tenet governing media access to military operations should be voluntary compliance by the media with security guidelines or ground rules established and issued by the military. These rules should be as few as possible and should be worked out during the planning process for each operation. Violations would mean exclusion of the correspondent(s) concerned from further coverage of the operation. ✓

RECOMMENDATION 5:

Public Affairs planning for military operations should include sufficient equipment and qualified military personnel whose function is to assist correspondents in covering the operation adequately.

RECOMMENDATION 6:

Planners should carefully consider media communications requirements to assure the earliest feasible availability. However, these communications must not interfere with combat and combat support operations. If necessary and feasible, plans should include communications facilities dedicated to the news media.

RECOMMENDATION 7:

Planning factors should include provision for intra- and inter-theatre transportation support of the media.

RECOMMENDATION 8:

To improve media-military understanding and cooperation:

a. CJCS should recommend to the Secretary of Defense that a program be undertaken by ASD(PA) for top military public affairs representatives to meet with news organization leadership, to include meetings with individual news organizations, on a reasonably regular basis to discuss mutual problems, including relationships with the media during military operations and exercises. This program should begin as soon as possible.

b. Enlarge programs already underway to improve military understanding of the media via public affairs instruction in service schools, to include media participation when possible.

c. Seek improved media understanding of the military through more visits by commanders and line officers to news organizations.

d. CJCS should recommend that the Secretary of Defense host at an early date a working meeting with representatives of the broadcast news media to explore the special problems of ensuring military security when and if there is real-time or near real-time news media audiovisual coverage of a battlefield and, if special problems exist, how they can best be dealt with consistent with the basic principle set forth at the beginning of this section of the report.

The Panel members fully support the statement of principle and the supporting recommendations listed above and so indicate by their signatures below:

Winant Sidle
Winant Sidle, Major General, USA, Retired
Chairman

Brent Baker
Brent Baker, Captain, USN

Fred C. Lash
Fred C. Lash, Major, USMC

Keyes Beach
Keyes Beach

James Major
James Major, Captain, USN

Scott M. Cutlip
Scott M. Cutlip

Wendell S. Merick
Wendell S. Merick

John T. Halbert
John T. Halbert

Robert O'Brien
Robert O'Brien, Colonel, USAF
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Public Affairs)

Billy Hunt
Billy Hunt

Richard S. Salant
Richard S. Salant

George Kirschenbauer
George Kirschenbauer, Colonel, USA

Barry Zorhian
Barry Zorhian

A. J. [unclear]

SECTION II:

RECOMMENDATION 1:

That public affairs planning for military operations be conducted concurrently with operational planning. This can be assured in the great majority of cases by implementing the following:

- a. Review all joint planning documents to assure that JCS guidance in public affairs matters is adequate.
- b. When sending implementing orders to Commanders in Chief in the field, direct that the CINC planners include consideration of public information aspects.
- c. Inform the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) of an impending military operation at the earliest possible time. This information should appropriately come from the Secretary of Defense.
- d. Complete the plan, currently being studied, to include a public affairs planning cell in OJCS to help ensure adequate public affairs review of CINC plans.
- e. Insofar as possible and appropriate, institutionalize these steps in written guidance or policy.

Comments

1. Under the current system of planning for military operations, provisions exist to include public affairs planning but it is neither mandatory nor certain that current joint planning documents are adequate from a public affairs standpoint. The basic purpose of this recommendation is to help assure that public affairs aspects are considered as soon as possible in the planning cycle for any appropriate military operation and that the public affairs planning guidance is adequate.

2. The panel was unanimous in feeling that every step should be taken to ensure public affairs participation in planning and/or review at every appropriate level. Recommendations 1a, b, and d are designed to assist in implementing this consideration.

3. Panel discussions indicated that it is difficult to determine in advance in all cases when public affairs planning should be included. The panel felt that the best procedure would be to include such planning if there were even a remote chance it would be needed. For example, a strictly covert operation, such as the Son Tay raid in North Vietnam, still requires addressing public affairs considerations if only to be sure that after action coverage adequately fulfills the obligation to inform the American people. Very small, routine operations might be exceptions.

4. Recommendation 1c is self-explanatory. The ASD(PA), as the principal public affairs advisor to both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS, must be brought into the planning process as soon as possible. In view of the DOD organization, the panel felt that this should be the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense.

5. We received indications that some commanders take the position that telling something to his public affairs officer is tantamount to telling it to the media. All members of the panel, including its public affairs officers decried this tendency and pointed out that a public affairs specialist is the least likely to release material prematurely to the media. Although the panel did not consider the matter officially, there is no doubt that public affairs officers are just as dedicated to maintaining military security as are operations officers and must know what is going on in a command if they are to do their job!

RECOMMENDATION 2:

When it becomes apparent during military operational planning that news media pooling provides the only feasible means of furnishing the media with early access to an operation, planning should support the largest possible press pool that is practical and minimize the length of time the pool will be necessary.

Comments

1. Media representatives appearing before the panel were unanimous in being opposed to pools in general. However, they all also agreed that they would cooperate in pooling agreements if that were necessary for them to obtain early access to an operation.

2. The media representatives generally felt that DOD should select the organizations to participate in pools, and the organizations should select the individual reporters. (See Recommendation 3.)

3. The media were unanimous in requesting that pools be terminated as soon as possible and "full coverage" allowed. "Full coverage" appeared to be a relative term, and some agreed that even this might be limited in cases where security, logistics, and the size of the operation created limitations that would not permit any and all bona fide reporters to cover an event. The panel felt that any limitations would have to be decided on a case-by-case basis but agreed that maximum possible coverage should be permitted.

4. The media agreed that prior notification of a pooling organization should be as close to H-Hour as possible to minimize the possibility of a story breaking too soon, especially if speculative stories about the operation should appear in media not in the pool or be initiated by one of their reporters not privy to the pool. This would require a pool media decision as to whether to break the story early, despite the embargo on such a break that is inherent in early notification for pooling purposes. The media representatives were not in agreement on this matter but did agree generally that they should not release aspects of the story that they had been made aware of during DOD early notification and which did not appear in the stories already out or in preparation; nor should this privy information be used to confirm speculation concerning an operation.

5. In this connection, the media generally did not agree with a view voiced by some members of the panel that, absolutely to guarantee security, pool notification would not be made until the first military personnel had hit the beach or airhead even though advance military preparation could speed the poolers to the site in the least time possible. The panel did not take a position on this, but some felt that carefully planned pool transportation could meet the media's objections in many, possibly most, cases. For example, in remote areas the pool could be assembled in a location close to the operation using overseas correspondent who would not have to travel from the United States. This is a subject worthy of detailed discussion in the military-media meetings proposed in Recommendation 8a.

6. In this connection, the panel recognized that in many areas of the world an established press presence would be encountered by U.S. forces irrespective of a decision as to whether or not a pool would be used. This consideration would have to be included in initial public affairs planning.

7. There was no unanimity among the media representatives as to whether correspondents, pooled or otherwise, should be in the "first wave" or any other precise point in the operation. All did agree that media presence should be as soon as possible and feasible. The panel believes that such timing has to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

8. Neither the media nor the panel agreed on use in a pool of full-time media employees who are not U.S. citizens. The media tended to agree that, if the parent organization considered such employees reliable, they should be allowed to be pool members. Based on public affairs experience in Vietnam, there were many cases where such employees proved entirely reliable; however, some did not. The panel suggests that this has to be another case-by-case situation.

9. There was also a divergence of opinion among the media as to what news organizations should make up a pool, although all agreed that the most important criterion was probably which organizations cover the widest American audience. Several media representatives suggested specific media pools, but, unfortunately, they varied widely. The panel was not in full agreement on this subject either, but did agree that the following types of news organizations should have top priority. The panel further agreed that DoD should take the factors discussed in this paragraph into account when designating news organizations to participate in a pool.

a. Wire services. AP and UPI to have priority. A reporter from each and a photographer from either one should be adequate. In a crash situation where inadequate planning time has been available, a reporter from one wire service and a photographer from the other could provide a two-person pool.

b. Television. A two-person TV pool (one correspondent, one film/sound man) can do the job for a brief time although perhaps minimally. All TV representatives agreed that a three-person team is better and can do more. A panel suggestion that a six-person team (one cameraman, one sound man, and one reporter each from ABC, CBS, NBC, and CNY) seemed agreeable to the four networks although the load on the two technicians would be difficult to handle. The panel has no suggestion on this except that TV pool representatives must have high priority with two representatives as the minimum and augmentation to depend on space available. This should be a matter of discussion at the meetings suggested in recommendation 8a. The question of radio participation in pools must also be resolved.

c. News Magazines. One reporter and one color photographer.

d. Daily newspapers. At least one reporter. The panel agreed with newspaper representatives that, although newspapers do use wire service copy and photos, at least one newspaper pooler is needed for the special aspects of newspaper coverage not provided by the wire services. Criteria suggested for use when deciding which newspaper(s) to include in a pool included: Circulation, whether the newspaper has a news service, does the newspaper specialize in military and foreign affairs, and does it cover the Pentagon regularly. There was some agreement among the media representatives that there are probably not more than 8-10 newspapers which should be considered for pooling under these criteria.

10. In addition to the type of embargo necessary when a pooling news agency is notified in advance about a military operation (i.e., nothing to be said about it until it begins) there is another type applicable to some military operations. This second type was used with great success in Vietnam and restricts media accompanying the forces from filing or releasing any information about the progress of the operation until the on-scene commander determines that such release will not impair his security by informing the opposing commander about his objectives. Normally, this is not a problem as general objectives quickly become apparent. In the case of a special objective, there might be some delay in authorizing stories until either the objective is attained or it is obvious the enemy commander knows what it is. In any case, this type of embargo is an option to planners that the media would almost certainly accept as opposed to not having correspondents with the forces from the outset or close to it. The panel did not have a consensus on this matter.

11. Media representatives emphasized the readiness of correspondents to accept, as in the past, the physical dangers inherent in military operations and agreed that the personal security of correspondents should not be a factor in planning media participation in military operations.

RECOMMENDATION 3:

In connection with the use of pools, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to the Secretary of Defense that he study the matter of whether to use a pre-established and constantly updated accreditation or notification list of correspondents in case of a military operation for which a pool is required or just the establishment of a news agency list for use in the same circumstances.

Comments

1. The panel envisions that in either case the agency would select the individual(s) to be its representatives in the pool. In the case of the accreditation/notification list, there would presumably be several names from each news agency/organization to provide the necessary flexibility. The agency would have provided the names in advance to DoD. In the case of the news agency/organization list, DoD would decide which agencies would be in the pool and the agencies would pick the person(s) desired without reference to a list. There was no agreement as to whether DoD should have approval authority of the individuals named to be pool members. The media representatives were unanimously against such approval as were some members of the panel. However, other panel members believed that in the case of an extremely sensitive operation, DoD should have such authority.

2. There was no agreement among either those who appeared before the panel or among the panel itself on this matter. More in both groups seemed to favor simply establishing a news agency list including wire services, television, news magazines and newspapers from which to pick when DOD establishes a pool.

3. This particular problem is one that should be resolved in advance of a military operation and should be a subject of discussion in connection with the military-media meetings suggested in Recommendation 8a.

4. This recommendation does not concern the accreditation that would have to be given each correspondent covering an operation, either at first or later, by the senior on-site commander. Traditionally, this accreditation is limited to establishing that the individual is a bona fide reporter (represents an actual media organization).

RECOMMENDATION 4:

That a basic tenet governing media access to military operations should be voluntary compliance by the media with security guidelines or ground rules established and issued by the military. These rules should be as few as possible and should be worked out during the planning process for each operation. Violations would mean exclusion of the correspondent(s) concerned from further coverage of the operation.

Comments

1. The media were in support of this concept as opposed to formal censorship of any type, and all media representatives agreed that their organizations would abide by these ground rules. This arrangement would place a heavy responsibility on the news media to exercise care so as not to inadvertently jeopardize mission security or troop safety.

2. The guidelines/ground rules are envisioned to be similar to those used in Vietnam (a copy at Enclosure 6). Recognizing that each situation will be different, public affairs planners could use the Vietnam rules as a starting point, as they were worked out empirically during Vietnam by public affairs and security personnel and, for the most part, in cooperation with news media on the scene. All media representatives who addressed the issue agreed that the ground rules worked out satisfactorily in Vietnam.

RECOMMENDATION 5:

Public affairs planning for military operations should include sufficient equipment and qualified military personnel whose function is to assist correspondents in covering the operation adequately.

Comments

1. The military personnel referred to in this recommendation are normally called escorts; however, this term has developed some unfortunate connotations as far as the media are concerned. In any case, the panel's recommendation is designed to provide personnel who, acting as agents of the on-scene commander, will perform such functions as keep the correspondents abreast of the situation; arrange for interviews and briefings; arrange for their transportation to appropriate locations; ensure they are fed and housed, if necessary; and be as helpful as possible consistent with security and troop safety.

2. Almost all of the media representatives agreed that such escorts are desirable, especially at the beginning of an operation, to assist in media coverage. As the operation progresses and the reporters become familiar with what is going on, the media representatives were generally less enthusiastic about this type of assistance.

3. All the media were against escorts if their goal was to try to direct, censor, or slant coverage. However, most agreed that pointing out possible ground rule violations and security problems would be part of the escort's responsibility.

4. The point was made to the panel and the media representatives that escorts were often required in Vietnam, especially after about mid-1968, without many problems arising. One of the major advantages of escorts was making sure the reporters had a full and accurate understanding of the operation being covered.

5. The senior on-scene commander will decide how long escorting should continue after an operation begins.

RECOMMENDATION 6:

Planners should carefully consider media communications requirements to assure the earliest feasible availability. However, these communications must not interfere with combat and combat support operations. If necessary and feasible, plans should include communicative facilities dedicated to the news media.

Comments

1. Media representatives were unanimous in preferring provision for use of their own communications or using local civilian communications when possible. They were also unanimous, however, in the need for access to military communications if nothing else were available, especially in the opening stages of an operation.

2. Permitting media coverage without providing some sort of filing capability does not make sense unless an embargo is in force.

3. Although not discussed in depth during the panel meetings, communications availability is an obvious factor in determining press pool size. Planners should consider the varying deadlines of the different types of media. For example, newsmagazine reporters usually have more time to file thus permitting courier service as a possible satisfactory solution from their standpoint.

4. There was considerable discussion of the possibility of media-provided satellite uplinks being a future threat to security if technology permits real-time or near real-time copy and film/tape processing. The media representatives felt that such a possibility was not imminent; however, the discussions resulted in Recommendation 3d being included in the report. One panel member made the point that such real-time or near real-time capability has long existed for radio news including the Murrow reporting during World War II.

RECOMMENDATION 7:

Planning factors should include provision for intra- and inter-theater transportation support of the media. There was no Panel comment on this matter.

RECOMMENDATION 8:

To improve media-military understanding and cooperation:

a. CJCS should recommend to the Secretary of Defense that a program be undertaken by ASD(PA) for top military public affairs representatives to meet with news organization leadership, to include meetings with individual news organizations, on a reasonably regular basis to discuss mutual problems, including relationships with the media during military operations and exercises. This program should begin as soon as possible.

b. Enlarge programs already underway to improve military understanding of the media via public affairs instruction in service schools and colleges, to include media participation when possible.

c. Seek improved media understanding of the military through more visits by commanders and line officers to news organizations.

d. CJCS should recommend that the Secretary of Defense host at an early date a working meeting with representatives of the broadcast news media to explore the special problems of ensuring military security when and if there is real-time news media audiovisual coverage of a battlefield and, if special problems exist, how they can best be dealt with consistent with the basic principle set forth at the beginning of this section of the report.

Comments

1. The panel became convinced during its meetings with both media and military representatives that any current actual or perceived lack of mutual understanding and cooperation could be largely eliminated through the time-tested vehicle of having reasonable people sit down with reasonable people and discuss their problems. Although some of this has occurred from time to time through the years, there has not been enough, especially in recent years. The panel envisages that these meetings would be between ASD(PA) and/or his representatives and the senior leadership of both media umbrella organizations and individual major news organizations. A number of media representatives appearing before the panel said that they thought the media would be happy to participate in such a program. The program should include use of the Chiefs/Directors of Public Affairs of the Services, some of whom are already doing this.

2. Such meetings would provide an excellent opportunity to discuss problems or potential problems involving future military operations/exercises such as pooling, security and troop safety, accreditation, logistic support, and, most importantly, improving mutual respect, trust, understanding, and cooperation in general.

3. The panel does not exclude any news organizations in this recommendation, but practicality will lead to emphasis on meetings with major organizations. It would be equally useful for commanders in the field and their public affairs officers to conduct similar meetings with local and regional media in their areas, some of which are also underway at this time.

4. Both the panel and the media representatives lauded the efforts underway today to reinsert meaningful public affairs instruction in service schools and colleges. Many officers are sheltered from becoming involved with the news media until they are promoted to certain assignments where they suddenly come face-to-face with the media. If they have not been adequately informed in advance of the mutual

with each other, they sometimes tend to make inadequate decisions concerning media matters. In this connection, several media representatives told the panel they would be, and in some cases have already been, delighted to cooperate in this process by talking to classes and seminars.

5. Several media representatives also were enthusiastic about undertaking an effort to inform their employees about the military, primarily through visits of commanders and other appropriate personnel to their headquarters or elsewhere in their organizations. It was also apparent that some media are concerned with this problem to the point that they are taking an introspective look at their relations not only with the military but other institutions.

General Comments:

1. The panel agreed that public affairs planning for military operations involving allied forces should also consider making plans flexible enough to cover allied media participation, even in pools in some cases.

2. It was pointed out to the panel and should be noted that planners may also have to consider the desires of U.S. Ambassadors and their country teams when operations take place in friendly foreign countries. Some of these problems can, of course, be handled by the commanders and senior public affairs personnel on the scene, but they should be alerted to them in advance.

3. The media representatives all agreed that U.S. media should have first priority in covering U.S. military operations. The panel generally agreed that this must be handled on a case-by-case basis, especially when allied forces are involved.

Final Comment:


An adversarial -- perhaps politely critical would be a better term -- relationship between the media and the government, including the military, is healthy and helps guarantee that both institutions do a good job. However, this relationship must not become antagonistic -- an "us versus them" relationship. The appropriate media role in relation to the government has been summarized aptly as being neither that of a lap dog nor an attack dog but, rather, a watch dog. Mutual antagonism and distrust are not in the best interests of the media, the military, or the American people.

In the final analysis, no statement of principles, policies, or procedures, no matter how carefully crafted, can guarantee the desired results because they have to be carried out by people -- the people in the military and the people

in the media. So, it is the good will of the people involved, their spirit, their genuine efforts to do the job for the benefit of the United States, on which a civil and fruitful relationship hinges.

The panel believes that, if its recommendations are adopted, and the people involved are infused with the proper spirit, the twin imperatives of genuine mission security/troop safety on the one hand and a free flow of information to the American public on the other will be achieved.

In other words, the optimum solution to ensure proper media coverage of military operations will be to have the military -- represented by competent, professional public affairs personnel and commanders who understand media problems -- working with the media -- represented by competent, professional reporters and editors who understand military problems -- in a nonantagonistic atmosphere. The panel urges both institutions to adopt this philosophy and make it work.



Winant Sidle
Major General, USA, Retired
Chairman

ATTACHMENT 2



IMMEDIATE RELEASE

AUGUST 23, 1984

NO. 450-84

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I am today releasing the final report of the CJCS Media-Military Relations Panel (Sidle Panel).

I have directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) to take the necessary steps to implement those portions of the final report which meet the Panel's criteria of providing maximum news media coverage of U.S. military operations "consistent with military security and the safety of U.S. forces."

As an added step, I will form a panel of eminent journalists and former war correspondents to advise me on the best ways to meet these objectives. This group will become a permanent Secretary of Defense Media Advisory Committee. By forming such a committee, I wish to ensure that the media's viewpoint can be expressed in our highest councils on a continuing basis.

I firmly believe that relations between members of the armed forces and members of the press will be greatly enhanced by continued, strengthened, and informed dialogue. As part of instilling a better understanding on our part of the problems and responsibilities of the press in connection with our armed forces in times of crisis or conflict, as well as in peacetime, I have already directed a review of the adequacy of instruction on relations between the press and armed services at all levels of our military educational system.

I greatly appreciate the work done by General Sidle and the members of his panel, and by General Vessey. It is a necessary first step toward improved understanding by all parties. I believe our News Media Advisory Committee will help us move further and further along that path.

END

ATTACHMENT 3

BATTLE LINES

**Report of the
Twentieth Century Fund
Task Force on the Military
and the Media**

**Background Paper
by Peter Braestrup**

PP Priority Press Publications/New York/1985

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REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE

IN OCTOBER 1983, when U.S. forces invaded Grenada, American journalists were deliberately barred. They were kept away not only during the brief, two-battalion assault phase, but for two days thereafter. Even when a small group was finally admitted, it was clear that the U.S. government had failed to plan adequately for a flow of information via print and broadcast from Grenada to the American public.

Fortunately, the Grenada operation achieved its objectives quickly. But the government's failure, at the outset, to allow an independent flow of information to the public about a major military operation was unprecedented in modern American history. It provoked fresh arguments over relations between the military and the media, with their sometimes conflicting goals of defending the nation and informing the citizenry; the role of the civilian government in setting information policy in war zones; the responsibilities of journalists in wartime; and the influence of television on the nation's will to apply military force in support of foreign policy. It also highlighted the continuing, deep hostility among many in the military toward the news media, especially toward television.

This Task Force, convened in late 1984, sought to explore the nature of these conflicts and to recommend remedies for this potentially damaging breakdown in relations. We started with the premise that U.S. information policy in a war zone is a civilian concern, not simply a military operational one. Prior to 1983, U.S. presidents understood that they bore this responsibility; they did not relinquish it to military commanders.

In World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and lesser military engagements, civilian authorities saw to it that, in keeping with our tradition as an open society, reasonable provision was made for journalists in war zones. There was tacit agreement between the military and the media that the president, in his role as commander-in-chief, and his civilian subordinates assumed responsibility for media policy as for the war effort as a whole. Civilian authority did not defer, as it did in Grenada, to the commander in the field.

It is critical, in wartime as well as in peacetime, that our democracy have the freest possible flow of information. *Accordingly, the Task Force*

believes that the presence of journalists in war zones is not a luxury but a necessity. Imperfect though it is, our independent press serves as the vital link between the battlefield and the home front, reporting on the military's successes, failures, and sacrifices. By doing so, the media have helped to foster citizen involvement and support, which presidents, admirals, and generals have recognized as essential to military success.

This Task Force does not think that it is the mission of the press to mobilize public opinion for war. To the contrary, it is the chief executive who must define the purposes of the nation's use of force and enlist the support of the public and Congress for military action. If an administration's war policy is marked by debate at home, that debate will be reflected and reported in the press, as it was most recently during the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam.

For reasons of security, the media have always accepted restraints on the publication of news, ranging from embargoes and "ground rules," voluntarily adhered to by journalists, to outright military censorship on the battlefield. From the Normandy landings in 1944 to the defense of Khe Sanh in South Vietnam in 1968, practicality has often limited the number of journalists who could be accommodated by individual units or on specific operations. But coverage of such operations established, without challenge, the principle that the press ought to be on hand and helped to report as freely as possible on what was—and was not—happening in the war zone.

Acceptance of this principle could not ensure that the public was well informed. It did not guarantee competence on the part of journalists or news organizations, or candor and adequate knowledge on the part of every military spokesman. The fog of war and the inherent limitations of journalism often blurred the running portrait of battle. Yet, application of the principle meant that on all but a few occasions, the government, the military, and the public were well served.

This traditional arrangement between the press and government was disrupted by the deliberate exclusion from Grenada of all reporters during the first two days of the operation and then by the government's failure to plan for the timely accommodation of journalists. *The Task Force believes that this breach need not have occurred, and that no valid security reason existed for excluding all reporters from the immediate post-assault phase.* At the policy direction of the president or the secretary of defense, and with routine planning by the military, a small pool of journalists can always be selected and taken along, with reasonable notice, on a major operation.

The initial reaction among news organizations following the Grenada exclusion featured some excessively self-righteous rhetoric. The response from some military officers and civilians in the Pentagon was not flavored

by admiration for the virtues of a free press. But before the debate subsided it brought to the surface some important considerations, including a widening "culture gap" that was, if anything, particularly pronounced between young military officers and reporters. Yet the debate also had a bright side. It provided an opportunity for all sides to take stock of their attitudes and of their professional procedures, and to assess their readiness to provide the public with accurate, comprehensive reporting of any future American involvement in combat.

Civilian Supremacy

In the aftermath of Grenada, an official attempt was made to set up new operational procedures for accommodating the media. But a critical point about that attempt has been overlooked by most observers: the government's effort was initiated, not by the White House or by the Pentagon's civilian authorities, but by General John W. Vessey, Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was Vessey, rather than the president or the secretary of defense, who appointed Winant Sidle, a retired army major general, to convene a panel of military officers and retired journalists to suggest workable arrangements for accommodating the press in battle. Although spokesmen for news organizations testified before the panel, they did not serve on it because they considered serving on a government body inappropriate.

With memories of Grenada still fresh, the Sidle panel naturally devoted much of its attention to those cases where only a small number of journalists could be accommodated in the early stages of combat. In such emergencies, it suggested, media pools should be formed, and it recommended that such pools be impartial and as widely representative of the press as possible (see Appendix).

The Task Force commends the Sidle panel for its unswerving belief that reporters should have the fullest possible access to the battlefield consistent with troop safety and mission security. The Pentagon's first attempt, in late April, to test the pool arrangement recommended by the panel demonstrated the need for patient, detailed preparations for such exercises. The test entailed secretly flying a group of reporters to a military exercise in Honduras on short notice. When word about the exercise leaked, some in the military wondered whether reporters could be entrusted with sensitive assignments. The members of this Task Force firmly believe that the real lesson to be learned was that such procedures must be painstakingly honed in peacetime if they are to function effectively in moments of crisis.

Although we endorse the Sidle panel's recommendations, we think that the White House or the civilian authorities in the Pentagon ought

to have established the panel. *The Task Force believes that just as the president and his civilian deputies bear the responsibility for prosecuting a war, so must they assume responsibility for policy decisions on press access and censorship.*

The secretary of defense has taken the welcome step of assembling his own advisory group of veteran journalists, but he has yet to give unequivocal support to the notion that information policy is a civilian responsibility and not one that can be delegated, as it was during the Grenada invasion, to military commanders. Everyone agrees that the safety of troops should not be jeopardized, but, as in past conflicts, the attitude of those in charge should be that reporters ought to be there. The basic question to be posed is: "How can we get them in?" not "How can we keep them out?"

The Question of Access

The public's need for timely information about its government's military operations is implicit in the constitutional guarantees that underpin our society, including the First Amendment. But the question of the right of access by journalists to war zones has been clouded by legal ambiguity; it may, or may not, be enforceable in a court of law.* In any event, *the Task Force believes that it is healthier for the press and for our democratic polity if such complicated constitutional issues are not left to the courts.* Precise legal determinations of press rights in combat could be contentious and might end up limiting press freedoms in the effort to preserve them. *The Task Force would far prefer to see press access to combat operations arranged, as in the past, through cooperative understandings between government and news media.* We also believe that if an administration in the future seeks to bar news media from reasonable access to U.S. combat operations, *the Congress should exert its influence to guarantee a speedy restoration of the historic understanding between the military and the media.*

*Samuel P. Huntington dissents: I fully believe the government should support and assist media coverage of military operations for the reason, well stated elsewhere in the report, that both the public and decisionmakers should have an independent source of information. To achieve this end, it is unnecessary to invoke a mythical "right of access." The First Amendment protects the right to speak and publish; it provides no right of access to anything. In addition, the rights protected by the First Amendment are not limited to any class of people. The First Amendment could not give a right of access to military operations to journalists without giving it to all Americans—which it obviously does not.

The Political Context of Military Intervention

To some degree, the reluctance of military commanders to accommodate the media in Grenada might have come about because of the strict controls on the British press during coverage of the Falklands War. Perhaps even more, it reflects a lingering nostalgia for the halcyon days of World War II. Although that war was not without its tensions between the military and the press, it is remembered by many as a time of patriotic harmony when the press, at home and abroad, was "on the team." Yet short of a war for national survival, it is unlikely that future wars will command such universal public support, nor is it likely that we will see another protracted global conflict. Rather, it is probable that when it comes to military strategy and operations, we will witness what has prevailed ever since the founding of the Republic: Americans at odds. Limited regional wars and guerrilla conflicts do not inspire unanimous support.

The probable regional character of future conflicts also means that U.S. combat forces may again be deployed in countries where host governments are hostile to foreign journalists. In such cases, the U.S. government should make vigorous diplomatic efforts to ensure, at a minimum, the access of American reporters to American forces. Public support for "secret" U.S. military operations, or inadequately reported ones, will not long endure.

Planning for the Press

Because public affairs planning should not be improvised in the heat of battle, the Task Force recommends that a "public affairs annex" be considered a routine feature in all plans for U.S. military operations. Included in the planning should be measures to assist and accredit journalists; procedures for embargoes, "guidelines," and other legitimate restraints on the type and timing of information that can be reported; and provision for special "pools" of journalists to accompany U.S. forces on surprise missions. (There are many precedents for such pool arrangements in wartime.)

To ensure the maximum flow of information to the public and the government, the Task Force recommends that the secretary of defense reemphasize the importance of Department of Defense public affairs officers, both civilian and military. Senior field commanders should recognize that such officers serve as important conduits, via the news media, to the citizenry and government. They should be treated, by superiors and field officers, as "insiders," participating in the planning of impending military operations and serving as informed spokesmen for the field commander in the war zone. This public affairs role has

been recognized and faithfully implemented by leading U.S. commanders—including Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chester Nimitz, Matthew Ridgway, William C. Westmoreland, and Creighton W. Abrams—since the beginning of World War II.

Ground Rules.*

The security of tactical operations is a legitimate military concern, and one that must not be dismissed by journalists. *To preserve the security of U.S. military operations, the Task Force favors the use of clearly stated "ground rules," such as existed in Vietnam.* These guidelines, voluntarily adhered to by journalists and enforced by the field commander, delineate those pieces of information, such as troop movements or unit identification in battle, that could imperil U.S. forces if reported by journalists. We regard a system of ground rules as less cumbersome and more effective than the mandatory, military field censorship used in World War II and Korea, which often led to unnecessary delays in the transmission of news, and required trained field censors and the application of consistent criteria for judging security violations. A censorship system may tempt military officials to invoke the rationale of security to black out news that might simply be embarrassing.

Although civilian authorities should lay down the broad outlines of information policy in combat, the Task Force recommends that the procedural details be left to the commander in the field. When he enforces ground rules, the military commander should, of course, have the firm backing of civilian authority. Those who violate the rules should, if necessary, be subject to sanctions laid down in advance, and all correspondents should be treated consistently and fairly. News organizations should impress upon reporters sent into combat zones the importance of scrupulous adherence to such rules to ensure that their effectiveness is not compromised by journalistic competitiveness or irresponsibility.

**Craig R. Whitney comments:* If our report is interpreted to express support for restrictive arrangements, I disagree with that interpretation. We should urge the military to be more open and forthright in its information policies, not to enumerate more restrictive measures, such as "pools" and ground rules. Civilian authorities should make it clear to the military chain of command that its duty is not to hedge in correspondents with restraints, but to be as informative as possible. Mutually agreed upon ground rules and sanctions may be necessary in some cases (although not in as many as the military authorities usually think). Our purpose is not to recommend their use, but to state that of the two evils, *censorship is worse than restraints on some categories of information.*

The military and the executive branch have a corresponding obligation to maintain the integrity of this relationship. The credibility of military operations will erode if journalists and the public believe that deception, secrecy, or press curbs in war zones are being employed, not for security reasons, but to serve the needs of domestic politics or bureaucratic self-protection. The lessons of history are instructive in this regard; on those rare occasions when the executive branch employed military leaders as spokesmen in order to try to manipulate the media and Congress for short-term political advantage, the practice eventually contributed to crises of confidence for both the military establishment and the civilian executive branch.

The Culture Divide

Military-media relations have never been entirely smooth, in part because of the very nature of war, but also in part because of historic differences between the two callings. Now, as in the past, each tends to attract different personality types and to foster different sets of values. Of necessity, military people are schooled to respect tradition, authority, and leadership; obedience is an inescapable part of military life. In contrast, because journalists on occasion have the job of challenging official wisdom, their ranks tend to be filled with those who are more free-wheeling, irreverent, and skeptical of authority. The culture gap is compounded by competing goals. Some tension will always exist between the military's mission of winning on the battlefield and the combat journalist's mission of providing the public with timely information on what is taking place.

As we see it, the divide between the military and the media is in danger of widening. On the media side, the overwhelming majority of young reporters have had no firsthand exposure to combat, let alone to military life or even to those who have had experience of it, in large part due to the end of conscription in 1972, the large-scale avoidance of the draft by college-educated males during Vietnam, and the recent influx of women into journalism. On the military side, younger officers—those under age thirty—also have no firsthand experience of combat, but they have, even though only at secondhand, a store of beliefs absorbed from their elders. Both young and old military people seem to be gripped by powerful myths about the media dating from Vietnam. To some extent, this is a response to critical newspaper reporting from Vietnam and Washington during the war and to the widespread belief that television coverage soured public opinion on the war.

We do not believe that the gap between the two cultures can—or should—be closed, but we recommend that steps be taken to keep what was traditionally a healthy adversarial relationship from deteriorating into antagonism. As the Sidle panel stressed, good planning by the ex-

ecutive branch, including the military services, plus common sense on the part of news organizations, should work to minimize tensions.

News media executives must keep in mind the lack of experience of military life among younger journalists, remembering that many spent their college years on campuses where hostility toward the military was pervasive. *The Task Force therefore recommends that news organizations urge the directors of the mid-career training programs for journalists at a number of major universities, as well as the heads of schools of journalism, to hold seminars and other functions with military people so as to broaden journalists' familiarity with their military counterparts.*

The Task Force also recommends that the Defense Department offer brief, field-familiarization programs to reporters from major news organizations. Their objective should be to allow reporters and news executives to become acquainted with military personnel, organization, tactics, weaponry, and logistics. This, obviously, cannot be done in a day. We also urge that reporters—particularly those likely to be assigned to cover military operations under planned pool arrangements—be invited to attend major military maneuvers of longer duration. Senior news executives should see to it that reporters take advantage of such opportunities.

The Task Force also recommends that the Defense Department encourage greater sophistication among its officers about the First Amendment, the role of a free press in American society, journalistic processes, and the limitations and strengths of American journalism generally. Courses dealing with these issues should be part of the core curriculum at mid- and senior-level service schools, and the occasional media-military seminars at the U.S. Naval War College and its counterparts in other services should be expanded. These courses should discuss the need for a cooperative working relationship between the military and the media and provide a history of the evolution of that relationship.

The Role of the Press

Public opinion polls—and the rising number of adverse jury verdicts in libel cases—suggest that the media do not bask in universal public esteem. Despite the success of individual television news stars in attracting high audience ratings, journalists as a group have seldom—the Watergate era is the major exception—ranked high in popularity. The military seem to focus their dislike of the media on the supposed adverse impact of television on public opinion during military operations. Among the causes of Hanoi's victory in Indochina, many cite what they perceive as the negative impact on home-front morale of television reporting from the battlefield. This perception, which, oddly, has been reinforced by the repeated claims of some network television journalists that power-

ful pictures alone brought home the brutal "reality" of war, is apparently shared, to a great extent, by the public.

Scholarly data, though, casts some doubt on this view. Although the scenes of actual carnage may be most vividly remembered, they were but a small fraction of the footage from Vietnam. And television was not the only source of the public's perception of the horror of war; there also were widely reproduced photographs that depicted its agony and tragedy. This Task Force also does not believe that television coverage caused the public to lose enthusiasm for the Vietnam War.* Opinion polls have documented that public support for the Vietnam War declined less rapidly than public support for the Korean War, when television coverage was much less significant and military field censorship was in force. The available evidence also suggests that television coverage of Vietnam reflected a critical view of the war only *after* public opinion had begun to oppose it.**

We further note that the televised portrayal of antiwar demonstrations during the Vietnam War, however distressing to public officials, did not seem to rouse the sympathies of the television audience. It is important to remember that, as of 1981, half of the nation's households with television sets did not even watch the network evening news shows. Accordingly, this Task Force urges both the critics and champions of television's alleged role in Vietnam to take a closer look at the evidence and to forego mythology in discussing future military-media arrangements.

Television is not, *per se*, a threat to the security of U.S. military operations. Potential problems with live transmission of videotape that might pose a hazard to U.S. combat forces can be resolved through mutual

**Craig R. Whitney dissents:* I think it is beyond the scope of our panel to determine in a few paragraphs what it was that caused the American public to turn away from support of the Vietnam War. It is enough to note that many in the military, and in the general public, dislike and distrust the media, and to urge that the media not ignore this state of affairs.

***Samuel P. Huntington dissents:* In reviewing effects of specific coverage, evidence can be found of major shifts in public opinion due to coverage. In January 1968, before the Tet offensive, 56 percent of the public identified themselves as hawks, 28 percent as doves; in March, after Tet, 41 percent identified themselves as hawks, 42 percent as doves. The erroneous media interpretation of Tet as a military disaster must have played a significant role in this shift. See S. Robert Lichter and Stanley Rothman, "The Media and National Defense," in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Uri Ra'anani, eds., *National Security Policy: The Decision-making Process* (Archon Books, 1984).

Robert Murray and Admiral Elmo Zumwalt join in this dissent.

agreements. So can arrangements for pooling and transporting television crews. The field commander must be the final arbiter of what constitutes a threat to the security of his operations. Advised by civilian authorities and guided by his public affairs officer, he must decide when and how to accommodate television camera crews. In the heat and confusion of battle, words—spoken and written—are often the most efficient means of communicating complex information to the public; pictures are, of course, a useful adjunct.*

We strongly recommend that the media not ignore the current popular resentments and suspicions reflected in the attitude of many military people. Most journalists will readily concede that the major print and broadcast news organizations are not without sin. Their highly competitive managers and reporters do not seek to aid the enemy in wartime, but they are sometimes guilty of hasty judgments, political biases of various shades, a taste for melodrama and misdeeds, selective memory, sloppiness with facts, unfairness, slipshod editing, and lazy thinking.** When it comes to reporting on combat operations, which are inherently difficult to cover, any one of these sins can lead to serious distortions. As in past wars, this happened in Vietnam. But it is worth remembering that in Vietnam, military spokesmen can recall only a handful of security violations among the hundreds of accredited journalists in Saigon.

Many critics of the news media, including military men, have called for a more "responsible" press. Yet they are unable to agree on a definition of responsible or on how to enforce responsibility without destroying media independence under the First Amendment. We see responsibility as consisting, first, of news organizations assigning people with knowledge of military affairs to cover combat, and second, of their insisting on reporting and editing that are as fair, accurate, sophisticated, and comprehensive as battlefield circumstances permit. News executives

**Charlayne Hunter-Gault dissents:* This passage seems to suggest acceptance of a different standard for television journalists than for print—to wit, if there are only three seats on the plane, the priority is print, and then the field commander can do whatever he wishes with the television people. Even if you don't buy that old chestnut that "A picture is worth a thousand words," to say that a picture is merely "a useful adjunct" seems to me at least arguable, and in this context certainly an unnecessarily provocative assertion.

***Craig R. Whitney dissents:* It is unfair to catalog the sins of reporters without also noting that military officials have not been free of prejudice, have been selective of the facts, and have revealed personal animosity in their view of the media. In few cases have any of the "sins" listed led to breaches of operational security in past wars—the reason given, in Grenada, for excluding the press.

should realize that their organizations' credibility will suffer unless they assign to combat operations journalists whose skills are commensurate with the complexity and seriousness of their task. *In addition, we believe that a diversity of news media coverage, along with more vigorous media self-scrutiny, are the public's best protection against journalistic sins.*

Conclusion

Thus, we believe that the president must be prepared to make the political effort—and, if necessary, pay the political price—to mobilize public opinion behind any military operation he authorizes. The press and television cannot repair inept leadership or flawed strategy, nor is it their business to try to do so. They cannot win or lose wars or attempt to remake the history they report.

The news media have, on occasion, been guilty of losing perspective on events. In their restless way, they signal first one development in foreign affairs, then another, usually following the public commentary of presidents and their critics. Nevertheless, our free press, when it accompanies the nation's soldiers into battle, performs a unique role. It serves as eyewitness; it forges a bond between the citizen and the soldier; and, at its best, it strives to avoid manipulation either by officials or by critics of the government through accurate, independent reporting. It also provides one of the checks and balances that sustains the confidence of the American people in their political system and armed forces.

Grenada raised the issue of media access to U.S. forces in combat. If we learn the lessons of Grenada, putting the hurly-burly of the battle and the exclusion of the press behind us, we should be able to restore the cooperative attitude that has marked military-media relations in the past. All of us have a stake in seeing to it that the nation's civilian authorities, military leaders, and journalists restore a workable yet arm's-length relationship. It is the best way to ensure a free and informed society.

BACKGROUND PAPER

by Peter Braestrup

PREFACE

THIS background paper is intended to provide an overview of U.S. military-media relations in overseas battle zones since 1941. For purposes of comparison, the United Kingdom's 1982 War for the Falklands is examined. As an aid to discussion of their respective roles in advancing the public interest, the contrasting "cultures" of the military and of American print and broadcast journalism are also examined.

My objective was to assist the members of a distinguished Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, assembled by M. J. Rossant, director of the Fund, in assessing past American experience and formulating recommendations for resolving the issues that arose in the controversy that followed the exclusion of the news media from Grenada for forty-eight hours after the United States' invasion of that island republic in October 1983.

The sources for this background paper are indicated in the footnotes. It should be emphasized that, while memoirs by generals and war correspondents abound, comprehensive studies of American military-media relations or of war reporting during the conflicts of the 1941-85 period do not yet exist. There are no accounts comparable to those of military-press relations and press performance that were compiled by scholars of the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and World War I. Much relevant archival material remains to be explored. Of necessity, some of my judgments of military-media relations prior to the Vietnam conflict are tentative.

Overall, I might add, the strengths and weaknesses of American press performance do not seem to have altered much since World War II, even as journalistic themes, reflecting the political environment at home, have changed over time in each case where newspeople accompanied U.S. forces into combat. Television news, on the other hand, has emerged as a distinct art form with special preoccupations of its own.

Leona Hiraoka, an editor of the *Wilson Quarterly*, did the research and first-draft writing for that portion of chapter 7 dealing with the public discussion that followed Grenada. She also supervised the research and fact-checking for the entire manuscript and served as the project's able general manager.

I am indebted to Mark Thompson, a law school graduate and former member of the *Wilson Quarterly* editorial staff, for researching and writing the first draft of that portion of chapter 7 dealing with the Constitutional issues that arose, or seemed to have arisen, in the government-press controversy after Grenada. Mr. Thompson also unearthed original archival material concerning allied plans for press coverage prior to the Normandy landings during World War II.

Given the uneven quality of available documentary sources, I am particularly grateful to the Task Force members and to the following individuals for their guidance, corrective comments, and other assistance:

Keyes Beech, Maj. Donald Black (USAF), Michael Burch, Paul Cassell, Bernard Diederich, Col. James Elmer (USAF), Maj. Douglas Frey (USA), Sandy Gilmour, Howard Handleman, Tom Lambert, S. Robert Lichter, Drew Middleton, Maj. Gen. John E. Murray (USA, ret.), Col. Robert O'Brien (USAF), Bill Plante, Capt. Owen Resweber (USN), Tom Ricks, Robert Sherrod, Maj. Gen. Winant Sidle (USA, ret.), Comm. Ronald Wildermuth (USN), Maj. Barry Willey (USA), Harry Zubkoff.

The paper's sins of omission and commission must be blamed solely on the author.

• 1 •

INTRODUCTION

BY MOST measures, the United States' hastily planned invasion of Grenada on October 25, 1983, was successful. Cuban and Grenadian resistance was short-lived; several hundred possibly imperiled American medical students were rescued; despite some costly mishaps, casualties were low; and the demise of General Bernard Coard's chaotic, newly installed local revolutionary regime was greeted with more joy than sorrow by the island's 100,000 inhabitants.

But many of the nation's editorial writers and television pundits did not rejoice. Almost as soon as the hostilities on the island died down, those that had arisen between the Reagan administration and the country's major news organizations, particularly those in television, over the exclusion by the military of journalists from the island during the first two days of the invasion erupted into a cold war.

The senior military commanders, with the approval of the White House, had decided to exclude the press and the television cameras from the island not just during the initial assault phase but until the medical students were rescued and well after the worst fighting was over. For forty-eight hours the island was off-limits to newsmen; a few who had gotten ashore in spite of the ban were, in effect, barred from filing their stories. No "pools" of newsmen were organized or transported to the scene.

Not until late on October 27, two days after the landing, after vociferous protests from journalists, were fifteen photographers and reporters brought by air force transports from Barbados (where more than 300 journalists had assembled) for a hasty, guided tour of the Point Salines airfield; over the next three days, more guided tours followed. It was not until October 30 that all restrictions on the press were lifted.

Meanwhile, the earliest "facts" the public received were supplied by ham radio operators in touch with Americans on the island and by intermittent, fragmentary briefings from the Pentagon, then by rescued U.S. medical students, and to some degree by reports from Havana and

other Caribbean islands. For almost a week, a multitude of official sources (informed, semi-informed, and uninformed) in Washington were talking about Grenada. Contradictions, rumors, exaggerations (notably of Cuban strength and ferocity) abounded—to be sorted out only later.

The unprecedented administration effort at news management quickly drew fire from senior journalists. "I'm outraged," said Howard Simons, *The Washington Post's* managing editor.¹ "Intolerable," said Jerry Friedheim, former Pentagon spokesman and executive vice president of the American Newspaper Publishers Association.² NBC's John Chancellor said, "The Reagan Administration has produced a bureaucrat's dream: Do anything, no one is watching."³

Judging by opinion polls, the public initially did not share the media's outrage. According to a *Los Angeles Times* poll taken from November 12 to 17, 1983, a majority of Americans supported, or at least condoned, the White House decision to exclude journalists during the Grenada military operation. But the same respondents, by a two-to-one margin, opposed making the Grenada news blackout a precedent for future U.S. combat operations.⁴

To the public, spokesmen for major news groups either claimed that the First Amendment gave newsmen right of access to the battlefield or cited tradition, invoking (flawed) memories of past accommodations by the U.S. military to the needs of journalists who in turn provided independent witness to the deeds of America's sons on the battlefield. Newsmen, they said, had always been on hand—from Bull Run to the Normandy beaches, and from Korea to the Dominican Republic and Vietnam.

One aspect of the problem that was not recognized, at least not publicly, by most news executives during the post-Grenada discussion was the fact that in the wake of the Indochinese War and the turbulent 1970s many of the nation's senior military officers, veterans of Vietnam, had developed a bitter consensus: newsmen, especially television newsmen, were, at bottom, adversaries, neither trustworthy nor competent in military affairs, eager to dramatize American failings, possessing enormous power to undercut civilian backing for the men in battle. Some military commentators, as we shall see, went so far as to blame the loss of the Vietnam War on the impact on the home front of television news coverage. The very presence of such adversaries was enough to impose a burden on U.S. commanders in the field, they believed, a burden that was unacceptable in hasty, small-scale expeditions such as that to Grenada. As they saw it, the tight rein kept on the reporters taken along during the 1982 Falklands War by the British was closer to the right idea.

Secretary of State George Shultz, a former marine, did not contest this sentiment: "These days," he told reporters, "in the adversary journalism that's been developed, it seems as though the reporters always

are against us. And when you are trying to conduct a military operation, you don't need that."⁵ And John E. Murray, a retired army major general and Vietnam veteran, observed in *The Wall Street Journal* that "engaging the press while engaging the enemy is taking on one adversary too many."⁶

Long after the initial furor, Vice Admiral Joseph W. Metcalf III, the commander of the Grenada expedition, conceded that, in terms of logistics and space, he could have accommodated a pool of eight newsmen aboard his flagship, the *Guam*. However, he said, "I did not want the press around where I would start second-guessing what I was doing relative to [what] the press [might choose to report to the public]."⁷

Although Admiral Metcalf was convinced that he and his superiors had been right in barring the news media, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger felt that some fence-mending was necessary. By order of General John W. Vessey, Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a panel of former journalists and military officers was convened by Warrant Officer Sidle, a retired army major general and former military spokesman in Vietnam, to recommend ways of improving military-media relations in future conflicts. The major news organizations agreed to testify before the Sidle panel (but not to join it), and some answered questionnaires sent them by the panel, which was seeking expressions of media wants and needs.

The post-Grenada discussions have clarified some major issues in media-military relationships that needed to be addressed, although it is clear that the issue, at bottom, is one of mutual trust and comprehension.

The Past. To a degree, both the suspicions of the military and the claims of newsmen are based on flawed recollections, bordering on myth, of American media-military relations—and media performance—in various combat zones over the past four decades. Reexamining this history will allow the discussions of the role of each to be based on something close to historical truth rather than selective memory.

Autonomy. In the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, a substantial number of news executives have come to contend that, in the public interest and under the First Amendment, the nation's news organizations should be seen as a kind of fourth branch of government, an autonomous watchdog over other major institutions. But does this mean that the growing claims of special privilege for journalists—pressed in cases involving access to court proceedings, governmental records, and penal institutions—should be extended to U.S. military operations in combat zones as well?

Roone Arledge, president of ABC News, noted, by way of analogy, that "conflicts . . . arise between the First Amendment right of a free

press and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a free trial as it is now interpreted. . . . Nobody has yet decided how to solve it . . . it simply exists. . . ."

"Our society," he suggested, "may be best served when government and press understand that each performs separate and ultimately autonomous functions. . . ."

Military commanders in future combat operations, however, are unlikely to share that view. When men's lives are at stake, when public perceptions (and political leaders' perceptions) of the battlefield are in part shaped by the news media, the notion of accommodating a profession that considers itself autonomous and by implication "neutral" or "critical" even in wartime is unlikely to appeal to generals, their civilian superiors, or the combat troops.

Censorship. The claim of autonomy also has cropped up in discussions of future military censorship of television film and press dispatches. After Grenada, Jack Foisie, the veteran *Los Angeles Times* war correspondent, argued that a "degree of censorship always is acceptable in wartime, even preferred. It shifts the judgment for 'not endangering lives' to military professionals; it gives all correspondents an even start in this competitive business; and it makes troop commanders a lot more ready to talk candidly."⁹

But the notion of censorship in combat zones was new to a few spokesmen in Washington for several major news organizations; in the last big war, in Vietnam, there was no censorship, just as there was none in Grenada. "Under no circumstances," said William W. Headline, bureau chief for Cable News Network, voicing a minority view, "could we acquiesce in direct censorship of our reports as a *precondition* to coverage of military operations. . . . Coverage, if censored, would be likely to have harmful effects on the credibility of the Defense Department . . . as well as on media which might convey such coverage."¹⁰

Constraints. The issue of barring the press and television for foreign policy reasons also emerged in the response of media organizations to the Sidle panel's query: What should the U.S. government do if the government of a host country to which U.S. forces were deployed insisted on banning reporters? (The Sidle panel had in mind the Persian Gulf area.) Said the National Association of Broadcasters:

The presence of U.S. newsmen should be a *precondition* to granting U.S. military aid. . . . Realistically, countries in dire need of U.S. military aid are not likely to forego assistance in order to keep U.S. journalists out.¹¹ [emphasis added]

In fact, as several military men noted, America's allies have put some curbs, if not outright bans, on U.S. journalists in the past. During the Vietnam War, for example, Thailand, a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, played host to five major U.S. Air Force bases from which came most of the air force strikes against North Vietnam; preferring a low profile, the Thais successfully insisted that the bases be under nominal Thai command and that American journalists not openly visit the bases without Thai permission. (In practice, U.S. journalists interviewed air force people "off-base," or did not disclose in their reporting that they had been "on-base.") Similar curbs might be likely in the Persian Gulf and the Caribbean should U.S. forces go into action there.

Access to the "Other Side." By implication, the question of "autonomy" raised the issue of unrestrained access by American journalists to "the other side." During the Korean War, only Western Communists, notably Australia's Wilfred Burchett, visited the enemy camp. Travel by Americans to North Korea (and China) was forbidden by the State Department, and no one who sought to challenge this rule was admitted by North Korea.

In El Salvador, where Communist-backed guerrillas are engaged in combat against an army trained and advised by the United States, there has been no retaliation by the U.S. government against American newsmen who visited the guerrillas. Nor has there been any U.S. attempt to bar American newsmen from reporting from Nicaragua—where the United States maintains an embassy and the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) supports the antigovernment "contra" guerrillas. In October 1983, while Cubans and Americans were in combat in Grenada, there was no official U.S. inhibition on American journalists accepting invitations to Havana.

During the Vietnam War, where U.S. troops were directly involved, neither Lyndon Johnson nor Richard Nixon put Hanoi off-limits to any U.S. journalist (or antiwar activist) who could persuade the North Vietnamese to let him in. Harrison Salisbury's vivid, sympathetic dispatches from Hanoi in *The New York Times* in 1966, stemming from a guided tour of urban damage due to U.S. bombing raids, were one result still deplored by U.S. military men. Next time, it has been said, the foe should not have a pipeline to the U.S. public. In wartime, should the U.S. press—or other Americans—be banned from travel to the "other side"?

Accommodating Technology. As yet dimly understood, there are problems involved in accommodating the increased requirements of television news (the demands of complex television technology mean that more manpower, transport, communications, and satellite up-links will be

needed) in the combat zone. This will be a bigger problem when U.S. forces consist of widely dispersed "austere" and rapidly shifting units, as is likely to be the case in Central America and the Persian Gulf and as was the case in Grenada. At one point, there were more than 300 journalists in Barbados waiting to go to Grenada; perhaps one-third of them were involved in some way with television; ABC News alone had twenty-five people on the scene, more than the entire U.S. press contingent that actually landed with U.S. forces on the beaches of Normandy on June 6, 1944.

If we assume that the goal of senior military men and their civilian superiors is making the maximum amount of information available to the U.S. public, what set of priorities, if any, should the U.S. military adopt with respect to the various media—wire services, newspapers, newsmagazines, television networks, radio?

Mutual Comprehension. Since World War II, the two cultures—the military and the media—have rarely been so divided. The fact that a high proportion of college-age males escaped service during the Vietnam War, the end of the draft in 1972, and the influx of women into journalism all mean that an increasing proportion of editors and television producers, to say nothing of young reporters, have had no direct exposure to the military. For their part, in an odd way, many senior military men have come to regard the "media" as all of a piece, and television news as synonymous with "the media," although print organizations and television are very different institutions, operating under very different pressures and requirements.

As has been clear from the outset, the underlying problem is one of mutual comprehension and trust. The fact is that since 1941, under many trying circumstances, the military and the media have managed to accommodate each other, often in surprising ways, mostly without undue jeopardy to either military operations or the healthy flow of information to the U.S. public. This said, history also shows us that all was not in harmony during World War II, that newsmen sought military censorship during the Korean War, that reporters did not expect instant access during the 1965 Dominican intervention, that journalists enjoyed unusual freedom and facilities during the Vietnam conflict, and that the British, out of necessity, curbed (but did not exclude) newsmen during the 1982 Falklands expedition. If nothing else, the Grenada affair showed what happens when the military does *not* make plans to accommodate the media and when the media concentrate on their own problems instead of following up on the events on the ground. We still do not have a comprehensive postmortem by newsmen of the Grenada military operation itself, and we still have a trickle of revelations, false, true, or half-true, about the U.S. military's performance on the island.

The past should not be used to draw up a set of hard rules to fit every possible contingency in the future. But since it is likely that the United States will be involved in combat overseas, short of a superpower conflict, again in this century, the government and the media need to ponder and discuss their relationship and their mutual Constitutional responsibilities to a free society. They need to take note of their respective roles—to gain military success at the lowest cost and to keep the public adequately informed about the sacrifices and successes of its sons on the battlefield. A brief look at the past may help the discussion.

APPENDIX F

ATTACHMENT 1

THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

Legal Defense
Fund

First Amendment
Clearinghouse

FOI Service
Center

Estab. 1970

Suite 504 • 1735 Eye Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20006 • Tel. (202) 466-6313

January 17, 1991

The Honorable Herbert H. Kohl
702 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Kohl:


I am writing to express my strong concern about the Pentagon's rules for news coverage of military operations in the Persian Gulf region.

The enclosed letter, sent jointly to Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney by my organization and the Radio-Television News Director, summarizes our position. I might add that a revised version of the rules, issued on January 14, appears to partially mitigate one of these problems by suggesting that pools may not be the only form of coverage permitted once the initial stages of combat are over. The revised rules also state that while security reviews will still be conducted, the ultimate decision on publication will be made by the news organization.

However, concerns about the functioning of non-pool members and about delays in transmitting information to the American public that will inevitably result from security reviews remain.

Along with many other media organizations, we would hope that Congress would review these rules at the earliest opportunity. I would be pleased to supply further information to assist with this process.

Very truly yours,



Jane E. Kirtley, Esq.
Executive Director

Steering Committee

WASHINGTON
Hodding Carter
*MainStreet
Sara Fritz
*Los Angeles Times
Hays Gorey
*Time Magazine
Albert Hunt
*Wall Street Journal
Jack C. Landau
*Newhouse Newspapers
Tony Mauro
*USA Today
Jack Nelson
*Los Angeles Times

David Rosenbaum
*New York Times
Cristine Russell
*Washington Post
Bernard Shaw
*CNN
Miranda S. Spivack
*Hartford Courant
Phillip Taubman
*New York Times
Linda Wertheimer
*National Public Radio
Bob Woodward
*Washington Post
Clemens P. Work
*U.S. News & World Report

NEW YORK
Tom Brokaw
*NBC News
Earl Caldwell
*New York Daily News
Diane Camper
*New York Times
John Chancellor
*NBC News
Walter Cronkite
*CBS News
Nat Hentoff
*The Village Voice
Peter Jennings
*ABC News
Dan Rather
*CBS News

CHICAGO
Mike Royko
*Chicago Tribune
DALLAS
Jack Taylor
*Times Herald
HOUSTON
John C. Henry
*Houston Chronicle
JACKSON, MS
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*Factual Reporting Service
MIAMI
Gene Miller
*Miami Herald

NASHVILLE
Fred Graham
*Freelance
NEPTUNE, NJ
Gary Deckelnick
*Asbury Park Press
Ex-Officio
Jane E. Kirtley
*Executive Director

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THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE, FRIDAY, JANUARY 11, 1991

MEDIA GROUPS CRITICIZE RESTRICTIONS ON NEWS COVERAGE IN PERSIAN GULF

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Two national media associations have sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney criticizing the final version of rules for news coverage of military operations in the Persian Gulf region.

The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and the Radio-Television News Directors Association urged Secretary Cheney to reconsider provisions restricting media coverage to escorted pools and requiring security reviews of all stories.

"The use of pools is, at best, a compromise. The news media's previous acceptance of pool procedures in very special situations, and for short periods of time, should not suggest that they would be willing to accept the exclusive use of pools under all circumstances," the letter said.

"Security review represents a potentially serious form of prior restraint. As a practical matter such reviews will not and cannot usurp the right of news organizations to make the ultimate decision whether or not publish or broadcast disputed material," the letter stated.

Steering Committee

WASHINGTON
Hodding Carter
*MainStreet
Sara Fritz
*Los Angeles Times
Hays Gorey
*Time Magazine
Albert Hunt
*Wall Street Journal
Jack C. Landau
*Newhouse Newspapers
Tony Mauro
*USA Today
Jack Nelson
*Los Angeles Times

David Rosenbaum
*New York Times
Cristine Russell
*Washington Post
Bernard Shaw
*CNN
Miranda S. Sprack
*Hartford Courant
Phillip Taubman
*New York Times
Linda Wertheimer
*National Public Radio
Bob Woodward
*Washington Post
Clemens P. Work
*U.S. News & World Report

NEW YORK
Tom Brokaw
*NBC News
Earl Caldwell
*New York Daily News
Diane Camper
*New York Times
John Chancellor
*NBC News
Walter Cronkite
*CBS News
Nat Hentoff
*The Village Voice
Peter Jennings
*ABC News
Dan Rather
*CBS News

CHICAGO
Mike Royko
*Chicago Tribune
DALLAS
Jack Taylor
*Times Herald
HOUSTON
John C. Henry
*Houston Chronicle
JACKSON, MS
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*Factual Reporting Service
MIAMI
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*Executive Director

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BARBARA BOXER
8TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
MEMBER RESOURCES THROUGH CHAIRMAN

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN,
YOUTH, AND FAMILIES

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ON LEAVE

MILITARY REFORM CAUCUS
CO-CHAIRMAN

WHP AT LARGE



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

January 17, 1991

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WASHINGTON, DC 20515
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MEMPHIS
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SAN RAFAEL, CA 94901
(415) 457-7272

WALLS
707 582-0720

SACRAMENTO
(916) 763-6033

The Hon. Richard Cheney
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon

Dear Secretary Cheney:

I am writing to urge you to authorize immediate revisions to the guidelines and ground rules issued by your Assistant Secretary of Defense on Monday for correspondents covering the hostilities in the Persian Gulf.

Although previous revisions have relaxed some of the restrictions, the Department of Defense ground rules still would impose unwarranted prior restraint on the abilities of the U.S. news media to report non-classified information on the unfolding events to the American public. Such censorship has not been seen since the Korean War.

The American public has the right to know the conduct of a war that involves their families, neighbors and fellow citizens. At the same time, however, I do not believe that the news media should report information that would put our service men and women in jeopardy. Based on past experience with voluntary compliance, I believe that we can trust the media to provide the public with needed information on the conduct of the war without endangering our forces. The Department of Defense will always have the threat of revoking accreditation to ensure compliance.

I urge you as well to expand the number of media pools organized to cover combat in the front. I understand that more than 250 reporters are accredited to cover U.S. operations in the Gulf but only two media pools of 18 reporters have been permitted.

We cannot promote democracy if we promote censorship at the same time.

Sincerely,

BARBARA BOXER

THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE OF RECYCLED FIBERS

BARBARA BOXER
6TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN,
YOUTH, AND FAMILIES

MILITARY REFORM CAUCUS
CO-CHAIR

WHIP AT LARGE



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

307 CANNON BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-6181

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MARIN
3301 KERNER BOULEVARD
SAN RAFAEL, CA 94901
(415) 457-7272

VALLEJO
(707) 552-0720

SONOMA
(707) 783-8023

We Cannot Promote Democracy With Censorship

COSPONSOR H.RES. 37

January 22, 1991

Dear Colleague:

I am writing to urge your support for H. Res. 37 which calls on the Department of Defense to authorize immediate revisions to the guidelines and ground rules issued by the Pentagon for correspondents covering the hostilities in the Persian Gulf. This resolution was drafted with the assistance and cooperation of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.


Although previous revisions have relaxed some of the restrictions, the Department of Defense ground rules still impose unwarranted prior restraint on the abilities of the U.S. news media to report non-classified information on the unfolding events to the American public. Such censorship has not been seen since the Korean War.

The American public has the right to know the conduct of a war that involves their families, neighbors and fellow citizens. At the same time, however, I do not believe that the news media should report information that would put our service men and women in jeopardy. Based on past experience with voluntary compliance, I believe that we can trust the media to provide the public with needed information on the conduct of the war without endangering our forces. The Department of Defense will always have the threat of revoking accreditation to ensure compliance.

This resolution also calls on the Defense Department to expand the number of media pools organized to cover combat in the front. I understand that more than 250 reporters are in Saudi Arabia to cover U.S. operations in the Gulf but only two media pools of 18 reporters have been permitted.

We cannot promote democracy if we promote censorship at the same time. If you would like to cosponsor this resolution—a copy of which is printed on the reverse—please call Maureen O'Brien at 5-5161.

Sincerely,


BARBARA BOXER

House Resolution:

WHEREAS, the United States Congress has granted the President authority to make war pursuant to Joint Resolution 77 in order to implement United Nations Security Council resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674 and 667;

WHEREAS, the Department of Defense has issued its "Ground rules and flight for auxiliary staff in the event of hostilities in the Persian Gulf" from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense;

WHEREAS, the Department of Defense, according to these "ground rules," intends to institute a policy of selective coverage by limiting the access of the news media to combat by allowing only two media pools of no more than 18 correspondents each;

WHEREAS, there are at least 250 U.S. news reporters accredited to the Department of Defense to report on hostilities in the Persian Gulf;

WHEREAS, the United States government should not discriminate among accredited correspondents as to whom should be allowed in the front-lines during the duration of hostilities;

WHEREAS, the Department of Defense intends to institute a policy of prior restraint by establishing security review of news media reports in the field of operations, and

WHEREAS, in recent conflicts the Department of Defense has apparently prevented accredited correspondents from covering the initiation of combat to prevent the disclosure of politically embarrassing information;

WHEREAS, the Department of Defense has the right and duty to withdraw accreditation to any member of the news media whose reports have placed U.S. military operations and U.S. personnel in imminent jeopardy;

WHEREAS, the citizens of the United States have the right to know the full extent of the armed conflict involving U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, including the participation of allied forces in hostilities, and the opportunity to witness the full emotional impact of combat and to learn the course of the war that involves more than 400,000 of their fellow citizens: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives calls on the Department of Defense to (1) cease the imposition of military security review panels that could result in unwarranted censorship of the news media, and (2) make such military security rules voluntary.

Sec. 2. The House of Representatives calls on the Department of Defense to expand the news media pooled coverage of combat to include as many accredited correspondents as possible and to suspend such pool requirements when they are no longer absolutely necessary so that all accredited correspondents will have the opportunity to report.

Bruce F. Vento
BRUCE F. VENTO

George Miller
GEORGE MILLER

* *Dante B. Fascell*
DANTE B. FASCELL

Mary Rose Oaker
MARY ROSE OAKAR

Louis Stokes
LOUIS STOKES

Peter H. Kostmayer
PETER H. KOSTMAYER

Don Edwards
DON EDWARDS

Les AuCoin
LES AuCOIN

Edward J. Markey
EDWARD J. MARKEY

John Bryant
JOHN BRYANT

Fortney Pete Stark
FORTNEY PETE STARK

* *Jim Bacchus*
JIM BACCHUS

Lane Evans
LANE EVANS

Nancy Pelosi
NANCY PELOSI

Peter A DeFazio
PETER A DeFAZIO

James L Oberstar
JAMES L OBERSTAR

Wayne Owens
WAYNE OWENS

Jolene Unsoeld
JOLENE UNSOELD



Congressman
DON EDWARDS
San Jose · Milpitas · Fremont · Newark · Union City

NEWS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: January 29, 1991
2307 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

CONTACT: Jim Dempsey
(202) 226-7680
91-11

**PRESS RESTRICTIONS ON GULF COVERAGE GO TOO FAR:
UNDERMINE FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES**

Pentagon restrictions on reporting from the Persian Gulf undermine First Amendment principles, going far beyond rules imposed in prior wars, and threaten to undermine public confidence in the U.S. war effort, said Don Edwards (D-CA), chairman of the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights in remarks prepared for delivery on the House Floor today.

Edwards is one of several House members expected to speak in a "Special Order" on the censorship of Gulf war coverage.

Edwards cited three types of press controls that go beyond the government's legitimate need to withhold information to protect the troops and the military operations. First and most troubling is the outright censorship of press reports. Everything from the front lines is reviewed by military censors, and some deletions and changes appear to have no security justification.

Second is the requirement that journalists can have access to forward areas only in Pentagon controlled pools. The third is the requirement for constant military escorts. The effect of these requirements is that the media cover only what the Pentagon wants them to see, and an information officer is standing right beside any soldier being interviewed.

Edwards said that "censorship is being used to put the Administration's spin on the news." Such use of censorship, he said, will make the public suspicious of all Pentagon statements. He urged the Pentagon to revise the restrictions.

###

PRESS FREEDOM AND THE GULF WAR

DON EDWARDS

January 29, 1991

Mr. Speaker, our thoughts are with the American fighting men and women in the Persian Gulf. We stand united in our admiration for their courage and skill, and we wish them swift success with a minimum loss of life.

I rise today to discuss the need during this war to preserve our constitutional rights here at home. In particular, I am concerned with the damage that is being done to the First Amendment by the Pentagon's attempts to control the news from the Gulf.

The Defense Department has established guidelines for press coverage of this war that, in their combined effect, go beyond anything we had in earlier wars. The press restrictions are depriving the American public of the objective information needed to make informed judgments on this conflict. We are getting instantaneous coverage of this war, but we are not getting very much information.

Mr. Speaker, no one here today is questioning the Pentagon's decisions on war strategy. No one is criticizing the performance of our soldiers, sailors and pilots. And no one is disputing the government's legitimate need to withhold certain information to protect the troops and the military operations.

What brings us to the Floor today is our concern that some of the controls imposed by the Pentagon go well beyond protecting security. Of particular concern are the overbroad use of censorship, the restrictive pool requirements, and the requirement for constant military escorts.

First, the Pentagon guidelines require that all press reports from the Persian Gulf must be cleared by U.S. military censors. There was no such censorship in Vietnam and the press acted very responsibly. They were critical, of course, and they published embarrassing information, but there were very few if any cases in which the press published information that was militarily harmful.

In the Gulf, censorship is being used to put the Pentagon's spin on the news. For example, in one instance, military censors changed a reporter's story to delete the word "giddy" and insert in its place the word "proud." Now there was no security purpose there. The Pentagon apparently felt it was unseemly to describe pilots just back from a bombing raid as being "giddy."

In another instance, reporters in the Gulf learned that the military had launched air strikes against Iraqi nuclear laboratories, which was certainly no secret to Iraq, but the reporters were forbidden from reporting that information. Later, American military commanders released detailed information on those very attacks in their press briefing. The Pentagon was clearly eager to be the first to report the information itself, again to put the proper spin on it.

Second, the guidelines require reporters to cover the war only from approved press pools. Pools have their place, for example, when an invasion is being launched. But the Pentagon seems determined to use the pools throughout the war. That is unprecedented; as far as I can tell, it goes beyond anything imposed even in World War II.

Some of the problems encountered by the pools are comical, but they illustrate the limitations of the pool concept. One pool recently was led by a military escort who had no maps and no compass. The pool spent six hours in the desert, finally stumbling on an American military base. However, the pool reporters could not get into the base to find out their location because the escort did not know the proper password.

Third, reporters on military bases must be accompanied by military escort at all time. This means that the Pentagon even selects which soldiers will be interviewed and a military information officer stands by while the interview is being conducted.

What we are seeing in the Persian Gulf is a highly refined version of rules that were used in the Grenada and Panama invasions to keep from the American public important information that was not militarily sensitive. For example, during the Panama invasion, the Pentagon flatly denied that there were any casualties during a parachute drop. It was not until a month later that the Army admitted that 86 paratroops had been hurt in the air drop. The military also kept from reporters information on civilian casualties, so that even today we do not know how many civilians died in Panama as a result of the invasion.

I am afraid that the current Pentagon leadership does not accept the role of the media in a free society. In fact, according to former Reagan defense official Fred Hoffman, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney personally hamstrung media coverage of the Panama invasion by refusing to activate the press pool until it was too late for the press to get any reports about the initial invasion. Not a single photograph, strip of film or eyewitness account was ever published about the combat in Panama.

The American people are financially supporting the military deployment and many have sons and daughters, husbands and wives

servicing in the Persian Gulf. The people at home and the troops in the Gulf have a right to an objective accounting of the hostilities, not a version controlled by the Pentagon.

There may be some who argue that censorship is necessary to maintain the morale of the troops. I believe that just the opposite is true. One of the most disturbing aspects of the Pentagon's censorship program is the negative effect it is having upon the morale of our own troops in the Gulf. As an Army captain stationed in the Gulf observed, "[i]t's the lack of news that gets people anxious... You start to wonder what they are keeping from us."

The Pentagon may feel that the public will turn against the war if failures are reported. To the contrary, Mr. Speaker, public support for the war is going to disappear if the public gets the impression that it is being given only the good news. The public will rapidly grow suspicious and stop believing anything. In the long run, a censorship program will damage the nation's trust in the wisdom of the war and the competence of the military.

By creating an atmosphere of unreal optimism, the Pentagon is actually magnifying the future effects on the public of even a small military reverse. We have already seen this happen. The Pentagon initially contended that Allied air sorties were enjoying an 80% success rate. Officials later admitted that "sorties" included many noncombat air missions wholly within Saudi Arabia, including transport and refueling missions. This disclosure led to doubts about the air war's effectiveness, doubts that would have been less serious had the military not overinflated expectations in the first place.

Mr. Speaker, concern about the press restrictions is not a partisan issue. It is not a question of liberals versus conservatives. A former Pentagon official in the Reagan and Bush Administration, Fred S. Hoffman, said earlier this month that the security review was not justified. He said it "is censorship by the government and could be abused to protect the military from criticism or embarrassment." David Gergen, White House communications director under Presidents Ford and Reagan, also noted, "there is too strong a tendency [in the Pentagon] to lean toward less coverage."

In a democracy, it is precisely in matters of the gravest national importance, such as war, when the freedom of the press is most important. I urge the Pentagon to revise these press restrictions and allow the American public a fuller picture of this war.

February 20, 1991

Testimony By Congressman Bruce Vento (D-MN)
Before the Senate Subcommittee
on Government Information and Regulation

Don't Let Truth Become Casualty of War

I commend the gentleman from Wisconsin, Chairman Herb Kohl, for holding this hearing on the very pressing issue of censorship of the Persian Gulf War news coverage. This is a concern that many of us have shared even before the war began. On January 12th, I sent a letter to Secretary Cheney protesting the restrictive press guidelines which had been established by the Defense Department. Several Members of Congress later joined me and we have continued to work together to urge the Defense Department to change its press guidelines.

Senator Kohl, the hearing you are conducting today is certainly helpful in our efforts to persuade the Defense Department to reconsider the restrictions. It is also timely as we have scheduled a meeting tomorrow with representatives of the Defense Department to discuss this very issue of media guidelines. Hopefully your hearing will highlight the difficulties and short-comings of the DOD position.

I object to the exclusive use of military escorted press pools and other aspects of the guidelines for a number of reasons, but most importantly because they violate the American public's right to

know. That right is so central to our democracy that it is protected by the First Amendment to our Constitution.

Today that right is being undermined and challenged at an especially critical time in our nation's history. The American public is being denied complete, timely, objective and accurate information on the war in the Persian Gulf and the Administration is hoping that the American public will not notice. But many Americans recognize the fatal flaw and danger of such action and are taking note.

One Minnesotan wrote to me:

"We, the American public are going to pay for that war in lives and dollars, and have a right to know what is happening."

We all understand why the temptation to control the press becomes greater during the time of war, but we must also realize the increased importance of accurately informing the public of such events. The American news media serve as the eyes and ears of the American people. This role becomes more essential in time of war when the public relies almost solely on the media to provide objective information about daily events in remote areas of the globe. Without such objective information, the public cannot make informed judgments about the status and conduct of the war.

There is a legitimate need for withholding certain information for national security purposes, but the prior restraint and information control being enforced by the Defense Department goes well beyond national security and protecting the well-being of

U.S. service men and women.

An example from the LA Times provides insight into the chilling effect of military escorts on the press coverage. When one Marine told a journalist that the food was too starchy, a Marine Major General intervened to say, "You're not an expert on the components of food. Keep to your area of expertise."

This example may appear harmless and almost humorous at first glance. However, once you look beneath the surface and take a serious look at that instance, you may too ask yourself what a candid comment on food has to do with national security and what other more essential information is being squelched by military censors under the guise of national security.

The mere presence of the officer at such interviews has a chilling effect by making the interviewee feel uncomfortable. When the military escort interjects his or her opinions into the interview, the journalist has no hope for obtaining objective information.

There is no place in a free society for this "see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil" Pentagon policy. We cannot tolerate the Pentagon dictating the words and images the public is allowed to receive. The Pentagon must stop trying to spoon feed us sanitized sound-bites and start allowing information to flow freely.

The Pentagon, Congress and the Administration simply must trust the American people with objective information about the Persian Gulf war. That is a basic tenet, the foundation, of our democracy. An informed electorate depends upon the news media for

information. The Administration is not entitled to prior restraint, censorship, sanitization or spin control of the news. When all aspects of the information and news become issues of national security and absolute control is employed, then the basic trust and support for our national government will crumble.

The Armed Forces should be allowed to concentrate on the military campaign rather than this zealous public relations campaign. The destructive weapon of censorship the Pentagon is employing to control the press is rapidly chiseling away at our democratic rights. If this dangerous public relations campaign is not stopped, "truth" could end up as another casualty of the Persian Gulf war.

BRUCE F. VENTO
4TH DISTRICT MINNESOTA

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WASHINGTON DC 20518
(202) 225-8831

DISTRICT OFFICE
AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK BUILDING
9TH AND MINNESOTA STREETS
ROOM 905
ST. PAUL, MN 55101
(612) 224-4503

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

January 23, 1991

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL PARKS
AND PUBLIC LANDS
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
BANKING, FINANCE AND
URBAN AFFAIRS
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON AGING

Secretary Dick Cheney
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1155

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Defense Department guidelines you have established for press coverage of the Persian Gulf crisis seriously undermine First Amendment rights and may well prevent the American public from receiving accurate and objective information on this international crisis.

The American people are financially supporting the military deployment and many have sons and daughters serving in the Persian Gulf. They have a right to an objective accounting of the hostilities, not a version controlled by the Pentagon.

In subjecting the media to prior review, you are in effect abridging the democratic rights and values we are pledged to preserve in this region of the world. We cannot tolerate the Pentagon dictating the words and images the public is allowed to receive.

The American news media serve as the eyes and ears of the American people. This role increases in importance in time of war when the public relies almost solely on the media to provide objective information about daily events in remote areas of the globe. Without such objective information, the public would be denied the opportunity to make informed judgments about the status and conduct of the military deployment.

We understand the legitimate need for withholding certain information for national security purposes and to protect our troops, but the prior restraint and information control you are enforcing goes well beyond that protection and could result in outright censorship. We urge you to immediately reevaluate the guidelines in a manner that recognizes the legitimate military security concerns but does not infringe on our free society's right to have timely accurate and uncensored reporting concerning any Persian Gulf activities.

Sincerely,



CONGRESSMAN SCOTT KLUG

2nd District
Wisconsin

NEWS RELEASE

1224 Longworth House Office Building • Washington, D.C. 20515

Contact: Jackie Dailey (202) 225-2906

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

January 24, 1991

KLUG URGES GREATER FREEDOM FOR MEDIA COVERING WAR IN THE PERSIAN GULF

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- OPPOSED TO OVERZEALOUS CENSORSHIP

RESTRICTIONS ON PRESS COVERAGE OF THE GULF WAR, CONGRESSMAN SCOTT KLUG (R-WI) TODAY ANNOUNCED HE HAS COSPONSORED A MEASURE CALLING FOR MORE TIMELY ACCESS TO ALL VITAL, UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

"The American press corps is growing increasingly frustrated because it can't do its job, which is to accurately inform the public about events in the Gulf," said Klug, a veteran journalist.

The Pentagon's combat coverage policy currently allows only a select pool of reporters at the front. They must be accompanied by a military monitor, and their stories are subject to a "security review" by Pentagon officials.

"Families of the men and women fighting the war depend on the press for objective information," Klug pointed out. "A restrained press creates a special hardship for those who are awaiting word of their loved ones on the front."

The resolution, which Klug cosponsored along with Rep. Louis Stokes (D-OH), calls on the Bush Administration and the Pentagon to release -- as quickly as possible -- all unclassified information that would not endanger the lives and security of Allied forces.

Klug also has written to Defense Secretary Dick Cheney outlining his concerns about the Pentagon's combat coverage policy.

"The American public has a right to hear as much about the sacrifices of war as it hears about the triumphs," Klug wrote. "The President need not be plagued with criticism at home that he is hiding the facts from the voters. That will only weaken his ability to lead the country during a very difficult time."

"Americans have been glued to their televisions, radios and papers since the war began," Klug said. "They are depending on the media for vital information. The Pentagon must recognize its responsibility to provide that information."

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

FEBRUARY 20, 1991

TESTIMONY OF U.S. REP. SCOTT KLUG
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS - UNITED STATES SENATE

THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN.

AS A FORMER JOURNALIST, I KNOW HOW VITALLY IMPORTANT IT IS FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IS ONE OF THE CORNERSTONES OF OUR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO PROMOTE THIS PRINCIPLE DURING TIMES OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT WHEN THOUSANDS OF AMERICAN LIVES ARE AT STAKE. THE AMERICAN PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO HEAR AS MUCH ABOUT THE SACRIFICES OF WAR AS IT HEARS ABOUT THE TRIUMPHS.

THAT'S WHY I AM PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PENTAGON'S "COMBAT COVERAGE POLICY". THE POLICY ONLY ALLOWS FOR A SELECT POOLS OF REPORTERS IN VARIOUS COMBAT AREAS. THEY ARE ACCOMPANIED BY A MILITARY MONITOR AND THEIR STORIES ARE SUBJECT TO A "SECURITY REVIEW" BY PENTAGON OFFICIALS. I BELIEVE THIS AMOUNTS TO CENSORSHIP. EVEN THOUGH SECURITY IS IMPORTANT, WE MUST CLEARLY DEFINE WHAT IS AND IS NOT ACCESSIBLE TO THE PRESS. ONCE THESE PARAMETERS ARE DEFINED MEMBERS OF THE PRESS CORPS SHOULD BE

PLEASE RESPOND TO:

1224 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-2906

16 NORTH CARROLL STREET
ROOM 600
MADISON, WI 53703
(608) 257-9200


THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE OF RECYCLED FIBERS

GIVEN THE UNCENSORED ABILITY TO REPORT THE NEWS THAT IS MADE WITHIN THESE AREAS.


THE AMERICAN PRESS CORPS IS GROWING INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED BECAUSE IT CANNOT DO ITS JOB - WHICH IS TO ACCURATELY INFORM THE PUBLIC ABOUT EVENTS IN THE GULF. AS JOURNALISTS HAVE SHOWN IN PREVIOUS WARS, ACCURATE, COMPELLING STORIES DO NOT NEED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT WOULD AID THE ENEMY OR RISK THE SECURITY OF OUR TROOPS. WHEN INFORMATION IS RATIONED TO THE PRESS IT GIVES THE PUBLIC THE PERCEPTION THAT THE UNITED STATES MILITARY IS MANIPULATING OPINION TO BOLSTER UNPOPULAR OBJECTIVES. THE PRESS CENSORSHIP DURING THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN GRENADA LEFT MANY AMERICANS WITH DOUBTS ABOUT THAT OPERATION. AS A MEMBER OF CONGRESS, I RELY ON THE PRESS TO OBJECTIVELY REPORT THE EVENTS OF THE WAR. WITHOUT INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF PENTAGON CLAIMS, I HAVE NO WAY OF SEPARATING FACT FROM FANCY, WISHFUL THINKING FROM HARD EVIDENCE.

I HAVE URGED THE ADMINISTRATION, AS I AM URGING YOU, TO REVIEW THE POLICY ON COMBAT COVERAGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I BELIEVE THE PENTAGON'S PRESS POLICY DOES A GREAT DISSERVICE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. WHATEVER WE CAN DO, WE MUST DO TO ENSURE THAT THE TRUTH IS BEING TOLD. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT NEED NOT BE PLAGUED WITH CRITICISM AT HOME THAT THE FACTS ARE BEING HIDDEN FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

ATTACHMENT 2



MILITARY FAMILIES SUPPORT NETWORK
supporting our troops and working for peace in the Persian Gulf



Alex Molnar
Co-chair
Son in Marines
Milwaukee, WI

Judy Davenport
Co-chair
Husband and Son
in Navy
Goose Creek, SC

Testimony of the
Military Families Support Network
to the
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
21 February 1991

National office: P.O. Box 11098, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53211
tel: (414) 963-2600 fax: (414) 963-2670

122 Maryland Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. 20002 tel: (202) 543-0974 fax: (202) 543-5193

A project of the Fund for New Priorities in America, a tax exempt educational foundation (501c3)
171 Madison Avenue, N.Y. 10016 tel: (212) 685-8848 fax: (212) 751-4131

The Military Families Support Network is composed of relatives, friends and fellow citizens of the service men and women serving in the Persian Gulf. The organization works to insure that the American public expresses its wholehearted support for the troops serving in the Gulf. The Network opposed the massive deployment of U.S. forces for offensive purposes and opposes the needless war in the Middle East. We support the imposition of economic sanctions on Iraq and would support U.S. participation in a genuinely multinational, purely peacekeeping force under U.N. control.

While we certainly do not support the publication or broadcast of information which would jeopardize the safety of military personnel, the Military Families Support Network believes that the American public has a right under the First Amendment to the Constitution, and a responsibility as citizens of a democracy at war, to have as full a picture as possible of the events and issues at stake in the Persian Gulf. The administration has, however, violated the First Amendment by imposing overly severe restrictions on the press in the Gulf and by completely banning the press from Dover Air Force Base. We find it a bitter irony that our family members who took oaths to protect the Constitution are being ordered into battle abroad by a President who is attacking the Constitution and the Bill of Rights at home.

We find ourselves outraged and saddened that the President would deny the members of the military killed in Operation Desert Storm one of our nation's traditional gestures of honor, the public military ceremonies for the dead which we have all seen broadcast from Dover Air Force base.

The President who says he agonizes over the death of every serviceperson wants the bodies of our brave military personnel to be ignominiously slipped into and out of Dover under the cover of darkness and of a press blackout. The administration says that if the war produces many casualties, it would be too difficult logistically to have some kind of ceremony of honor for the remains. An Air Force spokesperson told Newsday in September, 1990, that "The feeling was that if it turned into all-out combat there would be too many ceremonies. All four services agreed that if you can't do it for all, then let's not do it at all."

Surely an organization capable of moving over 500,000 people and their supplies to the Gulf is capable of providing a color guard for the bodies of the thousands of Americans who will die if the government begins a ground offensive.

The administration has also cited concern for the privacy of families as a reason for closing Dover to the press and deciding to deny servicepersons ceremonies of honor at the air base. It is ironic that this concern for the privacy of families has not prevented the military from having public ceremonies at Dover for

other military personnel killed in action in the past.

In fact, the administration seeks to hide the painful realities of war from the civilian population because, as defense officials told Newsday, the White House is concerned about the impact of "negative" publicity on the military operations. It is clear to us that the government wants to lead the nation in an act of collective denial of the horrors of war because the American public's support for the war in the Persian Gulf will quickly decrease if it sees the body bags being unloaded at Dover and the long rows of caskets waiting to be shipped all across America. Polls have shown that support for the war will erode quickly as casualties mount. A New York Times/CBS poll published last week has also shown that a majority of the American people think they should be allowed to see the ceremonies at Dover.

As part of its public relations campaign to woo support for the war from a nation that has expressed serious doubts about this policy, the administration has sacrificed a national gesture of honor and instead offers our military personnel a final appalling insult. It cannot be good for the morale of troops currently serving in the Gulf or anywhere else in the world to know that the government will not honor their sacrifice as it traditionally has and that their families will not have even the small comfort of this national recognition of their personal tragedies.

The American public has a right to have all the information that the media can publish without endangering the troops because the foundation of true democracy is an informed public. By engaging in a needless war and severely restricting press coverage at home and abroad, the President has doubly betrayed the American people and his own oath of office. The Military Families Support Network urges the Members of Congress to use their authority to restore the ceremonies of honor at Dover Air Force Base and to restore the freedom of the press which our democracy requires.

ATTACHMENT 3

Radio-Television News Directors Association
Suite 615
1717 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press
Suite 504
1735 Eye Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

January 10, 1991

The Honorable Richard B. Cheney
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The guidelines for news coverage of military operations in the Persian Gulf issued by the Department of Defense raise at least two potentially troubling issues: exclusive use of escorted tight pools, and security review.

The use of pools is, at best, a compromise. As a general rule, news organizations dislike them, but acknowledge that they may offer the most reasonable method for timely coverage of military operations under certain circumstances. However, the news media's previous acceptance of pool procedures in very special situations, and for short periods of time, should not suggest that they would be willing to accept the exclusive use of pools under all circumstances.

Security review represents a potentially serious form of prior restraint. In addition to raising significant concerns about delays in transmittal of news to the public, as a practical matter such reviews will not and cannot usurp the right of news organizations to make the ultimate decision whether or not to publish or broadcast disputed material.

We urge you to consider carefully whether prior review of pool material by military public affairs officers is really necessary for security, and whether more open coverage than is possible with escorted tight pools can be instituted once the military operation is underway. At the very least, we sincerely hope that the Department of Defense will do everything in its power to prevent abuse of these procedures by officials in the field.

The Honorable Richard B. Cheney
January 10, 1991
page 2

Finally, we hope you agree that the reporters covering Operation Desert Shield are reasonable and responsible people. They are in Saudi Arabia to cover an extremely important story. They have no desire to see the lives of American personnel put in jeopardy. To the extent that reasonable ground rules to protect legitimate safety and security concerns help reporters cover the story efficiently, we support them. But we cannot condone any attempt by the military to use the guidelines to limit coverage, distort the news, or hide embarrassing information that the American people are entitled to know.

Sincerely,

David Bartlett, President
Radio-Television News Directors
Association

Jane E. Kirtley, Esq.
Executive Director
The Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press

MILWAUKEE SENTINEL

JOURNAL / SENTINEL, INC., P.O. BOX 371, MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN 53201

January 23, 1991

Senator Herbert H. Kohl
SH-702 Hart Senate Office Bldg.
Washington, DC 20510-4903

Dear Senator Kohl:

I was delighted to hear that you are interested in taking up the cudgel for the press as a result of the restrictions placed by the Pentagon on its coverage of the Gulf War.

I am writing on behalf of the Society of Professional Journalists, the nationwide organization that represents 20,000 TV and newspaper reporters and editors, of which I am a past national president.

The Society is greatly concerned about the reporting guidelines instituted by the Department of Defense for coverage of the war in the Persian Gulf. The Society's National Freedom of Information Chairman, Paul K. McMasters, has written Secretary Cheney about this matter, and a copy of Mr. McMasters' letter is enclosed.

While the Society is sensitive to the need for secrecy in military operations, it believes that the prepublication review required by the guidelines is nothing short of censorship. We understand that you share the Society's concerns and are interested in holding hearings about these guidelines.

The Society and its First Amendment counsel, Bruce W. Sanford of Baker & Hostetler in Washington, would be happy to assist you in organizing and/or participating in such hearings, which we believe are necessary to convince the Department of Defense to revise its guidelines to permit the press freedoms that our men and women are fighting to preserve.


I encourage you to contact Mr. Sanford, a long time Freedom of Information attorney who has represented some of the top journalistic organizations in the nation. You can contact him at Baker & Hostetler, 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, 202-851-1500, (fax) 202-861-1783.

Senator Kohl
January 23, 1991
Page Two

If at sometime in the future you are in Milwaukee and would like to discuss this further, I would welcome the opportunity.

Thank you for your consideration.

sincerely,



Robert H. Wills
Editor

RHW/sjo

cc: SPJ National Officers and Board

FOI

WISCONSIN FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COUNCIL

Broadcast News Council
United Press International Editors
Wisconsin Associated Press
Wisconsin Broadcasters Assn.
Wisconsin News Photographers Assn.
Wisconsin Newspaper Association
Wisconsin Universities Journalism Council
Society of Professional Journalists,
Sigma Delta Chi

Mailing address:
c/o Wisconsin Newspaper Assn.
702 N. Midvale Blvd.
Madison, Wis. 53705

January 22, 1991

U.S. Senator Herbert Kohl
Suite 702 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Kohl:

A public opinion poll released this week revealed that half of the American population does not believe it is being told the whole story by our military of what is really happening in the Persian Gulf War.

I can't help but place the blame on that disturbing result on the military's repressive policy in dealing with the press and the electronic media that is trying to cover this war.

As president of the Wisconsin Freedom of Information Council, an organization that represents seven news gathering organizations in our state, I would like to convey to you our deep concern about the military's arbitrary and unnecessary regulations that are impeding the coverage of this war for the people back home.

It is incredibly ironic that our own military which is at the forefront of fighting for democracy would thumb its nose at the very basic democratic ideal--the free flow of information to the people.


No one in the media desires in any way to do anything in covering this war that would disturb the military or its necessary confidential operations. But a free press must be allowed to observe and report what it sees without being spoon-fed only

U.S. Senator Herbert Kohl
January 22, 1991
Page 2.

"positive" information or having its words and pictures "okayed" by military authorities. That is contrary to everything that the First Amendment stands for.

The Council hopes that you, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Government Information and Regulation, can help remedy this atrocious situation.

Sincerely,,



Dave Zweifel
President

DZ:mdp

APPENDIX G

ATTACHMENT 1

CENTCOM POOL MEMBERSHIP AND OPERATING PROCEDURES**General**

The following procedures pertain to the CENTCOM news media pool concept for providing news to the widest possible American audience during the initial stages of U.S. military activities in the Arabian Gulf area. The CENTCOM pools will be drawn from news media within Saudi Arabia. Their composition and operation should not be confused with that of the Department of Defense National Media Pool. The pools are a cooperative arrangement designed to balance the media's desire for unilateral coverage with the logistics realities of the military operation, which make it impossible for every media representative to cover every activity of his or her choice, and with CENTCOM's responsibility to maintain operational security, protect the safety of the troops, and prevent interference with military operations. There is no intention to discriminate among media representatives on the basis of reporting content or viewpoint. Favoritism or disparate treatment of the media in pool operations by pool coordinators will not be tolerated. The purpose and intention of the pool concept is to get media representatives to and from the scene of military action, to get their reports back to the Joint Information Bureau - Dhahran for filing -- rapidly and safely, and to permit unilateral media coverage of combat and combat-related activity as soon as possible. There will be two types of pools: eighteen-member pools for ground combat operations and smaller, seven-member pools for ground combat and other coverage. Pools will be formed and governed by the media organizations that are qualified to participate and will be administered through pool appointed coordinators working in conjunction with the JIB - Dhahran. The media will operate under the ground rules issued by CENTCOM on January 15, 1991.

Pool participation

Due to logistics and space limitations, participation in the pools will be limited to media that principally serve the American public and that have had a long-term presence covering Department of Defense military operations, except for pool positions specifically designated as "Saudi" or "international." Pool positions will be divided among the following categories of media: television, radio, wire service, news magazine, newspaper, pencil, photo, Saudi, and international. Media that do not principally serve the American public are qualified to participate in the CENTCOM media pool in the international category.

Pool procedures

Because of the extensive media presence in the Arabian Gulf, the fact that some media organizations are represented by many individuals, and the likelihood that more organizations and individuals will arrive in the future, membership in all categories except pencil will be by organization rather than specific individual. An organization will be eligible to participate in pool activities only after being a member of the appropriate media pool category for three continuous weeks. Members of a single-medium pool may use their discretion to allow participation by organizations which have had a significant stay in country, but which have had breaks in their stay that would otherwise cause them to be ineligible to participate under the three-continuous-weeks rule.

The single-medium pools will be formed and governed by the members. The members of each category will appoint a pool coordinator who will serve as the spokesperson and single point of contact for that medium. The print media will select a coordinator who will serve as the point of contact for the pencil category. Any disputes about membership in or operation of the pool shall be resolved by the pool coordinator.

Each single-medium pool coordinator will maintain a current list of members and a waiting list prioritized in the order in which they should be placed on the pools. The same order will be used to replace pool members during normal rotations and those individual members who return from the field prematurely and who do not have another individual in Dhahran from their organization to replace them.

Membership of standing pools will rotate approximately every two to three weeks as the situation permits.

Pool categories and composition:

Television: The television category will be open to the major television networks.

Radio: The radio category will be open to those radio networks that serve a general (nonprivate) listening audience.

Wire Service: The wire service category will be open to the major wire services.

News Magazine: The news magazine category will be open to those major national news magazines that serve a general news function.

Newspaper: The newspaper category will be divided into two subcategories for participation in the eighteen-member pools. One will be open to those major papers and newspaper groups that have made a commitment since the early stages of Operation Desert Shield to cover U.S. military activities in Saudi Arabia and which have had a continuous or near-continuous presence in Saudi Arabia since the early stages of the operation, such as the New York Times, Cox, Knight-Ridder, Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, USA Today, and Boston Globe. The second category will include all other newspapers.

Pencil: The general category of "pencil" (print reporter) may be used by the print media pool coordinator in assigning print reporters to the smaller pools. All eligible print reporters may participate.

Photo: The photography category will be divided into the four subcategories of wire, newspaper, magazine, and photo agency. Participants may take part in only one subcategory.

Saudi: The Saudi category will be open to Saudi reporters as determined by the Saudi Ministry of Information liaison in the JIB - Dhahran. They must speak and write English and must file their reports in English.

International: The international category will be open to reporters from organizations which do not principally serve the American public from any news medium. They must speak and write English and must file their reports in English.

SHARING OF MEDIA PRODUCTS WITHIN THE CENTCOM POOLS

Pool participants and media organizations eligible to participate in the pools will share all media products within their medium; e.g., television products will be shared by all other television pool members and photo products will be shared with other photo pool members. The procedures for sharing those products and the operating expenses of the pool will be determined by the participants of each medium.

Alert Procedures for Combat Correspondent Pool Activation

When the pools are to be activated, the JIB - Dhahran director or his designated representative will call each of the pool coordinators and announce the activation of the pools. The pool coordinators will be told when and where the pool members are to report (the reporting time will be within--but not later than-- two hours of alert notification).

Operational security (OPSEC) considerations are of the utmost concern. JIB personnel, pool coordinators, and pool members need to be especially cognizant of OPSEC. All involved with the activation of the pools need to remain calm and unexcited. Voice inflection, nervous behavior, etc., are all indicators that something extraordinary is underway and could signal that operations are imminent.

Neither pool coordinators nor pool members will be told if the activation is an "exercise" or actual "alert".

Pool members should report to the predesignated assembly area dressed for deployment, with the appropriate equipment and supplies.

Recommendations for changes to pool membership or other procedures will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

ATTACHMENT 2



Department of Defense
DIRECTIVE

August 4, 1988
NUMBER 5122.5

A&M

SUBJECT: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

- References:**
- (a) DoD Directive 5122.5, "Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)," June 15, 1982 (hereby canceled)
 - (b) Title 10, United States Code, Section 136
 - (c) DoD Directive 5122.15, "Defense Information Services Activity," June 14, 1985 (hereby canceled)
 - (d) Executive Order (E.O.) 12356, "National Security Information," April 2, 1982
 - (e) through (x), see enclosure 1

A. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE

This Directive:

1. Reissues reference (a) and establishes, pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense under reference (b), one of the positions of Assistant Secretary of Defense as the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (ASD(PA)), with responsibilities, functions, and authorities as prescribed herein.
2. Disestablishes the Defense Information Services Activity (DISA) (reference (c)) and consolidates its functions into the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD(PA)).

B. DEFINITION

DoD Components. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), the Unified and Specified Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (OIG, DoD), the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities.

C. RESPONSIBILITIES

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (ASD(PA)) shall:

1. Serve as principal staff advisor and assistant to the Secretary of Defense for DoD public information, internal information, the Freedom of Information act, mandatory declassification review and clearance of DoD information for public release, community relations, information training, and audiovisual matters.
2. Ensure a free flow of news and information to the media, appropriate forums, the general public, and to the internal audiences of the Armed Forces, limited only by national security constraints as authorized by reference (d) and statutory mandates.

3. Act as the releasing agency for DoD information and audiovisual materials to news media representatives. Evaluate news media requests for DoD support and cooperation and determine appropriate level of DoD participation.

D. FUNCTIONS

The ASD(PA) shall:

1. For each of the areas of responsibility cited in section C., above:

a. Develop policies, plans, and programs in support of DoD objectives and operations.

b. Monitor, evaluate, and develop systems, standards, and procedures for the administration and management of approved policies, plans, and programs.

c. Issue policy guidance to DoD Components.

d. As required, participate with the Comptroller of the Department of Defense in planning, programming, and budgeting activities.

e. Promote coordination, cooperation, and mutual understanding among DoD Components and with other Federal, State, and local agencies and the civilian community.

f. Serve on boards, committees, and other groups, and represent the Secretary of Defense outside of the Department of Defense.

2. Conduct security reviews, consistent with E.O. 12356 and DoD Directives 5230.9 and 5400.4 (references (d), (e), and (f)), of all material prepared for public release and publication originated by the Department of Defense, including testimony before congressional committees, or by its contractors, DoD employees as individuals, and material submitted by sources outside the Department of Defense for such review.

3. Review for conflict with established DoD and national security policies or programs, official speeches, news releases, photographs, films, and other information originated within the Department of Defense for public release, or similar material submitted for review by other executive agencies of the U.S. Government.

4. Oversee the provision of news analysis and news clipping services for the OSD, OJCS, and the Military Departments' headquarters.

5. As required, prepare speeches, public statements, congressional testimony, articles for publication, and other materials for public release by selected DoD and White House officials.

6. Serve as official point of contact for public and media appearances by DoD officials, and conduct advanced planning and coordination, as required, with private, public, and media organizations for such events.

7. Receive, analyze, and reply to inquiries regarding DoD policies, programs, or activities that are received from the general public either directly or from other Government Agencies. Prepare and provide to the referring office replies to inquiries from the general public that are forwarded from the Congress and the White House.

8. Evaluate and approve:

a. Requests for DoD cooperation in programs involving relations with the public consistent with DoD Directive 5410.18 and DoD Instruction 5410.19 (references (g) and (h)).

b. Requests by news media representatives or other non-DoD personnel for travel in military carriers for public affairs purposes..

9. Establish policy for the Department of Defense Freedom of Information Act Program consistent with 5 U.S.C. 552 (reference (i)) and DoD Directive 5400.7 (reference (j)).

10. Direct and administer the Freedom of Information Act Program consistent with reference (j) and DoD Instruction 5400.10 (reference (k)), and the access portion of the DoD Privacy Act consistent with DoD Directive 5400.11 (reference (l)) for the OSD, OJCS, and other DoD Components as may be assigned.

11. Direct and administer the Mandatory Declassification Review Program consistent with E.O. 12356 and DoD Directive 5200.1 (references (d) and (m)) for the OSD, OJCS, and other DoD Components as may be assigned.

12. Exercise direction, authority, and control over the American Forces Information Service (AFIS) in accordance with DoD Directive 5122.10 (reference (n)). The policy and program responsibilities of AFIS include the following:

a. Management of the DoD Internal Information Program.

b. Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS), consistent with DoD Directive 5120.20 (reference (o)).

c. DoD visual information and audiovisual activities, and joint visual information services, consistent with DoD Directives 5040.2 and 5040.3 (references (p) and (q)).

d. DoD newspapers, including European and Pacific Stars and Stripes, and civilian enterprise publications, consistent with DoD Instruction 5120.4 (reference (r)).

e. DoD periodicals, consistent with DoD Directive 5120.43 (reference (s)).

f. American Forces Press and Publications Service (AFPPS).

g. DoD information training, to include providing policy guidance regarding the Defense Information School, consistent with DoD Directive 5160.48 (reference (t)).

13. Provide DoD assistance to non-Government, entertainment-oriented motion picture, television, and video productions consistent with DoD Instruction 5410.16 (reference (u)).

14. Evaluate and coordinate the DoD response to requests for speakers received by the Department of Defense and, as required, assist in scheduling, programming, and drafting speeches for the participation of qualified personnel.

15. Perform such other functions as the Secretary of Defense may assign.

E. RELATIONSHIPS

1. In the performance of assigned duties, the ASD(PA) shall:

a. Coordinate and exchange information with DoD Components having collateral or related functions.

b. Use existing facilities and services of the Department of Defense and other Federal Agencies to avoid duplication and achieve maximum efficiency and economy.

c. Maintain liaison with and provide assistance to the general public, representatives of the news media, and private organizations seeking information relating to the activities of the Department of Defense.

2. Heads of DoD Components shall coordinate with the ASD(PA) on all matters related to the functions cited in section D., above.

F. AUTHORITIES

The ASD(PA) is hereby delegated authority to:

1. Issue DoD Instructions, publications, and one-time directive-type memoranda, consistent with DoD 5025.1-M (reference (v)), which carry out policies approved by the Secretary of Defense in assigned fields of responsibility. Instructions to the Military Departments shall be issued through the Secretaries of those Departments, or their designees. Instructions to Unified and Specified Commands regarding public affairs matters shall be issued directly to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands. Instructions that have operational implications shall be coordinated with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), consistent with DoD Directive 5105.35 (reference (w)).

2. Obtain reports, information, advice, and assistance, consistent with the policies and criteria of DoD Directive 7750.5 (reference (x)), as necessary.

3. Communicate directly with DoD Components. The channel of communications with the Unified and Specified Commands regarding public affairs matters shall be between the ASD(PA) and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands. Communications that have operational implications shall be coordinated with the CJCS consistent with DoD Directive 5105.35 (reference (w)).

4. Communicate with other Government Agencies, representatives of the legislative branch, and members of the public.

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5. Establish arrangements for DoD participation in those non-DoD Government programs for which the ASD(PA) has been assigned primary staff cognizance.

6. Act as the sole agent at the Seat of Government for the release of official DoD information for dissemination through any form of public information media.

7. Establish accreditation criteria and serve as the approving and issuing authority for credentials for news gathering media representatives traveling in connection with coverage of official DoD activities.

8. Approve military participation in public exhibitions, demonstrations, and ceremonies of national or international significance.

9. In the absence of a known DoD originator of classified information, declassify official information submitted for security review, mandatory declassification review, and in response to Freedom of Information Act (reference (j)) actions.

G. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective immediately.



William H. Taft, IV
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Enclosure - 1
References

ATTACHMENT 3

As of April 13, 1990

GROUND RULES

You have been selected to participate as a member of the DoD National Media Pool. The ground rules below will protect the security of the operation and the safety of the troops involved, while allowing you the greatest permissible freedom and access in covering the story as representatives of all U.S. media.

- Prior to your departure, do not tell anyone that the pool has been activated. This is absolutely essential to preserve security in the event of an actual contingency operation.

- You may not file stories or otherwise attempt to communicate with any individual about the operation until stories and all other information (from videotape, sound bites, photo cutlines, etc.) have been pooled with other pool members. This pooling may take place at a pool member meeting during or immediately following the operation. You will be expected to brief other pool members concerning your experiences. Detailed instructions on filing will be provided by your military escorts at an appropriate time.

- You must remain with the escort officers at all times, until released--and follow their instructions regarding your activities. These instructions are not intended to hinder your reporting and are given only to facilitate movement of the pool and ensure troop safety.

- Failure to follow these ground rules may result in your expulsion from the pool.

- Your participation in the pool indicates your understanding of these guidelines and your willingness to abide by them.

Additional ground rules developed by the news organizations within the pool are attached.

As of April 13, 1990

To: Members of the Pentagon News Media Pool

Re: Pool Operations

Representatives of the news organizations in the pool have adopted the following rules for pool operations:

1) The pool is a non-competitive pool. This means that all participants must share their reporting and photos on a timely basis.

Correspondents will share their pooled information at the scene of the operation. Photographers will make their film available by turning over their film to wire service participants.

2) Pool members should seek the widest possible coverage of the military operation. This will require pool members to assign themselves in an appropriate manner. If needed, pool members should draw straws or adopt some other method of allocating assignments.

3) The wire services undertake to transmit the newspaper pool's news report.

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ATTACHMENT 4



PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

December 14, 1990

MEMORANDUM

To: Washington bureau chiefs of the Pentagon press corps

From: Pete Williams *PK*

Re: Plans for pools and flight for auxiliary staff
in the event of hostilities in the Persian Gulf

Since the beginning of Operation Desert Shield I have met twice, at their initiative, with the bureau chiefs of several news organizations that are regular members of the Pentagon press corps. We discussed complaints from their correspondents in Saudi Arabia and the progress in refining a new plan for pool coverage in the event of hostilities in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. We also discussed a request from news organizations in the Pentagon press corps who cited difficulty in getting visas for staff and who accordingly wanted help in getting additional personnel to the region, should hostilities break out.

After the second meeting, on November 28th, I briefed Secretary Cheney and General Powell on a concept for combat pools, the result of a month of planning and discussions within the Pentagon and with military commanders in the Gulf. After making some suggestions, the Secretary and the Chairman approved the concept. I then briefed a representative of the Saudi government. Our staff has since been preparing the more detailed version of the pool concept that will become part of the overall military plan for the operation. That work has proceeded over the past week, while I was with the Secretary on his trip last week to NATO and Poland. A summary of the concept is attached. I am interested in your comments or questions.

The Secretary and the Chairman also approved the idea of sending a US military C-141 aircraft to Saudi Arabia, if hostilities were to break out, carrying supplemental news media personnel to help cover the story of combat, given that most news organizations have only very small staffs in Saudi Arabia now -- in many cases, only one correspondent. The objective is to help prevent the pool operation from breaking down through a lack of news media representatives necessary to make it work -- the editors, producers, technicians, writers, and pool coordinators who will be essential to successful pool operation.

This flight would be a one-way trip, transporting representatives of US news organizations who regularly cover the Pentagon. Space for cargo will be extremely limited: each passenger would be allowed one small suitcase. Equipment cases should be shipped separately. I solicit your comments on that list as well. The bureau chiefs who first suggested the idea said it was predicated on their inability to get more than one or two visas at a time from the government of Saudi Arabia. Should the visa picture open up, I suggest we readdress the need for the plane.

Thank you for your continued suggestions and comments.

APPENDIX H

ATTACHMENT 1



Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict

An Interim Report to Congress

*Pursuant to
Title V Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and
Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25)*

Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict

An Interim Report to Congress

*Pursuant to
Title V Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and
Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25)*

July 1991

Interim Report

INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERIM REPORT

From Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, to the Coalition military victory over Iraq seven months later, the attention of the world focused on the Persian Gulf crisis. The armed forces of the United States, along with the forces of the Coalition of nations that opposed Iraq's wrongful aggression, played a decisive role in the liberation of Kuwait and the defeat of Iraq. A proper understanding of the conduct of these military operations — the achievements and the shortcomings — is an important and continuing task of the Department of Defense as we look to the future.

Pursuant to Title V of Public Law 102-25, the Department of Defense has prepared this Interim Report on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict. This report reflects many of the preliminary impressions formed by the Department since the cessation of hostilities. However, much of the technical information needed for sound analysis is still being collected. The final report of the Commander-in-Chief of Central Command has not yet been completed. Nonetheless, it is possible to describe some of the key events that occurred in this conflict and to identify preliminarily some lessons to be learned. The Department of Defense will continue to study the lessons of the war and will submit a final Report in accordance with Title V in January 1992.

Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, sparked the first major international conflict of the post-Cold War era. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm presented the most important test of American arms in 25 years. The victory was impressive and important; it will affect the American military and American security interests in the Middle East and beyond for years to come.

Our Coalition victory was impressive militarily. Iraq possessed the fourth largest army in the world, an army hardened in long years of combat against Iran, a war in which Iraq killed hundreds of thousands of Iranian soldiers in exactly the type of defensive combat it planned to fight in Kuwait. Saddam's forces possessed superb artillery, front line T-72 tanks, modern MiG-29 aircraft, ballistic missiles, biological and chemical weapons and a vast and sophisticated air defense system. Saddam's combat engineers, rated among the best in the world, had months to construct their defenses. Nonetheless, the Coalition routed this force in six weeks with miraculously low casualties among Coalition forces.

The Coalition dominated every area of warfare. The seas belonged to the Coalition from the start. Naval units were first on the scene and contributed much of our military presence in the early days of the defense of Saudi Arabia. The United Nations approved economic sanctions against Iraq to reduce that country's access to the wherewithal to make war. Coalition naval units enforced those sanctions by inspecting ships and, when necessary, diverting them away from Iraq and Jordan. This maritime interdiction effort formed a core around which the Coalition coalesced in its earliest hours, signaled its resolve, and helped to deprive Iraq of outside resupply and revenues. The Coalition controlled the skies from virtually the beginning of the air war, freeing our ground and naval units from air attack. Coalition planes destroyed 41 Iraqi aircraft or helicopters in air-to-air combat without the loss of a single fighter. Air interdiction crippled Iraqi command and control and known unconventional weapons production, severely degraded the combat effectiveness of Iraqi forces and paved the way for the final land assault that swept Iraqi forces from the field in only 100 hours. The successful daily execution of thousands of multinational air sorties and a complex multinational ground assault reflected extraordinary international cooperation and technical skill.

American arms played a leading role. American forces led one of the most impressive deployments of force in history. It was widely recognized that no other nation could marshal so much strategic

Interim Report

lift. American F-117 Stealth jets and cruise missiles repeatedly struck Iraqi command and control facilities in Baghdad. Despite sophisticated Iraqi air defenses, not a single F-117 was lost. Iraq lost 3,800 tanks to Coalition fire; the US lost fewer than two dozen. The American armored forces that took part in the envelopment of Iraq's elite, specially trained and equipped Republican Guards traveled 230 miles in 100 hours, one of the fastest movements of armored forces in the history of combat.

The military victory reflected strategic insight. Coalition strategy made Saddam Hussein fight our type of war. We matched Coalition strengths against Iraqi weaknesses. We sapped the will and strength of his army and then we broke the formations themselves. We defeated his strategy as well as his forces. We frustrated his efforts to inflict large casualties on Coalition forces or on Saudi and Israeli civilians, as well as his attempts to draw Israel into the war.

The war marked the dawn of a new technological era. Precision guided munitions proved immensely effective. Cruise missiles, antiballistic missile defenses, advanced reconnaissance systems and Stealth aircraft were all used successfully for the first time in major combat. Our forces fought at night on a scale and with an effectiveness unprecedented in the history of warfare. In their first tests in major combat, F/A-18s and Light Armored Vehicles proved their versatility. High technology systems, such as the Apache helicopters and M1A1 tanks proved immensely valuable and consistent performers in their first real combat test. American technology saved Coalition lives and contributed greatly to victory.

The Coalition military campaign will be remembered for its effort, within the bounds of war, to be humane. Coalition airstrikes were designed to be as precise as possible. Coalition pilots took additional risks and planners spared legitimate military targets to minimize civilian casualties. Tens of thousands of Iraqi prisoners of war were cared for and treated with dignity and compassion. The world will not soon forget pictures of Iraqi soldiers kissing their captors' hands.

Lastly, this victory was neither easy nor certain, although in hindsight it may have come to seem both. Events would have been very different if Saudi Arabia had not welcomed Coalition forces, or if Hussein had carried his attack into Saudi Arabia in the last weeks of summer, when Coalition forces were still only beginning to build. We will not know how different things might have been if the air attack had been less brilliantly orchestrated, Coalition relations less aptly handled, or if Israel had retaliated against Iraq's Scud launchers in western Iraq. Had the Coalition attacked sooner or with many fewer forces, our casualties might have been higher and the war might have lasted longer.

This war saw bitter fighting. It saw long hours in desert heat, or rainstorms and intense moments under enemy fire. It was not easy for any American personnel, including the quarter of a million reservists whose civilian lives were disrupted, or for the families separated from their loved ones. It was especially hard for American prisoners of war, our wounded, and, above all, the Americans who gave their lives for their country and the families and friends who mourn them.

But this victory was important. It was important for what it signifies for the post-Cold War world. America demonstrated that it would act to redress a great wrong and to protect its national interests. America showed it would stand up to a formidable army and to the threat of great casualties. America withstood the psychological pressures created by Iraq's seizure of hostages and threats of chemical or biological warfare. America played a leadership role that only America has the ability to exercise in the post-Cold War world.

The world responded to this crisis and to American leadership. The Iraqi invasion violated one of the fundamental tenets underlying the Charter of the United Nations, and the United Nations played

a dramatic and historic role in resisting that aggression. The cooperation of all of the permanent members of the UN Security Council was essential, and was forthcoming. Many nations participated in enforcement of the economic sanctions against Iraq. Thirty-six nations, including some former members of the Warsaw Pact, provided forces to the maritime interdiction effort or for the final conflict itself. Others provided equipment or economic assistance to the front line states or to Coalition countries. Foreign participation in US costs alone included promised transfers to the US of over \$50 billion, a sum far larger than the defense budget of any country in the world except the Soviet Union and the United States. This amount covered the vast preponderance of the total incremental costs the US incurred in the war. These contributions were important both financially and for what they signified about international cohesion and determination.

Had the international community not responded to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, the world would be a much more dangerous place today, much less friendly to American interests, much more threatening to the peoples of the Middle East and beyond. With the seizure of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein threatened to control or dominate a key region and much of the world's known oil resources. His nuclear weapons program and chemical and biological weapons production continued, and it was clear he would use Kuwait's wealth to accelerate the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein's ballistic missile inventory also threatened to expand in size and quality. His army dwarfed those of the Arabian Peninsula. He had built and hardened his facilities and infrastructure for war on a massive scale. His brutality toward Kuwait and his rhetoric toward the rest of the region showed an immense and restive ambition. He had set a dangerous example of naked aggression that, unanswered, might have led to more aggression.

Within Iraq, the brutality of the Iraqi regime, which long preceded this war, has unfortunately survived it. The Coalition had no mandate to end Saddam Hussein's tyranny over Iraq, but it did have a mandate to prevent him tyrannizing other parts of the Middle East. The world will be a better place when Saddam Hussein no longer misrules Iraq either.

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were also important for what they gave to America. The war reaffirmed America's faith in its armed forces. And in some small measure, Desert Storm also helped to reaffirm America's faith in itself, in American products, in American performance, in American purpose and dedication.

Finally, the war was important for what it tells us about our armed forces, and America's future defense needs. On August 2, 1990, the very day Saddam Hussein invaded Iraq, President Bush was in Aspen, Colorado, presenting for the first time America's new defense strategy for the nineties and beyond, a strategy that takes into account the vast changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and envisions significant reductions in our forces and budgets. A distinguishing feature of this new strategy — which was developed before the Kuwait crisis even began — is that it focuses more on regional threats, like the Gulf conflict, and less on global conventional confrontation.

The new strategy and the Gulf war continue to be linked, as we draw on the lessons of the war to inform our decisions for the future. As we reshape America's defenses, we need to look at Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm for indications of what military capabilities we may need not just in the next few years, but 10, 20 or 30 years hence. We need to consider why we were successful, what worked and what did not, and what is important to protect and preserve in our military capability.

As we do so, we must remember that this war, like every other, was unique. We benefitted greatly from certain of its features — such as the long interval to deploy and prepare our forces — that we cannot count on in the future. We benefitted from our enemy's near-total international isolation and from our own strong coalition. We received ample support from the nations that hosted our forces

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and relied on a well-developed coastal infrastructure that may not be available the next time. And we fought in a unique desert environment, challenging in many ways, but presenting advantages too. Enemy forces were fielded largely in terrain ideally suited to armor and air power and largely free of noncombatant civilians.

We should also remember that much of our military capability was not tested in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. There was no submarine threat. Ships did not face significant anti-surface action. We had little fear that our forces sent from Europe or the US would be attacked on their way to the region. There was no effective attack by aircraft on our troops or our port and support facilities. Chemical warfare and biological warfare, though threatened, were never employed. American amphibious capabilities, though highly effective for deterrence and deception, were not tested on a large scale under fire. Our Army did not have to fight for long. Saddam Hussein's missiles were inaccurate. As such, much of what was tested needs to be viewed in the context of the unique environment and conflict we are addressing.

Even more important to remember is that potential adversaries will study the lessons of this war no less diligently than will we. Future adversaries will seek to avoid Saddam Hussein's mistakes. Some potential aggressors may be deterred by the punishment Iraq's forces suffered. But others might wonder if the outcome would have been different if Iraq had acquired nuclear weapons first, or struck sooner at Saudi Arabia, or possessed a larger arsenal of more sophisticated ballistic missiles, including some with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads.

During the war, we learned a lot of specific lessons about systems that work and some that need work, about command relations, and about areas of warfare where we need improvement. We found we did not have enough Heavy Equipment Transports or off-road mobility for logistics support vehicles. Helicopters and other equipment were maintained only with extra care in the harsh desert environment. We were not nearly good enough at clearing land and sea mines, especially shallow water mines. This might have imposed significant additional costs had large scale amphibious operations been required. We moved quickly to get Global Positioning System receivers more widely in the field and improvised to improve identification devices for our ground combat vehicles, but more extensive navigation and identification capabilities are needed. The morale and intentions of Iraqi forces and leaders were obscure to us. Field commanders wanted more tactical reconnaissance and imagery. We had difficulty with battle damage assessment and with communications interoperability. Tactical ballistic missile defense worked, but imperfectly. Mobile missile hunting was difficult and costly; we will need to do better. We were ill-prepared at the start for defense against biological weapons, even though Saddam possessed them. And tragically, despite our best efforts, there were here, as in any war, civilian casualties and losses to fire from friendly forces. These and many other specific accomplishments, shortcomings and lessons are discussed in greater depth in the body of the report.

Among the many lessons we must study from this war, five general lessons stand out:

- Decisive Presidential leadership set clear goals, gave others confidence in America's sense of purpose, and rallied the domestic and international support necessary to reach those goals;
- A revolutionary new generation of high-technology weapons, combined with innovative and effective doctrine, gave our forces the edge;
- The high quality of our military, from its skilled commanders to the highly ready, well-trained, brave and disciplined men and women of the US Armed Forces made an extraordinary victory possible;

- In a highly uncertain world, sound planning, forces in forward areas, and strategic air and sea lift are critical for developing the confidence, capabilities, international cooperation, and reach needed in times of trouble; and
- It takes a long time to build the high-quality forces and systems that gave us success.

President Bush's early conviction built the domestic and international consensus that underlay the Coalition and its eventual victory. The President accepted the enormous personal burdens of committing our prestige and our forces, and then he helped the nation and world withstand the pressures of confrontation and war. Many counseled inaction. Many predicted military catastrophe or tens of thousands of casualties in a desert war far from our shores. Our enemy seemed implacable. He had just inflicted more than half a million casualties in an eight-year war; he cared little for his own losses. Some counseled that even if we won, the Arab world would unite against us. But, having made his decisions, the President never once hesitated or wavered.

This crisis proved the wisdom of our Founding Fathers, who gave the office of the Presidency the authority needed to act decisively. When the time came, Congress gave the President the support he needed to carry his policies through, but those policies could never have been put in place without his personal strength and the institutional strength of his office.

Two critical moments of Presidential leadership bear particular mention. In the first few days following the invasion, the President determined that Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait would not stand. At the time we could not be sure that King Fahd of Saudi Arabia would invite our assistance to resist Iraq's aggression. Without Saudi cooperation, our task would have been much more difficult and costly. The Saudi decision to do so rested not only on their assessment of the gravity of the situation, but on their confidence in the President. Without that confidence, the course of history might have been different. A second critical moment came last November, when the President decided to double our forces in the Gulf. The President gave the military clear objectives, the tools to do the job, and the support to carry out their assigned task. Those decisions saved American lives.

While President Bush's leadership was the central element in the Coalition, the success of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm reflect as well the strength and wisdom of leaders from many countries. King Fahd and the other leaders of the Gulf states — Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman — chose to defy Saddam Hussein when there was only our word to protect them. President Mubarak of Egypt helped to rally the forces of the Arab League. President Ozal of Turkey chose to cut off an oil pipeline from Iraq and permit Coalition forces to strike Iraq from Turkey, although this would hurt Turkey economically and expose it to potential Iraqi military action. Iraq attacked with its Scud missiles, but Israel refused to be provoked into retaliating. Prime Ministers Thatcher and Major and President Mitterand devoted their efforts and their forces to the Coalition. Germany and other European nations opened their ports and airfields and yielded priorities on their railroads to speed our deployment. Countries from other distant regions, including Africa, East Asia, South Asia, the Pacific, South America, and, a sign of new times, Eastern Europe chose to make this their fight. Their commitment made possible the military Coalition and provided essential elements to the ultimate victory.

A second general lesson of the war is that high technology systems dramatically increased the effectiveness of our forces. This war was the first to exploit the new technological possibilities of what has been called the "military-technological revolution." This technological revolution encompasses several broad areas: Stand-off precision weaponry and the sensors and reconnaissance capabilities to make their targeting effective; stealth for surprise and survivability; and the development of missile defenses in response to the expanding proliferation of tactical ballistic missiles and

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weapons of mass destruction. In large part this revolution tracks the development of new technologies such as the microprocessing of information that has become familiar in our daily lives, sophisticated sensors, and new materials and designs that substantially reduce radar signatures. The exploitation of these new technologies will change warfare as significantly as did the advent of tanks, airplanes and aircraft carriers.

The war tested an entire generation of new weapons at the forefront of this revolution. It represented the coming of age of precision-guided munitions, which made possible a bombing campaign that could achieve strategic results in days rather than months or years, and the use of stealth technology and cruise missiles to achieve strategic surprise and to reduce aircraft losses dramatically. The war also saw the first combat use of the Patriot (or, indeed, of any weapon) in an anti-ballistic missile defense role. Battlefield combat systems, like the M1A1 tank, AV-8 jet, and the Apache helicopter, and critical subsystems, like advanced fire control, global positioning (GPS), and thermal and night vision devices, gave us maneuverability and reach our opponents could not match.

The war showed that we must work to maintain the tremendous advantages that accrue from being a generation ahead in weapons technology. A continued and substantial research and development effort, along with renewed efforts to prevent or at least constrain the spread of advanced technologies, will be required to maintain this advantage against what potential adversaries will be able to obtain from the world arms market. In today's budget debate, we need the high technology advantages offered to our future forces by the B-2 stealth bomber, the F-22 Stealth fighter, and the anti-ballistic missile defense program known as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS).

The Persian Gulf War was not the first in which ballistic missiles were used, and there is no reason to think that it will be the last. Indeed, ballistic missiles were the only weapon system with which Saddam Hussein was able to take significant offensive action against US forces and allies, and the only one to offer him an opportunity (via the attacks on Israel) to achieve a strategic objective. We must expect that even more countries will acquire ballistic missiles and will be prepared to use them in future conflicts. Therefore, our planning calls for a more robust defense against ballistic missile attack. We cannot allow tomorrow's forces to be defenseless against the more advanced ballistic missiles that one day soon will be found in a number of third world arsenals, perhaps armed with unconventional warheads. Patriot missiles cannot handle these advanced threats.

The third general lesson is the importance of high quality forces, both troops and commanders. Warriors win wars, and smart weapons require smart people to operate them. The best technology in the world cannot win battles. We need highly trained, highly motivated people for our armed forces. The highly trained, highly motivated all-volunteer force we fielded in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm is the highest quality fighting force the world has ever known.

Every aspect of the war — the complexity of the weapons systems used, the speed and intensity of the operations, the harsh physical environment in which it was fought, the unfamiliar cultural environment — tested the training, discipline and morale of the members of our Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard. They passed with flying colors. Over 98 percent of our all volunteer force are high school graduates. They are well trained. When the call came, they proved not just their skills, but their bravery and dedication. To continue to attract such people we must continue to meet their expectations for topnotch facilities, equipment and training and to provide the quality of life they and their families deserve. In taking care of them, we protect the single most important strategic asset of our armed forces.

The units that we deployed to the Gulf contrast meaningfully with the same units a decade ago. Among our early deployments to Saudi Arabia following King Fahd's invitation were the F-15 air

superiority fighters of the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. Within 53 hours of the order to move, 45 aircraft were on the ground in Saudi Arabia. Ten years ago, that same wing failed its operational readiness exam; only 27 of 72 aircraft were flyable, the rest were parked for lack of spare parts.

The 1st Infantry Division out of Fort Riley, Kansas, did a tremendous job in the Gulf. When we called upon them to deploy last fall, they were ready to go. But 10 years ago, they only had two-thirds of the equipment needed to equip the division, and half of that was not ready for combat.

The 3d Armored Division destroyed Iraqi Republican Guard formations in southern Iraq with very low casualties on our side. Many of the soldiers in the division had been to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, where they practiced armored warfare operations. One sergeant, who had been there six times, has said that the National Training Center was tougher than anything they ran into in Iraq. That is the way training is supposed to work.

The war also highlighted the importance and capability of the reserves. The early Operation Desert Shield deployments would not have been possible without volunteers from the Reserves and National Guard. The callup of additional reserves under the authority of Title 10 Sec 673b — the first time that authority has ever been used — was critical to the success of our operations. Reserves served in combat, combat support and combat service support roles — and they served well. However, the use of reserves was not without some problems. For example, we need to rethink the wisdom of including reserve brigades in our earliest-deploying divisions. Tested in combat, the Total Force concept remains an important element of our national defense. Nonetheless, as we reduce our active forces under the new strategy, we will need to reduce our reserve components as well.

Lastly, our success in the Gulf reflected outstanding military leadership, whether at the very top, like Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief of the forces in Central Command; or at the Component level, like Chuck Horner, who orchestrated the Coalition's massive and brilliant air campaign, or Hank Mauz and Stan Arthur, who led the largest deployment of naval power into combat since WW II; or Corps commanders like Freddie Franks of VII Corps and Gary Luck of the 18th Airborne Corps, who led the tremendous flanking maneuver that enveloped Iraq's Republican Guards, or Walt Boomer of I MEF who led his Marines to the outskirts of Kuwait City, while continuing to divert Iraqi attention to a possible amphibious attack; or division commanders like Barry McCaffrey, who led the 24th Mechanized Division on one of the swiftest armored advances in the history of warfare, or Mike Myatt, who led the 1st Marine Division in their swift breaching effort through the heavily fortified defenses Iraq had constructed on the Kuwaiti border.

CINCCENT deftly managed relations with the various forces of the nations of the Coalition. This was a particularly difficult task, given the number of countries represented, and the large cultural differences among them. The problem was solved by an innovative command arrangement involving parallel international commands, one, headed by CINCCENT, incorporating the forces from Western countries, and another, under the Saudi commander, for the forces from Arab and Islamic Coalition members. The Persian Gulf conflict also represented the first test in a major war of the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The nature of the combat at the dawn of this military technological revolution also imposed enormous tasks on the military commanders as they sought to integrate the forces of the different Services and of the different nations of the Coalition. For example, the air campaign was unprecedented in its complexity and speed. Managing the multitude of aircraft, weapons systems, and

missions involved the daily preparation of a combined Air Tasking Order the size of a telephone book. Simply to disseminate this Order to all elements of the force took creative efforts.

Finally, the air war, and the rapidity and depth of the ground war posed tremendous challenges in terms of logistics and command, control and communications (C³). The demand for intelligence support required not just collection and processing but difficult cross-service dissemination to the proper level of command. Our experience emphasizes the importance of advance planning of the overall "architecture" of the communications and intelligence (C³I) system.

The fourth general lesson of the Persian Gulf conflict is the importance in a highly uncertain world of sound planning, of having forces forward that build trust and experience in cooperative efforts, and of sufficient strategic lift.

In early 1990, few expected that we would be at war within a year. Few in early 1989 expected the dramatic developments that occurred in Eastern Europe in that year. Looking back over the past century, enormous strategic changes often arose unexpectedly in the course of a few years or even less. The Persian Gulf conflict reminds us that we cannot be sure when or where the next conflict will arise.

Advance planning played an important role as the Persian Gulf conflict unfolded. It was important in the days immediately following Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait to have a clear concept of how we would defend Saudi Arabia and of the forces we would need. This was important not just for our decisionmakers, but for King Fahd and other foreign leaders, who needed to judge our seriousness of purpose, and for our quick action should there be a decision to deploy. Our response in the crisis was greatly aided because we had planned for such a contingency.

In the fall of 1989 we shifted the focus of planning efforts in Southwest Asia to countering regional threats to the Arabian peninsula. The primary such threat was Iraq. As a result, CENTCOM prepared a Concept Plan to this effect in the Spring of 1990. The Concept Plan contained both the overall forces and strategy for a successful defense. This plan was in the final stages of review in July 1990. In conjunction with the update of his plans, CINCCENT had arranged to conduct a major exercise, INTERNAL LOOK 90, which began in July. This exercise included wargaming aspects of the plan for the defense of Southwest Asia. When the decision was made to deploy forces in response to King Fahd's invitation, this plan was selected as the best option. It gave CENTCOM a head start.

Also critical to the success of our efforts were past US experience in the region, and Saudi Arabia's airports and coastal infrastructure, which were well-developed to receive a major military deployment. Each of these, in turn, reflected a legacy of past defense planning. Without this legacy of past cooperation and experience in the region, our forces would not have been as ready, and the Saudis might never have had the confidence in us needed for them to confront Iraq.

A key element of our strategy was to frustrate Saddam Hussein's efforts to draw Israel into the war and thereby change the political complexion of the conflict. We devoted much attention and resources to this problem, but we could not have succeeded without a history of trust and cooperation with the Israelis.

The success of Operations Desert Shield (including the maritime interdiction effort) and Desert Storm required the creation of an international coalition and multinational military cooperation, not just with the nations of the Arabian peninsula, but with the United Kingdom, France, Egypt, Turkey and a host of other nations. These efforts were greatly enhanced by past military cooperation in NATO, in joint exercises, in US training of members of Allied forces, and in many other ways. The

Persian Gulf conflict reminds us of how important it will be to build on such efforts in a world where joint international efforts are important both militarily and politically.

Finally, we were fortunate to have more than five months in which to deploy an overwhelming force, to collect specific kinds of detailed intelligence, and to put together the complex command arrangements and communication systems that we needed. Our carrier presence in the region and long reach airpower helped to deter Iraq in the earliest days of the crisis. The rapid insertion of tactical air, airborne units and two Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons, along with their Marine Expeditionary Brigades, gave us early combat capability. However, the absence of more significant forward based forces or large scale prepositioning of Army equipment exposed our forces to potential risk in the initial phases of our military buildup. In future contingencies, we obviously cannot count on having so much time. Operation Desert Shield taught us a great deal about preparedness and lift for future contingencies.

A fifth general lesson that we must take from the Gulf conflict is how long it takes to build a high-quality military force. A general who is capable of commanding a division in combat is the work of more than 20 years' training. To train a senior noncommissioned officer in the Marine Corps to the high level of performance that we expect today takes 10 to 15 years.

The precision weapons that everyone watched on television were dropped by F-111 bombers first introduced into the force in 1967. The cruise missiles that people watched fly down the streets of Baghdad were first developed in the mid-'70s. The F-117 stealth fighter bomber that flew so many missions so successfully — not one of them was ever struck — was developed in the late '70s. About half of the aircraft carriers we had in the Gulf were over 20 years old.

Development and production of major weapons systems today remains a long process. From the time we make a decision to start a new aircraft system until the time it is first fielded in the force averages roughly 13 years, and double that before most of the planes are fielded.

The work of creating military forces takes a very, very long time.

As the Department of Defense reduces the armed forces over the next five years, two special challenges confront us, both of which were highlighted by Operation Desert Storm. The first is to hold our technological edge out into the future. The second is to be ready for the next Desert Storm — like contingency that comes along. Just as the high technology systems we used in the Gulf war reflect conceptions and commitments of 15, 20, or 25 years ago, so the decisions we make today will affect our forces 15, 20, or 25 years from now. We want our forces of the year 2015 to have the same high quality and the same technological edge our forces had in the Persian Gulf.

Our ability to predict events 5, 10, or 15 years out is quite limited. But, whatever occurs, we will need high-quality forces to deter aggression or, if necessary, to defend our interests. No matter how hard we wish for peace, there will come a time when a future President will have to send young Americans into combat somewhere in the world.

To provide that high quality force of the future, we must be smart today. We must keep up our investment in R&D, personnel and crucial systems. But we must also cut unneeded production, reduce our active and reserve forces, and close unneeded bases. F-16 aircraft and M1A1 tanks are superb systems, but we have enough of them. We can better use the money saved by investing in the systems of the future. Reserve forces are valuable, but as we cut the active forces we must cut the Reserves and National Guard units assigned the mission of supporting them. Our declining defense budgets need to sustain the high level of training our remaining forces need. And as we cut forces, we should cut base structure. Common sense dictates that smaller forces require fewer bases.

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If we choose wisely today, we can do well something America has always done badly before -- we can draw down our military force wisely. We did not do this well after WW II, and we found ourselves unprepared for the Korean war barely five years later. We did not draw down intelligently after Vietnam, and we found ourselves with the hollow forces of the late '70s. We are determined to avoid repeating these costly errors.

Our future national security and the lives of young Americans of the next decade or beyond depend on our learning the proper lessons from the Persian Gulf conflict. It is a task the Department of Defense takes seriously. Those Americans lost in the Persian Gulf Conflict and their families paid a heavy price for freedom. If we make the wrong choices now, if we waste defense dollars on force structure we cannot support, or on more weapons than we need, or on bases we cannot afford, then the next time young Americans go into combat we may suffer casualties that could have been avoided.

America can be proud of its many roles in the Persian Gulf conflict. There were lessons to be learned and problems to be sure. But overall there was an outstanding victory. We can be proud of our conviction and international leadership. We can be proud of one of the most remarkable deployments in history. We can be proud of our partnership in arms with many nations. We can be proud of our technology and the wisdom of our leaders at all levels. But most of all we can be proud of those dedicated young Americans -- soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines -- who showed their skill, their commitment to what we stand for, and their bravery in the way they fought this war.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Dick Cheney". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "D".

QUESTION 19:

*Policies and procedures relating to the media,
including the use of media pools.*

QUESTION 19:***Policies and procedures relating to the media, including the use of media pools.***

As in all previous American conflicts, the rules for news coverage of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were driven by the need to balance the requirements of operational security against the public's right to know about ongoing military operations. Department of Defense policy calls for making available "timely and accurate information so the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy," withholding information "only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces." The news media feel compelled to report as much information about current newsworthy events as possible. This perpetual dilemma was best described by General Eisenhower in 1944: "The first essential in military operations is that no information of value shall be given to the enemy. The first essential in newspaper work and broadcasting is wide-open publicity. It is your job and mine to try to reconcile those sometimes diverse considerations."

The challenge to provide full news coverage of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was complicated by several factors:

- The host nation, closed to Western media before the operation began, was reluctant to permit reporters to enter the country and was concerned about reporting of cultural sensitivities.
- More than 1,600 news media representatives eventually massed in Saudi Arabia to report about the war.
- The combat actions of Operation Desert Storm used high technology, long range weapons and occurred on and over a distant, vast, open desert and from ships operating in adjacent bodies of water.
- The speed of the combined armor and airmobile attacks and drives through Kuwait and Iraq was unusually rapid.
- This was the first US war to be covered by news media who were capable of broadcasting

reports instantaneously to the world, including the enemy.

From the outset of the crisis, the Department worked closely with US Central Command (CENTCOM), the military departments, the Joint Staff, and news media organizations to balance the news media's needs with the military's ability to support them and its responsibility to preserve operational security for US combat forces. The goal was to provide as much information as possible to the American people without endangering the lives or missions of US military personnel.

When the USS Independence Carrier Battle Group arrived in the Gulf of Oman on 7 August and the first US Air Force F-15s landed on sovereign Saudi territory on 8 August, approximately one week after Iraq invaded Kuwait, there were no Western reporters in the Kingdom. The US Government urged the Saudi government to begin granting visas to US news organizations, so that reporters could cover the arrival of the US military. On 10 August, Secretary Cheney called Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, to inquire about the progress for issuing visas. Prince Bandar said the Saudis were studying the question but agreed in the meantime to accept a pool of US reporters if the US military would arrange their transportation. The DOD National Media Pool, a structure that had been in use since 1985, was alerted that same day. The purpose of the DOD National Media Pool is to enable reporters to cover the earliest possible action of a US military operation in a remote area where there is no other presence of the American news media, while still protecting the element of surprise—an essential part of operational security.

Starting with those initial 17 press pool members—representing Associated Press (AP), United Press International (UPI), Reuters, Cable News Network (CNN), National Public Radio, Time, Scripps-Howard, the Los Angeles Times, and the Milwaukee Journal—the number of reporters, editors, photographers, producers, and technicians grew to nearly 800 by December. Except during the first two weeks of the pool, those reporters all filed their stories independently, directly to their own news organizations.

To facilitate media coverage of US forces in Saudi Arabia, CENTCOM established a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) in Dhahran and, later, another in Riyadh.

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The Saudi Ministry of Information was also located with the JIB in Dhahran, which enabled visiting media to register with the Saudi government and the JIB at one location. The JIB coordinated with reporters and worked to facilitate visits to those units that reporters desired to cover. The Saudi government required that reporters visiting Saudi bases be escorted by a US official. The CENTCOM public affairs office assumed this responsibility and provided escorts to facilitate coverage on Saudi bases and to US units on the ground and at sea and throughout the theater.

One of the concerns of news organizations in the Pentagon press corps was that they did not have enough staff in the Persian Gulf to cover hostilities. Since they did not know how the Saudi government would respond to their requests for more visas, and since they couldn't predict what restrictions might be imposed on commercial air traffic in the event of a war, they asked the Pentagon to provide a military plane to take in a group of reporters to act as journalistic reinforcements. A US Air Force C-141 cargo plane left Andrews Air Force Base on 17 January, the morning after the bombing began, with 126 news media personnel on board. That plane left at the onset of hostilities, during the most intensive airlift since the Berlin blockade. The fact that senior military commanders dedicated one of their cargo airplanes to the job of transporting another 126 journalists to Saudi Arabia demonstrated the military's commitment to take reporters to the scene of the action so they could get the story out to the American people.

The Pentagon worked closely with CENTCOM Public Affairs to determine how best to facilitate coverage of potential hostilities in the Persian Gulf. After several meetings at the Pentagon with military and civilian public affairs officials experienced in previous conflicts, and bureau chiefs of the Pentagon press corps, the Department published on 14 January 1991 a one-page list of ground rules and a one-page list of guidelines for the news media to follow during the course of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

As early as October 1990, it appeared that hostilities in the region could result in a large, fast-moving, and deadly battle. The Pentagon sent a joint public affairs team to Saudi Arabia on 6 October to evaluate the public affairs aspects of hostile action and assist CENTCOM in preparing for media coverage of any such eventuality. The team was convinced that given the size and

distances involved, the probable speed of advance of US forces, the potential for the enemy to use chemical weapons, and the sheer violence of a large scale armor battle would make open coverage of a ground combat operation impractical, at least during its initial phase.

The team, therefore, recommended that pools of reporters be assigned to units to cover activity within those units. These reporters would stay with units in order to ensure that they would be present with military forces at the beginning of any combat operations. Although the plan was initially rejected, the command ultimately implemented a similar plan calling for ground combat news media pools, all of which would be in place before hostilities commenced.

The second contentious issue was the requirement that in the event of hostilities, all pooled media products undergo a security review. Although the majority of reporting from the theater had been unrestricted, the military was concerned that reporters might not realize the sensitivity of certain information and might therefore inadvertently divulge details of military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities that would jeopardize the outcome of an operation or the safety of US or Coalition forces. The plan called for all pooled media material to be examined by the public affairs escort officer on scene solely for its conformance to the ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer would discuss ground rule problems he found with the reporter, and, if no agreement could be reached about the disputed material, it would be dispatched immediately to the JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB Director and the appropriate news media representative. If they could not agree, the issue would be elevated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) for review with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication rested with the originating reporter's news organization, not the government or the military.

While the pools were in existence, only five of more than 1,300 print pool stories were appealed through the stages of the review process to Washington for resolution. Four of those were cleared in Washington within a few hours. The fifth story dealt in considerable detail with the methods of intelligence operations in the field. The reporter's editor-in-chief chose to change the story to protect sensitive intelligence procedures.

In addition to 27 reporters on ships and at air bases, at the initiation of ground combat by Coalition forces, the Central Command had 132 reporters in place with the US ground forces to cover their activity. This enabled reporters to accompany every combat division into battle.

Although plans called for expeditious handling of pool reports, much of it moved far too slowly. The JIB Dhahran reviewed 343 pool reports filed during or immediately after the ground war and found that approximately 21% arrived at the JIB in less than 12 hours, 69% arrived in less than two days, and 10% arrived in more than three days. In fact, five reports, hampered either by weather or by poor transportation, arrived at the JIB more than six days after they were filed.

The press arrangements in Southwest Asia were a good faith effort on the part of the military to be as fair as possible to the large number of reporters on the scene, to get as many reporters as possible out with troops during a highly mobile, modern ground war, and to allow as much freedom in reporting as possible, while still preventing the enemy from knowing precisely the nature of Coalition plans.

An unanticipated problem, however, grew out of the security review issue. Reporters were upset with the presence of public affairs escort officers. Although it is a common practice for a public affairs officer to be present during interviews with military personnel, the fact that the escort officer had the additional role of

reviewing stories for conformance to ground rules led to the public affairs officer being perceived as an impediment. Normally the facilitators of interviews and the media's advocate, public affairs officers were now considered to be inhibiting the flow of information between the troops and the media.

The Department and the Central Command held extensive briefings on Operation Desert Storm. When the air war began on 16 January (7 p.m., Eastern Standard Time), the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs briefed the news media. Several hours later, during the morning of 17 January, General Schwarzkopf and Lieutenant General Horner, the Commander of CENTCOM air forces, conducted an extensive briefing in Riyadh. At the Pentagon, over the next 47 days, the Director of Operations and the Director of Intelligence for the Joint Staff – two of the most knowledgeable officials about the operation – along with the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs conducted 35 televised news briefings. Likewise, in Saudi Arabia, the command provided a Deputy Director of Operations. Brigadier General Richard I. Neal, for daily, televised briefings and also provided background briefings at the news media's request. The command provided 98 briefings (53 on-the-record and 45 on background). Along with the news reports coming from reporters accompanying our forces in the field, these daily news briefings – conducted by the people who were responsible for planning and carrying out the operation – provided an unprecedented amount of information about the war to the American people.

EMERGING OBSERVATIONS

Some Accomplishments

- The Department acted quickly to move news reporters into place to cover the early stages of the American military buildup in Saudi Arabia, providing access for the first western reporters to the early stages of the operation. The Central Command, in conjunction with the Department, established a pool system, enabling the news media to cover Operation Desert Storm through 159 reporters and photographers who were with combat units. By way of contrast, only 27 reporters were with the D-Day invasion force in 1944 when the first wave of troops went ashore.
- The media pool system placed pool members in positions to witness actual combat or interview troops immediately after combat, as evidenced by the fact that approximately 300 reports filed during the ground war were filed from forward deployed units on or near the front lines. Of that number, approximately 60% appeared to contain eyewitness accounts of the fighting.
- Pool members were permitted to interview front line troops. Some 362 stories filed from the front included interviews with front line troops.
- Frequent public briefings were held on details of the operation.

Some Shortcomings

- Command support for the PAO effort was uneven. Some component commands were highly cooperative while others did not appear to place a priority on getting the story out. In

some cases, this meant lack of communication and transportation assets or priorities to get stories back to the Dhahran JIB in a timely manner.

- Because of the scope and sensitive nature of much of the operational planning, a significant number of PAO's were not able to stay fully abreast of daily developments, nor were they trained to conduct security reviews of pool products. Many were therefore unable to properly judge operational security violations.
- The public affairs escort officers displayed a wide range of expertise in performing their duties. While many received praise from the media and unit commanders for having done excellent jobs, others, overzealously performing their duties, made mistakes which sometimes became news items. Occasional, isolated incidents, such as public affairs officers stepping in front of cameras to stop interviews, telling reporters that they could not ask questions about certain subjects, and attempting to have some news media reports altered to eliminate unfavorable information, were reported. Although these incidents were the exception, not the rule, they nonetheless frequently were highlighted in media reports.

A Selected Issue

- Media sources have voiced dissatisfaction with some of the press arrangements, especially with the media pools, the need for military escorts for the news media, and security review of media pool products.

ATTACHMENT 2

ATTACHMENT 3

**Department of Defense
Contingency Plan for Media Coverage of Hostilities
Operation DESERT SHIELD**

The objective of this plan is to ensure news media access to combat areas from the onset of hostilities, or as soon thereafter as possible, in Operation DESERT SHIELD. This is a three-phased plan for exercising and deploying rotating correspondent pools, aligned with front line forces to permit combat coverage.

Each pool would consist of eighteen news media personnel: three newspaper correspondents, two wire service correspondents, two three-member television crews, one radio correspondent, one wire service photographer, one newspaper photographer, one news magazine reporter, one news magazine photographer, one Saudi reporter and one third-country reporter. Membership in the pools would be drawn from news media personnel already in Saudi Arabia.

In Phase I of the plan, which would begin immediately, the first two pools would be formed by the Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran and randomly exercised at least once every two weeks to provide training for media participants and U.S. military personnel. These pools will always be exercised simultaneously to ensure that operational security is preserved. During Phase I, the pools would familiarize themselves with troops and equipment, cover activities in the areas to which the pools are sent, and exercise their ability to file news stories from the field.

Phase II would begin by deploying the pools when hostilities are imminent, putting them in place to cover the first stages of combat. If such prepositioning is not possible, the pools would be moved forward from Dhahran as quickly as possible to the immediate area of conflict. As soon as possible, additional pools would be deployed to expand the coverage. The size of these pools will be determined by the availability of transportation and other operational factors. These additional pools could be used to fill the gaps in coverage, if the conflict is spread over a wide area. Air Force, Navy, amphibious, and logistical support units will be covered by additional smaller pools, which will be rotated to ensure continuous coverage.

Security review for all pool material would be performed at the source, where the information was gathered, and transmitted to the Joint Information Bureau at Dhahran, where it would then be available to journalists covering the operation. Ground rules would consist of those currently in effect.

Phase III would begin when open coverage is possible and would provide for unilateral coverage of activities. The pools would be disbanded and all media would operate independently, although under U.S. Central Command escort.

13 December 1990

ATTACHMENT 4

U.S. CENTCOM
MEDIA GROUND RULES

Version II

THE GROUND RULES BELOW WILL PROTECT THE SECURITY AND THE SAFETY OF THE TROOPS INVOLVED, WHILE ALLOWING YOU THE GREATEST PERMISSIBLE FREEDOM AND ACCESS IN COVERING YOUR STORY.

1. All interviews with news media representatives will be "on the record." Security at the source will be the policy.

2. All Navy embark stories will state that the report is coming "FROM THE ARABIAN GULF, RED SEA or NORTH ARABIAN SEA." Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined, "EASTERN SAUDI ARABIA, CENTRAL SAUDI ARABIA, etc. Stories from other participating countries may be datelined from those countries only after their participation is released by DoD. No specific locations will be used when filing the stories.

3. You MUST remain with your military escort at all times, until released, and follow their instructions regarding your activities. These instructions are not intended to hinder your reporting. They are only to facilitate troop movement, ensure safety, and protect operational security.

4. The following categories of information are NOT releasable:

- (a) Number of troops
- (b) Number of aircraft
- (c) Numbers regarding other equipment (e.g. artillery, tanks, radars, trucks, water, etc.)
- (d) Names of military installations/specific geographic locations of U.S. military units in the CENTCOM Area of responsibility (AOR). (Unless specifically released by Department of Defense.)
- (e) Information regarding future operations.
- (f) Information concerning security precautions at military installations.
- (g) Photography that would show level of security at military installations, especially aerial and satellite photography.
- (h) Photography that would reveal the name or specific location of military forces or installations.
- (i) Rules of engagement details.
- (j) Information on intelligence collection activities to include targets, methods, results.
- (k) Information on in-progress operations against hostile targets.
- (l) Information on special units, unique operations methodology/tactical (air ops, angles of attack, speeds, etc.; naval tactical/evasive maneuvers, etc.)
- (m) Information identifying postponed or cancelled operations.
- (n) In case of operational necessity, additional specific guidelines may be necessary to protect tactical security.

This replaces the earlier version of CENTCOM Ground Rules and remains in effect until 15 Jan 91.

5. The following categories ARE releasable:

- (a) Arrival of major U.S. units in CENTCOM AOR when officially announced by a U.S. spokesperson. Mode of travel (sea or air) and date of departure from home station.
- (b) Approximate friendly force strength figures, after review by host nation government.
- (c) Approximate friendly casualty and POW figures, by service.
- (d) Approximate enemy casualty and POW figures for each action, operation.
- (e) Non-sensitive, unclassified information regarding U.S. air, ground and sea operations (past and present).
- (f) Friendly force size in an action or operation will be announced using general terms such as "multi-battalion", "naval task force", etc. Specific force/unit identification/designation may be released when it has become public knowledge and no longer warrants security protection.
- (g) Identification and location of military targets and objectives previously under attack.
- (h) Generic origin of air operations such as "land" or "carrier based".
- (i) Date/time/location of previous conventional military missions and actions as well as mission results.
- (j) Types of ordnance expended will be released in general terms rather than specific amounts.
- (k) Number of aerial combat or reconnaissance missions or sorties flown in theater or operational area.
- (l) Type of forces involved (infantry, armor, Marines, Carrier Battle Group).
- (m) Weather and climate conditions.
- (n) Allied participation by type of operation (ships, aircraft, ground units, etc.) after approval of host nation government.
- (o) Conventional operation nicknames.
- (p) Names and hometowns of U.S. Military units/individuals may now be released.

6. If you are not sure whether an action you will take will violate a ground rule, consult with your escort officer PRIOR TO TAKING THAT ACTION.

7. Media must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc.

8. Media should be prepared to cover the high cost of visiting Saudi Arabia (such as \$100 per night lodging, \$30 per meal dining, ground transportation, telephone calls, etc.) CASH/RIYALS IS A MUST.

9. Interviews with military personnel entering/departing the Ministry of Defense or other public places will be coordinated in advance by the Joint Information Bureau. THERE WILL BE NO "AMBUSH" INTERVIEWS.

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS TRUE AND CORRECT:

DATE: _____

NAME: _____

NAME OF NEXT OF KIN: _____

ADDRESS: _____

PHONE: (____) _____

MEDIA AFFILIATION: _____

MAILING ADDRESS: _____

PHONE: (____) _____

PASSPORT NUMBER AND COUNTRY OF ISSUE: _____

VISA EXPIRATION: _____

ADDRESS IN COUNTRY: _____

PHONE: _____

(JIB PERSONNEL WILL CHECK PICTURE ID'S)

I UNDERSTAND AND AGREE TO COMPLY WITH ALL PROVISIONS OF THE MEDIA GUIDELINES AND ANY ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS THAT MY MEDIA ESCORT MAY PROVIDE:

SIGNATURE: _____

BADGE NUMBER: _____

ATTACHMENT 4

GUIDELINES FOR NEWS MEDIA

News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc.

Night Operations -- Light discipline restrictions will be followed. The only approved light source is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless specifically approved by the on-scene commander.

You must remain with your military escort at all times, until released, and follow their instructions regarding your activities. These instructions are not intended to hinder your reporting. They are intended to facilitate movement, ensure safety, and protect operational security.

For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM Media Pools:

(1) Upon registering with the JIB, news media should contact their respective pool coordinator for explanation of pool operations.

(2) If you are unable to withstand the rigorous conditions required to operate with the forward-deployed forces, you will be medically evacuated out of the area.

(3) Security at the source will be the policy. In the event of hostilities, pool products will be subject to security review prior to release to determine if they contain information that would jeopardize an operation or the security of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will not be withheld just because it is embarrassing or contains criticism. The public affairs officer on the scene will conduct the security review. However, if a conflict arises, the product will be expeditiously sent to JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB Director. If no agreement can be reached, the product will be expeditiously forwarded to OASD(PA) for review with the appropriate bureau chief.

Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media. Casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other identifying feature or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news value of the photograph, film or videotape. Names of casualties whose next of kin have been notified can be verified through the JIB Dhahran.

**OPERATION DESERT SHIELD
GROUND RULES**

The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:

- (1) For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g., artillery, tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water), including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by or on hand in support and combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms such as "company-size," "multibattalion," "multidivision," "naval task force," and "carrier battle group." Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms such as "large," "small," or "many."
- (2) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or cancelled operations.
- (3) Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Locations may be described as follows: all Navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming from the "Persian Gulf," "Red Sea," or "North Arabian Sea." Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near the Kuwaiti border," etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that country has acknowledged its participation.
- (4) Rules of engagement details.
- (5) Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and results.
- (6) During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives. This would include unit designations, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.
- (7) Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrier-based.
- (8) Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.
- (9) Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.
- (10) Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment or tactics.
- (11) Specific operating methods and tactics, (e.g., air angles of attack or speeds, or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used.
- (12) Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or coalition units, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."

ATTACHMENT 5

**Operation Desert Shield
News media ground rules**

All interviews with service members will be on the record. Security at the source is the policy. In the event of hostilities, media products will be subject to security review prior to release. Interviews with pilots and aircrew members are authorized upon completion of mission; however, release of information must conform to the ground rules stated below.

All Navy embark stories will state that the report is coming "from the Persian Gulf, Red Sea or North Arabian Sea." Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined Riyadh, Dhahran, or other area by general geographical description, such as "Eastern Saudi Arabia." Stories from other participating countries may be datelined from those countries only after their participation is released by DoD.

You must remain with your military escort at all times, until released, and follow instructions regarding your activities. These instructions are intended only to facilitate troop movement, ensure safety, and maintain operational security.

You must be physically fit. If, in the opinion of the commander, you are unable to withstand the rigorous conditions required to operate with his forward-deployed forces, you will be medically evacuated out of the area.

You are not authorized to carry a personal weapon.

The following categories of information are releasable:

- (1) Arrival of U.S. military units in the Central Command area of responsibility when officially announced. Mode of travel (sea or air), date of departure, and home station.
- (2) Approximate friendly force strength figures ^{in theatre.}
- (3) Approximate friendly casualty and POW figures by service.
- (4) Confirmed figures of enemy personnel killed in action (KIA) or detained for each action or operation.
- (5) Nonsensitive, unclassified information regarding U.S. air, ground, and sea operations, past and present.
- (6) Size of friendly force participating in an action or operation will be disclosed using general terms such as "multi-battalion," "naval task force," etc. Specific force or unit identification may be released when it no longer warrants security protection.
- (7) Identification and location of military targets and objectives previously under attack.
- (8) Generic description of origin of air operations, such as "land" or "carrier-based."

(9) Date, time, or location of previous conventional military missions and actions as well as mission results.

(10) Types of ordnance expended, in general terms.

(11) Number of aerial combat or reconnaissance missions or sorties flown in theater or operational area.

(12) Type of forces involved (e.g., infantry, armor, Marines, carrier battle group).

(13) Weather and climate conditions.

(14) Allied participation by type of operation (ships, aircraft, ground units, etc.) after approval of host nation government.

(15) Conventional operation code names.

(16) Names and hometowns of U.S. military units or individuals.

The following categories of information are not releasable:

(1) Number of troops.

(2) Number of aircraft.

(3) Numbers regarding other equipment or critical supplies (e.g., artillery, tanks, landing craft, radars, trucks, water, etc.).

(4) Names of military installations or specific geographic locations of U.S. military units in the Central Command area of responsibility, unless specifically released by the Department of Defense.

(5) Information regarding future operations.

(6) Information regarding security precautions at military installations or encampments.

(7) Photography that would show level of security at military installations or encampments, especially aerial and satellite photography.

(8) Photography that would reveal the name or specific location of military units or installations.

(9) Rules of engagement details.

(10) Information on intelligence collection activities including targets, methods, and results.

(11) Information on operations underway against hostile targets.

(12) Information on special operations units, unique operations methodology or tactics, for example, air operations, angles of attack, and speeds; naval tactical or evasive maneuvers, etc.

(13) Information identifying postponed or cancelled operations.

(14) Information on missing or downed aircraft or missing ships, while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.

(15) Information on effectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.

(16) Additional guidelines may be necessary to protect tactical security.

Casualty information

(1) Notification of the next of kin is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by an officer of the appropriate service.

(2) There have been instances in which next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through news media reports. If casualty photographs show a recognizable face, name tag, items of jewelry or other identifying feature before the casualty's next of kin have been notified, the anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause is out of proportion to the news value of the photograph or video. Although the casualty reporting and notification system works on a priority basis, correspondents are urged to keep this problem in mind when covering action in the field. Names of casualties whose next of kin have been notified can be verified by the joint information bureaus in Riyadh or Dhahran, the appropriate public affairs office, or the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

- end -

ATTACHMENT 6

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IMMEDIATE
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FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD(PA):DPL//
TO USCINCCENT//CCPA// USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3J2//
CHINFO WASHINGTON DC
USCENTCOM REAR MACDILL AFB FL//CCPA//
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//NEA-P// CJCS WASHINGTON DC//PA//
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCPA//
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//CC/CCPA//
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//PA// AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI AMEMBASSY DOHA
CHUSMTH RIYADH SA
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PA//PA//
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//PA//
USCINCSPACEPETERSON AFB CO//PA//
CINCPAC FT MCPHERSON GA//CC/CCPA//
CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NE//CC/PA// CSA WASHINGTON DC//SAPA//
CNC WASHINGTON DC//DTPA// CSAF WASHINGTON DC//PA//
CINMAC SCOTT AFB IL//CC/PA//
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-C//
DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON DC//A-30//
USIA WASHINGTON DC//P/P// NSB WASHINGTON DC//PA//
HQ AFRES ROBINSON AFB GA//PA//
INFO CG PHFPA//PA// CG PHFLANT//PA//
CENTAF REAR LANGLEY VA//PA//

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FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD(PA):DPL//
TO USCINCCENT//CCPA// USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3J2//
CHINFO WASHINGTON DC
USCENTCOM REAR MACDILL AFB FL//CCPA//
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//NEA-P// CJCS WASHINGTON DC//PA//
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCPA//
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//CC/CCPA//
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//PA// AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI AMEMBASSY DOHA
CHUSMTH RIYADH SA
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PA//PA//
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//PA//
USCINCSPACEPETERSON AFB CO//PA//
CINCPAC FT MCPHERSON GA//CC/CCPA//
CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NE//CC/PA// CSA WASHINGTON DC//SAPA//
CNC WASHINGTON DC//DTPA// CSAF WASHINGTON DC//PA//
CINMAC SCOTT AFB IL//CC/PA//
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-C//
DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON DC//A-30//
USIA WASHINGTON DC//P/P// NSB WASHINGTON DC//PA//
HQ AFRES ROBINSON AFB GA//PA//
INFO CG PHFPA//PA// CG PHFLANT//PA//
CENTAF REAR LANGLEY VA//PA//

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03
USIA PASS TO COL STORE
SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE - MEDIA TRAVEL FOR HOMETOWN
COVERAGE (OPERATION DESERT SHIELD)

*****DESERT SHIELD TRAFFIC*****
*****SPEAF TRAFFIC LOGGED ON FORM 5*****
FIBAL DISTR ADDED FOR JCS PER COL SUMRALL JR/OCJCS/19OCT90/DNB

DELIVER ALL CJCS COPIES TO THE OIC

ACTION GULF:RESCCELL(24) ASD:PA(1) (R,M,C)
INFO CJCS(7) DJS(1) WIDS(1) JS(2) QUAL CONTROL(1)
SECDEF-W(1) USDP:GULF(10) USDP:FILE(1) USDP:NESEA(3)
USDP:DSAA(4) USDP:CM(1) USDP:PPFS(1) USDP:SO-LIC(1)
USDP:PO(1) USDP:ISA(1) USDP:POISA(1) USDP:NA(1)
NMIC(1) DAT-8(1) DB-8C(3) DB-8B(1)
+USCINCPAC VAHINGEN GE
+USDP-CCC WASHINGTON DC
+SAFE

A. SECDEF WASHINGTON DC 241812Z AUG 90
B. SECDEF WASHINGTON DC 261320Z AUG 90
C. DOD 4515.13-R
1. REF A AUTHORIZES MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES TO ACCOMPANY DEPLOYING FORCES INTO THEATER DURING OPERATION DESERT SHIELD (ODS). REF B PROVIDES AMPLIFYING GUIDANCE ON THIS TRAVEL, AND DESIGNATES USCINCCENT AS THE APPROVAL AUTHORITY FOR THEATER CLEARANCE AND MEDIA TRAVEL INTO THE CENTCOM ODS AOR. REF C PROVIDES GUIDANCE ON ROUTINE PUBLIC AFFAIRS TRAVEL PROCEDURES.
2. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE REGARDING "HOMETOWN" MEDIA TRAVEL WITH DEPLOYING UNITS WAS DEVELOPED BY USCINCCENT AND WAS COORDINATED AND APPROVED BY OASD(PA). PROCEDURES OUTLINED HEREIN TAKE EFFECT AS OF 0001 EST, 22 OCT 1990. TRAVEL REQUESTS SUBMITTED SUBSEQUENT TO THIS DATE/TIME WILL BE DENIED IF THEY DO NOT CONFORM TO THESE PROCEDURES. THIS MESSAGE SUPERCEDES ALL PREVIOUS ODS MEDIA TRAVEL MESSAGES.
A. THE INTENT OF THIS AUTHORIZATION IS TO ALLOW NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES (NMR'S) THAT NORMALLY COVER A SPECIFIC UNIT TO COVER THE DEPLOYMENT AND, TO A LIMITED EXTENT, THE EMPLOYMENT OF THAT UNIT IN SAUDI ARABIA. THIS AUTHORIZATION IS INTENDED TO ENCOURAGE A "HOMETOWN COVERAGE" CONCEPT IN THE USCINCCENT AOR DESIGNED TO SUPPORT LOCAL NEWS MEDIA WITH STANDING INTEREST IN A PARTICULAR UNIT OR INSTALLATION, AND TO ALLEVIATE MEDIA DEMANDS ON THE USCINCCENT PAO. SUBJECT TO USCINCCENT APPROVAL, THIS AUTHORIZATION MAY ALSO BE USED BY COMMANDERS OF UNITS ALREADY DEPLOYED TO SAUDI ARABIA TO INVITE "HOMETOWN" MEDIA TO COVER THAT UNIT, PROVIDED ALL REQUIREMENTS HEREIN ARE STRICTLY ADHERED TO. THE AUTHORIZATION IS NOT INTENDED AS A MEANS TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR MEDIA WITH NO LOCAL INTEREST IN A MILITARY UNIT. THAT ACCESS MAY BE GAINED THROUGH THE NORMAL VISA PROCESS, AND ON COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION OR, ON A VERY LIMITED BASIS, ON GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION LAW REF C WHEN REQUESTED BY A SERVICE OR UNIFIED/SPECIFIED COMMANDER. ACCORDINGLY, UNIT COMMANDERS WILL USE THE "LOCAL INTEREST" CRITERION (IN ADDITION TO OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS) IN DETERMINING WHETHER TO SUPPORT A REQUEST BY MEDIA TO ACCOMPANY THEIR UNITS.
B. USCINCCENT CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT THE "HOMETOWN COVERAGE" ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED: THERE ARE MORE THAN 250 INDEPENDENT NMR'S CURRENTLY BEING SUPPORTED BY THE USCINCCENT JIB'S, AND SEVERAL THOUSAND MORE NMR'S HAVE REQUESTED VISAS FOR ENTRY INTO SAUDI ARABIA. THEREFORE, "HOMETOWN COVERAGE" NMR'S AND ESCORTS SHOULD PLAN ON MINIMAL USCINCCENT JIB SUPPORT. HOWEVER, EARLY EXPERIENCE WITH THIS PROGRAM HAS SHOWN THAT SOME PA SUPPORT BY IN-THEATER, UNIT-LEVEL PERSONNEL IS REQUIRED. THE AVAILABILITY OF SUCH SUPPORT IS ONE OF THE CRITICAL FACTORS USCINCCENT WILL CONSIDER WHEN DETERMINING WHETHER THE REQUEST WILL BE APPROVED. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE HOST UNIT COMMANDER COORDINATE WITH THE COMMAND/BASE TO WHICH THE UNIT IS DEPLOYING PRIOR TO REQUESTING CLEARANCE, AND THAT THE COMMANDER INCLUDES THE UNIT'S DESTINATION AND POINT OF CONTACT AT THE DESTINATION IN THE CLEARANCE REQUEST MESSAGE.
C. TO EXPEDITE THE OVERALL APPROVAL PROCESS, A NMR MUST SUBMIT THE REQUEST TO TRAVEL WITH A DEPLOYING UNIT AND A REQUEST FOR A SAUDI VISA CONCURRENTLY. THE REQUEST TO ACCOMPANY THE DEPLOYING UNIT MUST BE SUBMITTED IN WRITING, AND MUST INCLUDE A COPY OF THE SAUDI VISA REQUEST. THE SAUDI VISA REQUEST SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE SAUDI EMBASSY OR THE SAUDI CONSULATE SERVING THE AREA/REGION OF THE U.S. IN WHICH THE NMR IS LOCATED. REFER NMR'S TO THE SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY VISA SECTION AT (202) 337-3765/3766 /3767 FOR DETAILS ON VISA REQUESTS.
(1) IN SOME CASES, SAUDI CONSULATES HAVE REFUSED TO ISSUE VISAS TO NMR'S UNTIL A UNIT AGREES TO SPONSOR THE NMR. DEPLOYING UNIT COMMANDERS ARE AUTHORIZED TO ISSUE LETTERS OF SPONSORSHIP TO THEIR LOCAL NMR'S. THIS LETTER DOES NOT GUARANTEE MEDIA TRAVEL TO THE AOR NOR DICTATE A REQUIREMENT FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A SAUDI VISA.
(2) A VALID PASSPORT WITH SAUDI VISA, AND PROOF OF THEATER AND AOR COUNTRY CLEARANCE MUST BE CARRIED BY EACH NMR THROUGHOUT THE DEPLOYMENT.
D. COMMANDERS OF UNITS THAT WISH TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY MEDIA MUST REQUEST IN ONE MESSAGE THROUGH THEIR CHAINS OF COMMAND MEDIA TRAVEL/THEATER/COUNTRY CLEARANCE FROM USCINCCENT. THAT REQUEST WILL INCLUDE THE PHRASE "HOMETOWN COVERAGE" IN THE SUBJECT LINE, AND MUST BE SUBMITTED IN THE FOLLOWING FORMAT:
(1) (YOUR UNIT) PROPOSES DESERT SHIELD MEDIA AIRLIFT FOR THE FOLLOWING "HOMETOWN" MEDIA: (LIST THE NAME(S) OF THE NMR(S) AS IT APPEARS ON THE PASSPORT, SSAN, AFFILIATIONS, PASSPORT

MCN=90292/04919 TOR=90291/11362 TAD=90292/15312 CDSN=MAJ181

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NUMBER, SAUDI VISA NUMBER OR DATE OF VISA REQUEST). (YOUR UNIT'S PUBLIC AFFAIRS ESCORT WILL BE (NAME, RANK, SSAN, ORGANIZATION), AND THE UNIT'S POC IN SAUDI ARABIA IS (NAME, RANK, SSAN, ORGANIZATION). THE UNIT DESTINATION IN THE USCINCCENT AOR IS (CLASSIFY ACCORDINGLY). THE PLAN FOR THE DEPLOYMENT FOLLOWS: (I.E. EXPECTED DEPARTURE DATE; TRAVEL PLANS SUCH AS DEPARTURE LOCATION, STAY WITH DEPLOYING UNIT OR ONE AIRCRAFT/CREW, FOLLOW AIRFLOW TO AIR, OVERNIGHT STAY AT STAGE BASE IN EUROPE). WHILE IN THE USCINCCENT AOR, IWR'S ARE SCHEDULED FOR THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES: (COVER THE DEPLOYED UNIT, VISIT FIELD HOSPITAL, ETC.) (2) TRAVEL WILL BE ON THE NEXT AVAILABLE DESERT SHIELD MISSION (GIVE SPECIFIC MISSION NUMBER FOR YOUR UNIT OR AN EXPECTED DEPARTURE DATE; YOU ARE LIMITED TO DEPARTING NO MORE THAN FIVE (5) DAYS BEFORE OR AFTER THIS DATE.) (YOUR UNIT) WILL NOTIFY APPROPRIATE OFFICES WHEN MISSION NUMBER IS KNOWN. (3) THIS UNIT WILL PROVIDE A PAO ESCORT FULL TIME FOR THE MEDIA (TO, IN, AND FROM THE THEATER). THE IWR(S) HAS AGREED TO REMAIN IN SAUDI ARABIA NO LONGER THAN 96 HOURS. THE IWR IS ACCOMPANYING THE UNIT FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF COVERING THE DEPLOYING UNIT, AND THE IWR HAS SHOWN PROOF OF SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO DEFRAY ALL PERSONAL COSTS, INCLUDING ACCOMMODATIONS, MEALS, PERSONAL ITEMS, AND RETURN TRANSPORTATION FROM SAUDI ARABIA IN THE EVENT OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS PRECLUDE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FROM PROVIDING AIR TRANSPORTATION BACK TO THE UNITED STATES. (4) (CITE LOCAL AND DEPLOYED COMMANDER'S APPROVAL, AS WELL AS BY

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NUMBERED AIR FORCE/COMPS/MEF/FLEET APPROVAL AS APPLICABLE.)
(5) THIS UNIT UNDERSTANDS THAT TRAVEL CLEARANCE THROUGH (USEUCOR, USPACOM, AND USLANTCOM--AS APPROPRIATE) BASES IS CONTINGENT UPON USCINCCENT APPROVAL OF PROPOSED MEDIA TRAVEL. THIS ORGANIZATION WILL NOTIFY (USEUCOR, USPACOM, USLANTCOM) AND STAGING BASE PAO'S BY OP IMMEDIATE MSG OR TELECOM WHEN MSG NUMBER/ITINERARY ARE KNOWN.
(6) FOR USCINCCENT/CCPA: REQUEST THEATER AND COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR PROPOSED HOMETOWN MEDIA TRAVEL.
(8) POC FOR THIS MSG IS (NAME, RANK, COMM AND A/Y PHONE, ORGANIZATION) USE THE FOLLOWING ADDRESSEES, IN ADDITION TO THE REQUIRED CHAIN OF COMMAND/COMMAND LINE ADDRESSEES:
USCINCCENT//CCPA//
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TEPA//
CINCPAC SCOTT AFB IL//PA/DO//
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECPAO// OR USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//3032//
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//PA// (AS REQUIRED)
HQ USAF RAMSTEIN AB GE//PA// OR HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//PA//
USCENTCOM REAR MACDILL AFB FL//CC/PA//
USCENTAF FWD HQS ELEMENT//PA//
HQ 21AF MCGUIRE AFB NJ//DO// OR HQ 22AF TRAVIS AFB CA//DO//
322ALD RAMSTEIN AB GE//DO// OR 834ALD HICKAM AFB HI//DO//
435TAW RHEIN-MAIN AB GE//PA// OR 374TAW CLARK AB RP//PA//
INFO ADDRESSES: SECSTATE WASH DC//USIA//
AMBASSY RIYADH
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD(PA):DPL//
CSAF WASHINGTON DC//PATT//
CENTAF REAR LANGLEY VA//PA//
318AD RAMSTEIN AB GE//PA// (AS APPROPRIATE)
401TFW TORREJON AB SP//PA// (AS APPROPRIATE)
406TFW ZARAGOZA AB SP//PA// (AS APPROPRIATE)
E. REQUESTS BY IWR'S TO DEPLOY UNDER THE "HOMETOWN COVERAGE" CONCEPT TO COVER OTHER UNITS AND ACTIVITIES BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE ACCOMPANIED UNIT'S DEPLOYMENT WILL NOT BE APPROVED. HOWEVER, COMMAND/BASE PAO'S IN SAUDI ARABIA MAY ARRANGE MEDIA EVENTS FOR "HOMETOWN" MEDIA COVERAGE, SUCH AS VISITS TO FIELD HOSPITALS, AWACS AIRCRAFT, ETC. IF DEDICATED APPROPRIATE.
F. MEDIA THAT VIOLATE AGREEMENTS/GROUND RULES HEREIN MAY BE DENIED FUTURE ACCREDITATION BY USCINCCENT. VIOLATORS, AND THEIR SPECIFIC VIOLATIONS, WILL BE REPORTED TO THE USCINCCOM JIB AT RIYADH (966-3-479-1234, EXT. 2701/2708) AND THE DHAMRAN JIB (966-3-891-8555, EXT. 5481/5434).
G. UPON RECEIPT OF A THEATER CLEARANCE REQUEST, USCINCCENT WILL EVALUATE AND APPROVE/DISAPPROVE THE MEDIA DEPLOYMENT SUBJECT TO THE AVAILABILITY OF COMPONENT/DESTINATION PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT AND OTHER FACTORS. USCINCCENT, VIA THE DHAMRAN JIB, WILL THEN INFORM SAUDI OFFICIALS OF ITS APPROVAL OF MEDIA TRAVEL AND PROVIDE THESE OFFICIALS PERTINENT INFORMATION ABOUT THE IWR'S. (NOTE: NEITHER USCINCCENT NOR THE DHAMRAN JIB ISSUE SAUDI VISAS. QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE STATUS OF VISA REQUESTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE SAUDI EMBASSY OR CONSULATE WHERE APPLICATION WAS MADE.)
H. USCINCEUR, USCINCPAC AND USCINCLANT WILL PROVIDE UPDATED GUIDANCE TO ADDRESSEES OF THIS MESSAGE REGARDING MEDIA-RELATED SENSITIVITIES OF COUNTRIES SUPPORTING THE OPERATION DESERT SHIELD BUILDUP. IWR'S WILL NOT TRAVEL ON AIRCRAFT/VESSELS SCHEDULED FOR STOPOVERS IN LOCATIONS SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITED BY THESE COMMANDS.
3. MEDIA APPROVED FOR TRAVEL WILL SIGN AN AGREEMENT WITH THE DEPLOYING UNIT THAT WILL INCLUDE, AT A MINIMUM, THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:
A. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF REQUIREMENT TO PAY FOR MESSING AND OTHER COMMONLY REIMBURSEABLE EXPENSES (SUCH AS EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE) PROVIDED BY THE DEPLOYING UNIT (EXCLUDING TRANSPORTATION COSTS), AND FOR ACCOMMODATIONS AND OTHER PERSONAL ITEMS.
B. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF REQUIREMENT (AND PROOF OF ABILITY, SUCH AS A MAJOR CREDIT CARD) TO PAY FOR RETURN COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION IF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS PRECLUDE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FROM PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION BACK TO THE UNITED STATES, AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT AND ABILITY TO PROVIDE THEIR OWN TRANSPORTATION TO THE POINT OF EMBARKATION AND FROM THE COMUS POINT OF ENTRY UPON RETURN.
C. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING THAT THE DEPLOYING UNIT CANNOT GUARANTEE THE IWR'S RETURN TO THE DEPARTURE AIRFIELD.
D. WAIVER OF LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE OR INJURY INCURRED WHILE USING DOD AND OTHER-COUNTRY TRANSPORTATION AND FACILITIES.
E. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE IWR'S COVERAGE IS RESTRICTED TO THE ACCOMPANIED DEPLOYED UNIT AND ITS IMMEDIATE LOCATION IN SAUDI ARABIA.
F. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT VIOLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT MAY RESULT IN THE DENIAL OF FURTHER USCINCCENT ACCESS OR SUPPORT FOR THE OFFENDING IWR(S).
G. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT NEWS MEDIA PRESENCE IS ON A STRICT NOT-TO-INTERFERE BASIS, AND THAT MEDIA REPS MUST BE PHYSICALLY CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR JOBS.
H. AGREEMENT TO COMPLY WITH GROUND RULES FOR MEDIA OUTLINED IN REF A, PARA 4C OF THIS MESSAGE, AND AS SUPPLEMENTED BY USCINCCENT.
1. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE HIGH COST OF LIVING IN SAUDI ARABIA (SUCH AS \$100 A NIGHT FOR LODGING, AVERAGE \$30 PER MEAL, MINIMUM \$4PLUS PER MINUTE TELEPHONE CALLS TO COMUS, ETC.)
4. ACCOMPANIED UNITS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS:
A. INSTITUTIONAL TRAVEL ORDERS WILL BE PROVIDED TO EACH IWR BY THE ACCOMPANIED UNIT, AND WILL CONTAIN SPECIFIC REMARKS AS TO TRAVEL AUTHORITY, VISA NUMBERS, LENGTH OF TIME THE MEDIA WILL BE IN THE AOR, AND MEDIA ACCEPTANCE OF USCINCCENT GROUND RULES. WORDING SHOULD BE SIMILAR TO THE FOLLOWING: NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES (IWR'S) LISTED IN THIS ORDER ARE INVITED TO TRAVEL FROM U.S. MILITARY BASE (OR OTHER APOC) NEAR THEIR POINT OF ORIGIN TO SAUDI ARABIA AND POINTS IN BETWEEN AND TO RETURN TO COMUS, BEGINNING ON/ABOUT (EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE) WITH AN EXPECTED RETURN DATE OF (DATE). PURPOSE IS TO GATHER MATERIAL, FILM/VIDEO AND/OR STILL PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE OF (DEPLOYING UNIT) IN OPERATION DESERT SHIELD. TRAVEL ABOARD DESERT SHIELD AIRCRAFT AUTHORIZED PER SECDEF (THIS MESSAGE DTG), DOD 4515.138, AND BY
UNCLAS FINAL SECTION OF 03
USCINCCENT (APPROVAL MESSAGE DTG). ACCESS TO FLIGHT DECK DURING FLIGHT AUTHORIZED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER. WAIVER OF AFB 80-18 FOR USE OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING EQUIPMENT ABOARD MILITARY AIRCRAFT IS GRANTED PROVIDED THE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER CONCURS AND USE OF THE EQUIPMENT DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH AIRCRAFT'S INSTRUMENTATION. (FOR HOMETOWN MEDIA BEING ESCORTED TO JOIN A UNIT ALREADY DEPLOYED, ADD: THIS AUTHORITY IS GRANTED PROVIDED SUCH AIRLIFT DOES NOT DISPLACE CARGO OR DUTY PASSENGERS.) IWR'S WILL BE SEATED DURING TAKEOFFS/LANDINGS. OBSERVE ALL SAFETY REGULATIONS. FOLLOW THE DIRECTIONS OF THE LOADMASTER/BOOM OPERATOR AT ALL TIMES. TRAVEL WILL BE ON A NON-REIMBURSABLE, NON-INTERFERENCE WITH MISSION BASIS. NO ADDITIONAL FUEL WILL BE EXPENDED AND IWR'S WILL NOT BE GRANTED ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OR MATERIALS. PUBLIC AFFAIRS ESCORT MUST ADVISE THE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS ORDER. IWR'S WILL BE GRANTED THE EQUIVALENT GRADE OF GS-12/MAJOR RANK. ON-BASE BILLETING, OFFICIAL TRANSPORTATION (WHEN AVAILABLE), BASE EXCHANGE (FOR ESSENTIAL ITEMS), OPEN MESS AND FIELD MESS PRIVILEGES ARE AUTHORIZED DURING THE INCLUSIVE DATES OF THIS ORDER. IWR'S WILL BE

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AND GOVERNMENT INSTALLATIONS, AIRPORTS, BRIDGES, PORTS, POWER STATIONS, OR ANY OTHER FACILITY THAT MAY HAVE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT. DO NOT ATTEMPT TO PHOTOGRAPH THESE FACILITIES WITHOUT SAUDI APPROVAL. ASK YOUR ESCORT FOR ASSISTANCE ON THIS.
(B) IF YOU ARE NOT SURE WHETHER AN ACTION YOU TAKE WILL VIOLATE A GROUND RULE, CONSULT WITH YOUR ESCORT OFFICER PRIOR TO TAKING THAT ACTION.

D. DEPLOYING UMR'S SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO OBTAIN THE SAME IMMUNIZATIONS AS THE DEPLOYING UNIT PERSONNEL. UMR IMMUNIZATION MUST BE OBTAINED AT THE UMR'S EXPENSE.

5. "HOMETOWN" MEDIA ARE AUTHORIZED LIMITED EXCHANGE PRIVILEGES FOR ESSENTIAL ITEMS WHILE TRAVELING OUTSIDE CONUS. USE OF UNIT MESS FACILITIES ON A REIMBURSABLE BASIS, AND ACCESS TO THE FLIGHT DECK ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER. UMR'S WILL BE GRANTED EQUIVALENT RANK OF MAJOR/GS-12 FOR PURPOSES OF TRAVEL, WITH THIS AUTHORIZATION REFLECTED IN INVITATIONAL TRAVEL ORDERS.

6. MAC MISSION OBSERVER (MMO) STATUS IS NOT REQUIRED FOR UMR'S FLYING ABOARD OCS MAC SUPPORT AIRCRAFT. ESCORTS TRAVEL UNDER NORMAL TRAVEL ORDERS; TRAVEL FOR ESCORT IS UNIT FUNDED.

7. ALTHOUGH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT U.S. FORCES ARE POSITIONED IN OTHER COUNTRIES OTHER THAN SAUDI ARABIA, "HOMETOWN COVERAGE" UMR'S ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO ENTER THOSE COUNTRIES.

8. CASO/PA POC FOR MEDIA TRAVEL REQUESTS IS CAPT SAM GRIZZLE, COM (703) 897-5131, DSN 227-5131; POC FOR PLANS IS MAJ K. GERSHANECK, COM (703) 893-1075, DSN 223-1075. BT

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ATTACHMENT 7

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OPER/DESERT STORM

MSGID/SYS RRI/USCINCENT CCFAC

REF/A/OPORD.DESERT STN ANNEX F.00DEC16//

1. RECENTLY AN UNESCORTED CORRESPONDENT ATTEMPTED UNILATERAL
COVERAGE IN VIOLATION OF GUIDANCE IN REF A. THE CORRESPONDENT WAS
ABLE TO COMVINCE A U.S. UNIT TO ALLOW HIM TO OBTAIN VIDEO COVERAGE.
THE UNIT SHOULD HAVE SENT THE CORRESPONDENT AND HIS CREW BACK TO
DIARRAN. ALL TA PERSONNEL AND COMMANDERS ARE REMINDED TO REVIEW
REF A. AND WHEN APPROACHED BY NON-ESCORTED, NON-POOL CORRESPONDENTS,
THEY SHOULD NOT PERMIT COVERAGE OF THEIR UNIT.
2. ALTHOUGH INITIAL POOL REPORTS HAVE BEEN VERY POSITIVE,
EMPHASIZING THE EXCELLENT CAPABILITIES OF U.S. FORCES AND THE SUCCESS
OF THE OPERATION, MILITARY POOL ESCORTS ARE REMINDED THAT THEY ARE ON
THE FRONT LINE OF OUR SECURITY REVIEW EFFORTS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE

PAGE 02 RHIPAAQ//UNCLAS//NOFORN//

UNRELEASABLE OF THE GUIDELINES AND GROUND RULES SO THAT ALL MAT'L
CAN BE REVIEWED CAREFULLY. WE DO NOT WANT TO GIVE THE ENEMY VALUABLE
INFORMATION.

3. REQUEST HIGHEST POSSIBLE DISSEMINATION OF THIS MESSAGE TO
SUBORDINATE COMMANDS.

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APPENDIX I

ATTACHMENT 1

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RUCDDA/CG II MEB//
RUIVFAA/NO USCENAF FWD HQS ELEMENT//DA//
RUFTRSA/JIB USCENCOM DHAHRAN//SA//
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MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

OPER/DESEPT SIORH//

SUBJ: MISSING CBS NEWS TEAM//

- 1. THE MISSING CBS NEWS TEAM IS MISSING AND HAS BEEN UNACCOUNTED FOR SINCE HOUR 01 21 JAN 91
- 2. THE UNESCORTED TEAM DEPARTED AL FAD HOTEL, HAFIR AL BATIN, SAUDI ARABIA, IN A BEIGE TOYOTA LAND CRUISER, LICENSE NO, 3354441, AT 0900 21 JAN AND WAS LAST SEEN IN THE FORWARD OPERATION AREA, IN VICINITY OF 1ST CAV DIV. ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST CAV DIV STOPPED THE TEAM AS THEY TRIED TO ENTER DIVISION AREA AND TURNED THEM AROUND IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDED BY HQS CENTCOM. CBS TEAM WAS NOT ESCORTED BY MILITARY ESCORT AND WAS NOT PART OF CENTCOM-SPONSORED POOL.
- 3. THE CBS NETWORK AND JIB-DHAHRAN HAVE SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT SAFETY

PAGE 02 RUWDCAA/CG UNCLAS//NOFORN//

- 4. CBS NEWS TEAM IS COMPOSED OF FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS:
 - (A) ROBERT STIHL, CORRESPONDENT, USA, BORN, MAY 29, 1941
PASSPORT: 013197895
 - (B) PETER BLUFF, PRODUCER, USA, BORN, JULY 3, 1944
PASSPORT: 8287012
 - (C) ROBERTO ALVAREZ, CAMERAMAN, USA - BORN, DEC 19, 1953
PASSPORT: 0497369
 - (D) JUAN CALDERA, SOUNDMAN, NICARAGUA - PASSPORT: 0201587
- 5. COMMANDERS WITH ANY KNOWLEDGE ON THE WHEREABOUTS OF THIS TEAM ARE REQUESTED TO CONTACT THE CENTCOM JIB-DHAHRAN, PHONE (COMM) 03-891-8555, EXTENSION 265261 OR CALL TACTICAL TELEPHONE AT

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JTR-DIAHPAN 770. IF THE TEAM ATTEMPTS TO ENTER A UNITS' AREA
THEY SHOULD BE DENIED ACCESS AND DIRECTED TO RETURN TO THE CENTCOM
JTR-DIAHPAN

6. COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS ARE REMINDED THAT THE ONLY AUTHORIZED
MEDIA COVERAGE IS BY CENTCOM MEDIA POOLS. UNESCORTED MEDIA
WILL BE DENIED ACCESS TO UNITS AND TROOPS AND DIRECTED TO RETURN TO
DIAHPAN

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ATTACHMENT 2

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ARCENT MAIN//AFRO-PD//
CDR1STINFDIV FWD GOEPFINGEN GE//PAO//
CDR1STCANDIVFWD//PAO//
CDR1AD WATH//PAO//
CDR30ACBMAIN//PAO//
CDR1STINFDIVMECH BNATH G1 GA//PAO//
CDR12THAVBDE FWD//PAO//
CDR18THAVBDE//PAO//
CDR24THAVBDE MECH FWD//PAO//
CDR3RDABNDIVFWD//PAO//
CDR101STABNDIV AASLT FWD//PAO//
CDRVIICORPS MCHRHINGEN GE//
CDR1VIIABNDIVCORPS ARTY//PAO//
CG FIRST FSSG//
CG SECOND MARDIV//
CG FIFTH MEB//
CG II NEF//
INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//ASD:DSC//

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COMUSMACCENT//
COMUSNAVCENT//
CDR1STCANDIVFWD//PAO//
CDR1STCOSCOPFWD//PAO//
CDR2DACR MAIN FWD//PAO//
CDR18THAVBDE FWD//PAO//
CDR20THMEGRDEPND//PAO//
CDR2NDCCSCOM FWD//PAO//
CDR2NDABNDIV FWD//PAO//
CDRVIICORPSMAIN FWD//
CDRVIICORPS MAIN FWD//PAO//
CDR1VIIABNDIVCORPS//PAO//
CG FIRST MARDIV//
CG FOURTH MEB//
CG I NEF//

AVAILABLE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
TIMELY, ACCURATE AND SUBSTANTIAL NEWS ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF OUR
FORCES. MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE EXPECTED TO BE CANDID AND
FORTHCOMING WHEN DEALING WITH NEWS MEDIA WITHIN THE LIMITS OF
OPERATIONAL SECURITY. FURTHER, ALL SUPPORT TO MEDIA COVERING THE
OPERATION IS PERFORMED ON A NON-INTERFERENCE TO MISSION BASIS. PER
REF A, MEDIA REPS WHO SUFFER INJURIES WILL BE PROVIDED MILITARY
MEDICAL TREATMENT.

4. (U) COMMENCEMENT OF GROUND OPERATIONS WILL MAKE THE FOLLOWING
AREAS OF INFORMATION PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE: INFORMATION
REVEALING DETAILS OR TACTICS ABOUT FUTURE OR POSTPONED
OPERATIONS; ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN SPECIFIC FRIENDLY UNITS AND
SPECIFIC LOCATIONS; INFORMATION ON EFFECTIVENESS OR
INEFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY CAMOUFLAGE, COVER, DECEPTION, TARGETING,
DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE; AND DETAILS OF OPERATIONAL OR SUPPORT
VULNERABILITIES THAT COULD BE USED AGAINST FRIENDLY FORCES.
CAUTION AND PRUDENCE MUST BE EXERCISED WHEN DISCUSSING INFORMATION
FALLING WITHIN THESE AREAS.

5. (U) WHEN NECESSARY, IT IS PERMISSIBLE TO REQUEST THAT REPORTERS
WITHHOLD OR DELAY INFORMATION THAT JEOPARDIZES LEGITIMATE OPSEC
CONCERNS. SHOULD THE REPORTER DECLINE TO COOPERATE, THE MATERIAL
SHOULD BE FLAGGED FOR REVIEW AT SUB-310 DHAHMAN IAW EXISTING
PROCEDURE. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD MEDIA POOL MATERIAL BE
UNNECESSARILY DELAYED.

8. (U) REQUEST WIDEST POSSIBLE DISSEMINATION OF THIS MSG TO
SUBORDINATE COMMANDS AS APPROPRIATE.

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED//
DECLAS UPON COMMENCEMENT OF GROUND CAMPAIGN BY

CONFIDENTIAL

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
MSGID/SYS.RHW/USCINCENT CCCC//
AMPN/SUBJ:PUBLIC AFFAIRS: GUIDANCE FOR CONTINGENCY USE AT
COMMENCEMENT OF GROUND PHASE (U)//
REF//A/DESERT STORM OPORD/USCINCENT/90DEC18//
RHS/1. (U) THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS THE OUTLINE OF A STATEMENT TO BE
PROVIDED TO MEDIA POOL PERSONNEL AT FORWARD OPERATING UNITS IF AND
WHEN WE COMMENCE A LARGE SCALE GROUND OPERATION IN SUPPORT OF
OPERATION DESERT STORM. IT ALSO SERVES AS FRAMEWORK FOR INITIAL POOL
STORIES FOR MEDIA POOL PERSONNEL SHOULD THEY DESIRE TO USE IT.
2. (C) THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT IS DECLASSIFIED AND MAY BE GIVEN TO
DEPLOYED POOL REPORTERS IF AND WHEN GROUND OPERATION BEGINS.
QUOTE: THE COALITION FORCES OF OPERATION DESERT STORM BEGAN LARGE
SCALE GROUND OPERATIONS AGAINST IRAQI FORCES IN KUWAIT AT
APPROXIMATELY (TIME). THE INITIAL ACTIONS CONSIST OF COMBINED
ARTILLERY, INFANTRY, AVIATION AND ARMOR ASSAULTS, WITH CLOSE AIR
SUPPORT, AGAINST ENEMY POSITIONS OVER A BROAD FRONT ALONG THE SAUDI
ARABIAN BORDER WITH KUWAIT AND IRAQ.
PARA. THIS PHASE OF THE DESERT STORM CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN
CAREFULLY PLANNED TO FORCE IRAQ OUT OF KUWAIT WITH THE MINIMUM
NUMBER OF CASUALTIES TO FRIENDLY FORCES. IN GENERAL, COALITION
FORCES WILL BE USING MOBILITY, FIREPOWER AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
TO CONDUCT CLOSELY COORDINATED AIR AND GROUND ATTACKS DIRECTLY
AGAINST IRAQI STATIC DEFENSE POSITIONS. COALITION UNITS WILL BE
OPERATING IN KUWAIT AND THOSE AREAS OF IRAQ THAT DIRECTLY SUPPORT
ENEMY FORCES IN KUWAIT. THEIR PRINCIPAL MISSION IS TO ISOLATE
IRAQI UNITS FROM LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPORT, PREVENT
THEM FROM LAUNCHING A COUNTER-ATTACK, AND DESTROY THEIR ABILITY
TO CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST COALITION FORCES.
PARA. PRESIDENT BUSH AUTHORIZED U.S. GROUND FORCES TO BEGIN
OPERATIONS AFTER MILITARY COMMANDERS IN THEATER DETERMINED THAT
THE AIR CAMPAIGN, LAUNCHED ON JAN. 17, HAD SUCCESSFULLY
DIMINISHED IRAQ'S WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY TO A POINT WHERE
COALITION GROUND FORCES COULD ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSION WITH A
MINIMUM OF FRIENDLY FORCE CASUALTIES. UNQUOTE.
3. (U) WITH THE COMMENCEMENT OF GROUND OPERATIONS, THE HANDLING
OF MEDIA POOL PRODUCTS AND ENFORCEMENT OF GROUND RULES GOVERNING
MEDIA COVERAGE BECOMES EVEN MORE CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE
OPERATION. USCINCENT DESIRES THAT RELEASABLE MATERIAL BE MADE

*****DESERT STORM TRAFFIC*****
*****SPECAT TRAFFIC LOGGED ON FORM 5*****

ACTION (M)
INFO USDP:CCC(1) CJCS(1) J3:NMCC(1) J3(4) MIDS(1)
QUAL CONTROL(1) COMMOFF(1) DUTY OFFICER(1)
SECDEF-W(1) SDO(8) USDA:ADMIN(1) ASD:PA(1)
ASD:PA&E/EPF(1) USDP:DSAA(4) USDP:OUTREAC(1) NMIC(1)
J21-B(1) DB(4)
+USDP-CCC WASHINGTON DC

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FEB 91

ATTACHMENT 3

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<SUBJECT>
SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE -- OPERATION DESERT STORM CASUALTY AND
MORTUARY AFFAIRS

PAGE 03 RUEKJCS2825 UNCLAS

- A. SECDEF MSG, DTG 211824Z JAN 91, SUBJECT AS ABOVE.
1. REF MSG PROVIDED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE RELATED TO OPERATION DESERT STORM CASUALTY AND MORTUARY AFFAIRS.
 2. THIS MSG CLARIFIES PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY CONCERNING MEMORIAL AND FUNERAL CEREMONIES AT THE PORTS OF ENTRY FOR REMAINS OF DECEASED MILITARY PERSONNEL ARRIVING FROM OVERSEAS, AND FOR MEDIA COVERAGE OF SUCH CEREMONIES.
 3. ARRIVAL CEREMONIES AT THE PORT OF ENTRY MAY CREATE HARDSHIPS FOR FAMILY MEMBERS AND FRIENDS WHO MAY FEEL OBLIGATED TO TRAVEL GREAT DISTANCES TO ATTEND THEM. THEREFORE, IT IS THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS' POLICY THAT CEREMONIES/SERVICES BE HELD AT THE SERVICE MEMBER'S DUTY OR HOME STATION AND/OR THE INTERMENT SITE, RATHER THAN AT THE PORT OF ENTRY. MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE ARRIVAL OF THE REMAINS AT THE PORT OF ENTRY OR AT INTERIM STOPS WILL NOT BE PERMITTED, BUT MAY BE PERMITTED AT THE SERVICE MEMBER'S DUTY OR HOME STATION OR AT THE INTERMENT SITE, IF THE FAMILY SO DESIRES.
 4. UNITS MAY HAVE MEMORIAL CEREMONIES/SERVICES TO HONOR THEIR FALLEN COMRADES AT THE UNIT'S HOME BASE OR DUTY LOCATION. MEDIA COVERAGE IS AUTHORIZED DEPENDING UPON THE UNIT'S AND/OR THE FAMILY'S DESIRES. IN ALL CASES, THE FAMILY'S DESIRES WILL TAKE PRECEDENCE.

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5. THIS POLICY IN NO WAY DETRACTS FROM THE SERVICE MEMBER'S VALOR AND SACRIFICE BUT, INSTEAD, PERMITS THE CEREMONY TO OCCUR AT A LOCATION WHERE THE SERVICE MEMBER'S FAMILY AND FRIENDS MAY MORE EASILY ATTEND.
6. OASD(PA) POC FOR PLANS IS LTC M. G. ANDREWS, USA, COMM (703) 693-1075, A/V 223-1075; FOR MEDIA INQUIRIES, LTCOL S. WAGNER, USMC, COMM (703) 697,5131, OR A/V 227,5131.

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ATTACHMENT 4

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CJCS WASHINGTON DC//PA//

TO USCINCENT//CCPA//
CINCPAC WASHINGTON DC
CINCPACFLT WASHINGTON DC//OLA,PA//
USCINCPAC REAR MACDILL AFB FL//CCPA//
USCINCPAC VAIHINGEN GE//CC/CPAD//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//CC/PA// USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//CC/PA//
USCINCPAC SCOTT AFB IL//CC/PA//
USCINCPAC MACDILL AFB FL//CC/CPA//
USCINCPAC QUARRY HEIGHTS PA//CC/CPA//
USCINCPAC PETERSON AFB CO//CC/PA//
CINCPAC FT WORTH TX//CC/CPA//
CINCPAC OFFUTT AFB NE//CC/PA//
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//ARA,PPC/PC/PA//
CINCPAC SCOTT AFB IL//CC/PA// COMTAC LANGLEY AFB VA//PA//
CINCPAC PETERSON AFB CO//CC/PA//
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI CINCINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
EINCSHAREUR LONDON UK HCB WASHINGTON DC//PA//
DA WASHINGTON DC//SAPA,DAAR,PA//
COMUSARCENT HAIN//PA// COMUSNAVCENT//PA//
USCENTAF FWD HOS ELEMENT//PA// COMUSARCENT//PA//
ARCENT REAR FT WORTH TX//PA//
CENTAF REAR LANGLEY AFB VA//PA//
COMUSNAVCENT PEARL HARBOR HI//PA//
CHUSMTH RIYADH SA
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-CP//
CJMAO ALEXANDRIA VA

MEDIA PURPOSES. PERSONNEL IN THIS STATUS WILL BE REPORTED AS MISSING. ONCE DETERMINED, THE FINAL STATUS WILL BE RELEASED FOR THE RECORD.

B. CENTRAL JOINT MORTUARY AFFAIRS OFFICE. THE CENTRAL JOINT MORTUARY AFFAIRS OFFICE (CJMAO) IS THE FOCAL POINT FOR DOC POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR MORTUARY AFFAIRS ISSUES. THE CJMAO, ACTIVATED ON SEPTEMBER 13, 1990, IS LOCATED IN ALEXANDRIA, VA, STAFFED BY REPRESENTATIVES FROM EACH SERVICE, AND CAN BE AUGMENTED AS REQUIRED BY SELECTED AGENCIES AND COMMANDS. THE CJMAO'S MISSION IS TO PROMOTE CONSISTENT POLICIES, PROCEDURES, PLANS, AND RECORDS FOR THE DISPOSITION OF REMAINS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS FOR ALL SERVICES AND, WHEN APPLICABLE, THE COAST GUARD. IT ALSO RECOMMENDS, AS REQUIRED, CORES MORTUARY EXPANSION ACTIVITIES, DISPOSITION OF RECORDS, MASS-FATALITY PLANNING, AND POST-CONFLICT DISPOSITION OF REMAINS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS.

C. U.S. ARMY. THE ARMY IS THE EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE CJMAO.
D. U.S. AIR FORCE. THE AIR FORCE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OPERATING AND MAINTAINING THE PORT-OF-ENTRY MORTUARY FACILITIES AT DOVER AIR FORCE BASE, DELAWARE, AND TRAVIS AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA, AND FOR PROVIDING AIR TRANSPORTATION FOR REMAINS. OPERATION DESERT STORM WILL USE THE FACILITIES AT DOWR WHICH WILL BE STAFFED WITH PERSONNEL FROM ALL SERVICES.

5. THE GENERAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR CASUALTY REPORTING AND THE PROCESSING OF REMAINS FOR OPERATION DESERT STORM IS AS FOLLOWS:
A. CASUALTY REPORTING. THE CASUALTY REPORT WILL BE INITIATED IN THE USCENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR) BY THE SERVICE MEMBER'S UNIT. THE REPORT WILL BE PROCESSED THROUGH PERSONNEL CHANNELS TO THE APPROPRIATE SERVICE'S CENTRAL CASUALTY OFFICE WHICH WILL ACCOMPLISH THE NOTIFICATION OF NEXT OF KIN (NOK).

B. EVACUATION OF REMAINS. BATTLEFIELD REMAINS WILL BE EVACUATED BY AVAILABLE TRANSPORTATION TO COLLECTION POINTS THROUGHOUT THE THEATER OF OPERATION, AND WILL BE FLOWN VIA MILITARY AIRLIFT FROM A DESIGNATED AERIAL PORT OF DEPARTURE TO THE DOVER AIR FORCE BASE MORTUARY. IDENTIFICATION OF THE REMAINS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AT DOVER.

B. HOSTILITIES. THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES FOR THE RELEASE OF CASUALTY RELATED INFORMATION ARE IN EFFECT:

A. THE INITIAL RELEASE OF NAMES OF DECEASED, MISSING, KIA, AND POW CASUALTIES WILL BE MADE ONLY BY THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, OASD(PA), AND ONLY AFTER NOK HAVE BEEN OFFICIALLY NOTIFIED. THIS INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE SERVICES CENTRAL CASUALTY OFFICES TO THE DIRECTORATE FOR INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND REPORTS (DIOR), WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICE, THE PENTAGON, WHICH, IN TURN, WILL PROVIDE RELEASABLE INFORMATION TO OASD(PA).

B. USCINCENT IS AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE THE NUMBER OF U.S. CASUALTIES IN THE CENTCOM THEATER OF OPERATION, INCLUDING CASUALTIES INCURRED BY UNITS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE THEATER. PRIOR TO RELEASE, CENTCOM WILL COORDINATE WITH OASD(PA). IF OPERATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS DICTATE THE TEMPORARY WITHHOLDING OF EXACT NUMBERS OF CASUALTIES, CINCENT MAY RELEASE INFORMATION ABOUT CASUALTIES SUFFERED BY U.S. UNITS IN TERMS OF "LIGHT, MODERATE, OR HEAVY" UNTIL SPECIFIC NUMBERS ARE RELEASABLE. CENTCOM PUBLIC AFFAIRS WILL PROVIDE ALL RELEASABLE NUMERICAL CASUALTY INFORMATION TO OASD(PA).

C. CINCENT AND THE SERVICES MAY RELEASE THE NAMES OF CASUALTIES ALREADY RELEASED BY OASD(PA). SERVICES MAY ALSO RELEASE THE NUMBERS OF CASUALTIES ALREADY RELEASED BY OASD(PA) OR CINCENT.

D. CASUALTIES EVACUATED TO THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND (USEUCOM) THEATER OF OPERATION FOR TREATMENT WILL BECOME THE RESPONSIBILITY OF USEUCOM FOR REPORTING PURPOSES. EUCOM(PA) MAY RELEASE NUMBERS OF OPERATION DESERT STORM PATIENTS ADMITTED TO MEDICAL FACILITIES IN THAT THEATER AND WILL PROVIDE OASD(PA) WITH THAT INFORMATION AND OTHER PATIENT STATUS REPORTS AS REQUIRED. EUCOM MAY ANSWER SPECIFIC QUERIES ON CASUALTY OR REMAINS TRANSFER PROCEDURES IN THE EUCOM AOR. EUCOM MAY ALSO RELEASE INFORMATION ABOUT SPECIFIC PATIENTS AFTER COMPLYING WITH APPLICABLE SERVICE RULES REGARDING NOTIFICATION OF NOK AND OBTAINING PATIENT CONSENT.

E. CASUALTIES EVACUATED TO COMUS HOSPITALS FOR TREATMENT WILL BECOME THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE APPROPRIATE SERVICE FOR REPORTING PURPOSES. THE SERVICE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICES WILL PROVIDE OASD(PA) PATIENT STATUS REPORTS AS REQUIRED. INITIAL RELEASE OF BY

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 06
INFORMATION ABOUT A SPECIFIC PATIENT MAY BE MADE ONLY AFTER NOK HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED AND, IF REQUIRED BY SERVICE REGULATIONS, AFTER

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SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE -- OPERATION DESERT STORM CASUALTY AND MORTUARY AFFAIRS
REF: DOD INSTRUCTION 7730.03, REPORTS ON MILITARY PERSONNEL CASUALTIES IN OFFICIAL COMBAT AREAS AND IN NONCOMBAT AREAS
1. REFERENCE REGULATION GOVERNS CASUALTY REPORTING.
2. ALL ADDRESSEES ARE AUTHORIZED AND ENCOURAGED TO RETRANSMIT THIS MESSAGE TO SUBORDINATE UNITS. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY AND GUIDANCE FOR CASUALTY AND MORTUARY AFFAIRS ISSUES.
3. CASUALTY REPORTING IS AN EXTREMELY SENSITIVE PUBLIC AFFAIRS ISSUE AND MUST BE HANDLED WITH CARE AND SENSITIVITY. THE DEPARTMENT'S OBJECTIVE IS TO PROVIDE ACCURATE AND TIMELY INFORMATION TO THE NEWS MEDIA WHILE ENSURING THE PRIVACY OF INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR FAMILIES.
4. THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:
A. CASUALTIES. CASUALTIES ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO CATEGORIES AND ONE TEMPORARY STATUS:
(1) HOSTILE. HOSTILE CASUALTIES ARE THOSE RESULTING FROM BATTLE OR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THEY ARE FURTHER CATEGORIZED AS KILLED IN ACTION (KIA) OR DIED OF WOUNDS RECEIVED IN ACTION (DOWIA) FOR DECEASED PERSONNEL, MISSING IN ACTION (MIA) OR CAPTURED (PRISONER OF WAR, POW) FOR MISSING PERSONNEL, AND WOUNDED IN ACTION (WIA) FOR INJURED PERSONNEL.
(2) NONHOSTILE. NONHOSTILE CASUALTIES INCLUDE PERSONNEL THAT ARE DECEASED, MISSING, ILL, OR INJURED AS A RESULT OF NONHOSTILE ACTIVITIES. NONHOSTILE CASUALTIES CAN OCCUR WITHIN A DESIGNATED COMBAT AREA.
(3) DUTY STATUS-WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN (DUSTWUN). DUSTWUN IS A TRANSITORY STATUS AND IS THEREFORE NOT RELEASED TO THE MEDIA. FOR

*****DESERT STORM TRAFFIC*****
*****SPECAT TRAFFIC LOGGED ON FORM 9*****

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SECDEF-H(1) USDP:WESA(3) USDP:DSAA(4) USDP-CH(1)
USDP:SO-LIC(1) USDP:PD(1) USDP:ISA(1)

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RUCLRFA/SAF/PAWR 11000 WILSHIRE BLVD SUITE 10114
LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA 90024-7511//
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ATSX-TR//ACCT AF-ACXJRF//
RUCIPGA/HQ AFESC TYNDALL AFB FL//PA//
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SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR OPERATION DESERT STORM CASUALTY SERVICES AND MORTUARY AFFAIRS

REF A: SAF/PAT MSG, 221215Z JAN 91, PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE - OPERATION DESERT STORM CASUALTY AND MORTUARY AFFAIRS (RETRANSMISSION OF OASD/PA MSG, 211824Z JAN 91, SAME SUBJECT).

REF B: SAF/PAT MSG, 210800Z JAN 91, RELEASE OF INFORMATION ON DUSTWUN, MISSING, MISSING IN ACTION AND PRISONER OF WAR CREW MEMBERS
1. REFERENCE A ESTABLISHED GUIDELINES FOR RELEASING INFORMATION CONCERNING DOD CASUALTIES. REFERENCE B REFERS TO CREW MEMBERS, BUT THIS GUIDANCE ALSO APPLIES TO ALL AIR FORCE CASUALTIES INVOLVED IN OPERATION DESERT STORM. THIS MESSAGE CLARIFIES TERMINOLOGY ASSOCIATED WITH SPECIFIC TYPES OF CASUALTIES AND PROVIDES GUIDANCE ON THE RELEASABILITY OF CASUALTY INFORMATION WHEN RESPONDING TO MEDIA QUERIES.

2. THE CASUALTY STATUS OF AIR FORCE MEN AND WOMEN IS DETERMINED BY THEIR COMMANDER. CASUALTIES IN THE DESERT STORM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR) ARE REPORTED BY PERSONNEL TEAMS, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE LOCAL COMMANDER, TO THE AIR FORCE CASUALTY OPERATIONS CENTER AT THE AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER (AFMPC), RANDOLPH AFB, TEXAS.

CASUALTIES ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO BASIC TYPES: HOSTILE (BATTLE CASUALTIES OR CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM TERRORIST ACTIVITIES) AND NON-HOSTILE (NONBATTLE CASUALTIES WHICH MAY OCCUR WITHIN A DESIGNATED AREA BY THEIR COMMANDERS AS DECEASED, DUTY STATUS-WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN (DUSTWUN), MISSING, ILL OR INJURED.

3. DUSTWUN IS USED AS A TEMPORARY CASUALTY STATUS UNTIL A COMMANDER HAS ENOUGH INFORMATION TO ACCURATELY DETERMINE AN INDIVIDUAL'S ACTUAL STATUS. ONCE AN INVESTIGATION, WHICH MAY INCLUDE SEARCH AND RESCUE, HAS BEEN COMPLETED, THE COMMANDER CHANGES THE INDIVIDUAL'S STATUS TO MISSING, DECEASED, ABSENT WITHOUT OFFICIAL LEAVE OR RETURNED TO DUTY.

*** AF SECTION MESSAGE ***

*****MESSAGE PREPARATION HINT*****

THE JOINT STAFF HAS IMPOSED MINIMIZE WORLDWIDE ON ALL USERS OF RECORD MESSAGE TRAFFIC COMMUNICATIONS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

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MILITARY CONTROL. THE DUSTWUN STATUS APPLIES ONLY TO MILITARY MEMBERS, AND IS NORMALLY ASSIGNED FOR 10 DAYS OR LESS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT CASUALTIES IN THE DUSTWUN STATUS ARE PRESENTLY BEING RELEASED BY OASD/PA TO THE MEDIA AS "MISSING" TO SIMPLIFY RELEASE PROCEDURES. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS SHOULD ALSO NOTE THAT THE NEXT OF KIN OF MEMBERS IN A DUSTWUN STATUS ARE NOTIFIED BY THE CASUALTY NOTIFICATION OFFICER THAT THE MEMBER'S WHEREABOUTS ARE PRESENTLY UNKNOWN AND THE MEMBER HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY DECLARED MISSING.

4. CASUALTY STATUSES ARE FURTHER BROKEN DOWN INTO CATEGORIES, AS DEFINED BELOW:

CASUALTY STATUS
(1) DECEASED

CASUALTY CATEGORY

KILLED IN ACTION (KIA)
DIED OF WOUNDS RECEIVED IN ACTION (DWRIA) (2)

DUSTWUN
(3) MISSING

NONE
MISSING IN ACTION (MIA) CAPTURED, COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS PRISONER OF WAR (POW). NOTE: INTERNED, BELEAGUERED, BESIEGED OR DETAINED ARE ADDITIONAL CATEGORIES THAT COULD BE APPLIED TO MISSING PERSONNEL. IF THESE CATEGORIES BECOME APPLICABLE TO DESERT STORM PERSONNEL, FURTHER GUIDANCE WILL BE PROVIDED.

(4) VERY SERIOUSLY
ILL OR INJURED (VSI)

WOUNDED IN ACTION (WIA) FOR INJURED PERSONNEL. NONE FOR ILL PERSONNEL.

(5) SERIOUSLY ILL
OR INJURED (SI)

WOUNDED IN ACTION (WIA) FOR INJURED PERSONNEL. NONE FOR ILL PERSONNEL.

(6) INCAPACITATING
ILLNESS OR INJURY (III)

WOUNDED IN ACTION (WIA) FOR INJURED PERSONNEL. NONE FOR ILL PERSONNEL.

(7) NOT SERIOUSLY
INJURED (NSI)

WOUNDED IN ACTION (WIA) FOR INJURED PERSONNEL. NONE FOR ILL PERSONNEL.

5. NORMALLY THERE ARE NO CASUALTY CATEGORIES ASSOCIATED WITH NONHOSTILE/NONBATTLE CASUALTIES. THE CASUALTY OFFICIALLY IS REPORTED SIMPLY AS DECEASED, DUSTWUN, MISSING, VSI, SI, III OR NSI.

6. OASD/PA WILL MAKE THE INITIAL PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ON DECEASED SERVICE MEMBERS OR THOSE WHO ARE MISSING, DECEASED OR DUSTWUN ONLY AFTER THE NEXT OF KIN HAVE BEEN OFFICIALLY NOTIFIED. IN RESPONSE TO QUERY, SAF/PA WILL MAKE INITIAL PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ON WOUNDED, ILL OR INJURED SERVICE MEMBERS ONLY AFTER THE NOK HAVE BEEN OFFICIALLY NOTIFIED. INFORMATION WILL NOT, REPEAT --NOT--BE RELEASED IF THE ILL OR INJURED SERVICE MEMBER DOES NOT WANT THE NOK NOTIFIED. ONCE INITIAL RELEASE OF INFORMATION HAS BEEN MADE BY EITHER OASD/PA OR SAF/PA, A MESSAGE CONFIRMING DETAILS RELEASED WILL BE SENT TO ALL PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICES. AFTER THE INITIAL RELEASE BY SAF/PA, AFFECT MAJCOM/BASE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS MAY RELEASE INFORMATION USING GUIDANCE IN REFERENCES A AND B, THIS MESSAGE, AND THE PRIVACY ACT.

7. THE AIR FORCE CASUALTY SERVICES PROGRAM ENSURES THAT THE NEXT OF KIN ARE NOTIFIED IN A PROMPT, DIGNIFIED AND COMPASSIONATE MANNER WHENEVER A CASUALTY OCCURS. EVERY CONSIDERATION IS GIVEN TO ENSURE THAT THE RELEASE/PUBLICATION OF CASUALTY INFORMATION DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SERVICE MEMBER, THEIR NEXT OF KIN AND OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS, FRIENDS, THE AIR FORCE AND PUBLIC MORALE.

8. WHEN CASUALTY OR MORTUARY SERVICES ARE REQUIRED, INFORMATION FOR EACH CASUALTY WILL BE RELEASED IAW REFERENCES A AND B; AND IAW AFR 190-1 (PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, 1 MAR 89); AFR 12-30 (AIR FORCE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION PROGRAM), 15 DEC 82 AND IAC 90-1, 061507Z SEP 90, AFR 12-35 (AIR FORCE PRIVACY ACT PROGRAM, 3 JUN 85); AND AFR 30-25, PARA 1-9 (CASUALTY SERVICES, AUG 87). PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL SHOULD CONTACT THEIR HOST PRIVACY ACT, PERSONAL AFFAIRS AND MORTUARY SERVICES OFFICERS TO BECOME FAMILIAR WITH THE PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN THESE REGULATIONS.

9. NEXT OF KIN NOTIFICATION IS ROUTINELY HANDLED THROUGH PERSONNEL CHANNELS. BASE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS SHOULD WORK CLOSELY WITH THEIR CBPO/PERSONNEL CHIEFS ON THE RELEASE OF SPECIFIC INFORMATION WITHIN GUIDELINES OF OASD/PA GUIDANCE AND THE PRIVACY ACT. REQUESTS FOR

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CASUALTY INFORMATION IN CONNECTION WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM SHOULD BE HANDLED AS FOLLOWS:

A. GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING CASUALTY NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES AVAILABLE FROM THE PERSONAL AFFAIRS OFFICE AT THE LOCAL CONSOLIDATED BASE PERSONNEL OFFICE. THIS INFORMATION IS RELEASABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC.

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PUBLIC AND NEWS MEDIA. IF MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WISH TO INTERVIEW A CASUALTY NOTIFICATION OFFICER, THAT SHOULD ALSO BE ARRANGED AT LOCAL INSTALLATIONS.

B. GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING BENEFITS AND ENTITLEMENTS AVAILABLE TO THE NEXT OF KIN OF DUSTWUN, DECEASED OR MISSING PERSONNEL IS ALSO AVAILABLE FROM THE PERSONAL AFFAIRS OFFICE AND IS RELEASABLE TO THE MEDIA BY PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS AT ANY LEVEL.

C. AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER PUBLIC AFFAIRS (DSN 487-6141 5167 OR CMCL (904) 652-6141/5167) -- THE AIR FORCE CASUALTY OPERATIONS CENTER IS LOCATED AT AFMPC. REFER TO AFMPC/PA ONLY THOSE REPORTERS WITH QUESTIONS WHICH CANNOT BE ANSWERED LOCALLY ON THE FOLLOWING TOPICS: CASUALTY SERVICES, INCLUDING QUESTIONS ABOUT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES WHICH APPLY TO AIR FORCE PERSONNEL WHO ARE MISSING IN ACTION, AND CAPTURED (COMMONLY CALLED POW); AND ABOUT NEXT OF KIN NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES NOT COVERED BY THIS GUIDANCE.

D. HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE ENGINEERING AND SERVICES CENTER PUBLIC AFFAIRS (DSN 523-6114, CMCL (512) 723-6114) -- AFESC/PA COORDINATES THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING MORTUARY SERVICES FOR DECEASED PERSONNEL. A HQTRS AIR FORCE MORTUARY SERVICES REPRESENTATIVE AT TYNDALL AFB, FLORIDA, CONTACTS THE NEXT OF KIN AFTER THE INITIAL NOTIFICATION HAS BEEN MADE AND BRIEFS THEM ON MORTUARY ENTITLEMENTS INCLUDE THE RECOVERY, IDENTIFICATION, REPATRIATION, DISPOSITION AND SHIPMENT OF REMAINS AND PERSONAL PROPERTY.

PA

10. THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS MAY BE USED IN RESPONDING TO NEWS MEDIA AND PUBLIC QUERIES:

Q1: HOW IS NOTIFICATION OF NEXT OF KIN ACCOMPLISHED?

A1: IN CASES OF PERSONNEL WHO ARE DECEASED, DUTY STATUS-WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN (DUSTWUN) OR MISSING, NEXT OF KIN NOTIFICATION IS ACCOMPLISHED IN PERSON BY A UNIFORMED AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVE. IN CASES OF PERSONNEL WHO ARE ILL OR INJURED, NOTIFICATION OF NOK MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED EITHER IN PERSON, BY TELEGRAM OR BY TELEPHONE, DEPENDING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE NATURE OF THE ILLNESS OR INJURY. NOTE: IN CASES OF ILLNESS OR INJURY, IF THE MEMBER/PATIENT IS CAPABLE OF COMMUNICATING, THEY WILL BE ASKED IF THE NEXT OF KIN SHOULD BE NOTIFIED AND THE WISHES OF THE MEMBER WILL BE FOLLOWED.

Q2: ARE UPDATES PROVIDED TO THE NEXT OF KIN AFTER INITIAL NOTIFICATION OF AN ILLNESS OR INJURY?

A2: WHEN POSSIBLE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE AIR FORCE CASUALTY CENTER PROVIDES A MEDICAL PROGRESS REPORT TO THE NEXT OF KIN EVERY FOUR DAYS OR WHENEVER A CHANGE IN CASUALTY STATUS OCCURS.

Q3: WHO PROVIDES CASUALTY ASSISTANCE TO THE NOK IN CASES OF DECEASED OR MISSING CASUALTIES?

A3: THERE ARE TWO BASIC TYPES OF ASSISTANCE PROVIDED. FIRST, THE PERSONAL AFFAIRS OFFICE, NORMALLY AT THE AIR FORCE INSTALLATION NEAREST THE NEXT OF KIN, PROVIDES ASSISTANCE CONCERNING ENTITLEMENTS. SECOND, IN CASES OF DECEASED PERSONNEL, AN AIR FORCE ENGINEERING AND SERVICES CENTER (HQ AFESC) MORTUARY AFFAIRS SPECIALIST ASSISTS THE NEXT OF KIN ON ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE SHIPMENT OF REMAINS, DISPOSITION OF PERSONAL EFFECTS AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS.

Q4: WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISPOSITION AND SHIPMENT OF REMAINS OF DECEASED PERSONNEL?

A4: THE AIR FORCE ENGINEERING SERVICES CENTER (AFESC) HANDLES MORTUARY AFFAIRS AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISPOSITION AND SHIPMENT OF REMAINS OF DECEASED PERSONNEL. QUESTIONS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE AFESC PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE, DSN 523-6114 OR COMMERCIAL (904) 283-6114.

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Q5: HOW LONG AFTER SOMEONE BECOMES A CASUALTY DOES IT TAKE FOR NOK NOTIFICATION?

A5: NEXT OF KIN WILL BE NOTIFIED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE STATUS OF THE CASUALTY HAS BEEN DETERMINED. THE NOTIFICATION WILL BE DIRECTED BY THE AIR FORCE CASUALTY OPERATIONS CENTER AND IS NORMALLY ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN A MATTER OF HOURS.

Q6: WHEN CAN THE NAMES OF CASUALTIES BE RELEASED TO THE MEDIA/PUBLIC?

A6: NAMES OF CASUALTIES ARE NOT RELEASED PUBLICLY UNTIL THE NEXT OF KIN HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED. FOLLOW GUIDELINES IN THIS MESSAGE AND REFERENCES A AND B.

Q7: IN ADDITION TO THE NAMES OF CASUALTIES, WHAT OTHER PERSONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING CASUALTIES MAY BE RELEASED TO THE MEDIA?

A7: THE TYPE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION THAT IS NORMALLY RELEASED IS COVERED UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT AND VARIES DEPENDING ON THE TYPE OF CASUALTY AND EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES. THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE APPLIES:

A. WOUNDED IN ACTION, ILL OR INJURED CASUALTIES -- IF THE WOUNDED, ILL OR INJURED SERVICE MEMBER DOES NOT WANT THE NEXT OF KIN NOTIFIED DO NOT, REPEAT DO NOT RELEASE PERSONAL INFORMATION THAT CAN BE USED TO IDENTIFY THE SERVICE MEMBER. AFTER THE PATIENT'S CONSENT, THE INFORMATION THAT MAY NORMALLY BE RELEASED INCLUDES MILITARY RANK, NAME, SERVICE, DATE AND COUNTRY OF OCCURRENCE, CONUS UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT, SERVICE OR JOB SPECIALTY, DATE OF RANK, COMMISSION SOURCE DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY (EAD), PAY DATE, MILITARY BASE PAY, ALLOWANCES (EXCEPT BASIC BAQ AND VHA ALLOWANCES THAT WOULD INDICATE MARITAL/DEPENDENT STATUS), PROMOTION NUMBER, SEX, MILITARY AWARDS/DECORATIONS, AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS NOT, REPEAT NOT RELEASABLE WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE INDIVIDUAL: SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, GROSS PAY, BAQ AND VHA ALLOWANCES THAT INDICATE MARITAL/DEPENDENT STATUS, AGE/DATE OF BIRTH (EXCEPT WHEN RELEASED BY OASD) CIVILIAN AWARDS, CIVILIAN EDUCATION (DEGREE/MAJOR AREA OF STUDY/SCHOOL/GRADUATION YEAR), DEPENDENT INFORMATION, HOME OF RECORD, MARITAL STATUS, OFFICIAL PHOTO (EXCEPT KEY PERSONNEL), HOME ADDRESS, HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER, NATIONAL ORIGIN AND RACE.

B. DUSTWUN OR MISSING CASUALTIES (INCLUDING PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION) -- ONLY THE NAME, RANK, AGE AND SERVICE OF MISSING AND DUSTWUN PERSONNEL CAN BE RELEASED. DO NOT, REPEAT, DO NOT RELEASE OR CONFIRM UNIT, HOME BASE, HOME OF RECORD OR ANY OTHER SPECIFIC INFORMATION. IN THE EVENT THESE INDIVIDUALS BECOME PRISONERS OF WAR ANY PERSONAL INFORMATION HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR ASSISTING CAPTORS IN GAINING INFORMATION OR PROMPTING PUBLIC STATEMENTS. FOR THIS REASON

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FAMILY MEMBERS ARE ADVISED OF THESE POSSIBILITIES WHEN CONSIDERING NEWS MEDIA INTERVIEW REQUESTS.

C. DECEASED CASUALTIES (INCLUDING KIA AND DWRIA) -- ONCE THE NEXT OF KIN OF A DECEASED CASUALTY HAVE BEEN OFFICIALLY NOTIFIED BY THE AIR FORCE, THE SAME INFORMATION RELEASABLE FOR ILL/INJURED PERSONNEL IS ALSO RELEASABLE FOR DECEASED PERSONNEL. IN SOME INSTANCES, PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION ABOUT A DECEASED PERSON MAY BE WITHHELD WHERE NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE PRIVACY INTERESTS OF SURVIVING FAMILY MEMBERS AND MAY INCLUDE SUCH INFORMATION AS THE DECEASED MEMBER'S HOME ADDRESS, HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER, MARITAL STATUS AND DEPENDENT INFORMATION (INCLUDING ALLOWANCES SUCH AS BAQ AND VHA THAT WOULD INDICATE SUCH), AND SPECIFIC/GRAPHIC DETAILS CONCERNING THE CAUSE OR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH. IN ADDITION, THE FOLLOWING IS RELEASABLE FOR DECEASED PERSONNEL: INFORMATION CONCERNING HOME OF RECORD (CITY AND STATE), AGE, DATE OF BIRTH, CIVILIAN EDUCATION (DEGREE/MAJOR AREA OF STUDY/GRADUATION YEAR) AND AWARDS, NATIONAL ORIGIN, OFFICIAL PHOTO (WITHOUT ID FRAME) AND RACE. THE NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF THE NEXT OF KIN ARE NOT RELEASABLE BY THE AIR FORCE WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT. CONSULT YOUR STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE IF THERE A

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ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING THE RELEASABILITY OF REQUESTED INFORMATION.
Q8: WHAT CASUALTY AND MORTUARY ASSISTANCE WILL AIR NATIONAL GUARD A
AIR FORCE RESERVE PERSONNEL AND THEIR NEXT OF KIN RECEIVE AS A RESULT
OF THE CALL-UP IN RESPONSE TO OPERATION DESERT STORM?
A8: THEY RECEIVE THE SAME ASSISTANCE AS ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL.
11. THE SAF/PA ACTION OFFICER FOR CASUALTY SERVICES AND MORTUARY
AFFAIRS IS CAPT SYLVIA FREEMAN, SAF/PATR, DSN 225-0640, COMMERCIAL
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